Discourses of silence : judicial responses to industrial action as an archaeolgy of juridification by Mischke, Carl
DISCOURSES OF SILENCE: JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO 
INDUSTRIAL ACTION AS AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF 
JURIDIFICATION 
by 
CARL MISCHKE 
submitted in accordance with the requirements 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR LEGUM 
at the 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
PROMOTER: PROFESSOR PAK LE ROUX 
CO-PROMOTER: PROFESSOR D VAN DER MERWE (RAU) 
AUGUST 1997 
************* 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my promoter, Professor PAK le Roux, and my co-promoter, Professor D 
van der Merwe, for their patience, support and invaluable guidance throughout this long and 
challenging project. 
Many thanks also to my parents for their unwavering support and assistance during the research 
and during the writing of this work. 
The research which forms the basis of this study would not have been possible without the able 
assistance of various librarians and the staff of the following research institutions: the Law 
Library of the University of South Africa (Nico Ferreira and Karen Breckon), the library staff at 
the Max Planck Institut fur ausldndisches offentliches Recht und Vdlkerrecht in Heidelberg, 
Germany, and the library staff at the Institut fur Arbeitsrecht und Arbeisbeziehungen in der 
Europaische Gemeinschaft in Trier, Germany. 
SUMMARY 
A study of silences: as a metaphysics of the law, juridification silences the text of the law in order 
to enable an allegorical reading of the law. This silencing of the legal text can only be avoided 
through a non-metaphysical archaeological reading. Similarly, the programme of comparative 
labour law is silent at its most pivotal points, leaving some concerns of the programme 
indeterminate and indeterminable. 
As context, the dominant discourses of the labour law systems of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Tarifautonomie), Great Britain (collective laizzesfaire) and South Africa (fairness) 
are identified and the agents of the jurisprudence (the courts) are briefly outlined. The silence 
operating within the phenomenology of the labour judiciary and the concept of a 'court' is also 
examined. 
The study then proceeds to read, in an archaeological manner, the industrial action jurisprudence 
in Germany, Great Britain and South Africa, such readings again yielding silences within the 
discourse of the law. 
The silences occurring throughout (and the resulting normative breaches in the rationality of the 
legal discourse) are the prerequisites for juridification, a process in terms of which the meta-
juridical standard is imported into the legal normative system and thereby rendered part of the 
archival discourse of the law. 
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Comparative labour law: methodology 
I have attempted more and more systematically to find a 
non-site, or a non-philosophical site, from which to question 
philosophy. But the search for a non-philosophical site does 
not bespeak an anti-philosophical attitude. My central 
question is: from what site or non-site can philosophy as 
such appear to itself as other than itself, so that it can 
interrogate and reflect upon itself in an original manner? 
- Jacques Derrida in interview in Richard Kearney 
Dialogues with contemporary continental thinkers: The 
phenomenological heritage (1984) 105 at 108. 
Give me a firm place to stand, and I shall move the earth. 
- Archimedes (ca. 289 BC) 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
THE DEATH OF METAPHYSICS AND 
JURIDIFICATION-AS-DISCOURSE 
'The newly vaunted demise of metaphysics has been cast as a theoretical jurisprudence 
which, nevertheless, leaves law as unknowable as it finds it.' 
-- Gillian Rose Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law (1984) 1. 
'Long Words. Excellent Words. I can hear them now.' 
-- Peter Gabriel and Laurie Anderson 'Excellent Birds' from Mister Heartbreak, 
Warner Brothers Records, 1984 
'I have not tried to write the history of that language but, rather, the archaeology of 
that silence.' 
-- Michel Foucault Madness and Civilization (1961) x-xi. 
[FIRST PARABLE: LOST IN THE FUNHOUSE (Continued) 
Ambrose spent some considerable length of time amonst the machines and technologies 
that make the funhouse such fun (at least, for some). He wandered past the machines 
that created illusions, that projected images on the walls, strange and contentedly hum-
ming pieces of technology that he failed to understand, for he could, from his present 
vantage point, not see what the machines were doing, he was precluded from sharing in 
the fun of the others (for whom the funhouse is fun).]1 
1 Discourse of Order Series 3 Part 1: This now-obscure, but vitally important, first parable---a reflection 
of some of the concerns of this specific part of the instant text---is derived from J Barth 'Lost in the Fun-
house' in the collection of short stories entitled Lost in the Funhouse: Fiction for Print, Tape, Live Voice 
(1969). Essentially, the conceit of the story is as follows: a young pubescent boy (Ambrose) accompanies 
his parents, his uncle Karl, his brother and a girl to an amusement park, Atlantic City, on a family excur-
sion during World War II. Amonst the entertainments presented at the amusement park is a fun-house, 
where persons are frightened or have their sensory perceptions altered in other ways through various 
mechanisms of illusion. The elder brother and the girl enter the 'fun-house' and enjoy the spectacle, 
while Ambrose becomes trapped 'behind the scenes', in and amongst that which is creating the illusions. 
Textually, the story is continually interrupted by an authorial voice explaining the rhetorical devices 
(such as plot, character, tension, the use of italics) as the story progresses (and digresses) and as these 
rhetorical devices are applied in the story. The relevance of this parable lies in the fact that a 'viewer' (in 
the case of the story, the protagonist, Ambrose) is trapped behind the illusion, occupying the very place 
from which the illusion stems. So too, the reader of the story is continually and forcibly reminded of the 
fact that he/she is perceiving (viewing) an illusion (fiction) and offered, at the same time, a glimpse of 
the 'machinery' (the rhetorical devices of the fiction) which is being employed to present the illusion. In 
much the same way, the following section(s) of the instant text reveals machines, technologies of produc-
1 
The death of metaphysics 
[INTRODUCING ... THE INTRODUCTION (Discourse of Order Series 2 Part 
1) 
This, then, is the beginning of the actual text: everything that appears before this point 
is not of the text; prompted by the institutional frame within which this text is offered, 
it is, to a greater or lesser degree, pretext. 
The introduction as an initiation into the (this) discourse . . . the function of the intro-
duction is one of initiating the reader into the discourse, into what is going to be said. 
The introduction is part of the text, yet not part of it: much like a preface, it comes 
before the text (and this is strange, because it is often written after the text has been 
completed). It is then simultaneously a pre-text and post-text, but also, strangely, of the 
text. 
In short: the introduction is then a prophecy. 
For the introduction may indeed summarise the text, pre-imposing an interpretation of 
the text upon the text, ironically, before it has been read: 'this is what will be meant in 
chapter 7', 'this is what will be said in chapter 12'. Summary as introduction means 
closure of the text before the text has been opened, before the page has been turned; 
making any reading superfluous before reading has even begun. The introduction is, 
then, conclusion. 2 
But the introduction may, instead of pre-empting the text, establish that within which 
the text is, the frame within which the text performs itself, establish ever-fluid and liq-
(footnote continued from previous page) 
tion, and, above all, a sense of having lost the way into that which is occurring behind the scenes. The 
functioning of the parables and the Discourse of Order Series 3 are explained in 1.3.3. below. 
2 
'The preface [introduction] would announce in a future tense ("this is what you are going to read") the 
conceptual content or significance ... of what will already have been written. And thus sufficiently read 
to be gathered up in its semantic tenor and proposed in advance. From the viewpoint of the fore-word 
[introduction], which recreates an intention-to-say after the fact, the text exists as something written --- a 
past --- which, under the false appearance of a present, a hidden omnipotent author (in full mastery of his 
product) is presenting to the reader as his future. Here is what I wrote, then read, and what I am writing 
that you are going to read. After which you will again be able to take possession of this preface 
[introduction] which in sum you have not yet begun to read, even though, once having read it, you will 
have anticipated everything that follows and thus you might just as well dispense with reading the rest. 
The pre of the preface [introduction] makes the future present, represents it, draws it closer, breathes it 
in, and in going ahead of it puts it ahead. The pre reduces the future to the form of manifest presence. 
This is an essential and ludicrous operation: not only because writing as such does not consist in any of 
these tenses (present, past or future insofar as they are all modified presents); not only because such an 
operation would confine itself to the discursive effects of an intention-to-mean, but because, in pointing 
out a single thematic nucleus or a single guiding thesis, it would cancel out the textual displacement that 
is at work "here".' J Derrida Dissemination (transl Barbara Johnson (1981) at 7. 
2 
The death of metaphysics 
uid foundations: expressing or outlining methods, structures, issues, concerns, topics, 
without 'disclosing' that which is to happen in the course of the text (this being the aim 
of the present introduction).3 In this sense, the introduction functions as an 'opening' of 
the text - that through which the text is accessed and read (in Afrikaans, this sense is 
reflected in the notion of an inleiding, in German: Einleitung). The discursive motion is 
different: in the case of introduction-as-summary, that which is said flows backward 
in(to) the introduction, and the introduction encapsulates, in miniature form, that which 
will be said. But if the introduction functions as opening of/to the text, that which is 
said in the introduction flows forward into the text, into and through that which is 
going to be said. Then the introduction is itself a discourse of order (a concept dis-
cussed in more detail below): within the space of the (this) introduction, all or some of 
the 'concerns' of the text are established. These concerns are not limits or strict bound-
aries (implying closure or limitation of meaning), for the text will undermine, over-
reach, ignore, and return to those concerns (even though the discourse of the introduc-
tion orders that which follows upon it, this process of ordering is not absolute - it folds 
in upon itself). The introduction does not close the text, it is, in this sense, an opening 
of the text and an opening to the text.] 
Insensitive, for the present moment, to all the considerations of phenomenology. 
What is the instant text? Or, better, what is the instant text about? A potential summary 
could read as follows: A study in/of/about juridification. The rest of this section, pur-
portedly an 'introduction', is a set of improvised variations on this single phrase: 
A study in/of/about juridification 
This phrase contains two nouns: 'study' and 'juridification'. The questions that crowd a 
superficial analysis of the phrase are: 'what is juridification?' and 'what is study?'. In 
dealing with these two fundamental questions, one would, in the first place, have to 
respond by defining juridification, re-situating it in its (own? Is the possessive form 
appropriate here?) historical and theoretical context and indicating the potential prob-
lems that are borne in the wake of the concepts and the discouse employed when talk-
ing about 'juridification'. 
3 Methodologically, this approach brings with it a severe disorientation, the effect of which is, at best, 
an apparent arbitrary montage of seemingly unconnected texts, events, discourses, themes. At worst, this 
approach leads a potential reader into dismissing it as an improvisation upon a number of themes. Opera-
tive in these responses is a quest for the stable beginning, a single and fixed point of departure, from 
which the text proceeds to outline its argument, much like a well-constructed German symphony of the 
nineteenth century, progressing from a single theme through variations and counter statements of various 
related themes (or even counter-themes, inversions, reversals ... ) 
3 
The death of metaphysics 
Also of importance is the term 'study'; used at this stage and in this case as a noun, but 
a noun which refuses to divest itself of its activity (the noun refuses to be rid of the 
verb: to study). The name (the noun) is incessantly disrupted by the activity it attempts 
to name. In dealing with this second and dynamic aspect of the phrase, issues of meth-
odology arise: how should juridification be studied, what is the apposite way of dealing 
with juridification, what are the processes involved in a 'study'? 
The untidy mix of prepositions in the middle signify a certain discomfort in interpreta-
tive position: It is amongst the ruins of the metaphors in prepositions that this study, 
displaying a characteristic self-reflexivity, finds itself. To say that it is a study 'in' 
juridification could create the impression that methods, terms, and discourses of the 
existing juridification discourse will be applied (and simply reaffirmed in that simple 
application). Measured against this standard, this present text will fall short of being a 
'study' in juridification, as totally different methods and techniques are used, implying 
totally different interpretational paradigms. Nor can this be a study 'of' juridification. 
This usage may indicate a study of 'juridification' as a full and complete concept as the 
term is understood and used. Again, this present study represents a perilous breach 
(brisure) with the juridification discourse. 
The best that can be said, at this uneasy stage, is that this study is 'about' juridification 
(iiber Verrechtlichung). In this sense, then, the ungainly prepositional links between the 
two nouns in the phrase are a warning: that the positions from which the interpretative 
processes (the 'study') are to take place are not stable, will shift, and will, on more 
than one occasion, undermine themselves. 
I.I THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF JURIDIFICATION 
I.I.I The long, long words of juridification 
For the present moment, as a (temporary) textual (starting) point (an 'establishment of 
the concerns'), a definition of juridification as it appears in Jiirgen Habermas' s Theorie 
des kommunikativen Handelns contains some of the essential strands of the juridifica-
tion discourse: 
'The expression "juridification" [Verrechtlichung] refers quite generally to the tendency 
toward an increase in formal (or positive, written) law that can be observed in modern 
society. We can distinguish here between the expansion of law, that is the legal regula-
tion of new, hitherto informally regulated social matters, from the increasing density of 
law, that is, the specialized breakdown of global statements of the legally relevant facts 
[Rechtstatbestande] into more detailed statements. '4 
4 J Habermas The Theory of Communicative Action Vol 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason (1987) 357. German terms and poor syntax in the original. An American author 
expresses juridification in the following terms: 'As a result of two centuries of law-making every aspect 
of an American's life has either been prescribed for or proscribed by laws that even as they are promul-
4 
The death of metaphysics 
Habermas identifies four 'epochal juridification processes' : 
'The first wave led to the bourgeois state which, in western Europe, developed during 
the period of Absolutism in the form of the European state system. The second wave 
led to the constitutional state [Rechtsstaat], which found an exemplary form in the 
monarchy of nineteenth-century Germany. The third wave led to the democratic con-
stitutional state [demokratischer Rechtsstaat], which spread in Europe and in North 
America in the wake of the French Revolution. The last stage (to date) led finally to the 
democratic welfare state [soziale und demokratische Rechtsstaat], which was achieved 
through the struggles of the European workers' movement in the course of the twentieth 
century .... '5 
Rudiger Voigt lists some of the terms associated with the juridification discourse, 
including 'Gesetzesflut' (flood of legislation)6 and 'Paragraphendickicht' (thicket of 
[legislative] paragraphs). 7 
The metaphors of the discourse of juridification are simultaneously vegetative (forests, 
thickets) and, if not actually nautical, distinctly aquatic: juridification takes place in 
waves. The picture painted by these metaphors is daunting: wave after inexorable wave 
of trees, vines, undergrowth; legal thickets on the march, entwining everything in their 
path, ruthlessly growing. This does not mean that they are ineffective: one gets the pic-
ture. 
The metaphor of the wave is a metaphor of sequentiality: as one ocean wave follows 
upon the next, so one wave of juridification marches in(to) the wake of its predecessor. 
This sequentiality of juridification immediately implies a certain diachronism in 
approach: juridification cannot be observed as a phenomenon of finite duration: it can, 
according to the metaphors, only be read diachronically; over an extended period. 8 
Juridification is not instant, nor, if one bears in mind the metaphor of the marching 
forest, particularly quick off the mark. Quantitative and qualitative growth/increase in 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
gated split amoeba-like to create more laws. The end to this Malthusian nightmare of law metastasized is 
nowhere in sight.' G Vidal 'How to Find God and Make Money' in The Second American Revolution 
and Other Essays (1976-1982) at 195. 
5 Habermas toe cit. Emphasis in original. 
6 Teubner uses the term 'flood of norms'. See G Teubner 'Juridification -- Concepts, Aspects, Limits, 
Solutions' in G Teubner (ed) Juridification of Social Spheres: A Comparative Analysis in the Areas of 
Labour, Corporate, Antitrust and Social Welfare Law (1987) 6. 
7 R Voigt 'Vorwort des Herausgebers' (Editor's Preface) in R Voigt (ed) Gegentendenzen zur Ver-
rechtlichung ( 1983) IX Jahrbuch fur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie at 7. 
8 Teubner speaks of 'the wider historical context of juridification'. Teubner op cit note 6 at 11. 
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law is ascertainable only through a historical (diachronic) analysis of juridification fol-
lowing upon juridification. 
The term 'juridification' has been expropriated (appropriated?) by a number of dis-
ciplines. In legal discourse, juridification is thought of in terms of legal growth, 
increase (in volume), dynamic processes of 'becoming more' .9 In quantity the law 
expands exponentially, as more and more legislation is passed by law-makers and 
increasing numbers of decisions are handed down by various courts. This view has led 
to 'juridification' degenerating into a counting of pages of legislation or of the number 
of new cases brought before certain courts.10 Viewing the notion of juridification from 
within this narrow frame of reference ignores changes to the quality of the law, and the 
historical specificities determining juridification. 11 
Legal sociology focuses upon 'juridification as a process in which human conflicts are 
(through formalisation) tom out of their living context and distorted by being subjected 
to legal processes. Juridification, as it were, is the expropriation of conflict' .12 
Juridification is also a dialecticity, there is an ambivalence in/of juridification: 'the 
ambivalence of a guarantee of freedom that is at the same time a deprivation of free-
dom' .1 3 The ambivalence refers to a dialectical co-existence of a guarantee -- depriva-
tion of freedom. 
Juridification is furthermore also seen as entailing the depoliticization of disputes, this 
in tum being linked to its dialecticity: it can be said, for example, that labour law not 
only 'protects and guarantees certain interests of employees and ensures that labour 
unions have scope for action' but also 'the repressive nature of juridification tends to 
depoliticize social conflict by drastically limiting the labor unions' possibilities of 
militant action' .14 
Juridification has a context, and this context provides illuminating glimpses of what 
juridification 'represents' . In nineteenth century German legal theory a distinction was 
9 
'In legal discussion juridification is described primarily as a growth phenomenon'; Teubner op cit note 
6 at 6. 
10 See the discussion of the work of Hubert Rottleuthner, replete with diagram, in T Raiser 
Rechtssoziologie (1987) at 169-73. 
11 See Teubner op cit note 6 at 7. In discussing legislative amendments in Great Britain and the inter-
pretation to be placed on the legislation, McCarthy notes: 'Obviously, if intervention of this kind is to 
count as evidence of juridification, the concept becomes synonymous with a mere addition to law, 
irrespective of content or intention.' W McCarthy 'The Rise and Fall of Collective Laissez Faire' Chap-
ter 1 in W McCarthy (ed) Legal Intervention in Industrial Relations: Gains and Losses (1992) 1 at 29. 
Emphasis added. 
12 Teubner op cit note 6 at 7-8. 
13 Teubner op cit note 6 at 4. 
14 Teubner op cit note 6 at 9. 
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drawn between conceptual jurisprudence and a jurisprudence of interests.1s Conceptual 
jurisprudence was related to the view that the law had its origin in universal human 
'laws' (this view was in effect an attempt to make law more 'scientific'): 
'In terms of the history of the social sciences, the latter quarter of the nineteenth 
century was characterised in no uncertain manner by neo-Kantianism. The revival in 
question was aimed at rehabilitating the Kantian concept of science as a system, unified 
essentially by the idea of a system, rather than by any more realistic or historical clas-
sification of its subject matter. The most notable and far-reaching effects of this revival 
were to be the constitution of the sciences of linguistics and of law. In both cases, the 
major portion of the nineteenth century had been dominated by attacks upon the 
received orthodoxies of universal grammar and of exegetical legal studies respectively, 
and their displacement by the uncertainties of creationist and historical methodologies. 
It was only towards the beginning of the twentieth century that the fully scientific and 
objective status of the disciplines in question could again be proclaimed and the com-
munity of the faithful be reassured. The manner of such reassurance was strikingly 
similar within the disciplines of language and law. It may be characterised broadly as 
that of the project of constituting autonomous sciences or axiomatic normative systems, 
whose principal value adherence was to transpire to be the positivistic postulate of order 
and of the logic of its internal development within a social life rationalistically con-
ceived as being governed and regulated by imperative linguistic and legal codes. ' 16 
The rules falling within the purview of conceptual jurisprudence would then transform 
and generate new law. 
A jurisprudence of interests was structured upon a view of law as being in the service 
of society and life, and that the law should promote justice between citizens: the law, in 
other words, had to serve certain interests (which interests were never clearly estab-
lished).17 
Against this background, Max Weber saw law as a rational enterprise in which the 
creation and application of the law depended upon articulated general (universal) princi-
ples.18 Weber drew a distinction between formal rationality and material rationality_ 19 
15 See D van der Merwe 'Es liifit sich nicht lesen -- Reflections on the status and continued relevance of 
the South African common law' (1994) 4 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 660 at 675-6. 
16 P Goodrich Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis (1987) 11. See also 
Van der Merwe op cit note 15 at 674f. 
17 See A Brand 'Ethical Rationalization and "Juridification" - Habermas's Critical Legal Theory' (1987) 
4 Australian Journal of Law and Society 103 at 107f. 
18 Rationality must, in this context, be contrasted with irrationality: 'Law is substantively irrational 
where every case is decided on its merits by the judge's intuition. Law is formally irrational where deci-
sions turn on some test beyond human control, such as an oracle or an ordeal. Law is substantively 
rational where decisions are made by reference to general principles which are not confined to rules 
deductible from legal texts. Law is formally rational where every case is decided by logical deduction 
from existing legal rules and concepts constituting a gapless system.' J W Harris Legal Philosophies 
(1980) 246. 
19 See M Weber Economy and Society (1978) at 653ff .. 
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Formally rational law functions by means of reference to general (universal) principles 
and rules. This formal rationality is, in modem law, both substantive and procedural: 
the substantive facts of the case are subsumed under the general rule or principle, and 
the substantive outcome is determined by means of simple legal (logical) syllogistic 
deduction. Procedurally, cases are decided in terms of rules and regulations of proce-
dure which apply to all cases (therefore the rules of procedure are also 'universal'). 
In modern societies (postwar and industrialized), however, the law is materially 
rationalized, this material rationalization taking, for instance, the form of particu-
larization of the law (including increasing state regulation of the contents of contracts). 
In this material rationalization process, the formally rational legal norms in terms of 
which cases are decided are supplanted (eclipsed) by other norms, such as rules of 
ethics (good/bad), rules of economics (does something make business sense?) or 
sociological rules (for instance: the good of society).20 This aspect of material 
rationalization will prove to be the most fertile ground for an analysis of juridification, 
as the shifts from the strict application of a legal norm to the consideration of the meta-
juridical (that which is outside the law) appears to be at the very core of the processes 
of juridification. 
The materialization of the law is especially prevalent in the modern welfare state, as the 
state increasingly has to intervene in society --- the main reasons for this intervention 
being 'the appearance of phenomena of economic power and/or a societal need for 
social protection' .21 
This shift from formal rationality to material rationality is characterised by three 
processes: 
(a) The law undergoes a functional change: the law 'is no longer tailored only to 
the normative requirements of conflict resolution but to the political intervention 
requirements of the modem welfare state. It can be instrumentalized for the pur-
poses of the political system which now takes on responsibility for social 
processes - and this means the definition of goals, the choice of normative 
20 In the case of material rationality, the goals of the law are 'external to the law', while in the case of 
formal rationality, the goals which the law had to attain were internal to the law: 'The formally rational 
character of law had to do with the goal of its internal logic which was served by deductive stringency on 
a high level of abstraction.' Brand op cit note 17 at 109-110. Emphasis in the original. 
21 Teubner op cit note 6 at 14. 
8 
The death of metaphysics 
means, the ordering of concrete behavioral programs and the implementation of 
norms' .22 
(b) The law undergoes a legitimation change. Formally rational law resolved dis-
putes --- in the resolution of disputes (and nothing more) lay the legitimation of 
the classical formal law. Beyond the resolution of disputes lay autonomy --- if 
citizens were not in dispute or not in contravention of a law, they were 
autonomous. Formal law 'viewed itself to be confined to the delimitation of 
abstract spheres for private-autonomous action'. Materially rational law 
'legitimizes itself by the results it achieves by regulation'. 23 
( c) The transformations of function and legitimation 'also affects the norm structure 
and inner order of the law itself. The effects range from a weakening of the idea 
of generality to changes in methods of interpretation' _24 This includes the 
incorporation of meta-juridical (extra-legal) norms into the legal process - the 
inequality between employer and employee (itself a meta-juridical consideration) 
is, for example, incorporated into the law as a norm, finding expression in vari-
ous (dis)guises. 
These, then, can be seen as moments of juridification: law no longer (merely) resolves 
disputes. In the modem welfare state, the law is an instrument for political intervention 
in society by a state that has taken over more and more responsibility for the condition 
of the society. This new function of the law is legitimated by the results that are 
obtained from the law (social benefits) --- no longer is the only worthwhile result the 
preservation of a zone in which an individual is free to do as she pleased. The material 
rationalization of the law means a shift away from the legal rule towards policies, 
towards the social ideal or the social aim that has to be achieved by the law. The law is 
increasingly 'result oriented' . 2s 
22 Teubner Zoe cit note 21. 'Classical formal law saw itself as having to provide only a formal frame-
work within which social autonomy could develop, and no particular control effects were thereby 
intended' (at 18). 
23 Teubner op cit note 6 at 15. 
24 Teubner Zoe cit note 23. 
25 
'As a general rule it can be said that the predominant rule orientation is being increasingly overlaid by 
an instrumental orientation .... Instead of strictly applying precisely defined legal norms (conditional 
programs), legal experts now tend to administer ill-defined standards and vague general clauses (purpose 
programs). This is causing a dramatic shift in the mode of legal thinking, a shift which can be adequately 
defined by the term "result orientation". Teubner op cit note 6 at 16. 
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Habermas indicated that those meta-juridical norms that serve as the foundation of 
materially rationalized law are also rationalized aspects of the modern lifeworld; the 
material rationalization of the law ---
' . . . is not pictured as rationalization in the realm of ethics but as a disturbance in the 
cognitive-instrumental rationality of law. In general, progress in the development of 
law is judged from the point of view of formal rationality. Weber did not sufficiently 
recognize, says Habermas, that the rationalization of law could only take place on the 
basis of a "post traditional" development of moral consciousness, which came about 
through the rationalization of the normative aspect of world views. '26 
Another point of criticism levelled against Weber by Habermas is that Weber's theories 
of rationalization failed to take full account of the phenomenon of 'colonization of the 
lifeworld'. For Habermas, communicative action is the basic type of social inter-action. 
This communicative action takes place within the context of the lifeworld: shared (but 
not expressed) social ideals, ideas, concepts, norms. These elements of the lifeworld 
structure the actions of human beings in society. Rationalization, for Habermas the 
basis of social evolution, increasingly rendered the lifeworld not only rational, but 
knowable, expressable, articulable and therefore colonised. 
For Habermas, juridification is merely a type of empirical research which would docu-
ment the colonization of the lifeworld.27 Juridification is, then, a type of legal-historical 
analysis, seeking to establish to what extent the sources of the law (be it in the form of 
legislation or court decisions) increase and change, and, furthermore, the effect that 
this increase and change in law has upon the individual members of society. 28 In its 
most superficial (legal) form, juridification represents number-crunching, counting 
pages of legislation, numbering and counting cases. 29 In less superficial forms, 
juridification is a diachronic account of the quantitative increase in the law and the 
26 Brand op cit note 17 at 111. 
27 See Habermas op cit note 4 at 357. 
28 See, for example, R Rogowski 'Rechtsgliiubigkeit oder die Antizipation vermuteter Rechtsfolgen', D 
Grunow and F Hegner 'Sozialpsychologische Konsequenzen der Verrechtlichung: Alltagskontakte mit der 
Verwaltung' and E Reidegeld 'Vollzugsdefizite sozialer Leistungen: Verrechtlichung und 
Biirokratisierung als Grenzen der Sozialpolitik' in R Voigt (ed) Verrechtlichung (1980) at 247ff. 
29 The juridification discourse is forced to disavow this superficiality: ' ... juridification is not to be 
understood primarily as a quantitative phenomenon of the growth of law and regulation. Rather, it has to 
be seen in its qualitative dimensions, that is, as the emergence of new structures of law to keep pace with 
the growth of the welfare state. To the degree that the law is used for the regulatory and compensatory 
purposes of the welfare state, extensive changes in the structure and function of law are involved'. G 
Teubner 'Preface' in G Teubner (ed) Juridification of Social Spheres: A Comparative Analysis in the 
Areas of Labour, Corporate, Antitrust, and Social Welfare Law at v. 
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qualitative change of the law from regulation to intervention by the modem social wel-
fare state. 3o 
1.1.2 Juridification as metaphysics 
The term 'juridification' is a representation of that which is, somehow, present: 
'Juridification is an ugly word -- as ugly as the reality which it describes. '31 The word 
'juridification', in other words, 'describes' something real ('reality'): it 're-presents' 
some thing, by naming it, the term 're-presences' something beyond itself. 
Juridification is a tendency, a tendency to quantitative increase and qualitative change 
of function in law; it functions as a description or re-presentation of reality. The aim of 
the juridification discourse is to reveal a single, stable trend or tendency (reality) 
'beneath the shifts and changes of political events', a tendency marked by the 'move-
ments or accumulation and slow saturation, the great silent, motionless bases' covered 
with a thick layer of legislation, court decisions, administrative acts.32 
By what economy is this process of naming determined? What is the price that must be 
paid when the law is gazed upon and pronounced upon thus: 'tending toward juridifica-
tion'? 
This very act of naming depends on an act of silencing, where the realisations 
(manifestations) of law (legislative acts, court decisions) are silenced and made to speak 
through a diacritical gesture: Enactments, decisions, all the monuments of past legal 
development, are turned into documents (in the sense of 'documenting' or 'proving' 
the tendency --- signifying for the other), or, in the case of mathematical juridification, 
into ciphers. 33 They are the 'documentary proof' of juridification; the instruments of 
the law become the 'founding documents' of juridification. 
The silencing takes place in that the law is given a meaning other than the one it articu-
lates itself: the shift is away from the content, or the 'stated' meaning of the legislation 
towards the mere instance that the legislation represents in the calculation or listing or 
progression of juridification. The monuments of past law are silenced (their content is 
largely ignored), while they are turned into documents to prove or to speak through the 
formulae as proof of juridification (the signification for itself or in itself by the monu-
ment is silenced to become a signification-for-another as a document). 
30 See Teubner op cit note 6 at 12. 
3! Teubner op cit note 6 at 4. 
32 M Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) at 3. 
33 
' ... history, in its traditional form, undertook to "memorize" the monuments of the past, transform 
them into documents, and lend speech to those traces which, in themselves, are often not verbal, or 
which say in silence something other than what they actually say ... ' Foucault op cit note 32 at 7. 
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This methodological aspect of juridification has significant implications. The silent 
(turned-into-document) monuments of the law are interpreted as supportive of a thesis, 
an interpretation. The law thus interpreted provides one with access to the 'reality' 
described by the word 'juridification'. The legal monuments are read (in the silence of 
having been turned into documents) in order to situate them in a model of quantitative 
increase and qualitative change. 
The concern here is that this methodology rests upon the assumption that the quantita-
tive/qualitative 'juridification' is in fact there (real): that, as Teubner would have it, the 
term 'juridification' 'describes' a 'reality', that the word refers to a 'trend' or to a 
'tendency', that 'juridification' is a re-presentation of a 'reality' (using the word 
'juridification' somehow 'makes the thing present', the word re-presences the 
tendency), and all that needs to be done is for the evidence (the legal documents) to be 
arranged and interpreted properly (like a deck of conjurer's cards) for juridification to 
be 'disclosed' in its full coherent brilliance. The interpretative process will 'yield' the 
model. 
Juridification, in other words, is a conclusion drawn from legal monuments-turned-into-
documents. It is the allocation of meaning (and new existence): juridification 'produces 
something which had previously been invisible or unintelligible' .34 
The discourse of juridification does not concern itself with the existence or the condi-
tions of existence (ontology) of its own discourse. The 'existence' or 'presence' of the 
juridificatory trend or tendency is accepted as given: it is accepted as self-evident, 
axiomatic: all that the observer need do is to closely observe an astonishingly fat deck 
of cards, all apparently pointing in a single direction, the direction of proof of 
juridification. Through interpretation, juridification is brought into 'existence' , it is 
given a 'presence', it has been 'liberated' from the mass of empirical evidence covering 
up this underlying tendency, a tendency seen as structuring the mass of legal monu-
ments. It is the light of a unifying tendency, of a 'reality' that renders those thousands 
of enactments and court decisions into a single structural coherence: their single mean-
ing is 'exposed' (made to speak) by virtue of an imposed silence. Millions of legal texts 
can be represented (re-presenced) upon a single Rottleuthner graph. The products of the 
law (enactments, decisions) are, in other words, 'merely an appearance; the [single] 
object of the critic's gaze [juridification], is located behind or within it'. 35 
1.1.3 The death of metaphysics (including the death of the judge) 
In the sentence quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Gillian Rose suggests that post-
structuralism has sounded the death-knell of metaphysics. This demise is based upon 
34 R Young 'Post-Structuralism: An Introduction' in R Young (ed) Untying the Text (1981) at 5. 
35 Young Zoe cit note 34. 
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the recognition that what is normally perceived and presented as 'presence' or as 
'reality' is nothing of the sort and that concepts (such as juridification) which appear to 
be ontologically self-sufficient (their existence is immediately cognizable) do not exist 
outside the discourses which contain them: 
' . . . if reading must not be content with doubling the text, it cannot legitimately trans-
gress the text toward something other than it, toward a referent (a reality that is 
metaphysical, historical, psychobiographical, etc.) or toward a signified outside the text 
whose content could take place, could have taken place outside of language .... There 
is nothing outside the text . ... [I]n what one calls the real life of these existences "of 
flesh and bone," beyond and behind what one believes can be circumscribed as [the] 
text, there has never been anything but writing; .... And thus to infinity ... the 
absolute present, Nature, that which words like "real mother" name, have always 
already escaped, have never existed; that which opens meaning and language is writing 
as the disappearance of natural presence. '36 
The 'death of metaphysics' entails that absolutes such as 'presence' or 'real' or 'clear' 
or 'obvious' have been deconstructed to show how they rest upon further assumptions, 
other textual foundations or discursive figurations.37 A written signifier ('juridifica-
tion') does refer to a signified (a 'concept'), but it does not refer to a 'reality' 
36 J Derrida Of Grammatology (transl G Spivak) (1967) 158-9. Emphasis in the original. 
37 This statement requires explanation. The essential moment of deconstruction lies in the distinction 
(usually regarded as self-evident and unproblematic) between writing and speech: 'Written words are the 
secondary symbols that stand in for speech and so -- at one further remove -- assist in the process of com-
munication. Already there is the outline of a hierarchy here, a descending order of priority in which writ-
ing ranks a very poor third on account of its irrevocable distance from origins, truth and self-present 
meanings .... It is because spoken words are thought of as symbolizing ideas "directly" -- without the 
further passage through a supplementary medium of written signs -- that speech can be safely maintained 
within the zone of a privileged relation to truth. Thus writing is the inferior term in this series, the term 
that is marked by its exclusion from the intimate circuit of exchange set up between ideas and truth. For 
Derrida, this [a moment in philosophy harking back to Aristotle] is the founding gesture of a whole 
philosophical tradition, one that will henceforth invest spoken language or its analogues (presence, 
origins, truth) with the value of a positive and self-authenticating truth.' 'Deconstruction' lies then in 
reading the cardinal texts of philosophy 'with an eye to their figural twist and complications. The more 
firmly writing is denied or demoted, the more clearly it leaves its problematic mark on the metaphors, 
allegories and detours of argument resorted to by thinkers in the mainstream (logocentric) tradition. 
Such, Derrida writes, is its [writing's] position in the history of Western metaphysics: "a debased, 
lateralized, repressed, displaced theme, yet exercising a permanent and obsessive pressure from the place 
where it remains held in check. A feared writing must be cancelled because it erases the presence of the 
self-same within speech." Derrida then establishes that 'this uncanny reversal, this "return of the 
repressed", is no mere accident or momentary lapse, but a rigorous necessity inscribed in the nature of all 
"metaphysical" thinking.' C Norris Derrida ( 1987) 65-68. The quote is from Derrida op cit note 36 at 
270. See also J M Balkin 'Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory' (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 743 at 
746f. 
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Uuridification does not refer to some THING) - '[t]he world as we know it is only a 
world of representations, and representations of representations, ad infinitum'. 38 
This means that 'the space of writing is to be ranged over, not pierced; writing cease-
lessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a systematic exemption of 
meaning' . 39 The writing cannot and does not disclose that which lies beyond it. 
If there is nothing which can escape from the text (and if there is nothing outside the 
text), the law itself is forcibly returned to whence it could not escape from in the first 
place: textuality. The law, then, is not a platonic shadow or a representation of an ideal 
('Justice', 'Fairness'): it exists in discourse, in language, and nowhere else. 40 Law, as 
discourse, as text, is not the speech of an idea, it is not the enunciation, the spoken 
word of Justice. 
Or is it? 
In literary theory, one of the metaphysical absolutes that had to be brutally murdered 
was the concept of the Author. Before the hecatomb of post-structuralism, the Author 
reigned supreme in literature: 
'The image of literature to be found in ordinary culture is tyranically centered on the 
author, his person, his life, his tastes, his passions, while criticism still consists for the 
most past in saying that Baudelaire's work is the failure of Baudelaire the man, Van 
Gogh's his madness, Tchaikovsky's his vice. The explanation of a work is always 
sought in the man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end, through 
the more or less transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice of a singe person, the 
author "confiding" in us. •41 
The text (the book, the novel, the poem) is interpreted in the light of something 'out-
side' it: the work of literature has no meaning (or has insufficient meaning) in and for 
itself, and needs to be supplemented by the metaphysical Author in order to sensibly 
exist, in order to make it make sense. 
In legal theory, the Author has a forbidding sister --~ the Judge. The 'work' of the 
Judge (the decision she hands down) is seen as the result not only of the facts of the 
38 Balkin op cit note 37 at 760. 
39 Barthes 'The Death of the Author' in R Barthes Image Music Text (1977) at 147. 
40 This does not, however, mean that law is literature, even though they are both textual in nature. The 
structures, tropes and generative principles of literature differ totally from those of the law. In law, for 
example, the concept of authority is of vital importance, relating as it does to the legitimation of the 
statement for which authority is being given. In giving authority for a statement, the law transfers the 
issue of legitimacy away from itself: saying, in effect, that another court has already decided the issue 
(and, by implication, placing the responsibility for the legitimacy of the decision upon the court which 
made the decision used as authority), and that decision has passed into the legal discourse, making it 
iterable (usable in the making of subsequent decisions). 
41 Barthes op cit note 39 at 143. Emphasis in original. 
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case, but especially also the moral and political predispositions of the person sitting on 
the bench. 42 In the same way that the Author is the metaphysical saviour of the literary 
text (the Author 'makes the text full', or 'supplements' the text), the Judge is the 
holder and keeper of the law: the law 'resides' within the Judge, is accessible through 
her and speaks through her intercession: 
'The judge is the prototypical legal institution. In his robed and exalted independence, 
he is the very apotheosis of fairness. The "social service" that he renders to the com-
munity is, in Lord Devlin's words, "the removal of a sense of injustice". The 
impartiality that informs his judgments in the settlement of disputes is nothing short of 
an article of faith in a free and just society. While this attractive and abiding conception 
of the judicial function has long been exposed as, at best, a myth, no amount of 
cynicism can easily dislodge the image of the judge as keeper of the law, protector and 
repository of justice. •43 
A careful reading of this passage reveals a startling role for the Judge. For just as the 
Author holds sway over her text, the Judge, as 'repository of justice' is the metaphysi-
cal point from which meaning derives in law: the Judge is the highest point of fair-
ness, and through her (not through anyone or anything else), 'impartiality' (nothing 
short of an article of faith -- the faith is placed not in 'men' but in 'Justice') flows to 
inform (to structure) as decision. The Judge is the doorkeeper of the Law, it is only 
through her that access to Justice or to the Law can be obtained. Consequently, a deci-
sion may be criticised as reflecting considerations of social class or politico-racial 
prejudice, while another decision may receive fulsome praise as being a 'true reflec-
tion' of (the) law. The Judge expresses the law: she 'keeps' and 'protects' that other 
metaphysical rosetta stone: Justice. She has access to Justice, while at the same time 
determining (in a sense 'barring') access to Justice by others. 44 
42 See generally J W Harris Legal Philosophies (1980) at 93-102. 
43 R Wacks 'Judges and Injustice' (1984) 101 South African Law Journal 266. Footnotes omitted, but 
emphasis added. 
44 Wacks's quoted text here finds resonance in a short text (a 'story', a fiction, a non-truth) by Franz 
Kafka, entitled Before the Law: 'Before the Law stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper there comes a 
countryman and prays for admittance to the Law. But the doorkeeper says that he cannot grant admittance 
at the moment. The man thinks it over and then asks if he will be allowed in later. "It is possible," says 
the doorkeeper, "but not at the moment." Since the gate stands open, as usual, and the doorkeeper steps 
to one side, the man stoops to peer through the gateway into the interior. Observing that, the doorkeeper 
laughs and says: "If you are so drawn to it, just try to go in despite my veto. But take note: I am power-
ful. And I am only the least of the doorkeepers. From hall to hall there is one doorkeeper after another, 
each more powerful than the last. The third doorkeeper is already so terrible that even I cannot bear to 
look at him." These are difficulties the countryman has not expected; the Law, he thinks, should surely 
be accessible at all times and to everyone, but as he now takes a closer look at the doorkeeper in his fur 
coat, and with his big sharp nose and long, thin, black Tartar beard, he decides that it is better to wait 
until he gets permission to enter. The doorkeeper gives him a stool and lets him sit down at one side of 
the door. There he sits for days and years. He makes many attempts to be admitted, and wearies the 
doorkeeper by his importunity. The doorkeeper frequently has little interviews with him, asking him 
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Like her brother, the Author, the Judge does not have a fully blank sheet on which to 
write freely. Both the Author and the Judge are constrained by that which came before, 
by numerous other earlier texts. 45 A potential charge against the preceding argument 
could be that the Author is being equated with the Judge, that they are indiscriminately 
being compared, no account being taken of the differences in the functions they per-
form. 
It is not, however, the aim of the present argument to lead to the conclusion that a 
Judge is 'like' an Author or that an Author is 'like' a Judge. The argument does not 
aim at establishing an identity. The concern here is that irrespective of the differences 
in methods used and the constraints placed on both the Author and the Judge, modern 
legal theory sees the Judge as the 'saviour' of the text: without the Judge, her per-
sonality, her dislikes, her prejudices, and, above all, her role as intermediary (bringing 
Justice among the people) the text of the law is seen as 'incomplete', and only once the 
Judge has been invoked, can the text of the law be seen as complete and full. The 
Judge 'keeps' the law, she bears the key to the exalted places in the temple of 'Justice'. 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
questions about his home and many other things, but the questions are put indifferently, as great lords 
put them, and always finish with the statement that he cannot be let in yet. The man, who has furnished 
himself with many things for his journey, sacrifices all he has, however valuable, to bribe the 
doorkeeper. That official accepts everything, but always with the remark: "I am only taking it to keep 
you from thinking you have omitted anything." During these many years the man fixes his attention 
almost continuously on the doorkeeper. He forgets the other doorkeepers, and this first one seems to him 
the sole obstacle preventing access to the Law. He curses his bad luck, in his early years boldly and 
loudly, later, as he grows old, he only grumbles to himself. He becomes childish, and since in his 
yearslong contemplation of the doorkeeper he has come to know even the fleas in his fur collar, he begs 
the fleas as well to help him and to change the doorkeeper's mind. At length his eyesight begins to fail, 
and he does not know whether the world is really darker or whether his eyes are only deceiving him. Yet 
in his darkness he is now aware of a radiance that streams inextinguishably from the gateway of the Law. 
Now he has not very long to live. Before he dies, all his experiences in these long years gather them-
selves in his head to one point, a question he has not yet asked the doorkeeper. He waves him nearer, 
since he can no longer raise his stiffening body. The doorkeeper has to bend low towards him, for the 
difference in height between them has altered much to the countryman's disadvantage. "What do you 
want to know now?" asks the doorkeeper. "You are insatiable." "Everyone strives to reach the Law," 
says the man, "so how does it happen that for all these many years no one but myself has ever begged for 
admittance?" The doorkeeper recognizes that the man has reached his end, and to let his failing senses 
catch the words, he roars in his ear: "No one else could ever be admitted here, since this gateway was 
made only for you. I am now going to shut it." ' F Kafka 'Before the Law' quoted in J Derrida 'Before 
the Law' in D Attridge (ed) Acts of Literature (1992) 183-4. 
45 The Author is also constrained by what came before: he is working within a certain tradition, a certain 
genre, a certain language. He is also writing into and through all the texts that come before him, and, in 
a sense, all those that are to follow in the traces of his words. 
16 
The death of metaphysics 
The concern is, simply, that not entirely dissimilar discursive operations are 
functioning when we talk about the Judge and when we talk about the Author. 46 
For modern literary theory, the Author is dead: 
'Once the Author is removed, the claim to dechiper a text becomes quite futile. To give 
a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to 
close the writing. Such a conception suits criticism very well, the latter then allotting 
itself the important task of discovering the Author (or its hypostases: society, history, 
psyche, liberty) beneath the work: when the Author has been found, the text is 
"explained" - victory to the critic .... In the multiplicity of writing, everything is to be 
disentangled, nothing deciphered; the structure can be followed, "run" (like the thread 
of a stocking) at every point and at every level, but there is nothing beneath: the space 
of writing is to be ranged over, not pierced; writing ceaselessly posits meaning cease-
lessly to evaporate it, carrying out a systematic exemption of meaning. In precisely this 
way literature (it would be better from now on to say writing), by refusing to assign a 
"secret", an ultimate meaning to the text (and to the world as text), liberates what may 
be called an anti-theological activity .... •47 
One could substitute 'Judge' for 'Author' in the above passage (and make the 
appropriate disciplinary changes): 
'Once the Judge is removed, the claim to dechiper the law becomes quite futile. To give 
the law a Judge is to impose a limit on the law, to furnish it with a final signified, to 
close the law. Such a conception suits legal interpretation very well, the latter then 
allotting itself the important task of discovering the Judge (or her hypostases: society, 
history, psyche, liberty [or Justice?]) beneath the law: when the Judge has been found, 
the law is "explained" - victory to the legal observer .... In the multiplicity of the 
law, everything is to be disentangled, nothing deciphered; the structure can be fol-
lowed, "run" (like the thread of a stocking) at every point and at every level, but there 
is nothing beneath: the space of the law is to be ranged over, not pierced; the law cease-
lessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a systematic exemption of 
meaning. In precisely this way the law, by refusing to assign a "secret", an ultimate 
meaning to itself [the law] (and to the world as text), liberates what may be called an 
anti-theological activity . . . . ' 
46 This entire issue must be seen within the context (a context that can only be vaguely indicated here, 
but a vital context nevertheless) of the legal-theoretical debates about the function of the Judge (creator of 
law, or mere applier of pret-a-porter legal principles). 
47 Barthes Loe cit note 39. If one were to do the same substitutions with the Barthes passage cited earlier, 
the result would be as follows: 'The image of law to be found in ordinary culture is tyranically centered 
on the judge, his person, his life, his tastes, his passions, while legal interpretation still consists for the 
most past in saying that Mr Justice Smith's pronouncements are the failure of Smith the man, Jones's his 
madness, Henry's his vice. The explanation of a the law is always sought in the man or woman who pro-
duced it, as if it were always in the end, through the more or less transparent allegory of the law, the 
voice of a singe person, the judge "confiding" in us [telling us "what the law is"].. 
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It is only after the death of the metaphysical Judge (and, with her, the idea that there is 
some dark, hidden 'secret' to the law, which only she has access to, being the 
repository and keeper of law) that the law-as-text comes into being. 
1.1.4 Juridification-as-discourse and transgression of the closure 
What are the implications of the death of metaphysics for juridification? If the law is 
text, and nothin~ but text (law-as-text), then juridification (being in or of the law) is 
text as well. 
The discursive figurations of juridification take place where the law is made, where law 
is created, in the zone where social structures, concepts, notions, ideals are 'turned into 
law', where law, for example, changes its function (from dispute resolution to regula-
tion) -- juridification is that which lies at the heart of materially rationalized law. 
It is in this zone that what is meta-juridical or meta-law (concepts such as 'fairness', 
'good industrial relations' , 'sound economic policy' , 'history') changes into legal 
norms-as-text: 48 they are rephrased in the language of the law, and the impact of this 
transformation leaves a trace (the trace of juridification), the telling ripple of juridifica-
tion's discursive figuration on the smooth surface of the law-as-text. 49 
Juridification is not, in this view, the calculation and mathematical processing of 
silenced monuments of legal history: instead, those judicial monuments are allowed to 
return in(to) vociferous speech.50 The legal text (in the case of this study, court deci-
sions) is not silenced and made into a document which makes of it empirical proof of 
juridification: it is only the individual, actual text that will be of interest. 51 
48 The phrase 'norms-as-text', though inelegant, is vital. Should the unadorned term 'norms' be used, 
the legal frame of reference immediately provides a ready-made interpretation: something beyond the 
text, some immutable metaphysic and meta-textual rule. The object of this section of the introduction has 
been precisely to undermine that impression. The same applies to the dreadful construct: 'law-as-text'. 
The term 'law' or, worse, 'Law', is so shot through with metatextual assumptions, that relative violence 
to the language is necessary to counter the virtually 'automatic' connotations. 
49 The concept 'trace' is of considerable importance here. If a trace is seen to be a trail, a track or spoor 
left by something else, a trace is then the pfesente of an absence. The word 'presence' is here placed 
under erasure in order to indicate the overtones of metaphysicality it bears with it. As to the concepts of 
placing words 'under erasure' and the idea of the 'trace' see G Spivak 'Translator's Preface' to J Derrida 
Of Grammatology (1967) at xiii-xviii. 
50 But this speech to which the document is returned is not allegorical: it does not stand for something 
else. 
51 In linguistic terms, the emphasis is on the parole (traditionally referring to a single, actual and indi-
vidual speech-act) rather than on the langue (or language-system, in terms of which the speech-act takes 
place). Metaphorically, the focus is upon certain, actual games of chess (actual decisions) rather than the 
system of the law, or the system of juridification (the rules of chess as a game). 
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This approach makes it possible for the normative operations of the text and of law-as-
text to be resuscitated: how are things classified as good or bad? By what economy can 
distinctions between prescription and proscription be made? How are norms-as-text 
made and what price must be paid for the making? 
This methodological shift is traced, obliquely, within the juridification discourse itself: 
'Instead of strictly applying precisely defined legal norms (conditional programs), legal 
experts now tend to administer ill-defined standards and vague general clauses (purpose 
programs). This is causing a dramatic shift in the mode of legal thinking .... '52 
This passage traces the outlines of the juridification process, and requires a reading 
with due care. It must be read in terms of its own structure and logic, as strange as the 
result may appear to be. 
• The hierarchical difference is structured around 'instead'. Instead of following 
one set of procedures, 'legal experts' follow other procedures. One set of proce-
dures or techniques is used in place of another. 
• The procedures that 'legal experts' 'tend' not to use relate to the strict applica-
tion of 'precisely defined legal norms' . These procedures (called a 'conditional 
programme') are dependent upon determinate meanings and definitions of 
norms. The status of the 'norm' cannot be questioned either: the norm is 
determinate, and can be 'precisely defined'. 
• Instead of the conditional programme, the procedures that 'legal experts' now 
'tend' to use relate to the following; they 'administer ill-defined standards and 
vague general clauses (purposive programs)'. There is a shift in activity --- from 
'application' to 'administering', the latter verb being vaguer than the first, and 
connoting other activities than a 'strict application'. The subject of the 
administering process are (a) ill-defined standards, and/or (b) vague general 
clauses. Instead of precise definition, there is ill-definition, instead of clarity, 
there is vagueness. Instead of being specific, what is being administered is 
regarded as 'general' . 53 
In formally rationalized law, concepts are clear, precisely defined, they are typical 
(ideal) legal norms. But in the juridification process, as the quality of the law changes 
52 Teubner op cit note 6 at 16. Emphasis added. 
53 In order to make this reading even clearer, the basic elements of the hierarchical opposition must be 
compared: (1) application - precise - defined - norms as against (2) administer - ill-defined - standards -
vague - generality. 
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from regulation to intervenion and the law becomes more purpose-oriented, ill-defined 
'standards' (not, according to the quoted passage, norms), and vague clauses (again, 
not norms) are applied or, somewhat sinisterly, administered. 
The shift itself is, of course, relatively unimportant: any discourse shifts from one posi-
tion to another, or from positions to other positions. But the importance of the dis-
cursive shift which constitutes juridification only emerges when seen in the light of the 
fact that it amounts to a transgression. It points towards a trangression (or opening, a 
breach) of normative closure, a characteristic of modern legal system theories. 
Luhman does not hesitate to brand the legal system as a normatively closed system: 
'Only within the legal system can the change of legal norms be perceived as change of 
the law. This is not a question of power or influence, and this is not to deny that the 
environment and particularly the political system has an impact on the legal system. But 
the legal system reproduces itself by legal events and only by legal events. Political 
events (e.g. elections) may be legal events at the same time, but with different connec-
tions, linkages and exclusions for each system. Only legal events (e.g. legal decisions 
but also events like elections in so far as they are communicated as legal events) warrant 
the continuity of the law and only deviant reproduction, merging continuity and discon-
tinuity, can change the law. 
A simple fact never bestows the quality of being legal or illegal upon acts or condi-
tions. It is always a norm which decides whether facts have legal relevance or not. 
After many centuries of doubts and discussions we are today used to admit that neither 
natural nor religious nor moral conditions have this law-making potential of legal 
norms. The legal system is a normatively closed system. '54 
Luhman stresses the fact that normative closure does not entail cognitive closure as 
well: the legal system, according to modern systems theory, is open to all kinds of 
information, but, as a normatively closed system, it is closed to normative control. 
It is the essential argument of this text that juridification is a discursive figuration con-
sequent upon a transgression of the normative closure and the restoration and mainte-
nance of that very closure. 
1.1.5 The archaeology of juridification-as-discourse 
This, then, is the hecatomb of juridification as metaphysics, of juridification referring 
to a 'reality'; to a 'presence'. Juridification-as-discourse (instead of 'juridification' as a 
signifier for a 'real' signified) demands different modes of interpretation (to return to 
that which purports to be (at) the beginning: how is one to 'study' (now a verb) 
juridification-as-discourse?). 
54 Niklas Luhman 'The Self-Reproduction of Law and its Limits' in Gunther Teubner (ed) Dilemmas of 
Law in the Welfare State (1986) 111at113. Emphasis in original. 
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If there is nothing to gain access to beyond the law-as-text, the law-as-text must, 
instead, be ranged over. The law, the changes in the functions and structures of the 
law, and the increase in the law (the signposts of juridification-as-discourse) are not 
signifiers of a reality, of a presence - the exteriority of the law-as-text does not provide 
a way into some dark interior that is juridification. 
Consequently, the normal modes of interpretation ('study') which characterise the cur-
rent juridification discourse are insufficient. 
The focus must be returned to the law-as-text as monument, not as document providing 
access to someTHING else. 
Instead of the sequential arithmetic or empirical descriptive, method, archaeology may 
be more apposite, the object of study of the archaeological method being the archive. 55 
But the archive should not be seen as ---
' ... the sum of all the texts that a culture has kept upon its person as documents attest-
ing to its own past, or as evidence of a continuing identity; [nor does it mean] the 
institutions, which, in a given society, make it possible to record and preserve those 
discourses that one wishes to remember and keep in circulation.' 
Instead, the archive can be better described as being ---
'the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as 
unique events. But the archive is also that which determines that all these things said do 
not accumulate endlessly in an amorphous mass . . . . The archive is not that which, 
despite its immediate escape, safeguards the event of the statement, and preserves, for 
future memories, its status as escapee; it is that which, at the very root of the statement-
event, and in that which embodies it, defines at the outset the system of its enunciability 
... [I]t is that which defines the mode of occurrence of the statement-thing; it is the 
system of its functioning. •56 
The archive, then, instead of being a physical place containing dusty records of events 
past, is rather a conceptual containment of discourses, it contains not, as Foucault is at 
pains to point out, just any discourse, but that specific set of discourses 'that conditions 
[determines] what counts as knowledge in a particular period. The archive is dis-
55 
' ... my object is not langauge but the archive, that is to say the accumulated existence of discourse. 
Archaeology, as I intend it, is kin neither to geology (an analysis of the sub-soil), nor to genealogy (as 
descriptions of beginning and sequences); it's the analysis of discourse in its modality of archive' Inter-
view with Foucault, quoted in T Flynn 'Foucault's mapping of history' in G Gutting (ed) The Cambridge 
Companion to Foucault (1994) 29. 
56 Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge 128-129. Emphasis in original. 
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courses? not only as events having occurred but as "things," with their own economies, 
scarcities, and ... strategies that continue to function, transformed through history and 
providing the possibility of appearing of other discourses. '58 
The archive, in terms that are to become familiar with subsequent use, consists of 
those canonical texts which structure (inform, determine) the state of knowledge; dis-
57 In view of the fact that the frequency of use of the term 'discourse' has increased and will continue to 
increase exponentially, it is necessary to briefly tum attention to the question: 'What is discourse?' The 
word 'discourse' has its origin in the Latin discursus, a noun in tum derived from the verb discurrere, 
meaning 'to run hither and thither.' A discourse, in a philological sense, would then be 'an utterance, or 
a talk of some length (not determined), whose unfolding or spontaneous development is not held back by 
any over-rigid intentions'. M Frank 'On Foucault's concept of discourse' in T J Armstrong (transl) 
Michel Foucault Philosopher (1992) 99. For linguistics, the largest possible unit of study is the sentence: 
'If the sentence, being an order and not a series, cannot be reduced to the sum of the words which com-
pose it and constitutes thereby a specific unit, a piece of discourse, on the contrary, is no more than the 
succession of the sentences composing it. From the point of view of linguistics, there is nothing in dis-
course that is not to be found in the sentence: "The sentence," writes Martinet, "is the smallest segment 
that is perfectly and wholly representative of discourse." Hence there can be no question of linguistics 
setting itself an object superior to the sentence, since beyond the sentence are only more sentences --
having described the flower, the botanist is not to get involved in describing the bouquet. And yet it is 
evident that discourse itself (as a set of sentences) is organized and that, through this organization, it can 
be seen as the message of another language, one operative at a higher level than the language of the 
linguists. Discourse has its units, its rules, its "grammar": beyond the sentence, and though consisting 
solely of sentences, it must naturally form the object of a second linguistics. For a long time indeed, such 
a linguistics of discourse bore a glorious name, that of Rhetoric .... If a working hypothesis is needed 
for an analysis whose task is immense and whose materials infinite, then the most reasonable is to posit a 
homological relation between sentence and discourse insofar as it is likely that a similar formation organ-
ization orders all semiotic systems, whatever their substances and dimensions. A discourse is a long 
"sentence" (the units of which are not necessarily sentences), just as a sentence, allowing for certain spec-
ifications, is a short "discourse." ' R Barthes 'Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives' in S 
Sontag (ed) A Roland Barthes Reader (1982) 251 at 254-6. As to the position of the term 'discourse' in 
relation to the structural principles of Sausserian and post-Sausserian linguistics, see P Goodrich Legal 
Discourse at 132-136. For the purposes of the present study, discourse may be said to be a specific set of 
sentences, structures and ordered by certain principles (which principles are themselves discursive in that 
they are formulated through sentences). Furthermore, the discourse is delimited (again through limita-
tions discursive in nature): it deals with what is called 'labour law' (the archival rules or discourse which 
makes possible this classification are largely traditional). Finally, it is important to bear in mind that the 
discourse of labour law consists not in a set of orally enunciated sentences (this would be discourse as 
well), but that the focus should be on the textual (in this case, written) text. Essentially then a discourse 
of labour law consists of a delineated and limited number of written sentences, each contained within a 
specific text, within a specific piece of writing. One of the problems that arise with this is the diffuse 
relationship between the one text and the other text on the higher level of discourse and on the lower 
level of the sentence. The text would, it appears, occupy a hierarchical position somewhere between the 
sentence (the text consists of sentences) and the discourse (a number of texts containing sentences make 
up the discourse). It is furthermore vital to bear in mind that the discourse is not homogenous and 
entirely coherent -- it would not be accurate to speak of a single discourse of labour law, for there are 
potentially infinite labour law discourses, each distinguishable (again through the operation of certain 
discursive archival structural principles) from the other. 
58 Flynn loc cit note 55. 
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courses that determine the existence of other discourses (in the sense that these sec-
ondary or passive discourses are 'derived' or, better, 'made possible' by the canonical 
discourse contained in the archive). 
It is vital, at this point, not to posit the archive as a metaphysics of discourse, for the 
archive is a discursive construction (it exists in and through discourse only). The fact of 
discourse makes possible the archive and the archive in turn makes further discourse 
possible. In this sense, the relationship between the archive and discourse can be prob-
lematized in that neither is logically fully anterior to the other: dialectically, each 
determines the other, as each contains the conditions of existence of the other. Dis-
course, structured by the archive, which exists through discourse, then becomes fully 
self-reflexive, as discourse is structured through and by discourse, as one discourse 
structures or informs another (and, for this very reason, it may be more accurate to 
speak of the archive as a 'discourse of order' in the sense discussed below in 1.3.3). 
What is the archive of labour law? Certainly it would include those texts, discourses all 
(decisions, legislation, comments), which make possible the appearance of other deci-
sions, comments, criticism, that again lead on to others, that inform those that come 
after them (in a temporal sense). These pivotal decisions and other canonical discursive 
practices contain the 'conditions of existence' of the other (passive) discourses, in that 
they contain a 'body of rules' which govern the way in which things are perceived, 
thought about, judged, talked about, written about. That which does not 'comply' with 
the archive is rejected, discarded as being 'non-sense', it is censored from the 
archive. 59 
The archaeological method turns its attention to these discursive practices that structure 
others, the canonical texts which determine the validity of subsequent discourses. When 
applied to law, the archaeological method would seek to establish, as far as this is pos-
sible, those archival structures which in turn discursively structure other discourses; it 
would attempt to excavate those cardinal discourses which determine the 
(dis)appearance of others. It is, succinctly, an attempt to trace the law of discourse in 
the discourse of the law. 
59 See Flynn op cit note 55 at 30. See also D Ingram 'Foucault and Habermas on the subject of reason' 
in G Gutting (ed) The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (1994) 215 at 231-2: 'The archaeology of 
knowledge construes a meaning in terms of objective structure. The meaning of a statement is defined by 
the sequence of statements that precede and follow it. This sequence, in tum, is one possible articulation 
among many alternatives that are permitted by a system of statements. Such a system is not closed, 
however. . . . [T]he system of regularities of governing possible speech delimits the range of what can be 
accepted as a possible true statement, censors unacceptable themes and utterances, and silences "dis-
qualified" speakers in a continually shifting manner. Foucault principally deploys his archaeological 
method in analyzing just those performative utterances that figure in the regimented language games of 
science. His aim is to articulate the archaeological deep structures that determine the limits and pos-
sibilities of knowledge for any given period.' 
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For present purposes, some key features of the method may be summarized as fol-
lows:60 
1. Archaeology does not attempt either description or definition of thoughts, repre-
sentations, images, themes, preoccupations or trends that are 'revealed' in the 
course of judicial decision-making (judicial discourse). The focus is on the dis-
course itself, and on the structures and rules of the discourses themselves and 
the discourses that inform them. 61 
2. Archaeology is not commentary or interpretation, it is analysis. Commentary or 
interpretation allows not only the construction of a new discourse on the basis of 
the old, but no matter how the commentary or interpretation is approached, its 
function 'is to say at last what was silently articulated "beyond", in the text. By 
a paradox which it always displaces but never escapes, the commentary must 
say for the first time what had, nonetheless, already been said, and must tire-
lessly repeat what had, however, never been said. '62 
3. The focus is upon the canonical text, as only the discourse of the canonical text 
is iterable. 63 Iterability is an essential property of the canonical text. This means 
that the discourse of the canonical text (the 'ratio') can be separated from the 
situation, from, for example, the facts giving rise to the case and applied to 
other, subsequent situations. 64 
60 Sections of these methodological signposts are based on the methodology described by Foucault. See 
M Foucault op cit note 56 at 138-9. 
61 Foucault states that archaeology 'does not treat discourse as document, as a sign of something else, as 
an element to be transparent, but whose unfortunate opacity must often be pierced if one is to reach at 
last the depth of the essential in the place in which it is held in reserve; it is concerned with discourse in 
its own volume, as a monument. It is not an interpretative discipline: it does not seek another, better-
hidden discourse. It refuses to be "allegorical".' Foucault op cit note 56 at 128-9. 
62 M Foucault 'The Order of Discouse' in R Young (ed) Untying the Text (1981) 48 at 58. 
63 This exclusive iterability of the canonical text is institutional. There are archival discourses which 
structure the selection of decisions that are to be followed by others (binding authority or the rules of 
stare decisis). In this way, the archive itself determines its own perpetuation. 
64 
'. . . iterability [ ] carries with it the notion of a repetition of the same in a different context. Lan-
guage can only operate to the extent that it is repeatable, but language is repeatable only to the extent that 
what A says means something, albeit not identical to what A meant, to another person B. According to 
Derrida ... "by virtue of its essential iterability one can always lift a written syntagma from the inter-
locking chain in which it is caught or given without making it lose every possibility of functioning .... " 
... [T]he very act of "meaning" something creates a chasm between the sign and the producer's inten-
tion. This detachability makes iterability, and thus intersubjective meaning, possible. The repetition of 
the sign [a section of a decision, for example] in the new context is simultaneously a relation of identity 
and difference; the repeated sign is syntactically identical, yet semantically different' Balkin op cit note 
37 at 779-80. 
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4. The analysis of the canonical texts must remain faithful to the text: the 'reading 
must be intrinsic and remain within the text' . 65 
What, then, would constitute an 'archaeology of juridification-as-discourse'? This 
would entail an excavation of the discourse of the law in an attempt to establish the 
archive, a system of discursive practices which function as normatively paradigmatic. 
In other words, to try to determine those archaeological structural principles which 
determine, inform, or lend structure to the qualitative shifts in the legal discourse, that 
govern the appearance or change of legal reasoning, that control the changes in the 
legal discourse, from the strict application of legal rules to the administration of ill-
defined standards. 
1.2 LEVELS OF SIGNIFICATION 
In essence, then, this study is a reading of texts (in other words reading of a limited 
and select part of the corpus of the law) in order to dig and sift through the text and 
through the law-as-text; to identify and excavate the discursive figurations and condi-
tions of juridification-as-discourse, to establish the rules (the textual economy) that 
govern these discursive figurations and, in the final analysis, the impact of the trans-
gression of the archival structures as the archive turns in upon its own discursiveness. It 
is an archaeological excavation of the law-as-text, searching for the trace (the pteten<U 
of an absence) of juridification-as-discourse as determined by the structural principles 
of the archive and the operations of the archive. 
There is no one point of departure. A single 'point of departure' implies that there is 
one certain and stable position from which the study proceeds; that there is a single 
coherent light which guides the departure on some journey into the unknown. But the 
'point' is no point at all: it is a cluster of departures, a place of beginnings. 66 
65 J Derrida op cit note 36 at 159. 
66 One other, vital source of point(s) of departure(s) deserves brief mention: 'Sociological generaliza-
tions [about juridification] can be corrected when viewed from within the laws if they are set against 
specific legal material. On the other hand a dynamization of the strictly juristic perspective could be 
hoped for if extralegal modes of interpretations are actually taken up and not simply dismissed'. Teubner 
op cit note 6 at 4, emphasis added. The aim is, in other words, for an 'extra' (=outside) legal mode of 
interpretation. This again harks back to the issue of interpretative position mentioned in passing earlier 
and the motto quoted at the very outset: how is one to proceed in order that the law may reflect upon 
itself in an original manner. It may be apposite at this point to perform certain operations of substitutions 
and paraphrase to the excerpt of the Derrida interview quoted at the outset, where the term 'philosophy' 
is replaced by the terms 'law'and 'legal' where appropriate: the aim is then to find a non-site, or a non-
legal site from which to question the law. The search for a non-legal site does not bespeak an anti-legal 
attitude. The central question is: how can the law as such appear to itself as other than itself, so that it 
can interrogate and reflect upon itself in an original manner. This study uses fictionality as a potential 
non-site from which to question the law: through its own (foregrounded) aesthetic aspect, its structure 
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One (but not, in any sense, the first) of these beginnings (which soon outgrew its 
origins) served as a primary hypothesis for another study by Blankenburg and 
Rogowski: 
'(i) Labour juriciaries are suited for individual employment problems rather than for 
collective industrial conflict resolution; (ii) even with respect to claims for employment 
protection, the role of labour judiciaries tends to be restricted to regulating the con-
sequences of dismissals; their direct impact on preventing dismissals or regulating 
ongoing employment relationships is rather limited; and (iii) labour judiciaries show a 
receptive attitude towards norms of industrial relations which also finds its expression 
in a high emphasis on conciliation and an institutionalised participation of collective 
industrial interest groups in decision-making. •67 
This passage signposts a number of issues. What, for example, are 'labour judiciaries'? 
Are these only 'labour courts' or 'labour tribunals' or 'industrial tribunals' or does the 
term used include civil courts having to decide labour issues? Where and to what extent 
do the archival rules (which make a differentiation between these typologies possible) 
break down; where and to what extent are they problematized by a discourse that may 
transgress them, overstep the conceptual boundaries (im)posed by these paradigms? 
Does the fact that labour courts are 'suited' (a word again implying the functioning of 
normative processes --- suited/unsuited) to resolve individual conflicts mean that these 
courts are per definition excluded from resolving collective disputes (and would one 
here be in a position to observe the transgression of the paradigmatic individ-
ual/collective divide?) 
For one of the issues here is the separation of individual and collective: does the way in 
which these labour courts deal with 'individual' issues not impact on the conduct of 
'collective issues'? Is the protection of striking workers against dismissal (individual) 
not a regulation of the consequence of a collective conflict? Do these courts not, by 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
and presentation, fictionality (especially in the form of parables) is used to shift the interpretative posi-
tion, to change the perspective or point of view on a certain problematics. This is certainly distressing, 
because it appears to deny the cogency, self-sufficiency, and coherence of the legal discourse, a discourse 
which presents itself as complete and full. But it is only by adopting admittedly unorthodox interpretative 
positions and paradigms that the law can be questioned afresh, that one could get lost in the funhouse of 
the legal discourse, to discover there, from a perspective newly sensitized by fictionality, those machines 
and machinations that make up the legal discourse. 
67 E Blankenburg & R Rogowski 'German Labour Courts and the British Industrial Tribunal System. A 
Socio-Legal Comparison of Degrees of Judicialisation' (1986) 13 Journal of Law and Society 67 at 68. 
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ostensibly deciding only individual disputes, regulate collective disputes as well. Do 
these questions indicate a rift or a lacuna in the archival structural rules? 
Blankenburg and Rogowski' s primary hypotheses can, with little adaptation, serve as 
one (but only one) beginning for the present study: Labour courts, even when 
ostensibly solving disputes between employer and employee (individual disputes) play a 
role in the resolution of industrial conflict, the latter usually seen as situated on a col-
lective level. In the course of their decisions, labour judiciaries 'colonise' or 'take 
over' other disputes, bringing them within the purview of the law. Unregulated aspects 
of collective disputes are then regulated by the labour courts. In other words, labour 
courts, despite being seen to be 'unsuited' to the regulation of collective industrial con-
flict, do exactly that. In summary: labour courts, even where they are confronted by 
disputes normally termed individual, still play an important role in the resolution of 
collective industrial conflict, thereby overstepping the conceptual rules of the individ-
ual/ collective san-andreas-fault. 
This functional and perfomative practice of a court has, of course, a name: juridifica-
tion. As the law colonises with law the lifeworld, law is being made (bringing with it 
its own archive, or determined by the old?). Often, this law is taken from meta-juristic 
norms, such as those of good industrial relations (themselves a matter of interpreta-
tion), the convictions of the community, the historical development of the legal system, 
or the perceived nature of collective disputes. 
It is exceptional for a court to admit that it is 'making law', and that the source of the 
law so made is meta-juridical (not in legal discourse, but in the discourse of, for exam-
ple, industrial relations). Usually, the law-making process is covert and the only way in 
which it can be accessed is through a thorough textual analysis. 
The object of a textual archaeology is therefore in part to find, identify and interpret 
the traces left in the text by the hidden textual processes of juridification-as-discourse, 
this perhaps giving an idea of how the archival structures are complied with, trans-
gressed, or, also possible, how the archival principles structure their own transgression. 
As policy is turned into law, as that which is perceived as 'good industrial relations' or 
'good business sense' become written into law (juridified), the law-as-text will either 
cover up this process or accommodate the introduction of meta-juridical terms into the 
legal discourse, most commonly by relying on a silencing or obliteration of a normative 
(archival) structure. If a court, for example, relies on 'rough and ready experience-
based values', these values are turned into law, and in this process, these values have to 
be given a content which is, if nothing else, iterable, and these values are determined 
by reference to the archive. Values and policies which are juridified into legal discourse 
(law-as-text) must be given a content sufficiently coherent and fixed (in a canonical 
text) in order that other courts or decision-making bodies can also apply these values 
through mere iteration. As meta-juridical values and policies are changed into law-as-
text, not only will their content undergo a sea change, but the meta-juridical discourse 
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in which they had their origin will be turned into legal discourse --- this 'turning-into' 
process taking place again in terms of the structural archival principles. The fall-out 
from this process leaves a trace or a wound on the law-as-text, the reading of which 
(ranging over, not piercing) is the task of an archaeological reading. 
Not all legal texts are equally relevant. Juridification-as-discourse operates hierarchi-
cally, like the courts performing the operation, dependent upon the iterability of the 
legal discourse (which law-as-text itself structures hierarchically). Once a superior 
court has transformed policy or values into law, and the product of the transformation 
is sufficiently iterable, lower courts will, almost blindly, apply the 'turned-into-law' 
values or policies. This hierarchical structure implies that the focus is upon the deci-
sions of the highest court in any given jurisdiction, as these are the canonical texts of 
juridification. 
The focus also rests upon the utterances of courts. An analysis of the policies which 
informed legislation (legislation is juridified policy) falls outside the ambit of this 
study. It is, however, vital to add that legislation (if any) establishes a framework (an 
archive) within which a policy decision is made by a court. Legislation is therefore not 
banished into irrelevance: one of the most interesting aspects of the investigation is to 
see how a court, when juridifying policy into law, strains against the structural frame 
or conceptual obstacles of the legislation. 
1.3 STRUCTURES 
Even though it may initially appear to be wide, the scope of this study is narrow: a 
close reading of canonical legal texts in order to excavate the textual traces (fractures) 
left by the process of juridification-as-discourse. 
The work is divided into two main parts. 
1.3.1 Context contratext 
The first part deals with the institutional frame of reference (the 'context') within which 
courts hand down decisions. Relevant in this regard are the dominant discourses of the 
industrial relations systems of the three jurisdictions under consideration: 
1. The Federal Republic of Germany, 
2. Great Britain, and 
3. The Republic of South Africa. 
These chapters are not intended to provide an in-depth view of the industrial relations 
system in each country, but instead to give some idea of the conceptual discursive con-
tours (the broader archive) of the labour law system in each country. 
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Because this study focuses upon courts and what they do (and what they say while 
doing it), brief overviews of the structures of the courts, their substantive competence, 
and aspects of procedure are also necessary. If one thinks of juridification-as-discourse 
as being a type of story-telling, the court is where the story is being told. And the tell-
ing may be influenced by the place in which it is told and who tells it. 
1.3.2 Discourses of silence 
In the second part, the methodology deserts the empirical-descriptive in favour of dis-
course analysis of some of the canonical (iterable) legal texts issuing from courts 
having competence to hear labour matters, specially referring to a special discourse, 
namely the discourse of the law of industrial action. 
1.3.3 Discourses of order, parables and citations 
Discourses of order are strategically scattered throughout the text. 
There are three distinct discourses of order: 
• Discourse of Order Series 1 relates to the canonical and quasi-canonical texts 
of the law. As will be illustrated in an example occurring later in this very para-
graph, what is of concern here are those texts that structure or lay down the 
foundations of legal discourse. 
• Discourse of Order Series 2 relates to the instant text, the one being read at 
this point. This discourse has as its aim to link, to uncouple, to bring into con-
trast or to unhinge this text, to subvert and to apply the structural principles 
which in turn determine the instant text. The inclusion of this series of dis-
courses makes the present text almost unbearably self-reflexive, as the discourse 
of order Series 2 relates to other discourses being presented and the manner in 
which those discourses are discoursed. In essence, then, the discourse of order 
Series 2 is a meta-text, offering commentary, interpretation, and, to an extent, 
prophecy as the text progresses, violently disrupting the divide between text and 
commentary. The importance of this Discourse of Order lies in it being an 
enactment: an enactment of interpretation, where text and countertext meet, 
that uncomfortable point where the commentary seeks to escape the text it is 
commenting upon (by maintaining a distance, by talking of 'that text') only to 
find itself being contaminated by that very text (in the sense that the com-
mentary cannot free itself, but incessantly returns to the text it is commenting 
upon). This discourse of order will, eventually, prove sufficiently disruptive in 
its effect to be destructive. 
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• The Discourse of Order Series 3 is closely linked to the parables. The 
parables are offered, not as comic relief, but to illuminate certain concerns, 
through a discourse entirely different from the law. The parables may appear as 
lugubrious, which, within the context in which they appear, is certainly a valid 
charge. But the intent motivating the parables (a form of story-telling possibly 
pre-biblical) is entirely serious: certain concerns are expressed through the 
parables; concerns that are dealt with in the relevant chapter. These parables 
represent a (futile?) attempt to find a non-site from which the legal discourse 
can be viewed, it is a vantage point for the discursive events taking place. In 
this sense, the instant study represents the revenge of literature (fiction) over 
law, as fictionality has to be resorted to in order to refresh the perspective on 
the law. 68 The Discourse of Order Series 3, in a footnote, offers an interpreta-
tion of each of the parables, an interpretation that derives its authority exclu-
sively from the fact that it is presented at the same time and in the same text as 
the parable (yet it is not part of the parable). 
• The brief citations that appear at the beginning of each chapter have similar 
functions: they are not mere self-indulgence, for through these citations are 
nodes of other texts, other concerns, histories, attitudes, motivations, all of 
which in turn structure this text (they are those -- on a practical level --
unwritten and unwritable discourses) and which structure the texts presented and 
analysed: sometimes a change in attitude over time becomes apparent, or con-
68 It is at this point apposite to present a more formalized motivation for this strategic move. It is vital to 
note that it is not original. In writing a history of madness, Michel Foucault, as described by his arch-
enemy Derrida 'wanted madness to be the subject of his book in every sense of the word: its theme and 
its first-person narrator, its author, madness speaking about itself. Foucault wanted to write a history of 
madness itself, that is madness speaking on the basis of its own experience and under its own authority, 
and now a history of madness described from within the language of reason, the language of psychiatry 
on madness -- the agonistic and rhetorical dimensions of the preposition on overlapping here -- on mad-
ness already crushed beneath psychiatry, dominated, beaten to the ground, interned, that is to say, mad-
ness made into an object and exiled as the other of a language and a historical meaning which had been 
confused with logos itself. "A history not of psychiatry," Foucault says, "but of madness itself, in its 
most vibrant state, before being captured by knowledge." ' As madness has been silenced through the 
discourse of medicine and psychiatry, Foucault continues: ' "The language of psychiatry, which is a 
monologue of reason on madness, could be established only on the basis of such a silence. I have not 
tried to write the history of that language, but, rather, the archaeology of that silence.' J Derrida 'Cogito 
and the History of Madness' in Writing and Difference (trans A Bass) (1978) 33-34. In order to return 
madness (or 'unreason') to voice, Foucault has recourse to literature, to the authors of 'unreason'; 
Nietzsche, De Sade, Artaud, the painters Goya, Van Gogh, Bosch. See D Eribon Michel Foucault (trans 
B Wing) (1991) 97-8. In a sense, then, there is not method in Foucault's madness, but there is madness 
in the method. 
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ceptual foundations that are to serve as the basis for analysis. They are then, the 
faintly ringing doorbells of a larger archive. 
Generally, the scheme of this text is that of an enactment of intratextuality: of texts 
flowing through texts, breaking through each other, casting different lights on each 
other, of difficulties of interpretation, even, at its most extreme, an allegory for certain 
processes of interpretation (such as the process of accommodating conflicting texts, 
establishing links between different texts, and the process of the commentary) which 
legal 'commentators' take for granted.69 
The name 'Discourse of Order' is not, regrettably, original. It is an (intentional) inver-
sion of 'The Order of Discourse', the title of Michel Foucault's inaugural lecture at the 
College de France on 2 December 1970. In this lecture, Foucault addresses procedures 
for the subjugation of discourse: 
'[I]n every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised 
and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role it is to ward off its 
powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events ... .'70 
69 One charge that may be brought against the instant text (and a charge that has been brought against the 
instant text as it found itself in the process of being-written) is its patent concern with its own aesthetic. 
For a text, even a legal text, to have an aesthetic dimension is, normally, not a bad thing. However, this 
'aesthetic' does not serve the purpose of merely 'being nice', of being a 'racy style'. The impression of 
the operation of a textual aesthetic is based on the fact that the textual operations and economy of textual 
production which determine this text are foregrounded and problematised --- the instant text is a 
(mis)leading guide-book into the maze of its focus of attention (the archaeology of juridification-as-
discourse) but also into the maze of itself. The being-lost-in-the-funhouse therefore applies not only to 
the operations being performed on other texts, but also to the text in/through which these operations are 
performed. 
70 M Foucault 'The Order of Discourse' at 52. In 'What is an Author?' Foucault identified a structure 
similar to the one that I have termed 'discourse of order': 'It is easy to see that in the sphere of discourse 
one can be the author of much more than a book - one can be the author of a theory, tradition, or dis-
cipline in which other books and authors will in their turn find a place. These authors are in a position 
which we shall call "transdiscursive." This is a recurring phenomenon - certainly as old as our civiliza-
tion. Homer, Aristotle, and the Church Fathers, as well as the first mathematicians and the originators of 
the Hippocratic traditions, all played this role. Furthermore, in the course of the nineteenth century, 
there appeared in Europe another, more uncommon, kind of author, whom one should confuse with nei-
ther the "great" literary authors, nor the authors of religious texts, nor the founders of science. In a 
somewhat arbitrary way we shall call those who belong in this last group "founders of discursivity." 
They are unique in that they are not just the authors of their own works. They have produced something 
else: the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts. In this sense, they are very dif-
ferent, for example, from a novelist, who is, in fact, nothing more than the author of his own text. Freud 
is not just the author of The Interpretation of Dreams or Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious; 
Marx is not just the author of the Communist Manifesto or Das Kapital: they both have established an 
endless possibility of discourse.' M Foucault 'What is an Author?' in P Rabinow (ed) The Foucault 
Reader (1984) 101at113-4. Emphasis added. 
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Foucault then identifies a number of procedures for the control of discourse: some dis-
courses are prohibited, while other discourses are limited through internal procedures 
such as the commentary, the attachment to the metaphysic of the Author, or the institu-
tional frame of reference within which that discourse is situated (the 'discipline'). 
Foucault's argument leads to an extension of the points made earlier about the archive, 
discourse, and the structural role of the archive. 
One of the most important methods of controlling discourse is discourse itself (a 
method not expressly mentioned by Foucault): the archive as discourse structures 
another discourse. The archival discourse structures another discourse which may in 
turn structure another, which may then discursively turn back upon itself, or upon that 
which purports to be the original archival discourse of order, to supplement, to disrupt, 
to ignore or to transgress the discourse which is not itself but which is of itself (in the 
sense that the disrupting discourse is structured precisely by that which it is disrupting, 
supplementing, ignoring or transgressing). Discourse, in other words, transgresses, dis-
rupts or supplements itself (which returns to the self-reflexive and self-disruptive pre-
sentation of the instant study). 
The canonical (active) archival text may do a number of things: it may lay down rules, 
establish procedures, define terms and concepts, establish links and relations, uses, 
affirm or reject a methodology, etc. Discourses that do not comply with the norms-as-
text of the active discourse are then rejected as 'incorrect' or 'false'. 
The issues orbiting comparativism in labour law may serve as an example. There are 
certain canonical texts which establish rules for the conduct of research in collective 
labour law. Many (if not most) passive discourses would conform to the rules and pro-
cedures contained in the canonical discourse: the rules or structures of the canonical 
discourse would be iterated in the passive discourse and there function not as mere 
repetition, but as a principle structuring the passive discourse. 
An analysis of the discourses of order would indicate their canonical status (the sig-
nificance and influence of the active discourse), and their iterability (which section of 
the active discourse serves as structural element of the passive discourse). Of primary 
importance, though, is the economy by which the text is what it is: the inherent con-
tradictions, shortcomings, and, ultimately, the silent and covert reliance upon silences 
in those discourses which structure and control others, and the extent to which the dis-
course turns in upon itself to transgress, supplement or disrupt nothing other than itself 
by itself. 71 
71 As such, the structuring effect of the constantly developing archival discourse of order upon other dis-
courses which in turn stand in a relationship not only to an archival discourse of order but also to other 
discourses becomes an allegory of the problematic of identity as discourse structures itself and disrupts 
and transgresses itself. 
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CONTEXT 
CONTRA TEXT 
' "Context" indicates both that which accompanies the text 
(con- as in convocation) and that which is posed against the 
text (con- as in contra). Both readings are important, for the 
text is both dependent upon and differentiated from its 
context. Text and context thus exist in a relation of 
dif.ferance. There is no text without a context.' 
- JM Balkin 'Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory' 
(1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 743 at 781. 
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DISCOURSE OF ORDER (SERIES 1 PART 1) 
COMP ARA TIVISM IN LABOUR LAW 
BAKE IN HOT OVEN 
'Today things will be slightly different.' 
-- Gillian Rose Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and La.w (1984) 11. 
[SECOND PARABLE: THE COOKING LESSON 
The situation is familiar (or, at least, easy to imagine): a woman wearing an apron is 
demonstrating to a television audience how to prepare an exotic dish. With a flourish, 
she lists her ingredients, some of which have not been seen in bourgeois households 
south of the Sahara since 1830. She then proceeds to mix together a number of these 
ingredients. This process takes some time. 
Naturally, television being what it is, showing the demonstratrix actually mixing the 
ingredients for the required thirty minutes would be inexpressibly dull. A sleight of 
hand occurs: before the taping of the programme started, she pre-mixed her 
ingredients. Instead of mixing for the required thirty minutes, she reaches for a bowl 
containing ready-mixed ingredients. She proceeds with her demonstration, brightly 
guiding the viewer through a number of complex steps. 
Nearing the end of the demonstration, the dish is placed into a hot oven. Again, a 
sleight of hand is performed: showing the forty minute baking process would be too 
time-consuming for the medium (television) she is trapped in, and therefore, the boring 
bit (watching the dish bake in the hot oven) is cut (edited) out. A few seconds later 
(instead of forty minutes), with another in a seemingly interminable series of flour-
ishes, the aproned demonstratrix removes the fully baked dish from the oven. 
Needless to say, it is a resounding success.]l 
1 Discourse of Order Series 3 Part 2. The concerns of this parable relate firstly to the establishment of a 
relatively inflexible programme,(a recipe) and the implicit success attendant upon a rigid and non-deviant 
application of the recipe. In the demonstration of the programme, however, certain crucial problems are 
effectively un-written, un-named (ex-nominated). Essential procedures which determine the outcome of 
the programme are, because of their redundancy (in that these ex-nominated procedures are assumed not 
to convey any significant information), omitted, cut out or edited out of sight. Even so, it is exactly that-
which-is-not-mentioned which largely determines the success of the application, and not, contrary to the 
expectations (and the assumptions of the programme itself), the rigid and non-deviant application of the 
programme. The programme claims a certain rigidity and avers that it contains all the relevant (non-
redundant) information. Upon an application of the programme, however, that which is un-written 
34 
Comparativism in labour law 
2.1 MAGICAL RECIPES 
It is a long and hard road for those foolhardy enough to cast longing eyes upon the 
tempting treat of a successful comparison between aspects of labour law systems of dif-
ferent countries. For one thing, one has to be old and mature. 2 
Once this considerable hurdle is vaulted, certain canonical (archival) texts provide com-
parativists with ostensibly easy-to-follow recipes that guarantee success, the success 
itself being defined within the texts. These recipes, and the canonical texts in which 
they appear, are structured upon three central and general concerns. 
2.1.1 The concerns of comparative labour law 
Concern #1: The Institution-in-action or the Institution-as-function 
There are considerable attendant perils in following the wrong procedure, in compar-
ing, simply put, the wrong things: '[A]re we always sure that when we undertake 
studies in comparative industrial relations we do in fact compare comparable things?' 3 
It appears that 'it is extremely problematical and dangerous to extract from a national 
industrial relations system a single institution or rule and to compare it with what 
appears to be the corresponding institution or rule in another country. '4 
In order to avoid the dangers of comparing institution with institution, the object of the 
gaze of the comparative investigator is instead the function of the institution: 'the point 
of departure of international comparison cannot be an institution as such, but must be 
the functions it carries out' . 5 
The safe procedure then, is as follows: 
'In order to compare what is in fact comparable one needs to compare the functions 
institutions perform, rather than institutions themselves. Indeed similar institutions, 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
proves to be some of the essential moments in the iteration of the programme. 
2 
'To be a sound comparative lawyer, one needs maturity and a certain age' F H Lawson The Com-
parison - Selected Essays Volume II European Studies in Law Vol 5 (1977), quoted in F Venter, A J van 
der Walt et al Regsnavorsing: Metode en Publikasie (1990) at 206 note 5. 
3 J Schregle 'Comparative Industrial Relations: Pitfalls and Potential' ( 1981) 120 International Labour 
Review 15 at 18. 
4 Schregle op cit note 3 at 21. Emphasis added. 
5 Schregle op cit note 3 at 22. Emphasis added. 
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e.g. works councils, labour courts, union delegations, may perform different functions 
in different countries. One is interested in what is going on, thus in the functions rather 
than in institutions. '6 
Comparativism in labour law and industrial relations appears, from a reading of these 
excerpts, to be a study in dynamics: how functions (such as collective bargaining or 
dispute resolution) are carried out. The gaze is purposively shifted away from the 
architecture of the institution (the structure of the institution) to the functioning of the 
institution: the object of the comparativist's gaze is the institution-in-action or, more 
precisely, the institution-as-junction. 
The inelegant conjunction (institution-as-function) is necessary because these quoted 
excerpts do not demand an absolute negation of the institution. No doubt is raised that 
an institution exists, but its existence has been rendered incidental to the 'true' object of 
the gaze: the institution is recognised as being 'merely that which performs the func-
tion' -- it is not to be regarded as the whole, but merely part of the whole. 
It is only the institution-as-function that is 'in fact' comparable: comparing institutions 
'as such' would, according to the texts, be wrong -- it would be a mistake. 
Concern #2: The context 
The canonical texts of comparativism rigidly insist on obeisance to the 'context'. Kahn-
Freund wrote that the use of the comparative method 'requires a knowledge not only of 
the foreign law, but also of its social, and above all its political context' .7 
Without the involvement (intercession) of the context, the enterprise of comparing 
labour law or industrial relations is, in terms of its own programmatical archival rules, 
doomed to sag in the middle, to burn, to turn out half-baked. For this is the sense in 
which the term 'context' is used: as medium of intercession, as a means of achieving 
access to 'reality' . It is in this sense that Kahn-Freund' s seminal words become the 
beginning of a canonical text by Blanpain. s 
Schregle, too, asserts that '[i]nstitutions must be considered within the general context 
of the industrial relations system of which they are an integral part' . 9 
6 R Blanpain 'Comparativism in Labour Law and Industrial Relations' Chapter 1 in R Blanpain (ed) 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 3 ed (1987) 3 at 13. Emphasis added. 
7 0 Kahn-Freund 'On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law' (1974) 37 The Modern Law Review 1 at 
27. Kahn-Freund's gaze is focused upon comparative law as a method of legal reform: 'My concern is 
not with comparative law as a tool of research or as a tool of education, but with comparative law as a 
tool of law reform. What are the uses and what are the misuses of foreign models in the process of law 
making?' (at 1). 
8 Blanpain op cit note 6 at 3. 
9 Schregle op cit note 3 at 22. Emphasis added. 
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According to the programme of comparative labour relations, the institution-as-function 
should not be viewed in isolation: it is an 'integral part' of an industrial relations 
system. The institution-as-function occupies a certain position within this system; 
presumably, there are other institutional components at work within this system (the 
institution-as-function is an 'integral part' of a 'whole', namely the industrial relations 
system). There are not only collective bargaining functions, but also dispute resolution 
functions and functions related to the establishment of minimum employment standards. 
These functions are 'carried out' by institutions, and all institutions-as-function of a 
particular system provide the industrial relations context for every single institution-as-
function; the institution-as-function is at the same time itself and the context for other 
institutions-as-function. But the context is more than other institutions-as-function: the 
context is the conduit for access to the 'reality' of the system: 
' .... the comparative scholar should try to find out what is "going on", look for 
"reality". It is therefore not sufficient to compare the text of the legislation of different 
countries, as they e.g. appear in the Legislative Series of the ILO; one should also look 
at collective agreements, works rules in the enterprise, tacit understanding, customs and 
past practice. It is above all important to find out whether and how laws are applied, 
how institutions function in practice. Is it not interesting to know whether the Belgian 
works councils do in fact get the abundant information they are by legislation entitled 
to? A recent investigation showed that the implementation of that legislation is far from 
adequate.' 10 
The comparativist should, according to the programme of the canonical texts, direct his 
or her gaze 'beyond' the text of the law, onto (into) reality, onto the context of day-to-
day practice in the industrial relations system. The text (legislation) that creates the 
institution is insufficient: the intercession of the context of daily doings is required to 
bake a perfect comparativist cake. 
Concern #3: Misleading terminology 
The text of the law is insufficient for the success of a comparative enterprise --- it is a 
weak whisper that has to be 'supplemented' into sense (reality) by conduct, actions, 
attitudes, feelings. 
But perils attend, for language is pernicious ---
'One of the main difficulties, which presents a real pitfall for the comparative scholar, 
is the fact that the identical words in different languages may have different meanings, 
while the corresponding terms may embrace wholly different realities.' 11 
10 Blanpain op cit note 6 at 14. Emphasis added. 
11 Blanpain op cit note 6 at 18 . Emphasis added. 
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It is not merely a problem of translation, for apart from the 'meanings' of words, there 
are the burdening meta-juridical connotations that weigh so heavily upon the clear, 
transparent terms: 
'Concepts, expressed in words, are laden [burdened?] with values, emotions, past expe-
riences and future expectations. Extracting such words from their national context and 
translating them into what appears to be the equivalent in another language, i.e. 
another society is a very problematical exercise indeed.' 12 
The concept 'collective bargaining', for example, denotes a localised process for a 
reader using the industrial relations system of the United States as a frame of reference, 
while the same two words denote corporatist negotiations to a Swedish reader. Inter-
preting the terms within a German frame of reference would lead to an ambiguity: do 
they mean negotiations between union and employer, or negotiations between employer 
and the works council?I3 Terms, in their fullness, do not travel beyond the borders of a 
particular system and words have different meanings when used in another frame of 
reference, when used in another context. 
2.1.2 Follow(ing) (in) these (foot)steps 
This analysis of these brief excerpts of the canonical texts of comparative labour law 
yields a number of procedural steps that have to be taken in order for the comparative 
enterprise to succeed: 
1. The object of the investigation is not the institution as institution, but the func-
tion of the institution. The focus of comparativism in labour law and industrial 
relations is squarely upon the institution-as-function. 
2. The functioning institution must be seen within the context of an industrial rela-
tions system, itself situated within a socio-political context. 
3. The name of the institution may be misleading (but the name of the institution-
as-function can never be misleading, for the functions are in fact comparable). 
4. The text which creates the institution is insufficient; the 'reality' is 'outside' or 
'beyond' the text of the law (legislation, usually), accessible only through the 
intercession of the context. 
12 Schregle op cit note 3 at 25. Emphasis added. 
13 See Schregle Zoe cit note 12. 
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The proof of the pudding, of course, is in the eating: how does this programme or 
recipe look when taken out of the oven? 
It is the dogmatic insistence on the context in particular that structures the comparative 
discourse. Token genuflections in the general direction of compliance with the strict 
requirement of the context as intercession to reality are observed: 
'Der Kontext der okonomischen, sozialen, politischen und rechtlichen Verhaltnisse ist 
wesentlich fi.ir die Einordnung und Bewertung des hier untersuchten Phanomens. Ein 
Blick ausschlieJ3lich auf einen isolierten Komplex, namlich die Arbeitsbeziehungen, 
muB bei jeder Landerstudie zu verzerrten Ergebnissen fi.ihren . . . . '[The context of the 
economic, social, political and legal relations is of vital importance when it comes to 
ordering and evaluating the phenomenon which is studied here. Viewing an isolated 
complex, namely labour relations, alone will invariably lead to distorted results in a 
study of a country ... ]14 
Here it is clear how the active discourse orders the passive discourse: the procedure 
outlined in the active canonical texts is being applied (rigorously, rigidly, and without 
question). The demands made in the active discourse of order are met; the recipe is fol-
lowed to the letter. 
The passive discourse is about South Africa. Therefore, the economic, social, political 
and legal relationships have to be sketched as context. 15 The result may be schemati-
cally represented as follows: 
Economic and social context 
• structurally weak economy, dependent on mining and agriculture; 
• low growth rate (figures cited); 
• high unemployment among blacks; 
• insufficient education among black school-leavers; 
• lack of social improvement and ever increasing unemployment leads to poverty 
striking entire families, in tum leading to radicalization of township-dwellers; 
14 M Komer-Dammann Bedeutung und faktische Wirkung von !LO-Standards (1991) at 81-2. The foot-
note has been omitted, because it refers directly back to the canonical texts which have been the object of 
analysis above: Kahn-Freund, Blanpain and Schregle. 
15 A possibility that must not be discounted is that the text under consideration is spurious, that the pro-
cedures and information are aberrations. In order to counter this possibility, the structures of the one pas-
sive text will be correlated with another passive text: J Piron and PAK le Roux 'South Africa' in R 
Blanpain (ed) International Encyclopedia of Laws (date of chapter: 1993). The relevance of this passive 
text lies in the fact that it was written specifically for the purposes of international comparative law - it is 
a chapter in a comparative publication. 
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• virtual collapse of the black education system at the end of 1990, caused by the 
separate education systems for blacks and whites; exacerbated by school 
boycots; 
• few blacks have completed secondary education, significant numbers have no 
formal education whatsoever .16 
Politico-legal context 
• apartheid legislation fundamentally affected the South African legal order, as 
well as all spheres of society; 
• relevant indications: no right to vote for blacks, moving blacks into formally 
independent homelands, linked to the problem of migrant labour and separation 
into group areas, the limitations on right of movement of blacks living in South 
Africa; 
• the workplace was severely affected by these legal structures: skin-colour 
determined education and training; 
• despite the limited loosening of the grip of the apartheid legislation since 1976, 
the system did not fundamentally change: classification and registration of popu-
lation groups remained; 
• most important features of apartheid system: no right to vote, the enforced 
citizenship of homelands and the limitation on the freedom to move; 
• South African labour law is closely linked to the structures of apartheid, this 
link cannot be dissolved by abolishing the legal bases of apartheid; 
• reason: security laws criminalise virtually any unwanted act, such as the 
'promotion of communism', the 'promotion of the aims of a prohibited 
organisation' or 'intimidation' . 11 
There are a number of reasons for this relatively detailed schematic overview of a com-
parative text. It is clear that this is a passive text, the structures of discourse have been 
informed by (taken over from) the canonical texts on the procedures of comparative 
law. Furthermore, the information is presented in a relatively detailed manner --- foot-
notes offer indications of sources. The research is thorough, the information is correct 
and presented with few flourishes. Finally, it is patently an honest attempt to comply 
with the recipe for comparative labour law. 
16 Komer-Dammann op cit note 14 at 84-5. In Piron & le Roux op cit at 17, the authors outline only the 
original agricultural economy of South Africa and trace historical developments (the rise of the mining 
and other industries). Unlike Komer-Dammann, no attention is paid to education and the lack of training. 
17 Komer-Dammann op cit note 14 at 83-4. Piron & le Roux deal largely with the same issues: racial 
segregation, the homelands, influx control (i e freedom of movement). Written later than the Komer-
Dammann text, the Piron & le Roux text reflects also political developments of the early 1990s. 
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The starting point of the passive comparative text is the importance of the context: the 
section summarized here is an attempt to provide a reader (as the book is in German, 
the reader will more than likely not be South African) with background information, to 
give her a glimpse of the realities of South Africa as it then was. 
But the context is, of course, everywhere: the section on the socio-political and legal 
context of South African labour law has its own context in the book itself. 
Korner-Dammann's book deals with the application of international labour standards of 
the International Labour Organisation. In the section immediately preceding the South 
African contextualization, she discusses the types of investigative procedures and com-
plaint procedures of the International Labour Organisation, including past complaints 
against the Federal Republic of Germany, Poland, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. 
But these complaints against these other countries are not placed in any context at 
all. This could indicate that the choice of the context is selective: only the South 
African context needs brief introduction. It is presumed that the (European) reader is 
familiar with the socio-political, economic and legal contexts of these countries ---
though this presumption in regard to Haiti and the Dominican Republic is probably 
unwarranted. 
In view of the central theme of Korner-Dammann's work (the application of ILO 
standards in South Africa), one cannot help but wonder at the relevance of the socio-
political and legal background information that is presented. This information is not 
directly relevant to the development of the central theme and appears to be virtually 
redundant. 18 The context is offered for its own sake --- the performance of the 
programme of comparative labour law has become an end in itself. There is no attempt 
to integrate the context into that which it contextualises. Like a high mountain, it is 
simply there. 
This virtual non-relevance of that which is presented as the context implies that the 
procedures followed by Komer-Dammann are merely a rigid (but selective) application 
of the procedures of the programmes of the canonical texts --- an application of the 
demands of contextualization. 
This is not a problem for a single author (Komer-Dammann) or anyone else following 
these comparative programmes contained in the canonical texts. The essential problem 
lies in the sleights of hand performed in the canonical texts themselves. 
18 In the Piron & le Roux text, the chapter starts off with some truly startling information, including 
exact geographic information on the location of the country (in these days of the global information vil-
lage and media explosions, this information appears out of place - certainly those readers who open a 
book of this nature would either know more or less where South Africa is, or, alternatively, would have 
the means of establishing the location of the country themselves), the various types of climate, and 
information about population, including information about the numerical strength of the various popula-
tion groups. Additional features of this passive text are high rates of population growth and urbanization 
of the population. 
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2.1.3 The limitations of the programmes of the canonical texts 
For the canonical text, the mere fact of insistence on contextualization is sufficient ---
this is the flourish with which an ingredient is presented by the programmatic 
demonstration of the active text. However, exactly as a sleight of hand was performed 
in the cooking demonstration, so a sleight of hand is performed in the canonical text. 
Once the active text has rigidly insisted on contextualization, the canonical text pro-
ceeds to withdraw into a silence from which it obstinately refuses to yield any addi-
tional illuminations. Finer details are left out, closer particulars are not given, the 
programme is not gapless. 
No mention is made of some of the central difficulties inherent in the comparative 
recipe. There is no indication of how the process of contextualization has to take place 
--- once the process has begun, the canonical text assumes that all that needs to be 
said has been said. Additional steps need not be outlined, for it is assumed that these 
additional steps and normative operations (which context is to be presented, which sec-
tion of the context) are known and that repeating these steps and operations is super-
fluous. The cooking demonstratrix does not take into account the nuisance of lumps 
appearing during the mixing process. The canonical texts of comparative labour law do 
not take into account the possibility of problems that may arise with the contextualiza-
tions performed in terms of their programmes. 
What, then, does the process of contextualization involve? Substantively, the compara-
tive programme fails to explain what type of information is relevant in the process. The 
programme fails to distinguish, in its own operation, between redundant and non-
redundant information (the operation of this information would make possible a sub-
sequent distinction between redundant contextual information and non-redundant con-
textual information). To illustrate: the historical development of a labour law and 
industrial relations system could be relevant, but the canonical programme, having 
retreated into a silence, yields no indication of time-frame, and the scope of the appli-
cation of the programme becomes problematical (should a comparativist go back to the 
nineteenth century?). 
This is not a spurious issue. The German labour court system, for instance, was intro-
duced on the western bank of the Rhine river in the wake of the Napoleonic conquest. 
To what extent should this historical fact be considered? In dealing with the structures 
of the German labour courts, should not a rigid insistence on contextualization imply 
that the structures of the parent institutions in France also be investigated? The British 
system of industrial tribunals had their origins in the First World War. To what extent 
is this historical fact relevant? The canonical programme is silent in this regard. 
This problem may be countered by stating that this historical information is simply not 
relevant. But stating that certain information is irrelevant or redundant means that other 
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normative operations are taking place --- operations that make possible a distinction 
between redundancy and non-redundancy. The canonical programme is content with a 
limited economy demanding contextualization. Claiming (ir)relevance would be sup-
plementing the programme contained in the canonical text by virtue of the fact that the 
normative structures of the distinction are contained not in the canonical programme 
itself, but outside it. 
This is the sleight of hand of the canonical programme: an insistence on the relevance 
of the context is also a failure to provide an additional normative programme for estab-
lishing the relevant context. 
Accessing the context is another trick of the light. Apart from a total immersion in a 
foreign legal system, the comparativist can only rely on written reports, written by 
national experts. Again the canonical programme makes an additional demand: the 
comparativist should try to find out 'what is going on' , the reality of industrial relations 
practice. Add to this the compounding difficulties of terminology and language, a com-
parativist is reduced to a shivering bundle of hope and faith: she can only hope that the 
written information about a given system contains sufficient information on 'what is 
going on' to ensure the success of the comparative enterprise. A comparativist working 
on a textual basis can only hope that texts contain sufficient information, that the text 
she is reading sufficiently reflects the 'reality' demanded by the programmes of com-
parativism. 
The programmes outlined in the canonical text are a flourish, they are the beginning of 
a process. With this flourish, the canonical text then desists and withdraws into a 
silence, covering up the difficulties, practical implications involved in the application, 
the normative structures which are required for a full application of the programme. 
The recipe seems simple and straightforward, but what is left unsaid leaves a com-
parativist in the lurch: the batter forms clumps, the context becomes unmanageable, 
stretching into infinity. . . . 
2.2 WHAT IS (REALLY) COOKING? (is there nothing outside the 
text?) 
Apart from the gaps in the programmes of the canonical texts of comparative labour 
law, the texts themselves contain a number of textual operations, structures, and meta-
phors. These textual operations in fact serve to undo another of the central concerns of 
the programme of the canonical texts, namely the explicitly stated disaffection with lan-
guage, where language is perceived as potential danger, as pitfall, as that which stands 
between the comparativist and what is being compared. 
For the sake of convenience, the relevant excerpts of the canonical texts are repeated 
here: 
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'In fact, one could argue that it is extremely problematical and dangerous to extract 
from a national industrial relations system a single institution or rule and to compare it 
with what appears to be the corresponding institution or rule in another country. Such 
comparison of isolated aspects of different industrial relations systems will in all 
probability lead to wrong conclusions - especially if made for the purpose of compara-
tive evaluation. Institutions must be considered within the context of the industrial rela-
tions system of which they are an integral part. To come back to our thesis, the point of 
departure of international comparison cannot be an institution as such, but must be the 
functions it carries out. And functions are a reflection of the operation of the industrial 
relations system in its entirety. '19 
Two of the three central concerns of comparativism in labour law and industrial rela-
tions are addressed in this passage: the importance of the system context and the 
institution-as-function. 
A careful reading of this passage discloses a number of operations (the key words have 
been emphasised). The institution-as-function is an integral part of an industrial rela-
tions system. An institution-as-function occupies a certain position and performs certain 
functions within that system. The institution-as-function is not alone --- it functions 
within a context (all the institutions-as-functions together form the system). The system 
(the whole) is the context of the institution-as-function (the part); collectively the parts 
(institutions-as-function) are the whole (industrial relations system). 
The institution-as-function is, however, stated to be more than just one part of many 
(part of the whole) --- it 'reflects' the operation of the entire industrial relations system. 
The institution-as-function mirrors the workings of the rest of the industrial relations 
system --- the 'context' (the industrial relations system) is mirrored, reflected by the 
functioning of a single institution (the whole is reflected in the part). 
Through the institution-as-function, the whole system (the industrial relations context) 
is revealed (for a reflected image is, in the ordinary course of events, a relatively 'true' 
--- in the sense of faithful --- picture, even though spatial orientation such as left and 
right may be reversed), it is glimpsed. From viewing the institution-as-function (a 
part), it is the conceit of the text that the observer may see an image (reflection) of the 
whole system: the motion is from institution-as-function toward system, or 
institution-as-function - > system, 
or 
institution-as-function - > context. 
Other fragments of the canonical texts illuminate these processes of reflection even fur-
ther: 
19 Schregle op cit note 3 at 21-22. Emphasis added. 
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'In order to compare what is in fact comparable one needs to compare the functions 
institutions perform, rather than institutions themselves. Indeed similar institutions, 
e.g. works councils, labour courts, union delegations, may perform different functions 
in different countries. One is interested in what is going on, thus in the functions rather 
than in institutions as such. •20 
This may, at first glance, appear to be a repetition of the first passage. But once the 
phrase 'what is going on' is given the meaning ascribed to it later in the same text, the 
focus starts to shift. For this particular text defines 'what is going on' as 'reality': 
'From what has been said this far concerning the comparison of functions, it follows 
self-evidently that the comparative scholar should try to find out what is "going on", 
look/or "reality".'21 
The 'reality' that is being referred to is the day-to-day industrial relations practice. The 
'reality' is, in one sense, the context in terms of which institutions carry out their func-
tions. This confirms the view that the text is operating on a motion of institution-as-
function toward context ('reality', that which is 'going on'). But only once it is 
accepted that the objects of the comparison are functions that the comparative scholar 
can 'look to' (in the mirror?) to see the reality of the industrial relations context. 
A similar structure orders the relationship between the institution and the function ---
this aspect is not quite as readily apparent from the passage quoted from the canonical 
text. 22 
A function, states the text, is 'carried out' by an institution, the function is performed 
by the institution. The function does not perform itself. In being carried out by an 
institution, the structure, organisation, view, opinion and, above all, the personnel of 
an institution inform (structure, determine) the carrying out of that function. This 
means that by viewing the function (as it has been performed), the observer may dis-
cern an image of the institution itself: its structures, politics, status. Again there is 
motion involved: from function to institution. It is by looking at the function that the 
institution can be glimpsed (not 'seen', for the gaze is directed at the function). In this 
way, the institution is the context of the function (the function must be seen in its 
institutional context) 
20 Blanpain op cit note 6 at 13. Emphasis added. 
21 Blanpain op cit note 6 at 14. Emphasis added. 
22 For the purposes of this section, I am conflating the Blanpain text and the Schregle texts into one 
canonical text. This appears farfetched only if the explicit conflation which is prevalent in the texts them-
selves (the Blanpain text is by and large derivate of the Schregle text) is ignored. 
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function - > institution, 
or 
function - > context. 
The third concern of comparativism is the ostensible pitfall of language: 
'In comparative industrial relations, problems of terminology go far beyond the diffi-
culty of literal translation. Concepts, expressed in words, are laden with values, emo-
tions, past experiences and future expectations. Extracting such words from their 
national context and translating them into what appears to be the equivalent in another 
language i.e. another society, is a very problematical exercise indeed. '23 
Again, certain textual operations are structuring the discourse (note the similarities: 
'extract' , and 'context'): a term cannot be 'extracted' from a 'context' --- the word has 
meaning only if seen in a certain context, it may have different meanings if translated 
into another context, another language (which is equated to 'society'). In the case of the 
concern about language and terminology, however, the discursive motion is reversed (is 
this why language is a pitfall?): it is the context, the society, the values, emotions and 
experiences that structure or inform the meaning of a technical term such as collective 
bargaining. The motion is from context to term: 
context - > term, 
or 
context - > language. 
Placed together, the structure of the discourses appear as follows (and the reversal of 
the discursive motion in the last case becomes even clearer): 
1. 
2. 
3. 
institution-as-function(part) 
function 
context ( = system) 
-> 
-> 
-> 
context ( = system, whole) 
context ( = institution) 
language ( = society) 
In cases 1. and 2. the left hand term (which the discourses place in a privileged posi-
tion) is a representation (in the sense of being a reflection) of the right hand term. That 
which appears on the left-hand side of the table is the signifier for that which appears 
on the right-hand side (the signified). Reading the texts makes it clear that that which 
appears on the left is preferred: the institution-as-function is 'in fact comparable', the 
function is preferred over the institution 'as such' . 
23 Schregle op cit note 6 at 25. Emphasis added. 
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In case 3., however, the (un-privileged --- right hand side) language is a reflection of 
the context (the privileged term). 
These statements about the three statements are neither interesting nor particularly illu-
minating, but they do serve the purpose of illustrating the limitations of interpretational 
paradigm. Up to this point, the utterances contained in the canonical archival texts have 
been reduced to dynamic formulae. Ordering these dynamic formulae vertically 
(paradigmatically) made it possible to identify certain changes, certain shifts operating 
in the texts, but hardly enables one to grasp the full import of these discursive opera-
tions. It is only through restoring a more discursive paradigm (partially restoring the 
formulae to sentences) and ordering them syntactically (or syntagmatically) that their 
true import becomes clearer. 
The texts equate language with society. Language (concepts expressed in words) carries 
with it values, emotions, and past and future experiences. These values, emotions, and 
experiences are the 'reality', another concern of the text: this is 'what is going on'. 
Language, therefore, represents or reflects the reality, the conduct of the system. And, 
finally, the text establishes a certain identity: language is society. 
Read together, the structure of the present comparativist discourse is as follows: 
FUNCTION - > INSTITUTION ( = institution-as-function) - > SYSTEM - > LANGUAGE = 
SOCIETY, 
or: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
• 
• 
• 
The function is a reflection of the institution 
the institution is the context of the function, which together form the 
institution-as-function. 
The institution-as-function is a reflection of the entire industrial relations 
system and 
• The industrial relations system is the context of the institution-as-
• 
• 
function. 
Language, with its connotations of value, emotions and experiences, is a 
reflection of the reality of the industrial relations system, and 
Language is society . 
This sequence of reflections or representations, would then, if factored out, amount to 
the following: the function is a reflection of society, not only the industrial relations 
system, but the whole society. But because the text creates an identity between language 
and society (language = society, but also society = language), the order can be 
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reversed yet again: the function is a reflection of language. Subsumed back into an ear-
lier equation (function/context), this would mean that language is the context, that 
which is signified (represented) by the function. 
What are the consequences of these discursive operations for the discourse on com-
parativism? The archival structures of the discourse on comparative labour law and 
industrial relations are not only dependent upon the language it so explicitly reviles and 
warns against (this is stating the obvious --- all these texts contain sentences). 
The discourse on comparativism is also, in the final analysis, about language, tex-
tuality, discourse. In spite of its radically expressed disaffection with language (it is, 
one should remember, a danger, a pitfall), the upshot of the discursive operations of 
the canonical texts is simply that viewing the function provides a view of the system, 
where things are going on (values, emotions, experiences) which are reflected in 
language. 
So comparative labour law and industrial relations is forcibly returned to its own tex-
tuality and discursivity and the comparative enterprise is one of gazing upon that dis-
course gleaming in the mirror of the text. The desired 'reality' is absent, there is 
nothing going on except certain discursive operations. 
There is nothing outside the text. 
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[. . . this very text relies for its own operations on a certain economy --- an economy 
which demands that a certain price be paid (such as the ordering of material) --- an 
economy of saying and of leaving-unsaid .... there is nothing outside the text, but the 
text is continually in the process of trangressing the 'self' of the 'itself' . . . 
Is there an internal coherence at stake? 
Here and now, at this very point, the internal coherence of the instant text breaks --- it 
is a point of brisure, which is both a break, a crack, and a joint in a piece of joinery. It 
is a hinge. This is a hinge. 
What follows is not only fearfully symmetrical but the chapters now following (with 
the exception of chapter 6) employ totally different modalities of presentation ---
marked (marred?) by changes in tone, different types of information presented. The 
nature of the text (and the discourse) undergoes a change from the reflexive and 
textual-analytical (in)to surface-overviews, legal structures, citations of legislation and 
judicial decisions ... at once, the 'legal' reader is again on solid ground, as the law is 
taken at face value, as those zones of difficulty, of metaphysics, of juridification and 
juridification-as-discourse are (temporarily) occulted by a representation (summary) of 
the contents of the positive law. 
In part (but only in part, not in whole) the following chapters attempt to comply with 
the programmes of the canonical texts on comparative labour law, namely establishing 
a context. 
The context presented in what follows is twofold: first, the industrial relations and 
labour law systems in each of the three countries under consideration; second, institu-
tional aspects of labour courts and other judicial bodies (the institution-as-context). 
Throughout, the focus is upon collective industrial relations and the law regulating 
those relations --- there are at least two reasons for this focus. Procedurally, taking into 
consideration and comparing that which is normally classified as individual labour law 
would fall outside the scope of this work. Substantively, considerations of a discursive 
nature apply: the object of chapters 3, 4, and 5 is to transmit some impressions of the 
dominant discourses of collective labour law. This discursive foundation is erected, 
however, also with another object in mind, namely to be in a position to subsequently 
trace the transgression of the (established) archival discourses through the discourse of 
individuality, of single employees; to be able to see how courts break through the col-
lective discursive archival structures which are traditionally seen as attaching to the dis-
pute by obliterating that discourse with others, one of which may be the discourse of 
individuality . . . 
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The following chapters are brief; brief sometimes to the point of the commonplace, the 
banal or the superficial. At the risk of closing the text, it perhaps needs to be stated at 
this point that the true object of this text is still some way off, the real exercise, the 
actual investigation has yet to begin (the remainder of this part is, then, in a sense, 
introductory, pre-textual). The aim of this text is not to compare complete labour law 
systems, nor to compare labour courts and other judicial bodies qua institution, but to 
lay some of the conceptual groundwork for what is to follow. 
The three chapters immediately following outline some of the structural aspects of each 
of the three labour law systems under consideration. Of vital importance in chapters 3, 
4 and 5 are the conceptual foundations of these systems: those concepts that structure 
the comprehension of/in the system. These structures are often contained in canonical 
discourses, such as the writings of Kahn-Freund on collective laissez-faire in Great 
Britain in 1954 (who re-wrote Sinzheimer, who re-wrote {to an extent} von Gierke, in 
turn re-writing ... ). Again, these discourses are, in a certain sense, discourses of 
order (archival rules). . . They lay (or lay bare, reveal or disrupt or close or hide) the 
conceptual foundations (a type of Urtext --- the discourse of industrial relations and 
labour law) for what follows, comes after them (in the sense of being 'led by' these 
discourses), this (present?) text, other institutions-as-functions, such as labour courts, 
which seek to follow the programmes of the archive, conceptualizing their function, its 
performance, its structural impact in terms of these discursive foundations . . . 
Foundations exceeded, transgressed, surpassed, silenced .... ] 
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3 
THE SYSTEM OF LABOUR LAW IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
OF GERMANY 
3.1 
THE EVERPRESENT (BASIC) LAW 
'Niemals werden deutsche Arbeitsgeber sich bereitfinden, mit den Vertretern von 
Arbeiterorganisationen auf dem Fufie der Gleichberechtigung zu verhandeln.' [German 
employers will never find themselves prepared to negotiate, on an equal footing, with 
the representatives of labour organisations] 
-- H A Bueck (General Secretary of the 'Centralverband Deutscher Industrieller', the 
'Central Association of German Industrialists'), 1890, quoted in W Daubler Das 
Arbeitsrecht Vol I (1990) 69. 
'Arbeitgeber und Betriebsrat arbeiten unter Beachtung der geltenden Tarifvertrage 
vertrauensvoll und im Zusammenwirken mit den im Betrieb vertretenen Gewerkschaften 
und Arbeitgebervereinigungen zum Wohl der Arbeitnehmer und des Betriebs zusam-
men.' [The employer and the works council are to work together in good faith taking 
into consideration the applicable collective agreements in cooperation with trade unions 
represented in the undertaking [Betrieb] and employers' organisations for the well-being 
of the employees and the undertaking.] 
-- § 2(1) Betriebsverjassungsgesetz (BetrVG) 
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 
The German industrial relations system is characterised by extensive legal codification. 
Legislation creates a number of structures in terms of which relations between 
employers and employees are conducted, from plant-level works councils, through 
employee representation in management, to a legislative framework for collective 
bargaining. 
By and large, though, this legislation still represents a type of negativity in structure: 1 
essentially, the limited aims of the legislation is to institutionalise forums where conflict 
resolution and bargaining can take place. The result of this prevalence of industrial 
relations legislation in the Federal Rebublic of Germany is that relations between 
employers and employees unfold not only in various forums (each focusing on different 
relational aspects), but that the relations are conducted within a rigorously determined 
legal infrastructure, which, with few (but nevertheless notable) exceptions, provides 
1 See P Davies and M Freedland Labour Legislation and Public Policy: A Contemporary History (1993) 
at 11-15. 
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legal remedies for industrial behaviour seen as dysfunctional. The legal institutions 
serve both the function of dispute resolution and the establishment of standards at vari-
ous levels: works councils on a factory-floor level, employee co-determination at enter-
prise level, and collective bargaining on a national level. 
On factory-floor level, the interests of employees are represented by the works council, 
which has, in terms of the enabling legislation, exhaustively enumerated functions and 
duties. On an enterprise level, the interests of employees are represented by labour rep-
resentatives in the managerial structures. Powerful trade unions and employers (some-
times employer organisations) collectively bargain issues falling outside the scope of 
competence of either the works councils or the labour representatives. 
Individual disputes between employers and employees are processed either through the 
works council (if the works council has jurisdiction in the matter), or through the 
labour court structure. 
Pervasive throughout the labour law system of the Federal Republic of Germany is the 
catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the Constitution, the 1949 Basic Law, so 
extremely powerful in the dissemination of conceptual structure throughout the legal 
system. 2 For collective labour law, the provisions of Article 9 of the Basic Law are of 
pivotal importance: 
'(1) All Germans shall have the right to form associations and societies. 
(2) Associations, the purposes or activities of which conflict with criminal laws or 
which are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international 
understanding, are prohibited. 
(3) The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic con-
ditions is guaranteed to everyone and to all trades, occupations and professions. 
Agreements which restrict or seek to impair this right shall be null and void .... '3 
This constitutional provision serves as the foundation for the concept of 'collective 
autonomy' (the original German term is 'Tarifautonomie', but the concept of the 
2 The Basic Law does not merely provide a framework for the rest of the German legal system. Substan-
tive constitutional law concepts, often the result of constitutional interpretation, seeps throughout the 
German legal system, thereby disseminating (distributing) the core 'content' of the Basic Law. In this 
way, a constitutional right to equal treatment before the law may serve as the basis for a labour court jur-
isprudence founded on a homological structure, namely that trade unions and employers should be treated 
equally by the law --- this in spite of the fact that the Article 3 right contains no reference to either trade 
unions or employers. For present purposes, the most important fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
Basic Law are the protection of human dignity (Article 1), equality before the law (Article 3), freedom of 
expression (Article 5) and freedom of assembly (Article 8). 
3 Translation: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn. Emphasis added. This is 
the only constitutional provision in the German constitution with explicit horizontal effect. 
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'Tarif(vertrag)' has no equivalent in English). 4 The contents of Article 9(3) by implica-
tion also entail what is called the Koalitionsbetiitigungsgarantie (the right of associa-
tions to take actions in order to safeguard and improve working and economic condi-
tions). The Federal Constitutional Court has held that this Betiitigungsgarantie requires 
the state to provide trade unions and employers (employers' organisations) with a 
system of collective agreements.s Within this system, the parties may bargain on terms 
and conditions of employment --- the concept of 'collective autonomy' means 'daB der 
Gesetzgeber den Tarifvertragsparteien immer ein ausreichend groBes Feld von 
Arbeitsbedingungen iiberlassen muB, auf dem sie sich im Sinne eines Aushandelns von 
Leistung und Gegenleistung sinnvoll beti:itigen konnen' [that the legislature must always 
leave the parties to collective agreements a sufficiently large range of conditions of 
employment on which they can take meaningful action in the sense of a negotiation of 
performance and counter-performance].6 The state, in other words, creates the frame 
within which trade unions and employers are to draw the lines of terms and conditions 
of employment: 
'Die Verfassungsordnung iiberliillt es den Gewerkschaften auf der einen und den Arbeit-
gebern bzw. Arbeitgeberverbande auf der anderen Seite, die Arbeits- und 
Wirtschaftsbedingungen, vor allem die Mindestlohne durch Tarifvertrage kollektiv fest-
zulegen. '7 
The right of the collective bargaining parties may only be limited where absolutely 
necessary. 8 Where the state establishes minimum terms and conditions of employment, 
the role of the state is to protect the 'legal property' of employees: life, health, the 
development of personality, the freedom to exercise a given calling, and the guarantee 
of the minimum that is necessary for existence. As such, then, the establishment of 
4 It may appear strange that the origins and the development of the concept Tarifautonomie will be 
traced in some greater detail at the beginning of Chapter 4 below --- which is, after all, a chapter dealing 
with British industrial relations and labour law. The concept of Tarifautonomie looks back on precursors 
well within the nineteenth century --- it is not an invention of modem jurisprudence or merely the result 
of innovative constitutional interpretation. 
5 See BVerfG AP Nr 1 on Art 9 GG. In order to simplify the explanation, the complexities of the 
German 'Kembereichslehre' (doctrine of the essential core) are glossed over. 
6 M LOwisch Arbeitsrecht 3 ed at 41. 
7 [The constitutional order leaves it to the trade unions on the one hand and the employers (or employer 
organisations) on the other hand to lay down the working and economic terms and conditions, especially 
the minimum wage, by means of collective agreements.] G Schwerdtfeger 'Die Koalitionsfreiheit des 
Arbeitnehmers in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland' in Max-Planck-Institut fur auslandisches offentliches 
Recht und VOlkerrecht The Freedom of the Worker to Organize: Comparative Law and International Law 
(1980) 149 at 164. 
8 See BVerfG AP Nr 1 on§ 1 MitbestG. 
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minimum terms and conditions of employment is justified and determining this mini-
mum does not fall within the collective autonomy of trade unions and employers. 
However, should the state try to establish maximum terms and conditions of employ-
ment, those economic policy considerations motivating the fixing of such terms would 
be eclipsed by the concept of collective autonomy. 9 
3.2 PLANT-LEVEL EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN WORKS 
COUNCILS 
Unlike the German labour court system, worker representation by means of works 
councils at plant level or factory floor level is a truly German invention. It has a long 
history. The concept of worker representation first found expression in a 1848 draft 
industrial code which never became law. It was only in 1891 that this concept, the 
origin of which can be traced back to civil unrest in the nineteenth century, found its 
place in legislation. Various metamorphoses of the idea in 1905, 1909 and 1916 led to 
the Works Councils Act of 1920, which for the first time allowed employees to partici-
pate in decisions relating to social and personnel matters. 
A new Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) was passed in 1952, this in 
turn replaced by a wholly new Act in 1972.10 
The Works Constitution Act, apart from regulating purely formal matters such as the 
technicalities of the election of the works council, consists largely of an exhaustive 
enumeration of participatory rights of the works council; 11 the effect of the Act is to 
9 Lowisch Zoe cit note 6. 
10 This brief historical overview is based in G von Hoyningen-Huene Betriebsverfassungsrecht (1990) 
!Of. See also V Hentchel Geschichte der deutschen Sozialpolitik (1983) 78-85 and 247-260 and W 
Daubler Das Arbeitsrecht Vol 1 at 371-386. 
11 Von Hoyningen-Huene op cit at 40-1. Von Hoyningen-Huene links the concept of worker participa-
tion and representation on the shop floor to the concept of democracy: 'Auf dem Grundgedanken der 
Demokratie aufbauend, will Mitbestimmung die Beteiligung der Betroffenen an der jeweiligen 
Entscheidungen durch Information und Mitwirkung ermoglichen. Auf diese Weise soll gleichzeitig die 
Kontrolle der betrieblichen evtl. unternehmerischen MaBnahmen erreicht werden. Diese 
Beteiligungsmoglichkeit beruht letztlich auf der Wiirde der Person und ihrer freien Entfaltung . . . Erst 
<lurch Mitbestimmung seid die Beriicksichtigung sozialer Umstande, also eine soziale Entscheidungs-
politik moglich ... ' [Building on the basic idea of democracy, participation is intended to enable those 
that are affected by decisions to take part in those decisions by means of information and co-operation. 
At the same time, this also establishes control over plant-related as well as enterpreneurial measures. 
These participatory rights rest in the final analysis on personal dignity and the free development thereof . 
. . Only by means of participation is it possible to take social conditions into consideration, thereby 
making a socially orientated decision-making policy possible]. Von Hoyningen-Huene op cit note 10 at 
3-4, emphasis in original. 
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promote peace and order in the plant, thereby promoting willingness to work and job 
satisfaction. 12 
The starting p.oint of the entire Works Constitution Act is the explicit emphases placed 
on peaceful cooperation in the Act itself.13 
A works council is established in every plant or undertaking with more than five 
employees. The council is elected on a proportional basis by the entire workforce (even 
though white-collar and blue-collar elect their representatives separately) .14 Works 
councils are not union organisations (the role of the union in the formation of a works 
council is clearly set out in the Act). 1s 
Once elected, the works council represents the collective interests of the entire work-
force, but as a creature of statute, it has no inherent powers - the powers of the council 
are exhaustively enumerated in the Act. These rights and powers include the right to 
information,16 the right to be heard by the employer,17 and, under certain circum-
stances, a right to veto some managerial decisions, such as decisions relating to trans-
fers and appointment of employees. is 
Of even greater importance are the true rights of participation (the employer may not 
take one step without the approval of the works council) -- this includes decisions 
regarding the ordering of the workplace, working hours, overtime, the place, manner 
and time of payment of remuneration.19 
12 Federal Labour Court BAG AP Nr 2 on § 56 BetrVG (1956) at 3R. See von Hoyningen-Huene op cit 
note 10 at 5. 
13 § 74(1) BetrVG provides that employers and works councils are to meet at least once a month, that 
they are to negotiate with the serious intention of reaching agreement and that they are to make sugges-
tions with a view to resolve any dispute that may arise. § 74(2) BetrVG prohibits industrial action relat-
ing to disputes between the works council and the employer. These relational duties between employer 
and works council are further underscored by § 2(1) BetrVG, which imposes a duty of cooperation on the 
employer, the works council, any trade unions enjoying representation in the plant, as well as any 
employers' organisation. 
14 §§1, 10, 7-20and 14(2)BetrVG. 
15 In terms of § 77(2) BetrVG, collective agreements between employers (or employers' organisations) 
and trade unions enjoy precedence over agreements concluded between employers and works councils. 
The constitutionally protected rights of a trade union to recruit members and to distribute information in 
the plant are not affected by the Act, while union rights of access are reiterated in § 2(2) BetrVG. 
16 In terms of§ 80(2) 1 BetrVG, the council has a general right to demand information required to fulfil 
its functions. 
17 In terms of § 102(1) 1 BetrVG, for example, the works council must be heard before an employee is 
dismissed. The employer may, of course, proceed with the dismissal despite opposition from the works 
council, but this is rare. See von Hoyningen-Huene op cit at 292. 
18 § 99(2) BetrVG. 
19 See§ 87 (1) BetrVG. 
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Disputes between employers and works council are usually referred to arbitration - the 
referral of a dispute to a labour court is the exception rather than the rule. 20 
3.3 EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN MANAGERIAL STRUCTURES 
(CO-DETERMINATION OR MITBESTIMMUNG) 
Apart from the detailed system of plant-level representation and participation, the inter-
ests of employees are also represented in the management of the undertaking. A num-
ber of statutes21 create a role for employee representatives on the supervisory boards of 
large companies. 22 
§§ 1 and 7 of the Codetermination Act provide that half the members of the supervisory 
board of share-capital companies with a workforce exceeding 2 000 employees shall be 
employee representatives. The other half consists of members representing the interests 
of shareholders and the size of the board is determined by the size of the undertaking 
(the size of the workforce being the relevant factor). At least one of the employee rep-
resentatives must represent the relevant trade union. Employee representatives are 
elected by the workforce, again white-collar and blue-collar workers separately. 
The parity of representation on the supervisory board does not mean that control over 
the enterprise has left the hands of the shareholders, for they retain the upper hand in 
the election of the chairperson. The chairperson is a powerful figure, for he or she has 
two votes. 23 In mining and steel industries, however, the chairperson and the executive 
director for labour affairs (who is a member of the executive committee of the com-
pany) cannot be elected against the wishes of the employee representatives. 
As an institution, co-determination signifies a node of three basic structural principles 
of the German legal system (some of which have constitutional status): The property 
right(s) of the owner(s) of the company (Article 14 of the Basic Law) intersects with 
the freedom of association of Article 9 of the Basic Law (in order for freedom of asso-
ciation to be effective, employers and trade unions must be independent of each other), 
20 In terms of§ 23 BetrVG, for example, the employer (or a trade union or a quarter of the workforce) 
may apply to a labour court to have a member of a council removed or to have the entire council dis-
solved, while a works council may apply for an interdict or order of the court. 
21 The basic piece of legislation is the Codetermination Act or the Gesetz uber die Mitbestimmung der 
Arbeitnehmer of 1976 (MitbestG), supplemented by two other pieces of legislation specifically for the 
mining industry and all steel-producing industries. 
22 This co-determination has its origins in the same history that gave rise to worker participation on plant 
level. The first legislative provision to provide for co-determination was § 70 of the 1920 Works Coun-
cils Act. 
23 § 27 MitbestG. 
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in turn intersected by the ideals of representation, joint decision-making and participa-
tion in management. 24 
3.4 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Issues such as remuneration structures or working hours (generally, all issues relevant 
to an industry as a whole) falling beyond the scope of factory-floor level or enterprise-
level representation are dealt with by means of collective bargaining. This should not 
create the impression that bargaining takes place on a national level, for it is a long-
standing practice that initial negotiations in a specific industry take place in a certain 
geographical bargaining area (for the metal industry, this is often Nord-
Wurttemberg/Nord-Baden), and that other bargaining areas then follow the example set 
by the agreement reached in the first area. 
German trade unions are unitary in structure: there is, for example, one union (the 
Industriegewerkschaft Metall) representing all employees working in steel or related 
industries, and there is one single union for all employees working in printing. Unions 
are further organised in a three-tier structure: federal executives, state executives and 
local union offices.25 Nationally, unions are grouped together under the umbrella of the 
Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (Federation of German Trade Unions). Employers in the 
Federal Republic of Germany are grouped along similar lines: employer organisations, 
such as the General Federation of Metal Industries Employers' Associations 
(Gesamtmetall, like the IG Metall the most powerful employers' organisation) shelter 
under the umbrella of the Bundesvereinigung deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande (Federal 
Confederation of German Employers' Associations). While the Deutschen 
Gewerkschaftsbund would not dare presume to coordinate the collective bargaining 
policies of its members, the Bundesvereinigung deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande has a 
committee which drew up a list of taboos -- issues over which the employers were not 
to negotiate, such as (until 1990) the 40 hour work week. 
Collective bargaining in Germany takes place in terms of the Collective Agreements 
Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz) of 1969. This Act regulates the nature of collective agree-
24 See BVerfG AP Nr 1 on§ 1 MitbestG 1976. 
25 German trade unions have no legal personality. The reason for this lack of personality was an original 
version of the Civil Code, in terms of which incorporated societies (which do have legal personality) 
could be required to provide a lower court with a list of its members. German trade unions feared state 
victimisation of individual members, and therefore refused to incorporate. In terms of § 57 of the Civil 
Procedure Code, unincorporated societies do enjoy passive standing in the civil courts. 
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ments,26 the capacity of parties to conclude collective agreements (and, by extension, 
capacity to bargain)27 and the applicability of agreements.28 
German labour law does not impose a duty to bargain, the view of the Federal Labour 
Court being that an imposition of such a duty could lead to an investigation of the 
demands made at the bargaining table and that this would amount to involving itself 
with the substance of collective bargaining.29 One of the fundamental leitmotivs of 
German law on industrial relations appears from this decision, namely the policy of the 
courts not to involve itself in the substantive collective bargaining process. 30 
26 In German law, collective agreements are both contracts between the signatories to the agreements, 
and a form of private legislation (their normative aspect), creating rules applicable to all employment 
contracts falling under the scope of applicability of the agreement. In relation to the normative aspect of 
collective agreements, the Act lists a number of topics that the parties may agree to, including the con-
tents of employment contracts, formalities of employment contracts, and formalities for the termination 
of contracts. See § 1 TVG. 
27 In terms of § 2 TVG, the parties to collective agreements are trade unions, single employers and 
employers' organisations. Umbrella bodies, such as the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, may conclude 
collective agreements if properly mandated to do so, or the umbrella body has the authority to conclude 
collective agreements in terms of its constitution. An additional requirement is that a collective bargain-
ing party must be capable of exerting pressure on its counterpart. On this point see C Mischke 'The 
inseparability of powers: judge-made law in the German legal system' (1992) 7 SA Publiekreg!Public 
Law 253 at 258. 
28 In terms of § 5 TVG, for example, the scope of a collective agreement may be extended by the Minis-
try of Labour (both federal or Land) if at least half of all employees within the bargaining unit are in the 
service of employers who are parties to the agreement and if the extension would be 'in the public inter-
est'. 
29 
'Das BAG steht in standiger Rechtsprechung auf dem Standpunkt, daB eine Gewerkschaft oder ein 
Arbeitgeberverband keinen Anspruch gegen den tariflichen Gegenspieler auf Aufnahme und Fiihrung von 
Tarifverhandlungen hat, sondern darauf beschriinkt ist, die Ablehnung von Verhandlungen durch 
KampfmaBnahmen zu iiberwinden. Das iiberrascht auf den ersten Blick, weil dadurch Chances fiir eine 
freiliche KonfliktlOsung vertan zu werden scheinen. Indessen muB beachtet werden, daB ein solcher Ver-
handlungsanspruch letzten Endes zu einer gerichtlichen Kontrolle von Tarifforderungen fiihren miiBte, 
weil jeweils festzustellen ware, ob die strikte Ablehnung einer bestimmten Forderung Ausdruck der Ver-
handlungsunwilligkeit oder aber sachlich begriindet ist. Eine solche Inhaltskontrolle wiirde der 
Tarifautonomie widersprechen.' [The Federal Labour Court is of the opinion that a trade union or an 
employer association does not have a right to demand that the opposite party take up and continue with 
negotiations. Such a party would be limited to overcome the refusal to negotiate by means of industrial 
action. This may, at first glance, appear surprising, because it appears to waste a chance for the peaceful 
resolution of conflict. However one must remember that a right to negotiate would in the end lead to an 
evaluation of collective bargaining demands by the court, because it would have to be established in 
every case whether the refusal of a certain demand amounts to an unwillingness to bargain or whether it 
has a substantive ground. This type of substantive evaluation would contradict collective autonomy.] 
LOwisch op cit note 6 at 95. 
30 See BAG AP Nr 5 on Art 9 GG (1963). 
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3.5 MEDIATION 
German law recognises both state mediation and private mediation. State mediation 
takes place in terms of the 1946 Kontrollratsgesetz Nr 35 (legislation inherited from the 
Allied controlling body set up after World War II). This Act provides for the estab-
1 ishment of mediation commissions as part of the state Ministries of Labour 
(Landerarbeitsbehorde). The chairperson of the mediation commission is selected by 
the Ministry from a list, subject to approval by the parties to the dispute. A dispute 
may be referred to state mediation by one party, provided the other party agrees. The 
mediation commission attempts to achieve a settlement between the parties; should this 
fail, the nature of the proceedings changes to arbitration. The decision made by the 
mediation commission is only binding on the parties if they agreed to be bound by the 
decision beforehand or indicate their subsequent acceptance of the decision. 
Private mediation agreements (collective agreements in terms of the Collective Agree-
ments Act) are of greater practical significance. For the most part, these mediation pro-
cedures are resorted to only after bargaining has failed.31 
3 l Lowisch op cit note 6 at 112-116. 
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THE SYSTEM OF LABOUR LAW IN GREAT BRITAIN 
KEEPING OUT OF THE WAY: THE ABSENCE OF LAW IN 
BRITISH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
4.1 
'Traditionally, industrial relations in the United Kingdom has been firmly rooted in its 
own culture and has operated largely separate from the legal system. This feeling of 
separateness has been so strong that in 1970, as the battle raged around the Industrial 
Relations Bill which was to move collective relations firmly into the area of legalism, 
the slogan "keep the law out of industrial relations" was much to be seen.' 
-- Sir John Wood 'Dispute Resolution - Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration' Chap-
ter 7 in W McCarthy (ed) Legal Intervention in Industrial Relations: Gains and Losses 
(1992) 241. 
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 
Strange as it may appear at first blush, the conceptual foundations of modem British 
labour law and industrial relations were imported from Germany, courtesy of the writ-
ings of the late Otto Kahn-Freund. 
Kahn-Freund was not the progenitor of the concept of collective autonomy or its British 
sibling collective laissez faire 1 - at most, he can be described (with a fair amount of 
accuracy) as populariser and extender of the concepts which stem, in fact, from a rich 
German legal and legal-sociological tradition.2 
1 As to the origins and context of the term see W McCarthy 'The Rise and Fall of Collective Laissez 
Faire' Chapter 1 in W McCarthy (ed) Legal Intervention in Industrial Relations: Gains and Losses 
(1992) 1at4f. 
2 One of the most important contributors to the idea of collective autonomy was Hugo Sinzheimer: as 
early as 1915, in his essay 'Der Tarifgedanke in Deutschland', ideas and concepts orbiting the nature of 
collective agreements in general, how they differed from ordinary contracts of employment and how they 
were enforced, appear (see H Sinzheimer 'Der Tarifgedanke in Deutschland' (1915) in H Sinzheimer 
Arbeitsrecht und Rechtssoziologie: Gesammelte Aufsii.tze und Reden 0 Kahn-Freund and T Ramm (eds) 
Vol I (1976) 150 at 157t). See also H Sinzheimer 'Die Neuordnung des Arbeitsrechts' (1919) in 0 Kahn-
Freund and T Ramm (eds) op cit 62 at 67f. Kahn-Freund himself provides a useful overview of 
Sinzheimer's work and the works of inter alia Otto von Gierke which served as the basis of Sinzheimer's 
research: 0 Kahn-Freund 'Hugo Sinzheimer 1875-1945' Chapter 2 in 0 Kahn-Freund Labour Law and 
Politics in the Weimar Republic R Lewis and J Clark (eds) (1981) 73 at 82f. See also J Clark 'Towards a 
Sociology of Labour Law: An Analysis of the German Writings of Otto Kahn-Freund' Chapter 4 in Wed-
derburn, Lewis and Clark (eds) Labour Law and Industrial Relations: Building on Kahn-Freund (1983) 
81 at 82f. 
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British labour law theory and industrial relations theory have been incapable of re-
conceptualizing labour law and its role in industrial society - the concept of collective 
laissez faire still serves as the conceptual foundation of British labour law at the dusk of 
the twentieth century. 3 
Describing the concept collective laissez-faire as 'the theory dominant in the early post-
war period', Davies and Freedland start off an impressive historical analysis of, essen-
tially, the rise and fall of this structural principle, the origins of which they trace back 
no further than Otto Kahn-Freund.4 
Using the conceptual machinery found and improved by his patron, Sinzheimer, Kahn-
Freund finds fertile ground in the British labour law system of the 1950s: 
'There is, perhaps, no major country in the world in which the law has played a less 
significant role in the shaping of [labour management] relations that [sic] in Great 
Britain and in which today the law and the legal profession have less to do with labour 
relations. '5 
The state appeared to leave the regulation of industrial relations to the parties involved: 
to trade unions and employers -- the parties could autonomously create (and, for that 
matter, enforce) rules and structures of industrial relations: 
'British industrial relations have, in the main, developed by way of industrial 
autonomy. This notion of autonomy is fandamental and it is . . . reflected in legislation 
and in administrative practice. It means that employers and employees have formulated 
their own codes of conduct and devised their own machinery for enforcing them . . . 
within the sphere of autonomy, obligations and agreements, rights and duties are, 
generally speaking, not of a legal character. •6 
To this day, collective laissez faire is the dominant discourse of British labour law: the 
law is interpreted in order to see to what extent it has fallen from this state of grace.7 In 
view of the absence of a British constitutional Urtext, which could structure a mainte-
3 As to the rise of the concept of collective laissez faire and its gradual eclipse, see the historical analysis 
of W McCarthy 'The Rise and Fall of Collective Laissez Faire' op cit note 1 at.4f. 
4 P Davies and M Freedland Labour Legislation and Public Policy: A Contemporary History (1993) 8f. 
5 0 Kahn-Freund 'Legal Framework' Chapter 2 in A Flanders and H Clegg (eds) The System of Indus-
trial Relations in Great Britian ( 1954) quoted in Davies and Freedland op cit note 4 at 9. 
6 Kahn-Freund Zoe cit note 5, cited in Davies and Freedland op cit note 4 at 9. Emphasis added. 
7 From a methodological point of view, the basic texts of Kahn-Freund contributed to the empiricism 
which marks British industrial relations research: 'Students were to be despatched into the field like 
botanists, returning with over-full notebooks crammed with significant facts.' W McCarthy op cit note 1 
at 2. 
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nance of8 or even a return to laissez faire collective (absent) labour law, the eclipse of 
this structuring concept presents a significant challenge to the continued dominance of 
collective laissez faire as dominant discourse. 
The concept of collective laissez faire relegated the law to a position of subsidiarity: the 
function of the law was reduced to creating a framework within which the industrial 
relations system could function unimpeded, this in turn necessitating over-writing 
(obliterating) aspects of the common law which failed to adapt sufficiently to accom-
modate modern industrial relations. 9 
Collective laissez faire was the absence of the law -- the law did not involve itself with 
the conduct of collective industrial relations. But the Fall (the death of collective 
laissez-faire) and its consequences is a return of the law; the absence becomes a 
presence. And this, of course, is nothing other than 'juridification'. 
British legislation does not provide for institutionalized plant-level forums such as the 
system of works councils in Germany, nor does it provide for employee participation in 
management structures in terms of a co-determination concept. 
4.2 HANDS OFF: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE LAW 
Extensive and autonomous collective bargaining has always been the key feature of 
British industrial relations, and before 1968 the law paid relatively scant attention to the 
institution --- even the Donovan Commission felt that '[p ]roperly conducted, collective 
bargaining is the most effective means of giving workers the right to representation in 
decisions affecting their working lives, a right which is or should be the prerogative of 
every worker in a democratic society.' 10 As far as the Commission was concerned, 
however, 'the system of multi-employer, industry-wide agreements' prevalent in the 
private sector 'were treated with little respect by employers who in practice bargain 
extensively over pay at the place of work.' Informally, plant-level bargaining was on 
the increase, but these informal bargaining situations were 'inflationary, strike-ridden 
and prevented the efficient organization of work. '1 1 
8 The German constitutional protection of the freedom of association in Article 9 of the Basic Law 
enables a maintenance of a (albeit limited) collective autonomy - the structural principle of this collective 
autonomy could not be done away with except in terms of a radical re-interpretation (re-writing) of the 
constitutional Urtext. 
9 See Davies and Freedland op cit note 4 at 11-12. See also chapter 12 below. 
10 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer Associations (Donovan Commission) Report 
Cmnd 3623 (1968) par 212. The Donovan Commission appeared to be of the view that the institution of 
collective bargaining could accommodate worker participation (which in Germany is institutionalized in 
the system of works councils) in employer decision-making. 
11 W Brown 'Bargaining Structure and the Impact of the Law' Chapter 9 in W McCarthy (ed) op cit note 
1 296 at 300. 
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In keeping with the great British tradition of collective laissez faire, the Report of the 
Donovan Commission did not bear fundamentally significant changes to the law on col-
lective bargaining in its wake. Nor, as such, did the 1971 Industrial Relations Act and 
its replacement by the 1975 Employment Protection Act do much to change the collec-
tive bargaining landscape. 12 But the increasing legal intervention in the sphere of indus-
trial relations generally represented by these Acts added momentum to a pre-existing 
trend towards single employer collective bargaining. 13 
Things changed totally in the 1980s, because the conservative government that came to 
power under Mrs Thatcher 'was hostile not only to industry-wide agreements but to all 
collective institutions in the labour market.• 14 Targets of the ire of the conservative 
government were the trade unions and their power, perceived as being one of the 
causes of British industrial decline. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, several 
Employment Acts found their way into the statute books which affected the power rela-
tionships between trade unions and employers.15 Even so, the import of the legislation, 
focusing largely on the internal powers of trade unions and prescribing rules that unions 
had to comply with, did not establish a legislative system for the conduct of industrial 
relations in Great Britian. 
By 1992 the system of collective bargaining had auto-transformed (brought about a 
change without the assistance of the law): 
'With accelerating pace over the past twenty years a new pattern of largely single-
employer bargaining has emerged from the remnants of once dominant industrial agree-
ments. Very little of this transformation can be attributed to government action and 
none directly to legislation. It has been driven by the need for employers to gain tighter 
controls over pay and productivity within their companies. Bargaining structures are 
employer driven and are peculiarly immune to direct legislative intervention.' 16 
Governmental policy (i e the hands-off approach to collective bargaining) continued, 
and, as economic factors continued to play a role, 17 those in power were of the opinion 
that 
12 The 1971 Act did, however, provide for a statutory procedure whereby employers could formally 
recognise trade unions; it also contained some provisions relating to freedom of association. See Davies 
and Freedland op cit note 4 at 655. 
13 See Brown op cit note 11 at 301-2. 
14 Brown toe cit note 13. See also Davies and Freedland op cit note 4 at 425f. 
15 For an schematic overview of the changes wrought by the legislation in the period 1980-1990 see 
McCarthy op cit note 1 at 43-54. 
16 Brown op cit note 11 at 306. Emphasis added. 
17 See McCarthy op cit note 1 at 58. 
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' ... traditional patterns of industrial relations, based on collective bargaining and col-
lective agreements, seem increasingly inappropriate and are in decline . . . [Individual 
workers] want the opportunity to influence, in some cases negotiate, their own terms 
and conditions of employment, rather than leaving them to the outcome of some distant 
negotiations between employers and trade unions.' 18 
The inescapable impression is of an informal and fragmented system of collective 
bargaining, usually taking the form of single employer bargaining with trade unions. 
There can also be no doubt that the law has not directly intervened in collective 
bargaining: there are no formal institutions where bargaining takes place on a regular 
basis, no works councils with which the employer has to meet at least once a month. 
Whereas the labour legislation of especially the 1980s may have had an indirect 
influence on bargaining practice and the change in bargaining patterns, legislation such 
as the German Tarifvertragsgesetz (Collective Agreements Act) in the context of British 
industrial relation remains inconceivable. 
4.3 CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE LAW 
Conceptually, industrial conflict resolution in Great Britain appears to be structured by 
the same absence of the law: relationships between employers, trade unions and their 
members, between employers and employees 'were felt to be so personal that inter-
ference, either by legislation or recourse to the courts, was resented as unwarranted and 
felt likely to be destructive of understandings painfully built up over the years.' 19 
Legal non-intervention did not as such concern the 1968 Donovan Commission, even 
though the Commission did praise efforts towards more conciliation. 20 The topic of 
increasingly institutionalized conciliation contributed no slight voice to the controversy 
surrounding the government's response to the Donovan Commission Report. 2 1 
Although the controversy expired, 1975 saw the establishment (in the Employment Pro-
tection Act) of the tripartite Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), 
the object of this body being 
18 People, Jobs and Opportunity Cmnd 1810 (1992) par 1.15 and 1.18, quoted in Davies and Freedland 
op cit note 4 at 656. 
19 J Wood 'Dispute Resolution - Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration' Chapter 7 in W McCarthy 
(ed) op cit note 1 at 240. Similarly W Brown 'Industrial Conflict Resolution in Great Britain' Chapter 1 
Part II in T Hanami and R Blanpain (eds) Industrial Conflict Resolution in Market Economies (1987) 103 
at 107: 'Conflict resolution in Britain is typically part of a continuing and complex process of negotia-
tion, often conducted at or close to the place of work, and whether or not the protagonists are satisfied 
with the outcome, they are usually equally hostile to any involvement of outsiders.' 
20 Donovan Commission Report par 434. 
21 See the Labour Government's White Paper In Place of Strife Cmnd 3888 at 93. 
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' . . . to provide conciliation and mediation as a means of avoiding and resolving dis-
putes, to make facilities available for arbitration, to provide advisory services to 
industry on industrial relations and related matters and to undertake investigations as a 
means of promoting the improvement and extension of collective bargaining. '22 
As suggested by its name, one of the functions of ACAS was to be conciliation. As 
regards collective conciliation, ACAS appears to have played a significant role in sup-
porting collective bargaining: the service has 'maintained an untarnished and almost 
universal reputation both for independence and for professionalism of the highest qual-
ity' _23 
The Central Arbitration Committee (CAC), which traces its origins back to a so-called 
Industrial Court of 1919, provides additional facilities for use in arbitration. 24 The 
process of arbitration of disputes appears to have enjoyed no great popularity in British 
industrial relations. 25 
Generally, third-party intervention in industrial disputes in Britain has not departed 
from the conceptual underpinnings of non-intervention; essentially, the activities of 
ACAS and the CAC are 
' ... concerned with helping to keep the peace. It has not had a reforming purpose ... 
. The main reason for this is the government's alleged policy of non-intervention in 
industrial matters - it should all be left to the parties. '26 
22 Letter from the Secretary of State to the first Chairman of ACAS, quoted in Wood op cit note 20 at 
249. One of the motivations for the establishment of ACAS was the fact that the industrial relations 
players no longer felt comfortable with the state Department of Employment offering conciliation and 
arbitration services (at stake were perceptions of impartiality or the lack thereof). See Davies and Freed-
land op cit note 4 at 409 and also s 1(2) of the original enabling legislation (The Employment Protection 
Act 1975): 'The Service [ACAS] shall be charged with the general duty of promoting the improvement of 
industrial relations, and in particular of encouraging the extension of collective bargaining and the devel-
opment and, where necessary, reform of collective bargaining machinery.' 
23 Wood op cit note 20 252. Also: 'Traditional industrial relations dispute settlement is universally 
recognized to have at its heart professional conciliation. ACAS cannot be praised too highly for the clear 
and consistent way it has demonstrated the value of this process and has maintained respect through its 
skill and impartiality in its use' (at 268-9). 
24 The functions of the CAC were set out in the 1975 Employment Protection Act: see s 3(l)(b) of that 
Act (in terms of which a dispute could be referred by ACAS to either an arbitrator appointed by ACAS 
or to the CAC). See also ss 17-19 of the Act. 
25 See generally Wood op cit note 20 at 258-62. 
26 S Kessler and F Bayliss Contemporary British Industrial Relations (1992) at 187. 
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THE SYSTEM OF LABOUR LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 
FIGHTING FOR FAIRNESS 
'Die Nasionale Party is ook nie te vinde vir die beleid van sy opponente om die Nywer-
heidsversoeningswet van toepassing te maak op naturellewerkers, en hulle dus op 'n 
gelyke voet met blanke werkers te plaas nie. Afsonderlike masjinerie sal vir naturel-
lewerkers geskep word om hulle belange te behartig. Ook sal die kleurslagboom in die 
nywerheid gehandhaaf word en die blanke werker se loonstandaarde beskerm word teen 
ondermyning deur goedkoop naturellearbeid.' [The National party does not propose fol-
lowing the policy of its opponents, namely to make the Industrial Conciliation Act 
applicable to black workers en thereby to place them on equal footing with white 
workers. Separate machinery will be established for black workers to deal with their 
interests. The colour bar in industry will be maintained and the wage standards of white 
workers will be protected from being undermined by cheap black labour.] 
-- BJ Schoeman (Minister of Labour) in Dagbreek en Sondagnuus, 12 April 1953 
' ... fairness is now the overriding consideration in labour relations in South Africa ... ' 
-- Fabricius AM in Food & Allied Workers Union v Spekenham Supreme (2) (1988) 9 
ILJ 628 (IC) at 637 A. 
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 
Whereas the concepts of Tarifautonomie and its derivative, collective laissez faire, can 
be seen as fundamental structuring principles or dominant discourses in the labour law 
systems of Germany and Great Britain respectively, South African labour law, trapped 
in yet another British tradition (empiricism) has yet to succeed in authoritatively 
identifying the dominant discourse of South African labour law. 
This is not the place in which to attempt such a full-scale identification. In view of the 
paucity of theoretical and conceptual research and writing in South Africa, an account 
of the dominant discourse of labour law is a daunting and virtually impossible task. 
However, the single most pervasive concept in South African labour law during the 
1980s and early 1990s was one of fairness. The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, 
which repealed the 1956 Act, is structured not on the basis of fairness, but rather on a 
framework of rights and duties. 
Fairness was introduced not through commentary by a South African equivalent of 
Kahn-Freund; instead, the concept is statutory in origin, having found its place in the 
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Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956 for the first time by way of an amendment in 
1979 (the name of the legislation was changed to the Labour Relations Act in 1980). 1 
The first statutory definition of an unfair labour practice was 'any labour practice which 
in the opinion of the industrial court is an unfair labour practice', a definition intro-
duced in the wake of the recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry into Labour 
Legislation (the Wiehahn Commission).2 The function of the industrial court, intro-
duced at the same time (and an institution considered in more detail in chapter 9 
below), was, according to some commentaries of the time, legislative in nature: the 
Government White Paper on Part 1 of the Wiehahn Commission Report envisaged that 
'the Industrial Court [will] develop a body of case law which would by judicial prece-
dent contribute to the formulating of fair employment guidelines'. 3 
The structural function of the unfair labour practice definition changed in 1980, with 
the introduction of the following definition: 
' "Unfair labour practice" means ---
1 This study will concentrate largely on the legal position as it was prior to the passing of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995. At the time of writing in 1997, the dispute resolution functions and institutions 
envisaged by the new legislation has not yet produced a corpus of decisions amenable to the type of ana-
lysis done in chapter 13. It is therefore not possible to trace any judicial reaction in terms of the new 
legislation, as the necessary texts have yet to be written. In spite of this historical focus, many of the con-
cerns which remain to be excavated in the course of chapter 13 below may retain some relevance even in 
the dispensation brought about by the Labour Relations Act 1995. Any reference to the 'Labour Rela-
tions Act' (or its abbreviation 'LRA') must be understood to be a reference to Act 28 of 1956 as 
amended, unless otherwise indicated. 
2 See The Complete Wiehahn Report (1982) Part 5, par 4.127. The Commission itself already indicated 
the vagueness of the concept of the unfair labour practice, and some of the inherent difficulties in inter-
pretation. Referring to the concept 'fair', the Commission states: 'The use of this wide and conveniently 
vague term is of course not always fortunate, enabling as it does the adjudicator to give an interpretation 
in a particular case which could be totally unrelated to logic or principle . ... Today's sources equate 
the word to others such as: equitable, equity, unbiased, reasonable, impartial, balanced, just, honest, free 
from irregularities, or accterding [sic] to the rules. It would seem that in the context of labour, the con-
cept should be seen as relating to practices which are in line with the tenets of justice - not in the strictly 
legal sense but in a rather broader sense, as an expression of the natural sense of justice in the com-
munity. The task of adjudication in a particular instance would therefore be to measure the facts of the 
case against the yardstick of the adjudicator's subjective interpretation of what the community's sense of 
justice would be in a particular case. Few if any objective criteria would be available to the adjudicator.' 
Wiehahn Commission Report par 4.127.3. Emphasis added. 
3 White Paper on Part 1 of the Wiehahn Commission Report par 7.3 (iv). The view of the function of 
the industrial court as legislative was not limited to the government of the time as commentators thought 
along similar lines: 'When the court determines unfair labour practice disputes, it is performing a judicial 
function, but when it defines unfair labour practices, it is making rules. The latter function is legislative; 
the court, it seems, is enacting delegated legislation.' A Reichman and E Mureinik 'Unfair Labour Prac-
tices' (1980) 1 Industrial Law Journal 1 at 22. Emphasis added. 
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(a) any labour practice or any change in any labour practice, other than a 
strike or a lock-out or any action contemplated in s 66(1), which has or 
may have the effect that ---
(i) any employee or class of employees is or may be unfairly 
affected or that his or their employment opportunities, work 
security or physical, economic, moral or social welfare is or may 
be prejudiced or jeopardized thereby; 
(ii) the business of any employer or class of employers is or may be 
unfairly affected or disrupted thereby; 
(iii) labour unrest is or may be created or promoted thereby; 
(iv) the relationship between employer and employee is or may be 
detrimentally affected thereby; or 
(b) any other labour practice or any other change in any labour practice 
which has or may have an effect which is similar or related to any effect 
mentioned in paragraph (a).' 
As the unfair labour practice concept was now defined in the legislation, the industrial 
court lost its function of legislating; instead, the function of the court was now the 
determination of unfair labour practice disputes. 4 
A totally new (and controversial)5 definition was introduced by the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act 83 of 1988, a definition that, apart from purporting to codify some of 
the guidelines developed by the industrial court acting in terms of the 1980 definition of 
an unfair labour practice, also brought strikes and lock-outs within the ambit of the 
unfair labour practice definition. 6 
The Labour Relations Amendment Act 9 of 1991 reintroduced what amounted to essen-
tially the same vague and open statutory definition of an unfair labour practice: 
' "Unfair labour practice" means any act or omission, other than a strike or a 
lock-out, which has or may have the effect that ---
(i) any employee or class of employees is or may be unfairly affected or 
that his or their employment opportunities or work security is or may be 
prejudiced or jeopardized thereby; 
4 See E Mureinik 'Unfair Labour Practices: Update' (1980) 1 Industrial Law Journal 113 at 116-7. The 
reference (in paragraph (a) of the statutory definition) to s 66(1) of the Labour Relations Act was 
removed in 1982, bringing employer victimization of employees under the ambit of the unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction of the industrial court. 
5 See P Benjamin 'Making Amends: The 1991 Labour Relations Amendment Act' (1991) 12 Industrial 
Law Journal 239. 
6 The complete definition is reprinted in A Rycroft and B Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 
2 ed (1992) 159-61. 
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(ii) the business of any employer or class of employer is or may be unfairly 
affected or disrupted thereby; 
(iii) labour unrest is or may be created or promoted thereby; 
(iv) the labour relationship between employer and employee is or may be 
detrimentally affected thereby. ' 
Apart from serving as a foundation for the development of a complex and technical jur-
isprudence on unfair termination of employment, the concept of the unfair labour prac-
tice had also invaded the discourse of collective labour law. 7 Because the unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction of the industrial court amounted to a cause of action sui generis 
(the cause of action need, in other words, not amount to delictual liability, nor need a 
breach of contract be alleged for the industrial court to have jurisdiction), the concept 
was not only flexible and adaptable, but almost perniciously capable of pervading, of 
spreading into and through the institutions and system of industrial relations in South 
Africa. Fairness seeped through the fabric of the entire industrial relations system: even 
into areas, situations and relations privately arranged between the parties, even where 
the Labour Relations Act (the Jons et origo of fairness) has been excluded. 
5.2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
In order to ensure peace in the arena of industrial relations, the Labour Relations Act 
was interpreted as promoting collective bargaining: 
'The principal purpose of the Act is to combat industrial unrest. . . . It is to achieve this 
end that it promotes collective bargaining between employers and trade unions and for 
this purpose provides for the establishment and registration of permanent collective 
bargaining fora, namely industrial councils . . . and for the establishment of ad hoc 
fora, namely, conciliation boards . . . provides for mediation and voluntary and com-
pulsory arbitration of industrial disputes .... •8 
7 See now also s 27 ( 1) of the Constitution Act 200 of 1993, in terms of which every person has the right 
not to have an unfair labour practice committed against him or her and similarly s 23(1) of the 1996 Con-
stitution. 
8 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd v John NO & others (1987) 8 JU 27 (W) at 32B-D, per Ackermann J. Even the 
Appellate Division of the South African Supreme Court has recognised this interpretation of the Labour 
Relations Act: 'The fundamental philosophy of the Act is that collective bargaining is the means 
preferred by the legislature for the maintenance of good labour relations and for the resolution of labour 
disputes.' National Union of Mineworkers v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd (1991) 12 JU 1221 (A) 
at 1236J-1237A, per Goldstone JA. 
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This passage indicates the operation of an duality: in it the emphasis is on collective 
bargaining as a mechanism for the resolution of labour disputes, 9 while several other 
sections of the Labour Relations Act of 1956 clearly related to collective bargaining as 
a means for establishing minimum terms and conditions of employment. 10 
Industrial councils have dotted the South African industrial relations landscape for a 
long time, and by 1989, one commentator could state the following: 
'One must not forget that, for the larger part of their existence, industrial councils were 
extraordinarily undemocratic in the way that most institutions in this country are, in 
that they allowed for the majority of employers coupled with a minority and racially 
exclusive trade union grouping to set wages and working conditions for entire 
industries. ' 11 
In spite of their (at times) controversial position in South African labour law generally, 
referral of a dispute to an industrial council having jurisdiction geographically and sub-
stantively was a procedural requirement preceding recourse to strikes, lock-outs, 12 or 
referral of an alleged unfair labour practice dispute to the industrial court. 13 
Conciliation boards, established only in the absence of an industrial council having 
geographical or substantive jurisdiction over the dispute, 14 differed from industrial 
councils in that they were ad hoc, temporary bodies. In spite of this fact, they shared a 
conflict resolution function. is In much the same way as industrial councils, referral of a 
9 See ss 21(1)(f) and 27A LRA. 
IO See for examples 24(l)(a)-(z) ands 48 LRA. 
I I P Benjamin in 'Panel Discussion on the Role of the State in the Regulation of Industrial Agreements' 
in A Rycroft (ed) The Private Regulation of Industrial Conflict: Proceedings of the Labour Law Con-
ference 1989 (1990) 77 at 84. 
Il Sees 65(1)(d)(i) LRA. 
IJ Sees 43(2)(a) ands 46(9)(a) and (b) LRA. 
14 Sees 35(3)(d) LRA. 
15 Section 36 of the Labour Relations Act reads in part as follows: '(l)(a) A conciliation board shall 
endeavour to settle the dispute referred to it within 30 days from the date on which the application was 
lodged or within such further period or periods as may be agreed upon by the parties involved in the con-
ciliation board.' Section 35 LRA, which contains provisions relating to the establishment of conciliation 
boards, reads, in part: '(l) Whenever a dispute exists in any undertaking, industry, trade or occupation in 
any area .... ' In terms of ss 42(1) and (2) LRA, a conciliation board ceases to exist either on settlement 
of the dispute, on failure to settle the dispute or on the expiry of certain time periods. In view of these 
legislative provisions, it is clear that 'a conciliation board has no permanent status and also no regulatory 
or peace-keeping function'. Rycroft & Jordaan op cit note 6 at 152. It therefore appears strange that the 
court in the Trident Steel decision quoted above mentions a conciliation board as a forum of collective 
bargaining, whereas the legislation seems to envisage these boards solely as dispute resolution 
mechanisms. The court in the Trident Steel case appears to have conflated collective bargaining and dis-
pute resolution. 
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dispute to a conciliation board was a procedural prerequisite for the use of other con-
flict resolution mechanisms or the exercise of collective power .16 
But the concept of the unfair labour practice made possible a legal invasion into collec-
tive bargaining --- in the form of the imposition of a general duty to bargain. Initially, 
the industrial court was of the opinion that 'negotiations should always assume a 
voluntary character in order to be effective' .11 In essence, ·the concept of voluntarism 
(i e that negotiations should be entered into voluntarily by the parties and that the court 
should refrain from imposing a duty on trade unions and employers to enter into 
negotiations), signifying an absence of the law, bore distinct similarities to the German 
concept of Tarijautonomie. 
The dissemination of the concept of fairness through collective labour law enabled and 
structured a brisure in the jurisprudence of the industrial court: 
'I do not believe that voluntarism has any further right of existence in a system which is 
principally intended to combat industrial unrest. . . . In my view, and having regard to 
the fact that fairness is now the overriding consideration in labour relations in South 
Africa, it is time for the court to find firmly and unequivocally that in general terms it 
is unfair for an employer not to negotiate with a representative trade union.' 18 
Collective bargaining in South Africa took place and still takes place outside the scope 
of the labour legislation and the machinery established by that legislation. Due to the 
fact that unions representing black employees were excluded from participation in the 
mechanisms of the Labour Relations Act until 1979, a system of informal bargaining 
relationships, formalised in recognition agreements developed. Even though these 
recognition agreements and the relationships they formalised were concluded and con-
ducted outside the Labour Relations Act, the concept of fairness invaded even these 
relationships -- after its introduction the concept of the unfair labour practice 'was har-
nessed in an effort to harmonize the official system with the unofficial one. The process 
is by no means complete' .19 Departure from procedures agreed to in terms of a recogni-
tion agreement would constitute an unfair labour practice. 20 There is, of course, a 
16 See ss 43(2)(b), 46(9)(a) and (b) and 65(l)(d)(ii). 
17 Metal and Allied Workers Union v Hart Ltd (1985) 6 JLJ 478 (IC) at 489A, per Bulbulia AM. 
18 Food and Allied Workers v Spekenham Supreme (2) (1988) 9 JLJ 628 (IC) at 636J-637 A. 
19 Rycroft & Jordaan op cit note 6 at 115. 
20 In National Union of Mineworkers v Gold Fields of SA Ltd & others (1989) 10 ILJ 86 (IC), for exam-
ple, unilateral action taken by an employer who had concluded a recognition agreement was held to be an 
unfair labour practice. The industrial court (per Bulbulia M) relied on the duty to negotiate in good faith, 
noting that 'trade union recognition and the obligation to negotiate are closely linked. In principle the 
recognition of a trade union implies the obligation to negotiate with it, even if this is not explicitly stated 
in any legal text or collective agreement' (at 99J-100A). As fairness was the principle structuring the 
imposition of the duty to bargain, and as the duty to bargain is imported, almost to the extent of it being 
an implied clause to a recognition agreement, fairness has also colonised the private (contractually based) 
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certain irony in this: while the parties elect to formalise a bargaining relationship out-
side the Labour Relations Act, recourse is still had to the unfair labour practice 
remedies contained in that act -- an irony proving the pervasiveness of fairness. 
5.3 THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES 
There are a number of ways in which (collective) industrial conflict is resolved in South 
Africa. The exercise of collective force is the object of investigation in Part 3 of this 
text, and care must be taken not to pre-empt the contents of subsequent chapters. 
Industrial councils had both regulatory functions and conflict resolution functions, 
while in the case of conciliation boards, as has been pointed out above, the functional 
emphasis was upon conflict resolution.21 
Another dispute resolution mechanism was the industrial court, with subsequent appeals 
to the Supreme Court and finally to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. 
These judicial (and quasi-judicial) bodies will be discussed in some detail in chapter 9 
below. 
South African industrial relations does not boast an institution performing functions 
similar to the British Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service or the mediation 
committees established at Land-level in German ministries of labour. 22 
But the Labour Relations Act did provide for both mediation and arbitration. The Min-
ister of Manpower (now Labour) may, on application by an industrial council or on 
his/her own motion or after consultation with the parties to a dispute, appoint a 
mediator to try and settle the dispute.23 Of greater importance, however, is private 
mediation, taking place outside the scope of the Labour Relations Act, and often under 
the auspices of the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA). 24 Private 
mediation has proved popular in South Africa: 
'. . . I think there is probably no success story which glows quite so brightly in our 
labour firmament as that which has been enjoyed by the process of mediation in recent 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
relationship between employer and trade union in terms of a recognition agreement. 
2 1 See above note 14. 
22 This does not, however, mean that a similar institution has never been canvassed in South Africa. See 
Wiehahn Commission Repon par 4.132f. 
23 Sees 44 LRA. 
24 As is the case with arbitration outside the scope of the Labour Relations Act, resorting to private 
mediation is often linked to relationships between unions and employers being formalized in terms of 
recognition agreements. See Appendices Band C in A Rycroft (ed) op cit note 11at163-5, and 177-181. 
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years. . . . There can be no doubt that the process of private mediation would seem to 
lend itself to the South African labour situation in some very unique ways. Firstly, its 
informality is important in a community where formalities are often regarded with deep 
suspicion. It is also perhaps most successful because in an emotionally charged environ-
ment the downsizes of failure are small and the parties can emerge from a failure of the 
process, dissatisfied but seldom shattered or broken. Failure of the process also does 
not exclude a positive purpose having been served because in many cases the position of 
the parties have moved closer during mediation or at least new insights have been 
revealed to the parties about their respective positions - which may facilitate a sub-
sequent face-to-face settlement. Costs are often minimal in relation to the issues in dis-
pute and providing one is not too fussy about nominations, the process can be very 
speedy. '25 
Fairness seeped into this private mediation process, too (albeit in a negative way). In 
Metal & Allied Workers Union & others v Siemens Ltd, 26 a large number of employees 
went on an illegal strike. All but 36 of these employees were reinstated, and the trade 
union and the employer agreed to refer the cases of these 36 employees to mediation. 
Agreement could not be reached on the position of 13 employees. The industrial court 
was of the opinion that the employer's dismissal of the 13 employees amounted to an 
unfair labour practice because of the employer's failure to comply with its disciplinary 
code: 
'Mediation proceedings per se cannot be a substitute for a disciplinary enquiry the 
object of which is to establish the guilt or innocence of a worker and to afford such 
worker a fair and adequate opportunity of stating his case either in mitigation of the 
charges facing him or in defence thereof. The object of the mediation exercise, on the 
other hand, is altogether different. ... 
It is evident that the crux of the grievance of the individual applicants is based upon the 
fact that they were not accorded the benefit of a disciplinary enquiry following the 
inability of the mediators to resolve their cases on 9 August 1985. The court, in the 
exercise of its discretion, intends to apply the necessary corrective action in this regard 
with the object of dispensing material justice in the delicate field of sound labour rela-
tions, and more so because the respondent's disciplinary code does not sanction any 
form of instant dismissal without a proper investigation and a level 3 full disciplinary 
enquiry. '27 
The implications of this judgment appear to be that fairness (especially procedural fair-
ness) is stronger in nature than private mediation --- that mediation cannot take the 
place of procedural fairness, and that the industrial court calibrates (and, where neces-
sary, corrects) the delicate scales of fairness. 
25 G Brown 'Cheap and Expeditious Dispute Resolution' in A Rycroft ( ed) op cit note 11, 90 at 93-4. 
26 (1986) 7 ILJ 547 (IC). 
27 At 557H-I and 558I-559A. Emphasis added. 
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Furthermore, the Labour Relations Act provides for both voluntary and compulsory 
arbitration. In terms of s 45 LRA, an industrial council or a conciliation board may 
refer a dispute to arbitration. Compulsory arbitration, in terms of s 46 LRA, applies to 
essential services, and takes place when an industrial council or conciliation board fails 
to settle a dispute. 
Private arbitration, taking place outside the scope of the Labour Relations Act, was also 
popular. This private resolution of conflict was often linked to collective relationships 
themselves being formalised outside the Labour Relations Act in recognition agree-
ments.28 
Again, even private arbitration has been viewed through the unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction of the industrial court. Acting in terms of the definition of an unfair labour 
practice in force from 1988 to 1991 (a definition which included strikes and lock-outs), 
the industrial court granted an employer relief when a trade union threatened strike 
action in order to compel the employer to agree to voluntary arbitration. 29 
28 See Appendices B, C and D in A Rycroft (ed) The Private Regulation of Industrial Conflict (1990) at 
162-3 and 186-189. 
29 BTR Dunlop Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1989) 10 ILJ 181 (IC). 
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DISCOURSE OF ORDER (SERIES 1 PART 2) 
AN ANTI-PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE LABOUR JUDICIARY 
DEFINITION, DESCRIPTION, RECOGNITION AND OTHER 
ELEPHANTS 
'It is sometimes said that the law is open to all -- like the Ritz Hotel. What was wanted 
for the new legal rights being given to workers in the 1960s and 1970s, however, was 
something with the accessibility of a MacDonalds [sic] hamburger bar.' 
-- Linda Dickens 'Industrial Tribunals -- The People's Courts' (1985) 7 Employee Rela-
tions 27. 
'It is largely a matter of impression.' 
-- Lord Edmund-Davies in Attorney General v British Broadcasting Corporation [1980] 
3 All ER (HL) 161at175j. 
'When you have got an elephant by the hind leg, and he is trying to run away, it's best 
to let him run.' 
-- Abraham Lincoln Remark 1865. 
[THIRD PARABLE: MRS PLESS AND THE ELEPHANT 
One sunny afternoon, circa 4050 BC, while stalking some innocent prey, Mrs A G 
Pless chanced upon a particularly large animal with a trunk and two tusks. 'What,' she 
(being, in this account, fictional, and therefore capable of English) asked 'are you?' 
'I don't know,' the creature (being, in this account, fictional, and therefore capable of 
English) replied, 'but if you don't get out of the way, I shall stomp you.' Mrs Pless 
complied with this instruction and returned to her cave-dwelling where she related the 
encounter to her mate. 'What,' her mate (being, in this account fictional, and therefore 
capable of English) asked, 'was it?' 'I don't know,' replied Mrs Pless, 'but it 
threatened to stomp me.' 'Oh, good grief,' said her mate, and turned away to watch the 
daily entertainment, consisting largely of watching several particularly large animals 
each with a trunk and two tusks chase prehistoric men, women, and children across the 
savannah. Mrs Pless returned to her cooking utensils, and thought to herself: 'I shall 
call it a tyger.' 
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Today, of course, these animals are commonly referred to as elephants.]l 
If the following discourse (a discourse attached to a name and a number: 6) is to 
succeed in being what it is stated as being, namely an anti-phenomenology, what is it 
not-about, what is there to-be-against? 
A phenomenology is dictionary-defined as being, in the first place, 'a description or 
study of appearances. '2 In this sense, a phenomenology of 'the labour court' or 'the 
labour judiciary' would be 'a description or study' of the appearance of the labour 
court; it would be an investigation of the various 'appearances' of a phenomenon 
named 'the labour judiciary' . 
But within the traditions of philosophy, 'phenomenology' refers to a movement associ-
ated with the philosophers Franz Brentano (1839-1917) and Edmund Husserl (1859-
1938), a movement which 
' ... at first emphasized the description of human experience as directed onto objects, 
in the sense in which thoughts or wishes have objects, even if unreal ones .... In Hus-
serl the emphasis shifted away from the mere description of experience towards a des-
cription of the objects of experience, which he called phenomena. Phenomena are 
things which appear. He saw them in fact as essences which the mind intuited, and the 
task of phenomenology was to describe them. This, however, was not an empirical 
task, but an a priori one. It resembled in fact what was later called conceptual analysis, 
though it insisted that the essences were real things, not, for example, ways in which 
words were used. (We can think of unreal things like unicorns; the essence of unicorn is 
real) .... Husserl thought that studying essences as they were intuited involved laying 
aside various preconceptions derived from science; this laying aside was called reduc-
tion, epoche or bracketing the world. '3 
In another, operationally similar, definition it is stated that 'Husserl insisted that it 
[phenomenology] was an a priori investigation of the essences or meanings common to 
the thought of different minds. '4 
1 Discourse of order series 3 part 2. The origin of this second parable lies in a name given to a test used 
to establish whether or not a contractual relationship between two persons is a contract of employment or 
not. Lord Wedderburn refers to the test formulated by the British courts in the following way: 'Most 
courts now appear to use this "elephant-test" for the employee -- an animal too difficult to define but easy 
to recognize when you see it' (Wedderburn The Worker and the Law 3 ed (1986) at 116). The concerns 
of this parable are a distinction between recognition and definition, the separability of definition and 
recognition and the intermediary nature of writing (' de-scription'), as well as the stated self-
authenticating processes in the process of 'recognition'. These are issues which will be pursued 
throughout this chapter. Also of concern will be the name, the giving of the name, and the concequences 
that flow from a naming or an unnaming. 
2 AR Lacey A Dictionary of Philosophy 2 ed (1986) 175. 
3 Lacey, op cit note 2 at 175-6. Emphasis added. 
4 A Flew A Dictionary of Philosophy (1979) 247-8. 
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For present purposes, phenomenology is not the end: it is merely a point a departure ---
it therefore suffices to list some of the central moments of the phenomenological tradi-
tion. Distilled from the above-quoted layperson's dictionary definitions (which no 
doubt oversimplify) of a rich philosophical tradition, the concerns of phenomenology 
include: the intuition of the essence (what is a labour court, that without which the 
labour court would not be a labour court, that which makes a labour court a labour 
court), the bracketing of preconceptions, and one of the fundamental concerns of the 
present chapter, the 'description' . 
Should this chapter have attempted a 'phenomenological' approach, it would, con-
ceivably, have attempted to 'describe' the 'intuited' 'essence' of the labour judiciary as 
an object of experience (as something that may be thought about). This chapter is anti-
phenomenological in approach in that it attempts, perhaps (probably) unsuccessfully, to 
problematize these very issues, the self-authenticating nature of the essence which can 
be intuited, the thoughts common to the many minds, the virtual impossibility of the 
reduction. 
6.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LABOUR JUDICIARIES 
The development of the labour judiciary as a phenomenon can be explained logically. 
There are reasons and motivations for the establishment of a labour court --- the labour 
judiciary does not spring from the ever-fertile soil of human conflict without reason: 
'Social institutions are not the product of chance. Their voluntary appearance or their 
legal establishment at a particular moment of history is a response to the emergence of 
certain specific needs. As these needs differ greatly among different countries --- as do 
the possibility of meeting them --- it is not surprising that social institutions throughout 
the world should show a very great variety. 
Yet, despite this variety, a number of social institutions have become a necessary pat-
tern of industrialized societies. Among them, the various institutions for settling or 
helping to settle labour disputes hold a prominent place. Here again, a very wide spec-
trum of institutions is to be seen. Joint voluntary bodies established through collective 
bargaining, conciliation or mediation facilities placed at the disposal of the parties by 
the public authorities, courts of inquiry or fact-finding boards entrusted with the inves-
tigation of facts, arbitration commissions or boards of various kinds and, finally, those 
bodies which may conveniently be referred to as industrial tribunals, industrial couns, 
or labour courts. '5 
5 J de Givry 'Labour Courts as Channels for the Settlement of Labour disputes: An International 
Review' (1968) 6 British Journal of Industrial Relations 346.Emphasis added. This is a canonical text --
for affirmation of the canonical status of the text see the unproblematic application in a passive text: P le 
Roux 'Substantive Competence of Industrial Courts' (1987) 8 Industrial Law Journal 183. Note also the 
unproblematic grouping together of 'tribunals' and 'courts'. 
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This lucid, auto-authenticating (it states, after all, what is seen as obvious, natural) and 
utterly logical passage makes a number of claims which can only be approached using 
the same obvious logic it itself employs (a logic to which it is oblivious). 
The first claim made in this canonical text is that social institutions are 'not the product 
of chance'. There is a process of production, and this process can be reduced to a 
certain logic or rationality: the 'appearance' of a social institution can be situated in a 
logical chain. 
This logical (non-arbitratry) process of production (which may take the form of 
voluntary appearance or legal establishment) is a response to the emergence of cenain 
specific needs'. This is a conditional logic: the as yet unnamed social institution is a 
response to a need. There is no indication in the text as to the nature of the needs, but 
is it claimed that the conditional logic of the production of the social institution takes 
place at a certain moment --- a point in time. 
The logic of production employed here is both conditional and prepositional. Phrased 
in terms of prepositional logic, the formula is simply that IF a specific (unnamed) need 
emerges (or has emerged) THEN the social institution is produced (in one of two 
forms, namely voluntary appearance or legal establishment): NEED --> PRODUC-
TION. The social institution is the response to the need. Additionally, a conditional 
logic is operating here, a logic closely related to prepositional logic: the import of the 
statement is that once certain conditions have been met, the social institution is pro-
duced. 
The question is now whether the specific need is a sufficient or a necessary condition 
for the production of the social institution. 6 If the 'specific need' were a necessary con-
dition, the social institution could not be (could not be produced) without the 'specific 
need' . Should the 'specific need' be a sufficient condition, the 'specific need' would 
itself be enough to guarantee the production of the social institution. These preposi-
tional and conditional logical chains are reiterated ('As these needs differ greatly among 
different countries --- as do the possibility of meeting them --- it is not surprising that 
social institutions throughout the world should show a very great variety'). As needs 
differ, so do the responses (the production of the institution) to that need.7 
6 A necessary condition may be summarised as follows: Xis a necessary condition for Y if, and only if, 
X cannot be without Y. A sufficient condition, in similar terms, would be: X is a sufficient condition for 
Y if, and only if, X is itself enough to guarantee Y. In this way, oxygen is a necessary condition for life, 
but oxygen itself does not guarantee life (the mere presence of oxygen does not produce life). Oxygen is 
therefore not a sufficient condition for life. 
7 This sense of variety is echoed by the variety of names (signifiying a variety of 'responses' to the 
'needs': 'Joint voluntary bodies established through collective bargaining, conciliation or mediation facil-
ities placed at the disposal of the parties by the public authorities, courts of inquiry or fact-finding boards 
entrusted with the investigation of facts, arbitration commissions or boards of various kinds and, finally, 
those bodies which may conveniently be referred to as industrial tribunals, industrial courts, or labour 
courts.' 
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The De Givry text also maintains that 'Yet, despite this variety, a number of social 
institutions have become a necessary pattern of industrialized societies.' The construc-
tion of this sentence depends, firstly, on its being 'despite'. It is a claim made 'in spite 
of' the variety (where Need X calls forth Response X and Need Y leads to the produc-
tion of Y). At first blush, this would appear to be a simple generalisation following on 
a disclaimer (despite variety, there is something general that can be said about social 
institutions --- even though the generalisation is being made, the variety, or difference, 
is affirmed, but the variety and differences do not affect the truth claim that follows). 
But the construction of the sentence also hinges on 'necessary pattern' and its strange 
link to 'industrialized societies' . The generalisation is achieved through the use of 'pat-
tern' --- all industrialised societies share a certain pattern, it is what they have in com-
mon. 
But what is to be made of the 'necessary' and the link to 'industrialised societies'? Is it 
again a case of conditional and prepositional logic? A logic where a 'number' (are they 
countable?) of social institutions has become a necessary pattern of industrialised 
societies --- where the logic in prepositional terms would appear as: IF none of the 
number of social institutions are present, THEN there is no industrialised society? 
Would this mean that if none of the social institutions are present, the society could not 
be seen as an 'industrialised' society? In short: is it the logic of the text that the social 
institution (produced by specific, but unnamed, needs) is a necessary condition for an 
industrialised society or for speaking of an 'industrialised society'? 
What would be the implications of linking the two logical structures (this relates to 
applying the logic of the text to the logic of the text): what are the implications of link-
ing 
Chain I: need -- > production of institution 
and the less clear chain 
Chain 2: institution -- > industrialised society? 
Throughout these considerations, a silence is constantly present. This silence is that of 
the 'certain specific needs' --- the text obstinately refuses to disclose what those needs 
are, whether they are of an economic, social policy, or political nature. 
But, should the chains of reasoning be linked, the result would be something as fol-
lows: 
IF need -- > institution; IF institution -- > industrialised society. 
It is clear that the need, the social institution which it produces, and the industrialised 
society of which it is a 'necessary' feature (or pattern) are locked in an uncomfortable 
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embrace of logic where both the discomfort and the embrace depend on the silence of 
the 'certain specific needs' . 8 
It is also this very silence, so central to the logic of the text, that makes it impossible to 
determine whether the existence of 'certain specific needs' is either a necessary condi-
tion for the production of the social institution9 where the need is a sine qua non, a 
precondition for the production of the labour judiciary, or whether the need is, in itself, 
sufficient to account for the production of the labour judiciary. Through the silence at 
the fundamental point of departure, the specific needs, the text renders itself 
undecidable, indecipherable -- no matter how many logical operations are performed. 
The above section has focused exclusively on the text, the logic of the text, and the 
silence which is central to the text. No attention has been paid to empirical data: the 
argument up to this point has been linked to the text and the logic of the text -- relying 
on the rules of the text and the procedures of the logic in the discourse. 
The next question, then, is the 'fit' between the stated theory of the development of the 
labour judiciary and the empirical evidence. 
The literature traditionally attributes the establishment of the German labour court 
system to Napoleon's conquest and colonization of the western bank of the Rhine 
river .10 British industrial tribunals are said to descend from the munitions tribunals 
established during the First World War.11 Needless to say, the modern system of indus-
trial tribunals bears little or no resemblance to its precursors. The South African indus-
trial court traces its origin back to 1924 with the passing of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act (itself a result of the Rand revolt in 1922), but it is only after 1979, in the wake of 
the sweeping changes wrought on South African labour law by the recommendations of 
8 The contentlessness of the 'certain specific needs' is related to the lack of meaning of 'a particular 
moment of history' --- there is no indiciation of when that moment (understood here in a temporal sense) 
took place or takes place. A particular moment of history can be anything: there may be a clock of his-
tory, but one has no means of knowing whether the particular moment of its striking has come. 
9 The text makes it clear that the social institutions being referred to encompass the labour judiciary: 
'those bodies which may conveniently be referred to as industrial tribunals, industrial courts, or labour 
courts.' 
IO See below, 7.1. 
I I The war made necessary dramatic increases in production. Failure to secure production by agreement 
between employers, unions and the state led to the Munitions of War Act of 1915. The munitions 
tribunal established in terms of this Act was charged with the task of resolving disputes between 
employers and employees. Even though the munitions tribunals ceased operation in 1920, the idea of a 
specialised institution for the resolution of disputes was revived in 1964 with the passing of the Industrial 
Training Act. See generally G R Rubin War, Law, and Labour: The Munitions Acts, State Regulation 
and the Unions (1987), GR Rubin 'The Origins of Industrial Tribunals: Munitions Tribunals during the 
First World War' (1977) 6 Industrial Law Journal (UK) 149 and G R Rubin 'Labour Courts and the 
Proposals of 1917-19' (1985) 14 Industrial Law Journal (UK) 33. 
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the Wiehahn Commission, that the extremely limited functions of the court were 
extended and the industrial court came to play such a pivotal role in the development of 
modern South African labour law .12 
It would be stating the obvious to say that in all three societies certain needs were pre-
sent at the given time. But problems of application remain: was Napoleon's conquest of 
the West Bank of the Rhine a sufficient condition or a necessary condition for the 
establishment of the German labour court system? Would the needs of German society 
(no matter what these needs were) have led to an autocthonous production of a labour 
judiciary even without the aid of Napoleon? Can the production of the German labour 
court system be accounted for only in terms of a necessary condition (assuming that 
Napoleon's conquest is a sine qua non for the establishment of the German labour court 
system)? Was Napoleon's conquest of German territory both necessary and sufficient to 
produce the precursors of the German labour court system? 
What were the sufficient and necessary conditions for the establishment of the British 
industrial tribunals system? Was the First World War a sufficient condition (its 
presence being itself sufficient to bring about the establishment of industrial tribunals)? 
Or what were the necessary conditions that had to be present before the War could act 
as sufficient condition? Would the necessary conditions (conceivably existing before the 
War) have transmogrified into sufficient conditions for the establishment of the 
tribunals? 
Finally, can the specifically political needs of South African society at the end of the 
1970s be seen as only a necessary condition for the establishment of the industrial 
court, or did these political needs serve as the sufficient condition for the production of 
a South African labour judiciary? 
6.2 WE HOLD THESE COURTS TO BE SELF-EVIDENT (Describing 
the Elephant) 
The point of these convoluted considerations of conditionality and the logic of creation 
lies not in a self-indulgent attempt to prove that an ostensibly logical text conceals 
certain zones of uncertainty and undecidability. Nor is the intention to be merely 
aporetic and to pose questions without proferring a resolution. 
The import of the discourse so forensically analysed above lies in the fact that it is the 
dark and silent zones of the discourse that prove to be its undoing. For the De Givry 
12 See 9.1 below. 
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text, even though it is implicitly offered as such, 13 does not present a clear account for 
the logical structures of the creation of the labour judiciary. It is in spite of the 
logicality of the text that all claims --- including those claims still to be made in sub-
sequent chapters --- as to the conditional logic of social institutions (be they labour 
courts or other courts) must be regarded with suspicion. 
There are two silences in the De Givry text: the silence of the 'certain specific needs' 
and the silence 'particular moment in time'. Both are without content. These silences 
occur at the very nodes of the logic of the text: without knowing what the 'certain 
specific needs' are or when the 'particular moment of history' is, the text leaves blank 
what cannot be said: the very point of origin of the labour judiciary. 14 
It is also these same two silences that make it possible to account for the entire order of 
social institutions and, by implication, for virtually the entire life-world: the labour 
judiciary is not the only response to, or the product of, a certain need. Nor is a labour 
court the only court which has its origin in a mythical 'particular moment of history'. 
So, for example, the need for centralized decision-making, as well as the sheer 
inconvenience of tagging along in the wake of the regent, could be seen as the need 
which produced the permanent spatial establishment of centralised British courts. 15 The 
development of certain needs also explains the development of (ordinary civil and 
criminal) courts, of central legislatures, of a centralised state administration. The entire 
phenomenon of the modern legal system can be reduced to responses to 'certain 
specific needs', each need, presumably, motivating another institution (the labour judi-
ciary as a response to labour conflict, for example, or civil courts being a response to a 
rise in civil claims, and criminal jurisdiction arising the moment that the state feels the 
need to preserve its own fabric by prosecuting its citizens). 
Accounting for the establishment of the labour judiciary in terms of a causal logic (with 
a silence at its core) which also accounts for the establishment of other social institu-
tions means that this causal logic hardly distinguishes between labour courts and other 
courts16 --- a distinction that, according to the literature, appears to be desirable: 
13 This is clear from the title: 'Labour Courts as Channels for the Settlement of Labour Disputes'. 
Emphasis added. The implication of this title is that, even though some general remarks are made at the 
very beginning, the social institution which forms the focus of the text under consideration is the labour 
court or the labour judiciary. 
14 It is, of course, very tempting to dismiss the 'problem' as one of historical research: the way out 
would then be to thoroughly investigate the historical data in order to determine which needs directly or 
indirectly gave rise to the labour judiciary, and at what point in time. This, to an extent, is the aim of the 
subsequent chapters. 
15 See below, chapter 8. 
16 This is not a claim made by the De Givry text itself. The excerpt of the De Givry text analysed above 
is, in terms of its generality, offered as a causal model for not only the labour court, but for all social 
institutions. 
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'In the traditional morphology of procedures for the settlement of labour disputes 
adjudication is distinguished from arbitration but one searches in vain for a clear 
modern account of the features of labour courts which differentiate them from ordinary 
courts. In this context, by "ordinary" courts I mean those which exercise general juris-
diction in civil disputes under a particular legal system.' 17 
The concerns of this passage are those of description. The futile search (it is stated as 
such --- it is in vain) is for an 'account' --- therefore a search for a reckoning, 
enumeration, a computation, list, statement (also of things bought and sold), an 
explanatory statement of particulars or of facts or of events, narrative, relation, or, 
finally, description. 18 The passage also indicates a failure to find a description of the 
labour court, a description that would clearly set apart (distinguish) the labour court 
from the ordinary courts (the description of which could be restated to read: 'An 
ordinary court is a court which exercises general jurisdiction in civil disputes under a 
particular legal system'). 
The text from which the above passage has been taken discusses the policy and 
appropriateness of introducing a system of 'labour courts' in Great Britain. In order to 
introduce something, however, the assumption of this text is that one has to know what 
it is that is going to be introduced.19 
But in true phenomenological spirit, the essence of 'the labour court' or 'the labour 
judiciary' is, in a text of comparative labour law, easy to intuit: 
'Although the organisation, jurisidiction, composition, and procedures of labour 
disputes-settlement mechanisms vary widely in minor details throughout the world, they 
can be subsumed under a relatively few systems of disputes settlement: labour courts; 
industrial tribunals; administrative agencies; organs of arbitration; and ordinary courts. 
Each has been developed to a relatively advanced degree in one or more countries. The 
distinction between ordinary courts and labour courts is, of course, self-evident. The 
distinction between labour courts and organs of arbitration is more complex. ·20 
17 B Hepple 'Labour Courts: Some Comparative Perspectives' (1988) 41 Current Legal Problems 169 at 
171. Emphasis added. 
18 This account of the term 'account' is based on the entry in the Webster's dictionary. 
19 
'An argument for labour courts must, therefore, define an appropriate species. After all, if you want 
to adopt a dog and would like to have a Corgi. you do not want to end up with a Rotweiler.' Lord Wed-
derburn of Charlton 'The Social Charter in Britain - Labour Law and Labour Courts' (1991) 54 Modern 
Law Review 1 at 27. 
20 B Aaron 'Settlement of Disputes over Rights' Chapter 16 in R Blanpain ( ed) Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations 3 ed (1987) 337. 
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Here the labour court has been made into an elephant: an animal that the discourse of 
comparative labour law assumes will be recognizable, thereby un-writing all the con-
ceptual difficulties. 21 
This passage deserves more detailed attention, for apart from presenting the description 
(definition, in the sense of differentiating) of the labour court as self-authenticating and 
as axiomatic as an elephant (the essence is easy to intuit), the passage also seems to 
draw a distinction between 'labour courts' and 'industrial tribunals'. Were one in the 
position to enter into a dialogue with this text, and if one were to ask what the dif-
ference is between the 'labour court' and an 'industrial tribunal' , the text may reply 
that the distinction is self-evident. 
The implications of this passage are that the 'search' , the concern of the first-quoted 
passage is not vain (as that passage explicitly admits), but it is entirely superfluous, for 
the 'account' (or description) through which the labour court is to be identified or dis-
tinguished from the ordinary court, is 'self-evident'. The essence of the labour judici-
ary, as such, can be intuited. 
Yet another text, with the imperturbability of a fully-rigged ship with a steady wind 
astern, contains an actual description of a 'labour court' : 
'The term "Labour Court" has been widely used to describe separate and "independent" 
forms of jurisdiction which interpret and enforce aspects of labour law that would 
otherwise be decided within the existing legal system. Those who desire to establish or 
extend this alternative type of jurisdiction wish it to take a non-conventional form --
usually "tripartism" in which legally qualified chairpersons sit alongside "lay-members" 
drawn from both sides of industry. ·22 
The most striking aspect of this passage, on a first reading, is its own absence. Through 
the use of the passive voice, the text is saying that 'other persons' (not footnoted) have 
already, at some past moment used the term 'labour court' to mean (when restated) a 
separate and 'independent'23 form of jurisdiction which interprets and enforces aspects 
of labour law (one is not told what labour law is; it is assumed that one knows this, 
21 
'But what is a labour court? ... Although there is some descriptive literature about them, these ques-
tions have been less discussed. A labour court is largely what you make it.' Lord Wedderburn op cit note 
19 at 26. 
22 W McCarthy 'The case for labour courts' (1990) 21 Industrial Relations Journal 98. 
23 The use of the quotation marks is vital, for the quotation marks would, in this case, not refer to 
reported speech, but to the fact that the text attempts to indicate that which is other than 'independent' ---
so-called independent? quasi-independent? Is the text really trying to indicate that labour courts are the 
exact opposite of independent --- that they depend on, and are part of a legal system. By implication, it 
would appear as if the word 'separate' should also appear in quotation marks. 
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perhaps that dealing with the elephant of the 'Labour Court' -- note the reported speech 
and the capitalization -- should not be confused by trying to deal with an elephant as 
easily recognizable as Labour Law at the same time). 
But then the text proceeds to undermine the very foundation it purports to posit, as it 
admits that were there no labour court, these issues would not go undecided. If there is 
no labour court, the issues would simply be decided by another court. 24 
How do these texts throw light on the phenomenon of the labour judiciary? For here 
again are essential moments: the labour court is 'independent' and 'separate' . This 
court then stands outside the legal system. Could it be that at least one of 'certain 
specific needs' mentioned above relates to the need for 'being separate' or 'being-
" independent" '? Is it through these constructions that the labour judiciary becomes 
obvious, 'self-evident'? 
It is also important to note that the labour judiciary is not, strictly, necessary at all, for 
the disputes which are resolved in a labour court would, in the absence of this institu-
tion, be resolved elsewhere. This could mean that the phenomenon of the labour judici-
ary is not a logical consequent of a need (a need such as having industrial conflicts 
resolved), but that the labour judiciary is merely contingent, it is something that may 
or may not occur; the creation of the labour judiciary is fortuitous, it occurs by chance. 
This would in turn imply that the creation of the labour judiciary cannot be reduced to 
a (prepositional and conditional) logic of causation, but that the appearance of the 
phenomenon is not logically necessary -- other institutions would, in the absence of the 
labour court, perform the function. 
The present position may be summarized as follows: The Labour Court is a 
phenomenon whose existence cannot adequately be accounted for by historical 
determinism based upon stated logical chains; the Labour Court may be distinguished 
from the ordinary civil courts by the fact that it is unconventional or non-
conventional,25 but the existence (establishment) of the Labour Court is contingent. In 
spite of an initial claim that social institutions (of which the labour judiciary is but one) 
is not produced by chance, a definition of the institution in question renders that very 
production contingent, the result of operations of chance. 
How is it then, that the phenomenon of the Labour Court is so self-evident, intuitively 
recognizable as an elephant, if one is neither in a position to say with any certainty how 
and when the Labour Court comes into being (de facto), and in no position to explain 
24 In Italy, labour disputes are processed through the ordinary civil courts. This is because article 102 of 
the Constitution forbids special courts. See Hepp le op cit note 17 at 192. 
25 The 'convention' here refers to the ordinary civil courts -- it is by referring to the archetype of the 
ordinary civil courts that a normative distinction such as 'conventional' and 'unconventional' can be 
drawn. 
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de jure the necessity (except as a matter of convenience) of the existence of the Labour 
Court as a separate jurisdiction? 
6.3 BEFORE THE LAW: KAFKA, DERRIDA, AND AT LEAST TWO 
NON-COURTS (no elephants allowed) 
One potential route out of the impasse presented above could be to argue that the labour 
judiciary is characterised by the fact that (in terms of the definition quoted above) it is 
set apart from the ordinary civil courts: the labour judiciary appears as (intuitively) 
separate and 'independent' institutions which decides certain matters; they take a 'non-
conventional' form. 
The labour court is not a 'court' as we normally regard a 'court', labour courts have 
the uncomfortable status of being a 'non-court'. The implication of this argument 
would be that it is possible to distinguish between that which is a 'court' in the received 
sense of the term, and that which is 'not a court' . 
In Kafka's short narration, entitled Before the Law, 26 a countryman approaches the 
temple of the Law and seeks admittance. He is refused. In circling the Kafka text, Der-
rida asks the following: 
'It is ... not as narrative that we define Before the Law as a literary phenomenon, nor 
is it as fictional, allegorical, mythical, symbolic, parabolic narrative, and so on. There 
are fictions, allegories, myths, symbols, or parables that are not specifically literary. 
What then decides that Before the Law belongs to what we think we understand under 
the name of literature? And who decides? Who judges? ... The double question, then, 
would be as follows: "Who decides, who judges, and according to what criteria, that 
this relation belongs to literature?" . . . 
I shall say without further delay that I cannot give nor am I withholding an answer to 
such a question. t27 
Similar questions arise in gazing upon the phenomenon of the labour judiciary, ques-
tions that relate pertinently to the 'conventional' I 'unconventional' divide identified 
earlier, questions vexingly made difficult by the persistence of the name. In two situa-
tions, a 'court' has had occasion to decide whether or not another institution is in fact a 
'court'. Consider an institution requesting entrance to the Law, entrance to the status of 
'court': before the Law stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper there comes an institu-
tion and prays for admittance to the Law. How is this institution to be received? 
According to what criteria would an institution be refused entry into the shrine of the 
Law? 
26 Quoted in full above Chapter 1 note 44. 
27 J Derrida, 'Before the Law' in J Derrida Acts of Literature (ed D Attridge) (1992) 181at186-7. 
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In Attorney-General v British Broadcasting Corporation, 28 the status of a local tax-
valuation court was at issue. The BBC planned to broadcast a television programme 
critical of a certain religious sect, including the fact that the sect was not exempt from 
liability for their municipal taxes because the exclusivity of the sect meant that the 
meetings rooms were not places of religious worship. Proceedings were scheduled at a 
local rates valuation court (the sect had applied for exemption). 
The House of Lords had to decide whether or not the valuation court was a 'court' for 
the BBC to be held in contempt of court by broadcasting the programme. 
What makes this decision of the House of Lords interesting and relevant are the proce-
dures by which the House of Lords had to answer a relative of Derrida's question: 
'What is a court, and according to which criteria is an institution a court?' 29 
In charting the question of what makes a court a court (the House of Lords did not 
share Derrida's trepidation in finding and presenting an answer), one Law Lord 
foundered upon the rocky conceptual shore of the name: the 'court' and the 'tribunal' : 
'There is a wide variety of courts; so there is of tribunals as the long list in the appen-
dix to the report of the Council on Tribunals for 1978-79 shows. While every court is a 
tribunal, the converse is not true. There are many tribunals which are not courts 
despite the fact that they are charged with dealing with certain matters and have fea-
tures in common with courts. A distinction is drawn in this country between tribunals 
which are courts and those which are not. ... Generally I would say that just because a 
tribunal has features resembling those of a court it should not be held to be a court. •3o 
The name keeps getting in the way, however: the local valuation courts were included 
in the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971 (the only court included in the list). 31 At this 
28 [1980] 3 All ER (HL) 161. 
29 Another pertinent question here would be, of course, the question of "Who judges?". For in essence, 
a court has to decide whether something else is a court. In other words, the subject has to determine 
whether or not something is of-itself, it has to determine itself, the extent and scope of itself, and, the 
nature of legal reasoning being what it is, the court making the pronunciation will have to explain the 
reasoning (the archival discourses) which structures the decision that a certain institution is of-itself (a 
court) or not of-itself (a non-court). 
30 Per Viscount Dilhome at 166c-e. Emphasis added. 
31 The importance of the name is illustrated by the following passage: ' . the inclusion of the local 
valuation courts in the list does not in my opinion suffice to establish that an Act stating that courts are to 
be constituted can properly be interpreted as creating something which is not a court.' (at 166h of the 
judgment). This means that the status of a legal institution would depend on the legislative language 
used: if the legislature uses the term 'court', the institution is, without more ado, a court. The fact that a 
'court' has been included in a list of 'tribunals' does not affect the status of that court, the legal institu-
tion does not lose its court-status by virtue of the context within which its name appears. The fact that the 
local valuation 'courts' are included in the list contained in the Tribunals and Inquiries Act can be, and 
is, explained away (' ... the more likely explanation is that Parliament thought them to be courts of such 
a character (and as I have said, all courts are tribunals) as to make it desirable that they should be subject 
torthe supervision of the council' (at 166g). Perhaps some of the problems lie in the fact that the House 
of Lords is here using the word 'court' in a narrow sense, and the word 'tribunal' in a much wider sense, 
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point in the judgment, then, the House of Lords places reliance upon what proves to be 
a dangerous distinction between a 'court' and a 'tribunal' , 32 even though there is no 
clear dividing line between the two names --- as the House of Lords establishes. 33 The 
House of Lords is then forced to rely on a species of elephant test: 
'At the end of the day it has unfortunately to be said that there emerges no sure guide, 
no unmistakable hallmark by which a "court" or "inferior court" may unerringly be 
identified. It is largely a matter of impression. '34 
Here the concept of 'court' has become an elephant, something that is easy enough to 
recognise, but impossible to describe, to give an account of. Whether or not a given 
institution is accorded the status of a 'conventional' 'court' is a matter of impression; 
the status of the institution is to be intuited. The phenomenon of the labour court leaves 
with the person gazing upon it an 'impression', there are traces left by the phenomenon 
in the process of investigation. 
What is then to be made of the 'conventional' I 'unconventional' divide discussed 
above (where the labour court is seen to be the 'unconventional'), for now that which is 
the convention, that which is the norm (the conventional court) cannot be established, it 
cannot be described (written), but it is, somehow, recognisable. Is it knowable through 
intuition only?35 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
a sense wide enough to refer almost to an archetype, where the term 'tribunal' is used in its dictionary 
sense of 'a place of judgment' (encompassing all courts and other institutions of judgments), and not in 
its technical sense (as being one of the institutions listed in the legislation, for example). This would be 
the only way to make sense of this part of the judgment; all courts are tribunals (in a wide and archetypi-
cal sense, they belong to a species of institutions of judgments or tribunals), while not all tribunals (here 
used in a narrow and technical sense) are courts (even though they may pertain to the same 'species', 
namely institutions of judgment). The name serves different purposes. 
32 The Oxford English Dictionary defines a 'tribunal' as being 'a court of justice', 'a seat or bench for 
the judges', or a 'place of judgment'. 
33 See at 172j-175h of the judgment (per Lord Edmund-Davies). Here the court painstakingly works 
through a number of tests which have been proposed to distinguish between courts and tribunals, only to 
remark: 'It is comparatively easy to identify and discard those tests which are not sure guides to the true 
meanings of "court" ... '(at 172j). Emphasis in original. 
34 At l 75j (per Lord Edmund-Davies). Emphasis added. 
35 It is interesting to note the dynamics of intuition: the phenomenon leaves an 'impression' (but only 
once all false guides and paradigms have been bracketed) upon that which perceives it. The process is 
marked by a certain passivity -- in normal conversation one would say that 'she left the impression' or 
'he gave' or 'it made' a certain impression. It is the object under investigation that produces the impres-
sion: this impression is a trace (the pteUMe of an absence) of the phenomenon. The word impression 
contains all the essential moments of the process of judging: an impression is not only 'a notion or belief 
(esp. a vague or mistaken one)', but it is also an 'imitation' (see the definition of 'impression' in the 
Oxford English Dictionary). The phenomenon being judged cannot itself be judged -- it is only the 'imita-
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The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, in SA Technical Offi-
cials' Association v President of the Industrial Court & Others36 also refused the South 
African industrial court the status of a court, in spite of the fact that the legislation as it 
was at the time of the decision explicitly clothed the industrial court with the powers of 
a court: 
'The functions of the industrial court shall be ... to perform all the functions, exclud-
ing the adjudication of alleged offences, which a court of law may perform in regard to 
a dispute or matter arising out of the application of the provisions of the laws 
administered by the Department of Manpower Utilization. '37 
In coming to the conclusion that the industrial court is not, in spite of its name, a court, 
the Appellate Division structured its 'impression' on a variety of factors, including the 
close relationship between the executive (the Minister of Manpower as the Minister was 
called at the time )38 and the qualifications and experience of the persons serving on the 
industrial court. 39 The judicial nature of the proceedings before the industrial court 
were not regarded as a relevant factor -- the Appellate Division disregarded the func-
tion performed by the industrial court, stating it to be irrelevant: 
' ... [the function exercised by the court does not] justify the further conclusion that 
the industrial court, when it makes such a determination, does not sit as a court of law 
at all, even when it discharges functions of a judicial nature .... '40 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
tion' (the trace) of the phenomenon that leads to a decision, to a judgment, to a finding that the 
phenomenon under investigation is a non-court. The phenomenon eludes the decision; judgment is 
delivered on the trail of an absence. 
36 (1985) 6 /LI 186 (A). 
37 Section 17(1 l)(a) (since repealed) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. 
38 See at 191G-I and 192C. 
39 See at 191E-G of the judgment. It has to be borne in mind, however, that the officials of the industrial 
court, including the President and the Deputy-President were appointed to their position 'by reason of 
their knowledge of the law' (section 17(l)(b) of the Labour Relations Act 38 of 1956) and additional 
members of the industrial court were 'any person who has knowledge of the law' (section 17(1)(bA) of 
the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956) -- the presiding officers were de jure required to have a legal back-
ground; de facto all the presiding officers (including the additional members) were legally trained. 
40 At 192F. Emphasis added. 
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In Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation v President of the Industrial Court and 
Others41 the industrial court is accorded the status of a quasi-judicial body. From this 
point on, it was accepted that the industrial court was not a court of law at all, but 
merely an administrative body with quasi-judicial functions. 
In this decision the South African Appellate Division was not formulating a test of gen-
eral validity for the purposes of distinguishing between courts and non-courts; the 
Appellate Division (a court) was simply processing a number of factors in order to gain 
an impression of the institution appearing before it, in order to base its decision upon 
the impression so gained. Much as the House of Lords processed various factors and 
tests (only to have to reject them), the Appellate Division processed the features of the 
institution standing before it and seeking entrance into the Law. 
At this point it is clear that there is no generally valid test in either South African law 
or in English law for distinguishing between what is a court and what is not a court. 42 
Through what strange lens do the doorkeepers of the Law gaze upon that which seeks 
admittance to the law, and decide that what stands before them deserves no admittance? 
What determines the 'impression' upon which hinges the status of court or non-court? 
Ultimately, this gaze is determined by that which lies beyond the law, namely law of 
the law, that which makes law of the law. The present operations of the law are charac-
terised by the reluctance of the law to appear, the operations take place in silence, this 
silence making possible the being-law: 
'What remains concealed and invisible in each law is thus presumably the law itself, 
that which makes laws of these laws, the being-law of these laws. The question and the 
quest are ineluctable, rendering irresistible the journey toward the place and the origin 
of the law. The law yields by withholding itself, without imparting its provenance and 
its site. This silence and discontinuity constitute the phenomenon of the law. '43 
The distinction between that which is a court and that which is not a court, then, is 
yielded through invisible and intangible operations which take place behind the walls of 
the funhouse, impressions of which the provenance and actual site are withheld. 
Making a distinction between that which is a 'court' and that which is a 'non-court' is 
an act of naming. While one social institution may be accorded the name of 'court', 
41 1986 (3) SA 786 (A) at 799C. See also Medupe & others v Golden Spur (1987) 8 JU 376 (IC) at 
378A. 
42 This problem does not arise in German law, by virtue of the fact that courts (the highest Federal 
courts) are exhaustively enumerated in the Basic Law: 'For the purposes of ordinary, administrative, fis-
cal, labour, and social jurisdiction, the Federation shall establish as highest courts of justice the Federal 
Court of Justice, the Federal Administrative Court, the Federal Fiscal Court, the Federal Labour Court, 
and the Federal Social Court.' Art 95(1) of the Basic Law. 
43 Derrida op cit note 27 at 192. Emphasis added. 
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that very name is denied another. This act of naming has profound power-implications: 
on the name hinges various powers (for example, the power related to contempt of 
'court') or the denial of powers. The name also makes it possible to situate that-which-
is-named within a system and an epistemic structure: it is in terms of the name that the 
named object is known and related to other structures. It is the name that is iterable, it 
is that by which the named phenomenon is known --- even though that very act of 
naming is performed in terms of a withholding, in terms of a silence . 
6.4 ELEPHANTINE EXPECTATIONS 
It may not be possible to say what the labour judiciary is. It may also not be possible to 
give an account (a description) of the origins of the labour judiciary. Nor is it possible 
to trap the processes by which a labour judiciary, 'unconventional' in nature, is distin-
guished from a 'conventional' court, for it is not possible to identify the processes 
whereby that-which-is-a-court is distinguished from that-which-is-not-a-court. 
It is, however, entirely possible to say what is expected of the labour judiciary. But the 
status as 'expectation' is important, for the fact that a labour court fails to meet an 
expectation does not render it a non-labour court. Nor do these expectations amount to 
a normative paradigm: they do not contain a list with which the labour court must com-
ply in order to function properly. The proper function of the labour court may amount 
to a disappointment of the expectations attached to that institution. 
The two main expectations accompanying the labour court are that the procedures 
before the labour court will be speedy and cheaper, and that the applicant, when 
appearing before a labour court, will know that those persons he or she is facing have 
some expertise in the field of labour law and industrial relations. 
6.4.1 Cheap, quick, no fuss, no lawyers 
'There can be no doubt that one of the principal motives for setting up special courts to 
deal with labour matters has been the belief that these will be more accessible, informal, 
cheap and expeditious than ordinary courts. •44 
In spite of the fact that the labour court may not be a court of law in status, such a 
court will, however, have to apply the law (the labour court has this feature in common 
with ordinary civil courts), 45 and the law so applied may be technical and complex. 
Referring to the task facing British industrial relations, it has been remarked that there 
44 Hepple op cit note 17 at 177. Emphasis added. 
45 See Hepp le op cit note 17 at 171-173. 
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is an assumption that the legislation to be applied in the tribunals 'consists of 
straightforward provisions whose application can safely be left to the tribunals employ-
ing their own robust common sense. '46 This is not the case: 
'Although this description of the legislation would suggest that Parliament has made 
every effort to reduce legal technicalities to a minimum, it is notable that the courts 
have repeatedly remarked that these enactments often exhibit the opposite qualities .... 
[I]f many of those who today accuse the tribunals of undue "legalism" are influenced by 
the belief that industrial law is fundamentally layman's law, much of their criticism is 
mistaken for it is founded upon a misapprehension about the nature of language, about 
the nature of lawyers and about the nature of litigants. '47 
Proceedings before the labour court may become just as bogged down in legal detail 
and argument, procedural niceties and delays, as proceedings before an ordinary 
court, 48 and sooner or later a point is reached where 'labour courts differ in procedural 
respects from ordinary courts only in degree rather than in kind'. 49 Some persist in 
seeing a difference in procedure, efficiency, and informality as a decisive factor, 50 but 
' ... although the establishment of labour courts may provide the occasion for an 
improvement in judicial proceedings there is nothing inherent in specialisation which 
leads to this improvement. One has but to read the current consultation papers in the 
Lord Chancellor's Civil Justice Review to see that an inquisitorial, informal, speedy 
and efficient system can be proposed within the context of the ordinary courts. '51 
The charge of legalism may be linked to the fact that the judgments of labour courts 
(including the British industrial tribunals) are reported, leading to the gradual 
accumulation of precedents. 52 
46 R Munday 'Tribunal Lore: Legalism and the Industrial Tribunals' (1981) 10 Industrial Law Journal 
(UK) 146 at 147. 
47 Munday op cit note 46 at 148, 149. Emphasis added. 
48 Contributing factors in the rise of legalism is identified by Munday as being the increased involve-
ment of legal personnel and litigants and the increase in the volume of reported cases. 
49 Hepple op cit note 17 at 177. 
50 
'There is no place for "legalism" in Industrial Tribunals. All those involved working in these tribunals 
must be on their guard to prevent it. "Legalism" properly so called, is contrary to the principles on which 
Industrial Tribunals were set up. There may be a place for it in a court of law but, especially in this 
respect, Industrial Tribunals are to be distinguished from courts of law . ... To conduct ... a hearing 
according to the dictates of strict law may be inappropriate.' His Honour Judge McKee 'Legalism in 
Industrial Tribunals' (1986) 15 Industrial Law Journal (UK) 110. Emphasis added. 
51 Hepp le op cit note 17 at 178. 
52 See Munday op cit note 46 at 154-158. 
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In spite of efficiency and informality being some of the motivations for the estab-
lishment of labour courts, these advantages soon give way to time-consuming, techni-
cal, and formal proceedings, in fact, proceedings much like those before the ordinary 
civil courts. 
6.4.2 Expecting experienced experts 
'Apart from their procedures, the other main justification for specialist industrial 
tribunals is their expertise in industrial relations and the handling of employee 
grievances. This is supposed to follow from their unique constitution. The legally-
qualified chairman may be outvoted on questions of law and fact by the two industrial 
members who are appointed because of their knowledge and practical experience. '53 
The expectation here is that labour matters are to be heard by persons who have not 
merely a knowledge of the law, but also have experience in industrial relations. The 
dispute before the tribunal (used here in the wide sense) can then be evaluated from 
various perspectives, not only the legal perspective. Usually this is associated with 
tripartism, where a legally qualified chairperson is assisted by persons who have little 
or no knowledge of the law, but practical experience. 
Depending on the composition of the tribunal, however, it may in some jurisdictions 
happen that 'a school teacher and the director of an engineering company may sit on a 
case about the dismissal of a farm labourer, shop assistant or construction worker' .54 
But considerations of expertise do not serve to explain why a labour court, 'independ-
ent' from the ordinary civil court, comes into being: 'Why, then, have some countries 
chosen to develop such expertise and specialisation in special courts while others have 
been content to leave this to ordinary courts.' 55 
53 Industrial Tribunals (1987) at 45. 
54 Hepp le op cit note l 7 at 183. 
55 Hepp le op cit note 17 at 179. 
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6.4.3 A normative paradigm for the functioning of the labour court 
The principles of expeditiousness and the availability of expertise amount, however, 
merely to two themes of a set of rules that determine whether or not a labour court is 
functioning properly:56 
(1) Labour Courts should be established on a permanent basis and should be com-
pletely independent of the executive authorities. 57 
(2) Labour judges should be selected from persons who have special experience and 
knowledge of labour questions. 58 
(3) Labour courts should be exclusively competent to take cognizance of disputes 
relating to the interpretation or application of individual labour contracts, col-
lective agreements and social legislation. 59 
( 4) Labour courts should seek the settlement of labour disputes of a legal character 
by agreement or conciliation of the parties before judicial awards or decisions 
are rendered. 60 
(5) The formalities of labour court procedure should be simplified to a maximum 
degree and all possible measures should be taken to expedite the procedure as 
far as possible. 61 
(6) The services of the labour court should be available to the parties concerned free 
of charge. 62 
56 
'Without entering into too many details I should like now to stress a few principles which appear to be 
of particular significance for the proper functioning of labour courts.' De Givry op cit note 5 at 371. 
57 De Givry op cit note 5 at 371. See also the Resolution adopted by the Fourth Conference of American 
States Members of the ILO in 1949, article 3. 
58 De Givry op cit note 5 at 372, Resolution cit note 57 article 8. Emphasis added. 
59 De Givry op cit note 5 at 372, Resolution cit note 57 article 10. Emphasis added. 
60 De Givry op cit note 5 at 373, Resolution cit note 57 article article 12. Emphasis added. 
61 De Givry op cit note 5 at 373. Emphasis added. 
62 De Givry op cit note 5 at 373, Resolution cit note 57 article 17. 
94 
An anti-phenomenology of the labour judiciary 
(7) Workers should enjoy adequate legal protection against any act of discrimination 
in respect of their employment likely to prevent them from having recourse to 
the labour courts, from giving evidence as witnesses or experts or, in the rele-
vant cases, from acting as members of labour courts. 63 
6.4.4 The disappointment of categorical expectations 
What is one to make of this set of normative first principles? Certainly a potential pro-
ject of comparative labour law could be to evaluate various actual labour courts and 
other institutions of judgment against these ideals, and determine the extent to which 
these ideals are realised in practice. 
Certainly none of these ideals, taken either individually or even collectively, serves to 
distinguish the labour judiciary from other institutions of judgment: the South African 
Appellate Division, for example, regarded the potential link between the industrial 
court and the executive branch of government as a relevant factor in coming to the con-
clusion that the industrial court was not a court -- implying that independence in respect 
of the executive is a key feature of all courts. It is also possible to think of other spe-
cialised courts, such as the Federal Social Court and the Federal Fiscal Court estab-
lished in terms of the German Basic Law -- implying that specialisation is not the 
province of the labour court only. 
Read together, however, this ideal of a labour court is significant in one respect only: 
the expectations attached to the phenomenon of the labour court. 
These expectations show that, in the institution of the labour court, an island of user-
friendliness and efficiency is expected -- the labour court is intended to 'fence-in' an 
area of layperson's law, where the law is easy to find, easy to understand, and even 
easier to apply. The language to be used is to be the language spoken, if not on the 
street, then at least a language understood by the (unrepresented?) applicant. 
Labour courts are meant to be 'people's courts' -- not courts for lawyers, nor for com-
plex litigation and the application of detailed legislative provisions. In terms of these 
expectations, almost any worker, after having been pointed in the right direction, and 
without incurring any great cost, can take his/her case to an institution where he or she 
will be able to tell experts (who in turn will provide the necessary guidance) his/her 
story. 64 
63 De Givry op cit note 5 at 373, Resolution cit note 57 article 21. 
64 This expectation explains an interesting side-phenomenon in British industrial relations, namely the 
plethora of do-it-yourself guides to the industrial tribunals, including, for instance, J Mcilroy Industrial 
Tribunals -- How to Take a Case, How to Win It (1983) and B Egan The Industrial Tribunals Handbook 
-- Fighting your case at the Industrial Tribunals (1978). 
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But there is also an expectation that, after having told the story, the applicant will be 
allowed into the temple of the Law, that the applicant will receive recompense (where 
appropriate), and that, in the end, Justice will be served. 
The problematic is complex, for there are a number of 'contradictory tendencies' that 
demand reconciliation: the labour courts must --
' . . . both administer a clear set of rules and maintain a high measure of flexibility in 
their decisions so that justice in individual cases prevails over mere consistency. '65 
The Justice sought in the labour court is a strange goddess indeed, for not only must 
she be willing to sacrifice her rites, her procedures, her way of doing things, but she 
must also be prepared to change her mind at short notice, or she may even be required 
to forget that which was done the day before, as the clear set of rules are prevailed over 
by other considerations, good practice, sound industrial relations. 
At this point, it may be argued that Lady Justice may well have to change her colours if 
labour law is to become 'autonomous' ;66 if labour law is freed from the contract of 
service, Justice may be chain-ganged into thinking along different lines altogether. 
This tension between user-friendly and 'layperson's law' on the one hand and 'prevail-
ing justice' on the other hand signals a return to a central dilemma, a dilemma which 
up till now bore the name 'court' and 'non-court'. 
Structure 1 'Court' 'Justice' 'Law' 
Under this discursive structure, all the elements within the zone circumscribed by 
'court' 'justice' and 'law' can be grouped. 
If we return to the ideals outlined above, it is noticeable how legal and proto-legal 
terminology pervades the discourse: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
the labour judiciary is to 'settle' disputes; 
by paying regard to (inter alia) the contract of employment; 
the labour court is presided over by a 'judge'; 
there are set (and presumably rigid) 'procedures'; 
there is to be independence from the executive (a typical concern relating to the 
law and the concept 'court' as the South African Appellate Division has pointed 
out); 
there may be 'witnesses' . 
65 Munday, op cit note 46 at 146. 
66 See, for example, Wedderburn 'Labour Law Now -- A Hold and a Nudge' (1984) 13 Industrial Law 
Journal (UK) 73, Wedderburn 'Labour Law: From Here to Autonomy?' (1987) 16 Industrial Law 
Journal (UK) 1. 
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What is then the expected result of the proceedings before the labour court? Is it not 
that which is expected in any proceedings before an institution of judgment (no matter 
what form it takes, and no matter what it is called) --- Justice? 
Structure 2 'Non-court' 'flexibility' 'informality' 'efficiency' 'experience' 
This discursive structure encompasses the 'ideals' associated with the phenomenon of 
the 'Labour Court': efficiency, cost, informality, flexibility (in other words, disregard-
ing the 'strict' law for the sake of other considerations), and the experience (and 
tripartite points of view) of the presiding officers. 
In spite of the apparent differences between these two structures, the expected end-
result (Justice) is the same. In the first case, Justice is reached through legal proce-
dures, through the strict application of a clear rule to a given set of facts, while in the 
second case, the strict letter of the law may be disregarded in favour of other considera-
tions and the procedures used in the settlement of the dispute is the opposite of what 
one has come to expect of legal proceedings. 
The difference between the labour court and the ordinary civil courts does not neces-
sarily lie in structures of competence or composition, or in procedures nor complexity, 
for the difference may be merely one of degree, and that turning point beyond which an 
institution has reached a degree sufficiently high or low enough to pass muster, 
unfathomable. 
But is it not possible that the difference between the Labour Court and the ordinary 
court lies precisely in those expectations which attach to the Labour Court, expectations 
which have long since been relinquished in the case of the ordinary courts? Could it be 
that it is the expectations which so anxiously cluster around the concept of 'the Labour 
Court' which harden the heart of the doorkeeper of the Law, and makes them keep the 
door to the temple of Justice tightly shut --- refusing the labour court as one of them-
selves, while admitting that the Labour Court may be a realisation of a wider ideal, 
namely an institution for dispute settlement (all courts are tribunals), in the service of 
the same deity: Justice? 
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'Wenn nach dem Anspruch der Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit gefragt wird, so ist damit ihr 
gesetzlicher Auftrag gemeint, also das, was die Gesetze von ihr erwarten. In erster 
Linie ist <las Gesetzestreue. Aber darin erschopft sich der spezifische Auftrag der 
Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit nach verbreiteter, schon von Sinzheimer geteilter Auffassung 
nicht. Das allgemeine Postulat der richterlichen Gesetzestreue ist danach im spezielle 
Auftrage zu erganzen, die den Gesetzgeber zur Schaffung der besonderen 
Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit veranlaBt haben. Der damalige Bundesrninister fiir Arbeit Anton 
Storch und der damalige SPD-Abgeordnete Richter haben bei der parlamentarischen 
Beratung des Arbeitsgerichtsgesetzes 1953 und Storch dann noch einmal bei der 
Eroffnung des BAG der Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit die Aufgabe gestellt, im Rahmen der 
Gesetze schnell, billig und lebensnah fiir sozialen Frieden und sozialen Fortschritt zu 
wirken.' 
[If one asks about the claim of the labour courts, one means the tasks imposed by legis-
lation; in other words, that which the legislation expects of the labour courts. This task, 
in the first place, entails being true to the legislation. But being true to the legislation 
does not, according to a widely held view (held also by Sinzheimer), exhaust the 
specific function of the labour courts. The general principle of judges being true to the 
legislation has to be expanded by referring to the specific tasks which led the legislature 
to the creation of a special type of court. The then Federal Minister for Labour Anton 
Storch and the SPD-delegate Richter, during the parliamentary discussion of the Labour 
Courts Act in 1953, and Storch once again with the opening of the Federal Labour 
Court, charged the labour courts with the task of working for (aiming for) social peace 
and social progress, within the framework of the laws, efficiently, cheaply, and true-to-
life.] 
-- Peter Hanau 'Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit -- Anspruch und Wirklichkeit' ( 1986) 3 Neue 
Zeitschrift far Arbeits- und Sozialrecht 809 at 810. Italics in original. 
DEVELOPMENT I 
The German labour court system is not a German invention: its origins lie in the com-
mercial courts which came into being in France by the middle of the 16th century. A 
1 This section is based on Germelmann/Matthes/Priitting Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz (1990), L Wenzel '75 
J ahre deutsche Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit' (1965) 20 Juristenzeitung 697, M Weiss 'Labour Dispute Settle-
ment by Labour Courts in Germany' (1994) 15 Industrial Law Journal 1 at 3-4, and A Hueck Lehrbuch 
des Arbeitsrechts 6 ed (1959) at 809-815. See also S Leich and A Lundt 'Zur Geschichte der Berliner 
Arbeitsgerichte' in 60 Jahre Berliner Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit (1987) 39-126, B Michel 'Der Kampf der 
Gewerkschaften um die einheitliche Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit' in Feser et al (eds) Arbeitsgerichtsprotokolle 
(1982) 29-54 and generally V Hentschel Geschichte der deutschen Sozialpolitik (1983). 
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special court, the Tribunal Commun existed in Lyon until 1791. 2 Even though this 
institution disappeared in the chaos of the French Revolution, the idea of a special court 
resurfaced in Napoleonic times: It was Napoleon who created the first Conseil des 
prud'hommes in France on 18 March 1806.3 
In 1808 and 1811, similar councils were established in the German cities of Aachen, 
Krefeld, and Cologne, at that time under French rule. The councils in Aachen and 
Cologne survived the war of liberation, and in 1840, further councils were established 
under Prussian influence, by that time taking the form of Gewerbegerichte or trade (or 
industrial) courts. 
The founding of the First German Empire in 1870-1871 did not bring with it the estab-
lishment of a unified system of trade courts: it was only in 1890 that unified Germany 
saw the passing of a Gewerbegerichtsgesetz --- a Trade Courts Act. Many Trade Courts 
were established: by 1900, there were 316 of these courts. 
Germelmann et al point out the most significant features of these courts: 
'Zentrales Kennzeichen der nunmehr geschaffenen Gerichtsbarkeit war es einmal, daB 
sich eine umfassende Sondergerichtsbarkeit in arbeitsrechtlichen Streitigkeiten durch-
gesetzt hatte, die in erster Instanz vollstandig an die Stelle der ordentlichen Gerichte 
trat. ... Bemerkenswert ist ferner, daB sich mit den Gewerbegerichten der Gedanke 
durchgesetzt hat, die Richterbank mit einem unabhangigen Vorsitzenden und mit 
weiteren ehrenamtlichen Richtern zu besetzen, die zur Halfte aus dem Bereich der 
Arbeitgeber und zur Halfte aus dem Bereich der Arbeitnehmer entnommen werden.' 
[The essential feature of the newly established courts was the fact that an extensive 
separate court system was introduced for labour disputes, a system which, in the first 
instance, entirely displaced the ordinary courts. It is also noteworthy that with these 
trade courts, the idea of placing an independent chairman as well as further judges on 
the bench, honorary judges, half of whom were taken from employer circles, the other 
half from employee circles, was established.]4 
The jurisdiction of the Gewerbegericht was limited to persons employed in crafts or 
trades, as defined in the Trades Code of 1845. The success of the Gewerbegerichte 
caused pressure on the government to establish courts also for labour disputes arising 
between employers and employees in commerce. This led to the passing of the Kauf-
mannsgerichtsgesetz in 1904, largely similar to the Gewerbegerichtsgesetz. 5 
This dual system of labour courts persisted until 1926, in spite of the confusion that 
reigned after the end of the First World War in 1919. As early as 1919, efforts were 
2 See Germelmann et al op cit note 1 at 44, Wenzel op cit note 1 at 697. 
3 
'Dieser erste Rat der Gewerbeverstandigen von 1806 kann als die Keimzelle der modernen 
Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit angesehen werden.' Germelmann et al Zoe cit note 2. 
4 Germelmann et al op cit note 1 at 45. 
5 See Germelmann et al op cit note 1 at 45. 
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underway to establish a unified labour court system. There were significant pressures to 
re-integrate the labour courts into the ordinary civil courts, these pressures leading to 
the 1926 compromise that the labour courts of first instance were independent courts, 
while new appellate and review instances were integrated into the ordinary civil court 
system. 6 The 1926 Labour Courts Act established, for the first time, a unified labour 
court system in Germany. 
In the period 1933 to 1945, as Germany suffered at the hands of the National-socialist 
government, the labour court system was stripped of some of its jurisdiction as the Nazi 
government placed extensive limitations on labour. By the end of the Second World 
War in 1945, the entire German court system, including the labour court system, had 
ground to a halt. 
In 1946, the Allied victors reinstated the labour courts of first instance, after having 
abolished all special courts in 1945. The political confusion that reigned in Germany 
after the end of the war, with four different occupied zones, led to a disintegration of 
the legal system. 7 
Based on the Basic Law of 1949 (which provides for a separation of the judiciary into 
separate branches), the new Labour Courts Act was passed in 1953, clearly based upon 
its predecessor of 1926. 
1979 saw the passing of legislation aimed at speeding up proceedings before the labour 
courts. 8 
7.2 JURISDICTION 
In terms of § 2 of the Labour Courts Act (ArbGG),9 the labour courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over: 
• civil disputes between parties to collective agreements10 relating to the validity 
or interpretation of a collective agreement, 
6 According to Germelmann et al, one of the most important features of the 1926 Labour Courts Act was 
that it provided for appellate and review jurisdictions: 'Von besonderem Gewicht fiir die 
Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit war es, daB nunmehr erstmals auch ein eigener lnstanzenzug und ein spezielles 
Revisionsgericht in Arbeitssachen vorhanden war.' Germelmann et al op cit note 1 at 46. 
7 See Germelmann et al op cit note 1 at 47-8. 
8 As to the nature of these amendments, see Germelmann et al op cit note 1 at 49. 
9 References to the Labour Courts Act or Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz (ArbGG) is to the amended 1979 version 
of the Act (BGBl. I S. 853). 
10 It is also possible, in terms of § 2 ArbGG, that a third party may bring an action in terms of the 
ArbGG. 
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• civil disputes between parties who may conclude collective agreements relating 
to delicts arising from industrial action, or questions relating to the freedom of 
association (including the right of the association to act), 
• civil disputes between employers and employees arising from the employment 
relationship. 
This is not a complete listing of the contents of § 2 ArbGG, which contains a detailed 
list of disputes over which the labour courts have exclusive jurisdiction. No distinction 
is drawn, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, between individual and collective 
disputes. 11 
In terms of §2a ArbGG, the labour courts also have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes 
arising from the Works Constitution Act, the Co-determination Act, and the decision 
whether or not an association (Vereinigung) has the necessary capacity to enter into col-
lective agreements (Tariffahigkeit) .12 
Generally speaking, the Labour Courts Act provides the labour courts with a very wide 
jurisdiction, encompassing both individual and collective disputes, but clearly, if regard 
is had to the wording of § 2 ArbGG, excluding disputes of interest. 
There is no doubt, in German law, that the labour courts are courts of law --- authority 
for this statement may be found in Article 95(1) of the Basic Law: 
'For the purposes of ordinary, administrative, fiscal, labour, and social jurisdiction, the 
Federation shall establish as highest courts of justice the Federal Court of Justice, the 
Federal Administrative Court, the Federal Fiscal Court, the Federal Labour Court, and 
the Federal Social Court.' 13 
Despite the fact that no practical significance attaches to the distinction, it is still dis-
puted what type of jurisdiction the labour courts have.14 
11 See Weiss op cit note 1 at 4. 
12 See § 2a(4) ArbGG. 
13 
'Nach der in Art. 95 Abs. 1 GG getroffenen Bestimmung wird die Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit verfas-
sungsrechtlich als eigener Rechtsweg neben der ordentlicher Gerichtsbarkeit angesehen.' [In terms of the 
provisions of Article 95(1) of the Basic Law, the labour courts are constitutionally regarded as being a 
separate recourse to the law, alongside the ordinary courts] Germelmann et al op cit note 1 at 75. 
14 According to the view held by most commentators, the difference in jurisdiction between the ordinary 
civil courts and the labour courts is founded on the nature of the dispute. The question, crisply put, is 
whether the labour courts are part of the ordinary courts and that their jurisdiction is therefore founded 
on procedure (Rechtswegzustiindigkeit), or whether they are totally separate courts, deriving their juris-
diction to hear a certain matter from the nature of the dispute (sachliche Zustiindigkeit). Schaub, for 
example, sees in the fact that labour law has developed into a separate branch of the law, that collective 
labour law has surpassed the rules of the ordinary law, and that proceedings before the labour court 
require speed and simplicity, an argument that the labour courts are totally separate from the ordinary 
civil courts. See G Schaub Arbeitsrechtliche Formularsammlung und Arbeitsgerichtsverfahren 5 ed 
(1990) at 446. Bader, reviewing changes to the legislative language in 1992, states that no actual conclu-
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7.3 STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION 
German labour courts have a three-tier structure: labour courts of first instance, appel-
late labour courts, and the Federal Labour Court. 
7.3.1 Labour courts of first instance 
The establishment of the labour courts of first instance is the responsibility of the 
Lander (who also finance these courts).15 Labour courts are divided into panels, Kam-
mern, each presided over by a judge16 (who may, however, preside over other panels) 
assisted by two honorary judges. These ehrenamtliche Richter (honorary judges), who 
are not qualified judges in terms of the applicable legislation, are, however, fully inde-
pendent and not subject to the control of the presiding judge. One of the honorary 
judges is taken from employer circles, and the other from employee circles. 17 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
sion on this point can be reached: Bader, Friedrich, Leinemann, Stahlhacke, Wenzel Gemeinschaftskom-
mentar zum Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz (GK-ArbGG) at § 48 11-13. See also Germelmann et al op cit at 581 
and Grunsky Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz 6 ed (1990) at 46. 
15 See § 14 ArbGG. In terms of§ 15 ArbGG, the administration of the labour court and the supervision 
of the court is the responsibility of the state labour authorities acting in agreement with the state justice 
authorities. The fact that the labour courts do not fall under the justice authorities has led to some con-
troversy. One of the arguments in favour of the labour authorities retaining the supervision of the labour 
courts is that the labour authorities enjoy the confidence of trade unions, employers, and employer 
organisations, a confidence which the justice authorities could never hope to attain. Arguments for 
returning the labour courts to the Department of Justice (both on a Federal and Ltlnd level) include the 
possibility of increasing isolation of the labour courts and considerations of personnel. It is also argued 
that the labour courts share a judicial function with all German courts, and that all institutions exercising 
judicial functions should be supervised by the same state department. See Germelmann et al op cit note 1 
at 422. 
16 The presiding judge is appointed jointly by the state labour authorities and justice department after 
consultation with an advisory committee (§ 18(1) ArbGG). The committee is tripartite in structure, con-
sisting of an equal number of representatives of employer organisations, trade unions, and the labour 
courts(§ 18(2) ArbGG). Normally these judges are appointed permanently. See Weiss op cit note 1 at 8. 
17 This is prescribed by § 16( 1) ArbGG. § 20 ArbGG sets out the procedure for appointing these 
honorary judges. The labour authorities of the Land appoints the judges for a period of 4 years. The 
judges are selected from a list provided by the local trade unions, employer organisations, and other 
bodies. § 20 ArbGG adds the requirement that due consideration of minorities must be had before a 
honorary judge is appointed. Only persons who are active as employer or employee in the area over 
which the court has jurisdiction may be appointed as honorary judges, and they must be older than 25 
(see § 21 ArbGG). See Weiss op cit note 1 at 9. 
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7.3.2 Appellate labour courts 
Many of the provisions applicable to labour courts of first instance apply also to the 
appellate labour courts (Landesarbeitsgerichte).18 
These courts have only an appellate jurisdiction extending geographically throughout a 
state (Land). 19 As is the case with labour courts of first instance, a panel of the appel-
late labour court consists of a presiding judge20 and two honorary judges.21 
7.3.3 The Federal Labour Court 
The Federal Labour Court, with its seat in Kassel, falls under the supervision of the 
Federal Ministry for Labour acting in agreement with the Federal Justice Ministry. 22 
The nine panels of the Federal Labour Court (called 'Senates') are significantly larger: 
apart from the presiding judge, a Senate consists of two additional judges, together with 
the two honorary judges.23 
The 'Big Senate', provided for in § 45 ArbGG consists of the President of the Federal 
Labour Court, the longest serving presiding judge, four other judges, as well as four 
honorary judges (two each representing employers and employees). 24 § 45(2) ArbGG 
provides for a special case where the Big Senate must be called upon: 
'Will in einer Rechtsfrage ein Senat von der Entscheidung eines anderen Senates oder 
des GroBen Senats abweichen, so ist iiber die streitige Rechtsfrage eine Entscheidung 
des GroBen Senates herbeizufiihren. Der erkennende Senat kann in einer Frage von 
grundsiitzlicher Bedeutung die Entscheidung des GroBen Senats herbeifiihren, wenn 
nach seiner Auffassung die Fortbildung des Rechts oder die Sicherung einer einheit-
18 In terms of§ 33 ArbGG, appellate labour courts are established by the individual states, and § 34 
ArbGG provides for similar supervision and control by the state labour authorities acting in agreement 
with the state judicial authorities. 
19 See Weiss op cit note 1 at 6-7. 
20 § 35 ArbGG. The presiding judges are appointed also by the labour authorities acting in agreement 
with the judicial authorities after hearing trade unions, employer organisations, and other interested 
bodies - § 36 ArbGG. 
21 In the case of honorary judges in the appellate labour court, the minimum age is 30 years - § 37 
ArbGG. 
22 § 40 ArbGG. 
23 § 41 ArbGG. 
24 
'Since the Federal Labour Court focuses exclusively on questions of law and consequently does not 
decide on the facts of case, the professional element is given more weight than in the lower level courts 
where the decision on facts is also at stake.' Weiss op cit note 1 at 7. 
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lichen Rechtsprechung es erfordern.' [Should a Senate wish to depart from the decision 
of another Senate or of the Big Senate, a decision of the Big Senate must be obtained. A 
Senate may, in a question of fundamental importance, request the decision of the Big 
Senate, when it is of the opinion that the development of the law or the securing of a 
unified jurisprudence so requires.] 25 
ASPECTS OF PROCEDURE26 
General 
The Labour Courts Act is founded on two types of proceedings. The Urteilsveifahren 
(literally: judgment proceedings) is the standard type of proceedings before the labour 
courts, and, as such, it is similar in nature to ordinary civil proceedings. This fact 
means that the rules of civil procedure apply, though with modifications imposed by the 
Labour Courts Act. 
The Beschluflveifahren (literally: decision proceedings) apply only in the case of dis-
putes arising from the Works Constitution Act, the Co-Determination Act, or disputes 
relating to the power of a trade union or employer organisation to conclude collective 
agreements. 27 
Because the Labour Courts Act does not distinguish between individual and collective 
disputes, an individual employee may represent him- or herself before the court;28 legal 
representation is, however, provided for.29 Trade unions and employer organisations 
may be represented by their respective legal officers or by qualified attorneys. 
25 Emphasis added in translation. 
26 This section does not purport to be a complete overview of all aspects of proceedings before the 
labour courts. Emphasis is placed on aspects which may interest readers accustomed to accusatorial pro-
ceedings in civil courts. 
27 
'Matters concerning the works constitution in the private sector, the election procedure for workers' 
representatives on the supervisory board and the competence to be a party to a collective agreement are 
dealt with by a special procedure, the so-called "order procedure" [Beschlujlverfahren]. The basic dif-
ferences between the normal procedure and this procedure are: while normally the basis for the court's 
decision is the material introduced by the parties to the lawsuit, in these special cases it is up to the court 
to investigate and to find out the truth .... ' Weiss op cit note 1 at 13. 
28 Personal representation is possible only in courts of first instance: in the appellate labour courts and in 
the Federal Labour Court, legal representation is required. 
29 
'Originally, the statute of 1926 excluded attorneys from representing parties in labour courts of first 
instance; only legal officers of the trade unions were allowed to act as counsel'. Weiss op cit note 1 at 
10. 
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7 .4.2 Continual conciliation 
The Labour Courts Act prescribes that all proceedings in the first instance begin with a 
Giiteveifahren or a conciliation session. In terms of § 54 ArbGG, the presiding judge 
has to discuss the dispute with the parties, taking into consideration all the facts leading 
to the dispute. In the conciliation session the presiding judge acts alone, but still exerts 
considerable influence over the parties by indicating to the parties 'his legal opinion, 
thereby substantially influencing the willingness of participants to compromise' . 30 
There are three possible results of the pre-trial conciliation: 'either the action is with-
drawn, a compromise is agreed upon or a date is set for litigious proceedings before the 
entire panel' . 3 I 
But conciliation is not only a pre-trial step: 'Die giitliche Erledigung des Rechtsstreits 
soll wahrend des ganzen Verfahrens angestrebt werden. '32 
7.4.3 Expeditiousness 
In terms of § 9(1) ArbGG, all proceedings (in all instances) are to be expedited: this 
provision of the Labour Courts Act contains a clear instruction to all persons concerned 
with the application of justice in the labour courts. The provisions of the Courts Con-
stitution Act relating to court recesses are expressly excluded. 33 
This principle of expeditiousness is a central theme of the Labour Courts Act: § 57(1) 
ArbGG provides that the proceedings should be completed, where possible, in one ses-
sion. Should this be impossible, particularly as matters of evidence delay the pro-
ceedings, the date of the next session is to be made known immediately. In terms of § 
46(2) ArbGG, many of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to pre-
trial procedures and exchange of documents are expressly excluded from operation in 
the Labour Courts. 
30 Weiss op cit note 1 at 11. 
3 t Weiss Loe cit note 30. 
32 § 57(2) ArbGG [An amicable settlement of the legal dipute should be strived for throughout the pro-
ceedings]. Emphasis added in translation. 
33 
'Das Verfahren ist in alien Rechtzugen zu beschleunigen. Die Vorschriften des Gerichtsverfas-
sungsgesetz uber Gerichtsferien sind nicht anzuwenden.' Legislation passed in 1976 (Gesetz zur Verein-
fachung und Beschleunigung gerichtlicher Verfahren) makes this principle of expeditiousness a basic 
principle in all courts. 
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7.4.4 The role of the presiding judge 
The presiding judge plays an important role in the proceedings. German civil proce-
dure, as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, provides for a more active and 
inquisitorial role on the part of the judge. 34 
7.4.5 Appeals 
A decision handed down by a labour court of first instance is appealable to an appellate 
labour court within a month (§ 87 ArbGG). Once leave to appeal has been granted, a 
further appeal is possible to the Federal Labour Court, but this appeal relates to matters 
of law only (see § 93 ArbGG). 
34 In terms of§ 136(3) of the ZPO (Zivilprozeflordnung, or Civil Procedure Code), the judge has a duty 
to ensure that the matter before him or her is exhaustively discussed. § 139 ZPO states that the judge has 
to ensure that the parties state all relevant facts. In order to achieve this, the judge must discuss the mat-
ter and the relevant facts with the parties and must ask questions. These provisions must, however, be 
seen as constituting exceptions to the basic principle of German civil procedure, which is based on the 
Verhandlungsmaxime, in terms of which it is the duty of the parties to present the court with all the rele-
vant factual information. This implies that the court may base its decision only on facts presented by a 
party: 'Es gibt also keine Aufklarung des Sachverhalts von Gerichts wegen.' [The court does not clear up 
the facts.] 0 Jauemig ZivilprozejJrecht 23 ed (1991) at 75. See also Schaub Arbeitsrechtliche For-
mularsammlung und Arbeitsgerichtsverfahren ( 1990) at 597. 
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'Only in England could the vocation of the judge be described as "something like a 
priesthood" or "analogous to the Royal Family", requiring practitioners to "seclude 
themselves" in various ways.' 
-- David Pannick Judges (1987) 10. Footnote omitted. 
'Imagine that Earth has been colonised by a civilisation from a distant solar system. 
These benevolent conquerors have set up a Commission of Inquiry ("The Inter-Stellar 
Law Commission") to discover the best national system of civil procedure .... If Earth 
had been invaded a few galactic time units earlier, as at first intended, the Commission 
would have found that the English civil court consisted of a professional judge, wearing 
an oddly adorned hat, and twelve ordinary citizens .... The Commission heard few 
lay-people speak positively in favour of these judges. However, there was no sugges-
tion that these judges were corrupt or that they were coerced by powerful figures in 
society into distorting their decisions. It was this record of consistent rectitude which 
very much impressed the Commission. Its own judicial history has been a less happy 
one.' 
-- Neil Andrews Principles of Civil Procedure (1994) 7-8, 9-10. 
DEVELOPMENT1 
In attempting to trace the development of the modem English court system, 2 the basic 
1 This section is based on J H Baker An Introduction to English Legal History 3 ed (1990), G J Hand & 
DJ Bentley (eds) Radcliffe and Cross The English Legal System 6 ed (1977), R J Walker & R Ward 
Walker & Walker's English Legal System 7 ed (1994). 
2 It may come as some suprise to find here a discussion of the English court system and its development, 
concentrating on the High Court and the House of Lords. The reason for this is that the industrial 
tribunals do not have jurisdiction to decide disputes relating to industrial action. In terms of s 62 of the 
1978 Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, the industrial tribunal was deprived of jurisdiction to 
determine the fairness of a dismissal resulting from industrial action, unless the complainant could show 
that selective dismissal or selective re-employment occurred. Furthermore, all the decisions that are 
analysed in Chapter 12 originate in the various divisions of the High Court, the Court of Appeals, and 
the House of Lords. Whereas the German labour courts have a wide jurisdiction, and exercise the func-
tion of dispute resolution also in disputes of a collective nature, industrial councils do not exercise this 
function, a function instead exercised by the British High Court and the House of Lords. Operative here 
again is the distinction drawn in the canonical texts of the comparative labour law discourse, namely that 
it is the function that must be compared, and not the institution. A narrow and distorted approach, one 
comparing the British system of industrial tribunals with the German labour courts and the South African 
industrial tribunal would be inappropriate in the context of collective dispute resolution where those dis-
putes have their origins in industrial action. 
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point of departure is the central historical role of the monarch: 'Historically the 
sovereign is the fountain of justice in England. '3 
Central to the royal government was the curia regis, a 'body of advisers and courtiers 
who attended the king and supervised the administration of the realm'. 4 In the 13th 
century, this king's court split up, as certain administrative bodies became 'quasi-
independent bureaux, no longer directly expressive of the king's immediate personal 
will' .5 
The first institution to separate from the monarch's household was the Court of the 
Exchequer. By the reign of Henry I (1100-1135), the Exchequer had become a depart-
ment of the curia regis dealing with the collection of revenue. By the time of Henry II 
(1154-1189), it had become a court, presided over by Exchequer Barons. 6 
During the reign of Henry II a certain class of 'judges' developed within the ranks of 
the royal councillors.7 It was also Henry II who 'ordered that five judges from his 
household were to reman in curia regis and not to depart therefrom, and that they 
should refer only difficult cases to himself' . s This marks the founding of a stationary 
court structure, and a court began to sit regularly at Westminster during the reign of 
Henry II. Clause 17 of the Magna Carta entrenched this, by providing that common 
pleas (civil suits between ordinary subjects of the king) 'shall not follow our court but 
be heard in some fixed place' .9 The judges of the Court of Common Pleas were full-
time lawyers (appointed from the ranks of advocates, the serjeants-at-law). The pro-
ceedings before this court were extremely formal, causing significant delays.10 
3 Walker & Ward op cit note 1. 
4 Baker op cit note 1 at 20. 
5 Radcliffe & Cross op cit note 1 at 55. 'When we speak of the curia regis as the "centre" of royal 
administration, we should remember that the centre was not static. The king himself was given to 
peripatetic rule, for to stay in one place for too long was not sound policy, and the king's court followed 
the king. Nevertheless, even in the twelfth century there was a tendency for a corps of administrators to 
settle in one place, usually the palace of Westminster, while the king was away. The Exchequer was the 
first department to be deposited; the king's treasure and the elaborate revenue service which controlled it 
were too cumbrous to keep constantly on the move'. Baker op cit note 1 at 21. 
6 Walker & Ward op cit note 1 at 132. 
7 Radcliffe & Cross op cit note 1 at 56. 
8 Baker op cit note 1 at 21. 
9 Quoted in Radcliffe & Cross Loe cit note 5. 
10 
'The jurisdiction of the court existed over disputes between subjects where the King's interest was not 
involved. Hence it tried all the real actions [actions relating to immovable property] and the personal 
actions of debt, covenant and tenure .... Thus the Common Pleas in the early period of the development 
of the common law exercised a far wider jurisdiction than the Exchequer or the King's Bench'. Walker & 
Walker op cit note 1 at 132-3. 
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The last court to break away from the curia regis was the Court of King's Bench. In 
this court the monarch continued to sit for some time, and continued to exert a sig-
nificant influence. It appears that the Court of King's Bench and the Court of Common 
Pleas exercised 'parallel jurisdiction, amicably exercised by both courts'. 11 
These three medieval courts, the Court of the Exchequer, the Court of Common Pleas 
and the Court of King's (or Queen's) Bench served as the basis for, and the nucleus of, 
the English court system administering the common law until the passing of the Judi-
cature Acts in 1873-1875. 
The coming into force of the Judicature Acts in 1875 marks the beginning of the 
modern English legal system: 
'The three chief results of the Judicature Acts 1873-1875, were the establishment of a 
single Supreme Court in which the jurisdiction of the various existing superior courts 
was concentrated; the concurrent administration in this new court of the rules of law 
and of equity; and lastly, the framing of a uniform code of procedure applicable to most 
civil proceedings in the new court.• 12 
The bases of the system introduced in 187 5, with amendments and a significant con-
solidation in 1925, subsisted until the passing of the Courts Act ( 1971 c 23). Ten years 
later, the Supreme Court Act ( 1981 c 54) brought about significant changes to the con-
stitution, composition, and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
8.2 STRUCTURE, JURISDICTION, AND COMPOSITION OF THE 
COURTS 
Because of the fragmented development of the English legal system, no unified system 
for the administration of justice in England developed in the form of a 'Ministry of Jus-
tice' . From the Supreme Court Act 1981 it is clear, however, that 'prime responsibility 
in many areas lies with the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chancellor's Department' .13 
The appointment of the Lord Chancellor is a political appointment; the appointment is 
made by the Queen on the advice of the Prime Minister. 
Traditionally, judges are regarded as 'servants of the Crown', because they are 
appointed by the Queen, even though the Queen or her Ministers cannot exercise any 
11 Radcliffe & Cross op cit note 1 at 59. 
12 Radcliffe & Cross op cit note 1 at 289. 
13 Walker & Ward op cit note 1 at 15. 'Given the wide-ranging responsibilities and powers vested in the 
Lord Chancellor it is perhaps surprising that, until recently, there has been no direct accountability to the 
elected House of Commons. This gap was filled in 1991, when it was announced that a Minister was to 
answer in the House of Commons for the work of the Lord Chancellor, and that a department was to be 
appointed.' Walker & Ward op cit note 1 at 16. 
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control over the judges. 14 The independence of the judiciary is fiercely guarded: 
'Whether judges are or are not Crown servants there is no doubt that the judicial func-
tion is not under the control of the legislature or the executive. Judicial independence is 
a fundamental of English constitutional law' . 1s 
8.2.1 The House of Lords 
The House of Lords is the highest court· in the United Kingdom and it exercises the 
judicial function of the British Parliament (this is why, technically speaking, an appeal 
to the House of Lords is an appeal to the entire House). 16 
The close link between the House of Lords, as a judicial body, and Parliament meant 
that until the nineteenth century, any member of the House of Lords could attend, and 
vote in, a judicial session. 17 
Any appeal to the House of Lords is heard by a panel of not less than three persons: the 
Lord Chancellor of Great Britain,1s the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (the 'law lords') 
14 Generally, judges in the various courts are appointed from the ranks of practitioners. See, for exam-
ple, s 71(3) of the Courts and Legal Services Act (1990, c 41). 
15 Walker & Ward op cit note 1 at 183. 
16 By the fourteenth century, as the Court of King's Bench separated itself from the Royal Council, the 
power of appeal to Parliament developed; at the same time, Parliament was separating into commons and 
Lords. Since the fifteenth century, judicial power was exercised by the Lords alone: 'If we remember that 
the Commons were coming to spend more and more of their time during the sessions of Parliament in 
private deliberation in their own chamber, and only to appear in the Parliament Chamber on important 
occasions, to hear messages from the Crown and the like, it should not surprise us very much to find that 
the hearing of appeals in the Parliament Chamber fell into the hands of the Peers, who were always there' 
Radcliffe & Cross op cit note 1 at 218. The idea of Parliament as a whole being the highest court per-
sisted: ' ... as late as the seventeenth century, analytical legal writers saw no fundamental difference 
between judicial and parliamentary law-making. For Hale, the supreme power of making laws and the 
supreme power of deciding cases had to reside in the same body'. Baker op cit note 1 at 238-9. The Judi-
cature Act of 1873, as originally envisaged, would have done away with appeal to the House of Lords: 
'Under the Judicature Acts as passed, the [appellate] jurisdiction [of the House of Lords] would indeed 
have disappeared; but, before the new legislation came into force, conservative opposition from members 
of Disraeli's government forced a reconsideration of the role of the House of Lords. At the last moment 
the original scheme was changed, the Lords were given a statutory appellate jurisdiction superior but akin 
to that of the Court of Appeal ... ' Baker op cit note 1 at 163. 
17 
'For the purpose of aiding the House of Lords in the hearing and determination of appeals, Her 
Majesty may by letters patent appoint qualified persons to be Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. ' Section 6 of 
the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 (39 & 40 Viet c 59). Since the passing of this Act, providing as it 
does for the creation of life peers for the purposes of hearing and determining appeals, a firm convention 
has arisen that lay peers do not participate in the judicial function of the House of Lords. See SH Bailey 
and M J Gunn Smith and Bailey on the Modem English Legal System (1991) at 92 for a brief discussion 
of the relevant case law. 
18 The Lord Chancellor is the president of the House of Lords. 
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and 'such Peers of Parliament as are for the time being holding or have held any of the 
offices in this Act described as high judicial offices' . 19 
The jurisdiction of the House of Lords is limited almost entirely to appellate jurisdic-
tion. 20 In civil matters the House of Lords hears appeals from the Court of Appeal, but 
only once leave to appeal has been obtained. 21 
8.2.2 The Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal, a superior court of record, 22 was established for the first time in 
the Judicature Act 1873 , and it forms, together with the High Court of Justice and the 
Crown Court, the Supreme Court of England and Wales. 23 
The Court of Appeal consists of a number of ex-officio judges24 and not more than 29 
ordinary judges (Lords Justices of Appeal).25 There are two divisions: the criminal 
division is presided over by the Lord Chief Justice, and the civil division by the Master 
of the Rolls.26 Typical panel-configurations of the Court of Appeal would be the Master 
19 Section 5 Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876. Section 25 defines the term 'high judicial office' to mean 
the office of Lord Chancellor, or the office of Judge of one of Her Majesty's superior courts of Great 
Britian and Ireland. 
20 The few vestiges of original jurisdiction include impeachment proceedings, claims of peerage, and 
breaches of privilege. 
21 
'No appeal shall lie to the House of Lords from any order or judgment made or given by the Court of 
Appeal .... except with the leave of that Court or of the House of Lords.' Administration of Justice 
(Appeals) Act 1934 (24 & 25 Geo 5 c 40). However, it is possible to skip over the appeal to the Court of 
Appeal and proceed directly after the trial to the House of Lords by virtue of the provisions of ss 12 and 
13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 (1969 c 58). Before this 'leap-from' appeal is possible, the 
trial judge must grant a certificate, which is only possible if all the parties consent and 'a sufficient case 
for an appeal to the House of Lords . . . has been made out to justify an application for leave to bring 
such an appeal' (s 12). 
22 See section 15(1) Supreme Court Act 1981. 
23 Section 1(1) Supreme Court Act (1981 c 54). The Lord Chancellor, the de facto head of the British 
judiciary, is the President of the Supreme Court (s 1(2) Supreme Court Act). The House of Lords is not 
part of the Supreme Court; therefore, in spite of its name, the Supreme Court is not the highest court in 
England and Wales. 
24 Including the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, and any Lord of 
Appeal who consents to hear the appeal on the request of the Lord Chancellor. Section 2(2) Supreme 
Court Act 1981. The Lord Chancellor almost never sits in appeals: the most work of the Court of Appeal 
is done by the Master of the Rolls and the ordinary judges. 
25 Sections 2(1) and 2(3) Supreme Court Act 1981. In order to qualify for appointment as Lord Justice 
of Appeal, a judge must have a ten year High Court qualification (ie a right of audience in relation to all 
proceedings in the High Court - see s 71 (3) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990) or be a judge of 
the High Court (s 10(3)(b) Supreme Court Act 1981). 
26 Section 3 Supreme Court Act 1981. 
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of the Rolls assisted by two Lords Justices of Appeal, or Lords Justices assisted by 
High Court judges. 21 
The Court of Appeal exercises only appellate jurisdiction, this being conferred by sec-
tion 15 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Jurisdiction is given to the Court of Appeal by 
the Act itself, but there is also a general provision (section 15(2)(b)), in terms of which 
the court retains any jurisdiction it could exercise before the commencement of this 
Act. Section 16 explicitly provides that the Court of Appeal has the jurisdiction to hear 
and determine appeals from any judgment or order of the High Court. 
8.2.3 The High Court 
Established for the first time by the Judicature Acts, the High Court consists of the 
Chancery Division (presided over by the Lord Chancellor), the Queen's Bench Division 
(presided over by the Lord Chief Justice) and the Family Division (presided over by the 
President of the Family Division). Puisne judges are allocated to the various divisions 
by the Lord Chancellor. 2s For present purposes the most important division of the High 
Court is the Queen's Bench Division. 
The Queen's Bench Division has a wide jurisdiction: both original and appellate, and 
both civil and criminal. The most significant jurisdiction of the Queen's Bench division 
is the original civil jurisdiction it has to hear matters arising from contracts or tort 
(delict). These matters are normally heard by a puisne judge sitting alone. 
8.3 ASPECTS OF PROCEDURE 
8.3.1 General 
The procedure before English courts of law displays a high degree of complexity. 
Whereas the German Labour Courts Act expressly excludes a number of pre-trial pro-
ceedings, most notably the exchange of pleadings,29 civil proceedings in England are 
characterised by extensive pre-trial procedures. 30 
27 In terms of section 9 Supreme Court Act 1981, a puisne judge of the High Court may act in the Court 
of Appeal when 'requested' to do so (in terms of s9(3), a High Court judge must comply with such 
request). 
28 Section 5(1) and (2) Supreme Court Act 1981. 'Over half of the total number of puisne judges of the 
High Court are attached to the Queen's Bench Division. This judicial strength reflects ... the volume of 
business in the division ... 'T Ingman The English Legal Process 4 ed (1992) 17. 
29 See 7.4.3 above on§ 46 ArbGG. 
30 See N Andrews Principles of Civil Procedure (1994) at 18, discussing pre-trial disclosure and J 
O'Hare & R Hill Civil Litigation 5 ed (1990) at 147-163 on the service of documents. 
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Even though the procedural rules of the British courts do not contain the explicit direc-
tions of expeditiousness contained in German law's § 9 ArbGG, there is still a 'princi-
ple of accelerated justice', referring to default judgments, summary judgments, or deci-
sions relating to points of law only. 31 But this principle relates to cases where 
attenuated proceedings are possible --- there is no general duty on the courts to expedite 
proceedings once they have reached trial. 32 
While proceedings before the German labour courts start off with a conciliation ses-
sion, and attempts must be made throughout all proceedings (be they in the first 
instance or on appeal) to promote an amicable settlement between the parties, English 
law displays a certain hesitancy in judges trying to lead the parties to a settlement: 
8.3.2 
'. . . it is not the judges' function to coax parties into accepting settlement. There is 
Solomonic jurisdiction and no procedure for "knocking together heads" .... Nor does 
English law recognise a generally applicable machinery for conciliation between parties 
to civil proceedings. •33 
Adversarial proceedings and the passive role of the judge 
Adversarial proceedings places the form, conduct, content, and pace of the proceedings 
in the hands of the parties themselves. This has consequences for the relationship 
between the parties,34 and also for the relationship between the parties and the court. 35 
Whereas the German rules of civil procedure expect a judge to involve him- or herself 
in the process of adducing evidence by asking questions, and to ensure that the facts of 
the dispute are fully discussed, a judge in an English court who dared to ask questions 
31 See Andrews op cit note 30 at 21-2. 
32 Attempts have been made to expedite proceedings before some English courts; most notably the Court 
of Appeal: 'Procedural changes were introduced in an effort to reduce the length of oral hearings before 
the court. Although proposals to change to a system of written briefs and to impose time-limits on 
counsel's argument have been rejected, the judges are now expected to familiarise themselves before the 
hearing with the general background to the dispute, the judgment of the court below and the grounds of 
appeal. The Master of Rolls has given guidance on the preparation of "skeleton arguments", which 
counsel are expected to submit to the court at least fourteen days in advance of the hearing of all appeals 
other than those of exceptional urgency .... ' Ingman op cit note 28 at 15. 
33 Andrews op cit note 30 at 27. Conciliation does take place on an official basis to claims brought 
before Industrial Tribunals. 
34 
'[The adversarial system] introduces an element of sportsmanship or gamesmanship into the conduct 
of civil proceedings, and it develops the propensity on the part of lawyers to indulge in procedural 
manoeuvres.' Jacob The Fabric of English Civil Justice (1987) quoted in Andrews op cit note 30 at 35. 
35 
'The principle of party control ensures that the court remains detached and passive. This is considered 
to be beneficial in two main ways. First, the court can preserve its impartiality. Secondly, detachment 
during a hearing will save the court from falling into errors.' Andrews op cit note 30 at 34. 
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during the hearing was urged into retirement soon after the hearing. 36 All relevant evi-
dence must be placed before the court by the parties or their representatives; the judge 
should avoid descending into the arena where the parties do battle. 
The effectiveness of adversarial proceedings rests upon a number of assumptions 
regarding the representation of the parties: (1) both parties must have legal representa-
tion, and (2) the representation on both sides should be equally efficient and equally 
matched. The representatives must (3) serve the interests of their clients --- each client 
is intent upon winning, and through this conflict of intentions it is hoped that the truth 
will emerge. 37 Representation in all the British higher courts is the rule rather than the 
exception. 
8.3.3 Appeals 
In civil matters, section 16(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 provides that appeals 
against any judgment or order of the High Court (including the Queen's Bench Divi-
sion) is to be heard by the Court of Appeal. It is, however, possible to circumvent 
appeal to the Court of Appeal once the requirements of s 13 of the Administration of 
Justice Act 1969 have been complied with and to proceed directly to the House of 
Lords from the High Court. 38 
The House of Lords has jurisdiction to hear appeals against any order or judgment of 
the Court of Appeal.39 Leave to appeal (from either the Court of Appeal or the House 
of Lords) is required. 40 
36 See Andrews op cit note 30 42-43. 
37 See Andrews op cit note 30 at 34-5. 
38 See above, note 21. 
39 Section 3 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 (39 & 40 Viet c 59). Section 4 of this Act, still in 
force, clearly shows the link between the House of Lords and Parliament and the still-present central 
position of the Crown: 'Every appeal shall be brought by way of petition to the House of Lords, praying 
that the matter of the order or judgment appealed against may be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen 
in her Court of Parliament, on order that the said Court may determine what of right, and according to 
the law and custom of this realm, ought to be done in the subject-matter of such appeal'. 
40 Section 1 Administration of Justice (Appeals) Act 1934 (24 & 25 Geo 5 c 40). 
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THE SOUTH AFRICAN INDUSTRIAL COURT 
'Yet the industrial court has remained an institution of anomalies. Successes have been 
matched by failures. Consistency has been followed by inconsistency. Courage in the 
assumption and exercise of jurisdiction has been met on other occasions with failure of 
nerve. And the overall impression one might get of industrial court jurisprudence from 
the judgments of its more sophisticated members is often matched by the bleak reality 
of appearance before uninformed and evasive - or perhaps simply incompetent - presid-
ing officers.' 
-- Edwin Cameron 'Overview of the Industrial Court' in Benjamin, Jacobus & Albertyn 
(eds) Strikes, Lock-outs & Arbitration in South African Labour Law (1989) 11. 
' "Glad you're not charging any money for this. How can we win?" 
"Get lucky with the right judge." 
"Sounds like Vegas. " 
The lawyer shrugged. "That's because life is Vegas." 
"Oboy," Zoyd groaned, "I've got worse trouble here than I've ever had, and I'm hear-
ing 'Life is Vegas'?" 
Elmhurst's eyes moistened, and his lips began to tremble. "Y-You mean ... life isn't 
Vegas?" ' 
-- Thomas Pynchon Vineland (1990) 360. 
DEVELOPMENT 
The South African industrial court, now having met its demise at the hands of labour 
legislation passed in 1995, is an institution of relatively recent origin. 1 
The predecessor of the industrial court, the Industrial Tribunal, was established in 
terms of section 17 of the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956. The coming into 
being of the Tribunal must be seen in the light of a report of a Commission of Enquiry 
into Industrial Legislation, which reported in 1951 that 'the commercial and industrial 
1 This should not create the impression that the idea of a labour judiciary is as recent in South Africa: 
'The Industrial Court Bill of 1932 was the first attempt to establish a labour court in South Africa. It pro-
vided for the establishment of an industrial division of the Supreme Court of South Africa with country-
wide jurisdiction. The court was to have had criminal appeal and review jurisdiction in all offences com-
mitted under the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1924 (Act 11of1924), and the Wage Act, 1925 (Act 27 of 
1925). It was to be staffed by a judge of the Supreme Court, and provision was also made for assessors to 
sit with the judge in certain cases. The Bill was however withdrawn after its first reading.' The Complete 
Wiehahn Repon Part 1 par 4 .13. 
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development of the country up to that time had made the establishment of special judi-
cial machinery to deal with labour disputes a necessity' . 2 
The functions of the Industrial Tribunals were limited and largely of a technical nature, 
including advising the Minister of Manpower (as he was then called), undertaking 
demarcations, and conducting both compulsory and voluntary arbitrations. In spite of 
its name, the Industrial Tribunal exercised no judicial function. 3 
The industrial court which was to leave such indelible traces on South African labour 
law was the result of recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legis-
lation appointed in 1977, and acting under the chairmanship of Professor N Wiehahn. 4 
The Wiehahn Commission recommended that the existing Industrial Tribunal be re-
named the industrial court, and outlined the main features of the institution it 
envisaged, including a country-wide jurisdiction, the appointment of a president and 
'suitably qualified assessors' and that the industrial court was to follow a less formal 
procedure but still adhere to the principles of administrative justice (audi alteram 
partem and nemo iudex in sua causa).5 
According to the architects of the industrial court,6 that court would, through its deci-
sions, develop a body of case law which would by 'judicial precedent contribute to the 
formulation and development of fair employment guidelines' . 7 With the passing of the 
2 Wiehahn report op cit note 1 par 4.15. 
3 Wiehahn Report op cit note 1 at par 4.20. 
4 The appointment of this commission should itself be seen within its historical context. 1972-3 saw sig-
nificant waves of strikes shake especially Natal. The industrial action and the concomitant increase in 
worker-awareness was met by the government of the day passing the Black Labour Relations Regulation 
Act in 1973. By 1976, 'it had become obvious that the provisions of the Black Labour Relations Regula-
tion Act of 1973 had not solved the problem of black worker militancy'. S Bendix Industrial Relations in 
South Africa 2 ed (1992) 341. Commenting on the rationale for the establishment of the Commission of 
Inquiry, the cited author continues (Loe cit): 'The original brief of the Commission was to rationalise the 
then existent labour legislation, to seek possible means of adapting the industrial relations system to 
11 
changing needs 11 and to 11 • • • eliminate bottlenecks and other problems experienced in the labour 
sphere 11 • This was the stated brief but, in retrospect, it appears highly probable that the Commission was 
specifically instructed to consider a method by which black trade unions could be controlled and 
incorporated into the industrial relations system without creating too great a disruption.' 
5 See par 4 .28 of Part 1 of the Wiehahn Report op cit note 1. 
6 The non-court status of the industrial court was discussed in 6.3 above. It is interesting to note that, in 
terms of the response of the government to the first part of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, the 
industrial court would occupy the same uneasy position orbiting between Ministries of Labour and Jus-
tice as the German labour courts occupy: 'Finally it is the Government's decision that the Industrial 
Court shall fall under the Department of Labour, but that the Court should maintain very close ties with 
the Department of Justice. The president of the Industrial Court will in fact only be appointed after con-
sultation with the Minister of Justice.' White Paper on Part 1 of the Wiehahn Report, par 7 .3. 
7 Wiehahn Report op cit note 1 par 4.25.5. 
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Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 94 of 1979 in the wake of the recommendations 
of the Wiehahn Commission, the industrial court came into being. 8 
Once the wording of the legislation pertaining to the jurisdiction of the industrial court 
to strike down unfair labour practices had settled, 9 from about 1983 the court pro-
ceeded to exercise its powers with enthusiasm, creating, for example, an entirely new 
law of unfair dismissal. IO 
Controversial amendments to the Labour Relations Act (as the Industrial Conciliation 
Act had been re-named) included the establishment of a Labour Appeal Court, itself 
subject to some controversy. 11 The Labour Appeal Court survived significant amend-
ments to the Labour Relations Act in 1991. 
9.2 JURISDICTION 
9.2.1 The industrial court 
The industrial court, lacking an inherent jurisidction, has a jurisdiction conferred by 
statute, more specifically in terms of the definition of an unfair labour practice. 12 It has 
the power to strike down unfair labour practices as defined.1 3 In exercising its exhaus-
tively enumerated functions, 14 the powers of the industrial court 'are in accord with a 
8 
'Already at the time of its inception some doubts were expressed as to whether the new institution 
would succeed in fulfilling all the expectations. See H Cheadle 'The New Industrial Court' (1980) 97 
South African Law Journal 137 at 143. 
9 See chapter 5 above. 
10 
' . • . the industrial court used its powers in terms of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction to bring 
about fundamental changes to everyday employment practices and collective bargaining structures in 
South Africa. Although this has been achieved under the guise of an interpretation of a statutory defini-
tion and by adopting judicial techniques and procedures, what cannot be concealed is that the decisions of 
the court were heavily influenced by what it regarded as policy considerations. It created what is, in 
effect, a "new labour law" in which common-law contractual principles play a lesser role and where 
emphasis is placed on fairness in the employment and industrial relations context'. PAK le Roux & A van 
Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 19. 
11 
'Since its inception the Labour Appeal Court has been the subject of continued controversy. Unions 
regard it as employer-biased and criticism has also been levelled at the attitude of judges and assessors, 
the latter more often than not being advocates whose usual work is to represent employers'. S Bendix op 
cit note 4 at 529. 
12 In terms of section 17(2)(b) Labour Relations Act, the industrial court has country-wide jurisdiction, 
in spite of the fact that section 17(2)(a) makes Pretoria the seat of the court. 
13 As to the definition, see above 5. 1. 
14 See section 17 ( 11) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 as amended. 
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court of equity rather than a court of law'_ 15 The industrial court has itself repeatedly 
stated that considerations of 'fairness' play a significant role. 16 
The legislation provides for a number of remedies for unfair labour practices, ranging 
from urgent interim relief, 17 a remedy restoring the position to the status quo before the 
alleged unfair labour practice was committed, 1s and final relief in the form of a final 
unfair labour practice determination.19 
9.2.2 The Labour Appeal Court 
This Court, established in terms of section 17 A of the Labour Relations Act, has no 
original jurisdiction, its functions being exclusively the hearing of appeals against 
industrial court decisions,20 reviewing industrial court proceedings, 21 and deciding 
questions of law reserved for decision by the Labour Appeal Court by the industrial 
15 T Poolman Equity, the Court, and Labour Relations (1988) 8. 
16 See, for example, Metal and Allied Workers Union & Others v Barlows Manufacturing Co Ltd (1983) 
4 ILJ 283 (IC) at 293G--H, SA Laundry, Dry Cleaning, Dyeing & Allied Workers Union & Others v 
Advance Laundries Ltd t/a Stork Napkins (1985) 6 /LJ 544 (IC) at 565H, and Anglo American Farms t/a 
Boschendal Restaurant v Komjwayo (1992) 13 ILJ 573 (LAC) at 589E--F. The fact that the industrial 
court has a jurisdiction based on fairness coupled with the fact that the industrial court is not a court of 
law meant that the industrial court did not always follow precedents, even though the establishment of a 
code of fair labour practices through precedent was the aim of the architects of the industrial court. In 
TATU & others v Spoomet (1993) 14 ILJ 1056 (IC), the industrial court dismissively found that a judg-
ment of the Labour Appeal Court 'does not create a binding precedent, but constitutes, instead, a mere 
expression of opinion which opinion is one of the factors to be taken into account as a possible guide-line 
by this court in the exercise of its discretion' (at 1062B, per Van Niekerk, Senior Member). The presi-
dent of the industrial court retaliated: ' ... this court [the industrial court] is committed to the observa-
tion of the rule of law. I comprehend this principle also to mean that an administrative body is enjoined 
to follow and apply the law as determined by the binding authority of a superior court or other judicial 
body. The Industrial Court has been classified as an administrative organ. The Industrial Court could 
probably be better classified as an administrative court. This does not however affect the principle. The 
consequence is that this court will follow and apply binding decisions of superior courts. The Labour 
Appeal Court is such a superior court .... Any decision of this court which has indicated that, as a gen-
eral rule, we will not follow a decision of the Labour Appeal Court is an aberration and does not con-
stitute the considered approach of this court.' Hlatswayo v Sub-Nigel Gold Mining Co Ltd (1994) 15 ILJ 
431 (IC) at 433G-H, 435D-E. 
17 See section 17(1 l)(a) of the Labour Relations Act. This type of relief was available pending relief in 
terms of section 43. 
18 See section 43 of the Labour Relations Act. 
19 See section 46(9) Labour Relations Act. 
20 See sections 17(21A)(a) and 17B(l)(b) of the Labour Relations Act as amended. 
2 1 Section 17B(2) Labour Relations Act. 
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court mero motu or acting on the request of a party to the proceedings before the indus-
trial court. 22 
9.3 COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE 
9.3.1 The industrial court 
The industrial court is presided over by the president and the deputy president, both 
appointed 'by reason of their knowledge of the law' and their competence to perform 
the designated functions of the industrial court. 23 The legislation also provides for the 
appointment of permanent members of the industrial court. All appointments are made 
by the Minister of Labour. Additional members may be appointed either by the Minis-
ter of Labour or by the president of the industrial court if he or she has been authorised 
to do so by the Minister. The appointment of an additional member can only be made 
with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance. 24 
9.3.2 The Labour Appeal Court 
Each division of the Labour Appeal Court consists of a judge of the Supreme Court of 
South Africa who acts as chairperson, aided by two assessors, selected by the chairper-
son. 25 The Judge President of each provincial division of the Supreme Court appoints 
22 See sections 17(21)(a) and 17B(l)(a) Labour Relations Act as amended. 
23 Section 17 ( 1 )(b) Labour Relations Act. These phrases relate to all appointments to the industrial 
court, including the appointment of additional members and the registrar (see section 17(l)(d) Labour 
Relations Act). 
24 See section 17(1)(bA) Labour Relations Act. 
25 See section 17 A(3) Labour Relations Act. These assessors do not represent a tripartite structure to the 
Labour Appeal Court; the legislation provides that an assessor 'shall be a person who, in the opinion of 
the chairman of the court, has experience of the administration of justice or skill in any matter which may 
be considered by the court' Section 17 A(3)(c). Section 17 A(3)(e)(ii) provides that when a question of law 
has to be decided, the chairman sits alone. The wording of the definition of an unfair labour practice, 
however, rendered impossible a categorical distinction between questions of fact and questions of law: ' . 
. . the wording and purpose of the [Labour Relations] Act lead to only one conclusion, namely that the 
ultimate question whether the facts found by the court constitute an unfair labour practice is neither a 
"question of law" within the meaning of s 17A(3)(e)(ii) of the Act nor a "question of fact" for the pur-
poses of s 17C( 1 )(a). It falls within a third category of question which has its genesis in the extraordinary 
jurisdiction established by the Act. . . . [T]he learned judge a quo was not correct in holding that the 
assessors had no part to play in deciding the question as to whether or not the facts found constituted an 
unfair labour practice. The assessors are full members of the court for the purpose of deciding this ques-
tion.' Media Workers Association of SA & Others v The Press Corporation of SA Ltd (1992) 13 ILJ 1391 
(A) at 1404C-E, per Grosskopf JA. 
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judges to act as chairpersons in the Labour Appeal Court.26 
The geographical jurisdiction of the Labour Appeal Court as described here was similar 
to that of the provincial divisions of the Supreme Court prior to the 1996 Constitution. 
9.4 ASPECTS OF PROCEDURE 
9.4.1 General 
South African civil proceedings are in nature adversarial, implying that the conduct of 
the proceedings is largely in the hands of the parties or their representatives. 27 
Proceedings before the industrial court are therefore characterised by exchange of docu-
ments, the filing of documents with the registrar of the court, and discovery of docu-
ments. The Rules of the Industrial Court contain specific instructions relating to certain 
specific functions: detailed rules apply inter alia in the case of applications for urgent 
interim relief, status quo orders, appeals to the Labour Appeal Court, and final unfair 
labour practice determinations. 
Significant delays developed in industrial court proceedings, caused in no small part by 
the cavalier manner in which some practitioners approached and dealt with industrial 
26 The status of the Labour Appeal Court changes with the specific function being exercised: 'For the 
purposes of appeal and not, it must be emphasized, as regards the reserved question of law or the review, 
the labour appeal court is deemed for certain purposes to be a division of the supreme court. These pur-
poses include the adjournment of proceedings, the appearance of the parties, the accessibility of the court 
and any other matter not specifically governed by the LRA [Labour Relations Act] as amended' A A 
Landman 'The Industrial Court and the Labour Appeal Court: A Note on some Aspects of the Labour 
Relations Amendment Bill' (1988) 10 Modern Business Law 102 at 105. When, however, reviewing 
industrial court proceedings, the Labour Appeal Court itself appears to share the status of the industrial 
court as an administrative organ: ' . . . given the composition and functioning of the Labour Appeal 
Court there is a good case to be made out that when it performs certain functions including review func-
tions the Labour Appeal Court is itself an administrative organ' per Landman, President, in Hlatswayo v 
Sub-Nigel Gold Mining Co Ltd (1994) 15 ILJ 431 (IC) at 4331. 
27 
'A court designed to be informal, and whose day-to-day business consists primarily of deciding the 
fairness of dismissal cases, has become a happy hunting ground for the legal profession. The court's 
approach is to a large extent attributable to the fact that proceedings in the Industrial Court are adver-
sarial with parties assuming the responsibility of presenting their cases and the presiding officer playing a 
role similar to that of a judge or magistrate. The court has operated in this manner since its inception. 
However there are strong indications that the drafters of the 1979 amendments intended the court to take 
a more inquisitorial form' P Benjamin 'Legal Representation in Labour Courts' (1994) 15 Industrial Law 
Journal 250 at 255. 
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court proceedings.is In the final years of the industrial court, earnest attempts were 
made to introduce new courts and new members, to expedite proceedings in certain 
cases, 29 the proposed establishment of industrial council courts, 3o and the establishment 
of temporary circuit courts in the environs of Johannesburg. 31 
9.4.2 Pre-hearing conferences 
Rule 9 of the Rules of the Industrial Court provide that upon request of the industrial 
court, the parties shall hold an informal conference outside the court before the matter 
is heard. The conference is presided over by a member of the court. This pre-hearing 
conference is directed, firstly, at attempting to bring the parties to an amicable settle-
ment, and, secondly, at eliminating as much of the evidentiary complexities and factual 
disputes as possible. 
The behaviour of the parties may have an impact on costs: failure to attent a pre-
hearing conference or failure to agree may be taken into consideration by the court with 
respect to costs. 32 
9.4.3 Appeals 
Appeals against decisions of the industrial court is to the Labour Appeal Court. A fur-
ther possibility of appeal exists, in terms of section 17C Labour Relations Act, to the 
28 It is patent from a reading of the various Practice Notes appearing above the signature of the last pres-
ident of the Industrial Court, Professor A Landman, that practitioners involved in industrial court pro-
ceedings often did not exercise the care and attention the proceedings required: In Practice Note 1/1993 
(29 June 1993) the president of the court alludes to the fact that many cases are withdrawn because prac-
titioners only lavish attention upon the matter at a late stage; there is also a reminder that headings and 
references should be correct. The president also found it necessary to remind practitioners to paginate the 
papers in opposed applications (Practice Note 4/1993 - 22 November 1993). All these Practice Notes are 
reproduced in Cheadle et al Current Labour Law 1994 (1994) at 155-169. 
29 See Practice Note 2/1993. 
30 Practice Note 3/1993. 
31 See Practice Note 1/1994 and 2/1994 (the latter announcing the foundering of 'Operation Aegean' ---
the attempt to establish five temporary courts in Johannesburg). 
32 
'The underlying rationale for this measure [possible order pertaining to cost] is that many cases are 
being withdrawn at the last moment because they only receive the earnest attention of the practitioners 
involved at a late stage. Every case on the roll should be a case which is ready for hearing. If it is not, it 
clogs the roll and disadvantages parties whose matters are ready. The holding of pre-trial conferences at 
the court's premises under the auspices of a member of the court has occasioned unnecessary cost and 
inconvenience for parties and practitioners. Consequently this practice will not be reintroduced. Every 
presiding member will, however, retain the discretion to insist on a further pre-trial conference, even 
under his or her auspices, should this be warranted.' Industrial Court Practice Note 111993. 
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Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (as that court was named prior to the Con-
stitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996). Leave to appeal from either the Labour 
Appeal Court or the Appellate Division (the latter now called the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in terms of section 168 of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996) is required. 
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[ ... standing OUTside, but still being INside the text (OF the text --- is the genetive 
warranted?) ... reflecting upon what has happened up to this point in text-time ... 
What is to be made of these apparently unrelated, at worst, irrelevant chapters? What 
ARE these pieces of text, so meticulously footnoted? Why are they here in the first 
place, and what function do they serve? 
In the beginning was the programme of comparative labour law, a programme charac-
terised by its insistence on the context. A reading of that chapter (at the outset of this 
part of the text) investigating that programme may appear to be a rejection of that 
programme --- but that programme appears to find application in the very text (this 
text) that investigated it {pointing to this, to that, looking back, looking forward, at the 
self, ranging over the contours of the writing as it has unfolded up to this point} ... 
The import of chapter 2 lies not in an outright rejection of the programme of compara-
tive labour law (does it lie instead only in an investigation of the lacunae of the 
programme?). Every text has a context, and what has occurred in the preceding chap-
ters is an establishment of the context of that which remains to be read. 
What is the dynamics of this process? By outlining the dominant discourses in collec-
tive labour law of the countries involved (in chapters 3, 4, and 5), these short and 
somewhat motley chapters outline, in briefest possible (is brevity a virtue?) form, the 
manner in which collective labour law is talked about and thought about in each of the 
three countries. They attempt to allude to the major strands in the discourses of order 
of collective labour law. 
But what is to be made of the strange chapter 6, pretentiously (is its poetry despera-
tion?) claiming to be an 'anti-phenomenology'? Is that chapter merely a prelude to the 
brief outlines of institutions-as-function which dog its footsteps (in chapters 7-9)? Or is 
the focus of that difficult and obtuse piece of text another series (stretching into 
infinity) of discourses of order: the way in which the labour judiciary is thought of and 
spoken about? 
Note the strange dissonance between what is said in chapter 6 and in chapters 7-9, as 
those latter chapters simply ignore the implications of chapter 6 and proceed to silence 
the operations of the implications in the discourse of order by closing off and present-
ing, again (in symmetry to chapters 3, 4, and 5) what could be called 'hard law', filled 
with references to legislation, to paragraphs (in German economically: §), to historical 
sources. The issue of the limits of the discourse of order (which are herausgearbeitet in 
chapter 6) disappear behind the law closing off its own problematical nature, as the dis-
course of the law succeeds in (re)presenting itself as complete and full. It could go on 
forever. 
If only it were all like that! 
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What, then, can be said of the preceding chapters? That they are, in a certain sense, 
introductory, is clear. That they are not the main focus of the instant text is also patent 
--- they do not contain sufficient detail in order to justify that status. 
They point to those discourses that constitute the 'context': those chapters are mere 
indications of the archival rules which those texts which are soon to be investigated are 
to be read in terms of and to be read against (versus). For the context is at the same 
time that which supports the text and that which undermines the text. 
Metaphorically --- if one were to think of an act of narration: various stories are to be 
told. These stories are to be told in terms of various archival rules {these rules enable 
the stories to make sense). But the stories may also (re)present a transgression of those 
rules. The purpose of these/those preceding chapters is, then, to vaguely point in the 
direction of those archival (discursive) rules, and, further, to usher in the place (the 
court, the tribunal: where things are heard) where the stories are to unfold. 
The context/contratext is there. It has been written. The (protracted) introduction is 
over and done with. 
This is a breach, a crack in the text, this is . . . ] 
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brisure [bri'zy:r], nf Break; crack, joint, folding point in a 
piece of joiner's work, small fragment; (Her.) rebatement; 
difference. 
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LAW(S) AGAINST STRIKES 
THE EMBRACE 
'The most obvious function of group conflict is to make explicit the grounds that sepa-
rate the groups in opposition. It is a venerable sociological proposition that the "we" 
group always characterizes its virtues explicitly in contrast to the equally concretely 
stated vices of the "they" group. In terms of the larger society, this concrete expression 
of the differing goals and objectives of competing groups is useful. It suggests that 
overt conflict cannot be carried out without each side's striving for some kind of public 
justification of its position. Now the significance of having to justify publicly a dis-
puted position lies in the fact that elements underlying the dispute are given some kind 
of affirmative expression. Each side comes to know its own mind and that of its 
opponent. There is no guarantee that, because the grounds for conflict are made 
explicit, these will necessarily represent the "true" basis of conflict.' 
-- Kornhauser, Dubin, & Ross 'Problems and Viewpoints' in Kornhauser, Dubin, & 
Ross (eds) Industrial Conflict (1954) 16. 
'In the funhouse mirror-room you can't see yourself go on forever, because no matter 
how you stand, your head gets in the way. Even if you had a glass periscope, the image 
of your eye would cover up the thing you really wanted to see. The police will come; 
there' 11 be a story in the papers. ' 
-- J Barth 'Lost in the Funhouse' in Lost in the Funhouse: Fiction for Print, Tape, Live 
Voice (1969) 85. 
[FOURTH PARABLE: ARABIAN NIGHTS #1 --- #1001 + 
This tale is not politically correct. 
Having come under the impression (through a number of strangely symmetrical experi-
ences) that women are ex natura faithless creatures, a male person in a position of 
power (a king) undertakes a programme consisting of 'marrying' a woman, spending a 
night with her, and, before she has the opportunity to betray his trust in her, having the 
poor girl executed at the crack of dawn the following day. 
The supply of women within the force-field of the king being ex natura finite, it is soon 
the tum of the daughter of his most trusted adviser. This girl, an entirely fictional crea-
ture one could call Sheherezade, being quite a brazen hussy with her wits about her, 
devises a plan to escape the peril she faces. After having 'married' the king, she pro-
ceeds to tell the king a story (about a fisherman and a jinni) during the night. The king 
so enjoys the narration that he decides to stay the execution of Sheherezade until the 
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tale be told (it takes four nights to conclude the particular tale -- it is {ex natura?} fol-
lowed by others). This pattern is repeated for some time, in fact, for one thousand and 
one nights. In spite of the fact that Sheherezade bears the king three sons during the 
course of these three years, she continues the narration. 
At the crack of dawn of Night #1001, and upon her request, the king exempts 
Sheherezade from execution, and a large feast is held to celebrate the true union of the 
king and Sheherezade. 
This being a fairy tale, they lived happily ever after.JI 
'Laws against Strikes' is not the name of a problem: nor is it only the name of a 
pamphlet appearing above the names of Hepple and Kahn-Freund;2 but it is also a des-
cription (a writing-down, a de{down} - scription {writing} of a name) of a relationship 
('law against strikes') between two concepts ('law' and 'strike'), a relationship that 
changes from an initial versus into an embrace, a genitive ('the law of strikes', Recht 
des Arbeitskampfes). 
It is also Night #1 of a three-stage narrative. 
1 Discourse of Order Series 3 Part 4: This re-telling of the fairy tale 'Arabian Nights' discloses three 
stadia: The initial stage (or Night #1: before the telling) of the relationship between Sheherezade and the 
king is one of versus, a relationship characterised by the fact that silence = death. Even her institutional 
position and therefore relative importance (being the daughter of the adviser) would not save her life. 
The 'marriage' which takes place during this stage, like those of Sheherezade's less fortunate predeces-
sors, is a sham, a pretense for a killing, a silencing at dawn. The king is committed to his programme of 
execution, a programme that would inexorably include the death (silencing) of Sheherezade; she opposes 
that programme through a stratagem (narration, storytelling) --- she is able to stay her execution only by 
telling the king a story. The second stage (Nights #1 --- #1001) is taken up by the telling of the various 
tales. Stage 3 (Night #1001 +) is characterised by the 'true' union of Sheherezade and the king, a true 
'marriage' which takes place only after the completion of the telling of the last tale. This marriage is 
celebrated publicly. The narration changes or transforms the relationship from one of opposition (versus) 
where silence = death, where the ostensible union is a sham, to an ostensibly true union, itself celebrated 
in a strange silence: 'amid rejoicings which no storyteller may describe'. B Alderson and M Foreman The 
Arabian Nights or Tales Told by Sheherezade During a Thousand Nights and One Night (1992) 182 
emphasis added. Situating the relationship between the law and the strike within the framework of a fic-
tion is necessary in order to be able to excavate (in different, sometimes anthropomorphic terms) the 
implied metaphors operating within the texts under consideration in this chapter. See above, 1.3.3. 
2 B A Hepple and 0 Kahn-Freund Laws against Strikes (1972). All the sections dealt with in this part 
were written, according to the table of contents, by Kahn-Freund himself. It is also, strangely enough --
in view of the relative obscurity of the publication -- the most complete and lucid account of the reasons 
for permitting the strike within the oevre of this influential writer: the equivalent section of a text which 
is doubtlessly more canonical (P Davies and M Freedland (eds) Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law 
(1983)) deals only with the equilibrium argument (see below) in any detail. In its own small way, this is 
a canonical text. For a reception, see PAK le Roux 'Strikes and Lockouts - a Reassessment' (1986) 8 
Modem Business Law 99 at 100. 
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10.1 LAW AGAINST STRIKES [NIGHT #1] 
Considering that the Kahn-Freund text directs its initial attention largely to the telling 
of four tales, it is somewhat difficult to seduce the text into disclosing an initial binary 
opposition. 
'Why, then, should the law permit the use of the concerted stoppage of work as a means 
of enforcing rights or their improvement? What is the justification, the rationale of the 
right or the freedom to strike?' 3 
This brief passage provides an elusive glimpse of the functioning of an initial binary 
opposition of versus, even though this may not be immediately patent. 
The 'law' (the legal system, any legal system --- in other words, law generally) 
'permits' the strike, the strike is allowed, but before this can be done, it has to be 'jus-
tified', the strike is permitted only once a 'rationale' for the strike can be, and is in 
fact, offered. 
A 'rationale' is a fundamental reason or basis, it is a reasoned exposition; a 'justifi-
cation' is to adduce adequate grounds for conduct. Before the law will 'permit' the 
strike, then, there must be grounds or reasons given why the law should do so. The 
law, in other words, must be convinced, a tale must be told to the doorkeeper, to the 
king, before the law will be admitted into an embrace. 
Law does not of its own motion allow or accept the strike (in other words, it does not 
accept without justification) --- not surprisingly, in view of the fact that the strike is 'an 
event which of necessity entails a waste of resources, and damage to the economy' .4 
The very fact that reasons, grounds, justifications, and rationales must be presented to 
the law before the law will be prepared to overcome its opposition (its being-against, its 
being-versus), underscores the most essential moment of the text itself - that of its 
beginning, mapped out by its title: 'Laws against Strikes' .s 
3 Kahn-Freund op cit note 2 at 6. Emphasis added. 
4 Kahn-Freund op cit note 2 at 4. 'But the strike and lockout have in common that both are a waste of 
social resources. So is litigation in the courts.' P Davies and M Freedland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the 
Law (1983) 291. 
5 The title is not explained. It could be thought that the plural 'Laws' refers only to legislation, an 
impression strengthened by the fact that the booklet starts out by explicitly temporally linking itself to the 
controversial Industrial Relations Act 1971 (repealed in 1974). However, this narrow view is 
counteracted by the text itself, as it purports to be a text of comparison: it is part of a series entitled 
'international comparisons in social policy', prefaced by the series editor. The general remarks which 
precede the comparative sections of the booklet also clearly refer to a general issue: the law generally, 
referring not specifically to legislation only, or specific legislation. The very first phrase of the booklet 
also refers to 'the law of labour relations'. 
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This, then, is the Night #1 of the relationship between the law and the strike: because 
of the polluting and damaging consequences of the strike, the law is pitted against it. 
The sanction for a failure to present the rationale or to justify (the strike must justify 
itself before the law; the law needs no justification in the gaze of the strike) is 'not to 
be permitted'. If no rationale or justification could be presented for the strike, the law 
would prohibit the strike, would name it as 'illegal' - an execution of the strike 
undertaken at the crack of dawn. 
10.2 STRIKE('S) STORIES [NIGHT #1-- NIGHT #1001) 
The text then proceeds to tell the four stories with which the strike seeks the embrace 
of the law. 
10.2.1 The tale of the balanced scale 
The first story which is told (traditionally called the 'equilibrium argument') relates to 
balance, to equality in strength: 
'In the context of the use of the strike as a sanction in industrial relations, the equi-
librium argument is much the most important of the four. It is simple enough, and it 
was, in all its simplicity, stated as long ago as 1896 by Oliver Wendell Holmes ... 
"Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other is the 
necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal 
way .... " 
The concentrated power of accumulated capital can only be matched by the concentrated 
power of the workers acting in solidarity. . . . 
All this is almost platitudinous, but the argument, based on the need for an equilibrium 
of forces in labour/management relations, derives its imponance from the antithetic or 
polemical fu.nction it had to exercise in the history of labour law. It was this theory of 
countervailing power which was needed to overcome the mechanical individualism 
permeating the legal systems of continental countries such as France or West Germany 
no less than those of the United Kingdom or the United States. '6 
This passage contains the outlines of the tale told to the law. In briefest form, the story 
goes that employees collectively need a sanction in industrial relations, and that the law 
should therefore permit the strike, because without it, the employee collective entities 
would have no power to match the power of accumulated capital. 
But this tale tells more: it also tells how the very tale-telling changed the attitude of 
law. The rationale (the tale) changes the 'history of labour law' - whereas the law had 
persisted in 'mechanically' (programmatically?) re-casting all labour disputes into indi-
6 Kahn-Freund op cit note 2 at 6. Emphasis added. 
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victual disputes, into disputes between individual employers and individual employees, 
the telling of the balanced-scale-tale succeeded in 'overcoming' the programme of the 
law. 
The mechanical individualism of the law would have entailed an inability to either per-
ceive or to accommodate (accept) the aspects of collective power which characterise the 
strike. And it is precisely this collective-power aspect that the law would be against: 
'It is clear that the concept of a strike contains two elements; one is the cessation of 
work, the other is the element of concerted action. . . . 
Parallel actions of isolated individuals do not amount to a strike. A number of employ-
ees, annoyed by some act of the employer, all giving notice, may do as much damage to 
the employer as a strike, but unless they act in agreement it is not a strike. This is 
generally recognised, and indeed the repressive principles which legislators and courts 
of law applied in the past against strikers usually fastened on this element of "collec-
tive" action, this element of "conspiracy" or coalition. '7 
The telling of the tale of equilibrium (the balanced scale) was therefore needed to break 
through the antagonism of the law, an antagonism directed not against the cessation of 
work as such, but against the collective power aspect of the strike: the tale-telling suc-
ceeded in diverting the law from its programme of individualising disputes (which 
would have resulted in the death of the strike, as the strike is per definition --- as 
defined in the Kahn-Freund text --- a collective measure). It is only by insisting upon 
balance, on equilibrium in labour/management relations, that the strike can persuade 
the law to desist from individualising the dispute; it is only through an insistence upon 
a balance between labour/management that the strike can succeed in overcoming the 
law's resistance to its (strike's) collective nature, that the law can be persuaded not to 
prohibit the strike (containing as it does the element of collective exercise of power). 8 
10.2.2 The tale of do-it-yourself rule-makers and enforcers 
The 'autonomy argument' or the 'autonomous sanctions argument', the second 
rationale presented to the law, is linked to collective bargaining and its perceived 
nature: 
'Except in marginal situations, conditions of employment cannot be regulated by legis-
lation. . . . The rules of employment have to be made outside the framework of law 
making in the technical sense, that is through collective bargaining. This need for, and 
7 Kahn-Freund op cit note 2 at 4. Emphasis added. 
8 This prohibition of the strike would take the form of applying the full force of the law against individ-
ual employees. 
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existence of, a body of autonomous norms is not peculiar to labour relations (we find it 
in commercial relations of many kinds) but what is characteristic of labour relations is 
that the individual whose rights are involved does not participate in the rule making 
process .... [I]t is a continuous process of rule making by collective entities .... 
How can such rules be enforced through sanctions provided by law, through the judg-
ments of courts and the machinery for their enforcement? It is not only desirable that 
those who have made the autonomous rules should also wield the sanctions, and not 
leave the enforcement to individuals who did not participate in the rule making. . . . 
As a sanction the strike or the threat of a strike can be far more expeditious and 
stringent than any legal procedure . . . . [T]he sanction is a kind of self-help which the 
law ... is too slow to supplant. •9 
It may be hard to see how this story, containing as it does an insult to the law (the law 
can neither make the rules, nor effectively enforce the rules created by others), can 
serve as a reason, a justification why the law should accept the strike. This rationale is 
that the law should accept the strike as a substitute for its own remedies, for the law's 
own way of dealing with things (through courts, judgments, and the enforcement of 
those judgments) - largely due to the fact that the law is simply too slow in providing 
relief, but also because it makes sense to place rule-enforcement in the hands of those 
who made the rules in the first place. 
However, the autonomy argument is not based on a 'being-separate' (autonomous) 
from the law at all, as it might appear at first blush; it is not in the slightest based on 
rules being made outside the law and enforced outside the law by the makers of the 
rules. It is instead a rationale that relates more to an ex-nominated or un-named 
empowerment, where the law, for some reason, 10 empowers certain power-entitities 
(collectives, trade unions) to regulate certain matters, and also leaves the enforcement 
of the auto-regulation to those power-entities. The effect of this ex-nominated 
empowerment is then the creation of an illusion of an autonomous sphere within which 
the collective power-entities are 'free' to establish their own rules and enforce them. 
Both the creation of rules in auto-regulation and the subsequent auto-enforcement are 
dependent upon power (that very power which the law appears to have abdicated, but 
has in fact merely transferred) and the exercise of power. 
9 Kahn-Freund op cit note 2 at 7. Emphasis added. 
10 One possible reason is that the law finds all collective action (including collective rule-making and 
rule-enforcement) repugnant; the mere fact that the rule-making and enforcement was by collective 
entities served to tum the law away in disgust and to leave the regulation and enforcement to the makers 
of the rules (this is quite a nasty piece of ideology): 'Concerted action for economic purposes was 
obnoxious to the laizzes faire ideology which dominated the thinking of the middle class and therefore of 
the courts and the legal profession in the whole western orbit of civilisation in the 19th century, and the 
spirit of the common law differs only in degree from that of the legal systems of the continent' Kahn-
Freund op cit note 2 at 4. 
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The essence of this story is then that the strike says to the law: permit me, embrace me, 
and I shall serve as a sanction for those whom you have empowered to make rules 
ostensibly outside you; I shall do what your courts with their judgments can do with 
. difficulty. I shall, with your indulgence, exercise your power. 
10.2.3 The story of forced labour 
The third rationale for permitting the strike is based upon the potential perception that 
were the strike (entailing a cessation of work) not permitted, the law would be seen as 
forcing people to work: 
'If people may not withdraw their labour, this may mean that the law compels them to 
work, and a legal compulsion to work is abhorrent to systems of law imbued with a lib-
eral tradition, and compatible only with a totalitarian system of government. This argu-
ment, ultimately based on the Bentharnite postulate of the freedom to dispose of one's 
labour, is likely to impress the legal mind more than arguments derived from social 
reality. ' 11 
The essence of this rationale is a threat to the law: permit the strike, for should the law 
fail to do so, the law will be seen as compelling the workers to work when they do not 
desire to do so. Such legal compulsion is immoral, compatible only with a totalitarian 
state. 
But the shortcomings of this justification for the strike is recognised: this rationale is 
flawed by its failure to take into account sophistication of legislative technique12 and the 
power-realities involved in the strike. 13 
10.2.4 Finally: A story of feeling better 
The final tale told to justify the strike to the law is one of feeling better: 
'Lastly, it is now widely accepted that the strike is sometimes a necessary release of 
psychological tension, especially where men and women have to work under physical 
or psychological strain .... To some extent, but compared with other factors perhaps 
only to a minor extent, it may help to explain the distribution of the incidence of strikes 
11 Kahn-Freund op cit note 2 at 7. 
12 
'As a matter of legislative technique it is possible to forbid a strike without forcing the individual 
striker to go back to work and without threatening him with imprisonment if he does not .... The argu-
ment against compulsory labour, whilst superficially appealing to sentiment, is thus less than convincing 
because the freedom to strike can be effectively undermined without directly compelling anyone to 
work.' Kahn-Freund op cit note 2 at 8. 
13 
' ••. legal sanctions cannot be enforced against strikers ... ' Kahn-Freund Loe cit note 12. 
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over various industries. It may have something to do with the fact that the mining 
industries have always and everywhere been the scene of a large number of frequently 
spontaneous stoppages.' 14 
The core of this story can be briefly re-stated: the law should permit the strike because 
the strike is a method of employees' blowing off steam. Presumably (the text is not too 
clear on this point), severe physical and psychological damage to employees, especially 
those who work under difficult circumstances, will result should the law refuse to 
embrace the strike. 
10.2.5 And the best story is . . . 
A clear distinction is drawn between the four justifications presented, it is plainly stated 
that there are four 'arguments' or justifications: the equilibrium argument, the 
autonomy argument, the voluntary labour argument, and the psychological argument. 15 
It is also made patently clear that, apart from the sequence in which they are presented 
(a sequentiality which implies the operation of a hierarchy where the most important is 
placed first, the least last), there is only one story that succeeds in causing the law to 
permit the strike: 
'However, the imperative need for a social power countervailing that of property over-
shadows everything else. If the workers are not free by concerted action to withdraw 
their labour, their organisations do not wield a credible social force. The power to 
withdraw their labour is for the workers what for management is its power to shut 
down production, to switch it to different purposes, to transfer it to different places. A 
legal system which suppresses the freedom to strike puts the workers at the mercy of 
their employers. This -- in all its simplicity -- is the essence of the matter. '1 6 
Accordingly, there is only one success-story: it is only the tale of the balanced scale 
which succeeds in transforming the relationship of versus in which the law and the 
strike finds itself. This story, as rationale, as justification, 'overshadows' everything 
else, it is, in an almost spatial sense, of so overwhelming dimension that all three other 
rationales are dismissed, cast into darkness; the three other arguments or rationales are 
banished to the shadows. 
14 Kahn-Freund loc cit note 13. 
15 
'Why, then, should the law permit the use of the concerted stoppage of work as a means of enforcing 
rights or their improvement? What is the justification, the rationale of the right or the freedom to strike? 
To this fundamental question there are at least four answers. These are based on the equilibrium argu-
ment, the autonomy argument, the voluntary labour (or Benthamite) argument, and the psychological 
argument.' Kahn-Freund op cit note 2 at 6. 
!6 Kahn-Freund op cit note 2 at 8. Emphasis added. 
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It is also only the story of the balanced scale, one which can be stated in the form of a 
'simplicity', that is the 'essence' of the matter. It is the equilibrium argument and only 
the equilibrium argument that succeeds in being the essence of the matter (it is also the 
rationale which succeeded, through its antithetical and polemical nature, in changing 
labour law history). The equilibrium argument is the answer to the question posed at 
the outset: why should the law permit the strike? 
The hierarchical operation of the text is, then, that the equilibrium argument is in a 
privileged position: it is the one that 'overshadows' the other three arguments, it 
renders the other arguments dark and silent; it is also the one argument that is the 
'essence' of the matter, an essence that can be stated simply. The privileging of the 
equilibrium argument would appear to entail the rejection of all three other arguments; 
they are overshadowed, they are not the essence of the matter (they are rejected as 
being not-essential, or not-being essential). 
But what is the essence of the equilibrium argument? Does this privileged argument not 
derive its privileging from the very fact of the rejection of 'everything else' ; is it not 
possible that the equilibrium argument is the 'best story' to shatter the relationship of 
versus between the law and the strike because of the uneasy process of shadowing that 
is taking place with regard to the other three arguments presented? Is not this process 
one where that which is darkened and silenced persists in shimmering through the dark-
ness into which it has been cast; does not that-which-is-rejected darken that-which-
overshadows? Can the equilibrium argument be the sum of that which is rejected or 
does the operation of the equilibrium argument entail an affirmation of that-which-is-
rejected? 
The forced labour argument finds itself surfacing within the very act of privileging the 
equilibrium argument: 
'A legal system which suppresses the freedom to strike puts the workers at the mercy 
of their employers'. 
Workers are 'at the mercy' of the employer, placed in that position ('put' there) by a 
legal system which suppresses the right to strike. If the legal system suppresses the 
right to strike, the employees (being, through the failure of the law to permit the strike, 
'at the mercy' of employers) are compelled to obey all commands of the employers, 
commands such as that all employees are to wear protective clothing, all employees are 
to receive minimal wages in kind, all employees are to clean their places of work, and 
all employees are to work. If the employee 'is at the mercy' of the employer, the 
employee is, when ordered to work, compelled to obey the command of the employer 
(there is no choice: whether or not something is done, or some benefit is granted, 
depends entirely on the discretion, or the 'mercy' of the employer). Because the 
employee has no choice, he or she is not free to withhold his/her labour. This lack of 
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freedom to withhold labour is directly attributable to the failure of the law to permit the 
strike (employees are 'put' at the mercy of the employers by 'a legal system which sup-
presses the freedom to strike', the legal system 'puts' the employees at the mercy of the 
employers). 
The failure to permit the strike would, by placing the employees 'at the mercy' of their 
employers (and thereby eliminating any freedom, including the freedom to stop work-
ing) mean that the law, through its failure, permits the compulsion to work. 
Through the word 'power' an uneasy relationship arises between the equilibrium argu-
ment and the autonomous argument. The equilibrium argument is founded upon a 
balancing of power: 'the imperative need for a social power countervailing that of 
property', the 'power to withdraw their labour'. The focus of the equilibrium argument 
is the provision of a social power with which employees (or their collectives) 
counteract the exercise of the power of accumulated capital: 'to shut down production, 
to switch it to different purposes, to transfer it to different places' . 
These balanced powers are necessary, in the Holmesian terms incorporated into the 
original formulation of the equilibrium argument, 'if the battle is to be carried on in a 
fair and equal way . . . . ' This formulation clearly foresees that the countervailing 
powers are not there for their own sake (when is power for its own sake?), but that 
these powers are to be exercised in a 'battle' . 
Now the formulation of the autonomous argument refers to neither battles nor 
skirmishes. But it does concern power and the exercise of power. In a telling para-
graph, the exercises of power in collective bargaining (as auto-regulation) become 
clear: 
'It [the strike] is, in other words, an essential element not only of the unions' bargain-
ing power, that is for the bargaining process itself, it [the strike] is also a necessary 
sanction for enforcing agreed rules. ot 7 
The bargaining process, it appears from this passage, is a process whereby power is 
exercised; one party (the union) has a 'bargaining power', and the strike is an essential 
(constituting?) element of that power. Phrased in the reverse: if a strike was not pos-
sible, the union would have no bargaining power, and either (a) there would be no 
bargaining process, or (b) the bargaining process itself would not take place or be 
flawed (in the sense of being deprived of one of its essential elements). 
This, then, is why power is necessary: parties to collective bargaining must have power 
to exercise during the battle (power-struggle) which is collective bargaining. Without 
this power collective bargaining would not, could not take place; without countervail-
ing power, the one party would be at the mercy of the other. 
17 Kahn-Freund op cit note 2 at 7. Emphasis added. 
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Using a 'sanction' to 'enforce' auto-regulation also implies the use of power. A sanc-
tion is used to force the other party to comply with the terms and conditions of the 
'agreed rules' (the auto-regulation). Without power, and the concomitant threat of 
power being exercised, there could be no enforcement: 'As a sanction the strike or the 
threat of a strike can be far more expeditious and stringent than any legal procedure . . 
This may merely look like a restatement of the autonomous or autonomous sanction 
argument. But the importance of this re-formulation and working-through of the 
autonomous argument serves the purpose of unthreading its importance, namely that it 
contains the programmes in terms of which power is to be exercised and the purposes 
for which the power is used. The autonomous argument, as formulated, states that 
power is to be used for the purposes of auto-regulation through collective bargain-
ing and auto-enforcement. 
This reformulation leads inevitably to a problematization of the relationship between 
the equilibirum argument and the autonomous argument, a problematization that the 
formulation of the equilibrium argument implicitly recognises by re-situating itself 
within the context of power-exercise: 'In the context of the use of the strike as a sanc-
tion in industrial relations, the equilibrium argument is much the most important of the 
four.' This initial phrase at the very outset of the exposition of the equilibrium argu-
ment admits that the balancing of power is of relevance only within the context of the 
exercise of power ('sanction', 'battle'). But it is to be that very context which proves to 
be the undoing of the simultaneous privileging of the equilibrium argument, for 
through its oblique references to the actual exercise of power, it by implication recog-
nises its own dependence on the autonomous argument which contains programmes and 
purposes for the exercise of power. 
The equilibrium argument, then, focuses on a balance of power: one power is to be 
matched by another power of equal force. But the formulation of that argument betrays 
its own stated privileging by admitting that the relevance of this balance-of-power lies 
in the power-exercising programmes equally obliquely outlined in the formulation of 
the autonomous argument. The equilibrium argument states that power should be equal 
(and discloses the significant effect it had on changing the individualist obsession of the 
law) and balanced; the autonomous argument indicates what power is to be used for 
and the context within which it is to be exercised. 
The uneasy relationship between the equilibrium argument and the autonomous argu-
ment also impact on the view of autonomy-as-empowerment outlined earlier. Success is 
attributed to the the equilibrium argument: it is the only argument which has succeeded 
in changing labour law history by destroying the programmatic legal individualisation 
of disputes. 
If the law yields to the tale of the balanced scale and permits the strike in order to 
ensure balance of power between labour and management, the law is providing an 
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instrument of power which may be applied for the purpose of either auto-regulation or 
auto-enforcement. Without power (itself determined by the availability of the strike), or 
the potentiality of the exercise of power, neither auto-regulation nor auto-enforcement 
would be effective. In order for auto-regulation and auto-enforcement to be effective, it 
is necessary for the law to equalise the power-balance by permitting the strike. 
It is with a certain irony that the programmes of auto-regulation and auto-enforcement 
contained within the formulation of the autonomous argument depend, for their effec-
tiveness, on the equality of power brought about by the equilibrium argument's inter-
cession with the law to permit the strike. The autonomous argument, in spite of its 
avowed being-separate-from-the-law, its self-regulation and self-enforcement outside 
the slow and cumbersome law, is predicated, for its effectiveness, upon that very law 
permitting the use or the threat of a strike: its very programmes of auto-regulation and 
auto-enforcement depend not on auto-power, but on an empowerment by the very law 
which is rejected as ineffective. 
10.3 THE EMBRACE AND THE SEEING-OF-THE-SELF [NIGHT 
#1001 +] (lost in the funhouse) 
What is to be made of these tall tales that in their telling inextricably circle and fold 
back onto, through, and into each other? Is it indeed the operation of only the equi-
librium argument which succeeds in attaining for the strike the embrace of the law, or 
is it a combination of the tales (if so, what combination: 503 of one, 20% of the 
other?)? 
What economy makes possible the transfer of power by the law through her embrace; 
what rules of demand succeed in attaining the necessary supply of power if the 
privileged tale, the one said to be the successful one (the one which silences and over-
shadows the others) depends for its cogency upon the existence and the cogency of 
those very tales which are rejected? Is the telling, the manner of the telling (with its 
hierarchical programme) not dialectically a telling of silence (a telling into silence) 
where a part of what is told is silenced in favour of another part of the tale? 
For it is clear that, no matter what discursive operations are involved, the tale-telling 
succeeds, for the law embraces the strike: 
' . . . a freedom to strike is quite generally recognised as an indispensible ingredient of 
a democratic society.' 18 
Or, expanded ---
18 Kahn-Freund op cit note 2 at 2. 
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'Why is it that in all democratic countries the "freedom to strike," or, as is it sometimes 
put, the "right to strike", is considered to be a fundamental freedom, alongside the free-
dom to organise, to assemble peacefully, to express one's opinion? Why is the strike, 
or better perhaps, the potentiality of a strike, that is, of an event which of necessity 
entails a waste of resources, and damage to the economy, nevertheless by general con-
sent an indispensable element of a democratic society? Or, to put it the other way, why 
is there no one (outside a very insignificant lunatic fringe) who in countries such as 
Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and the United States would even attempt 
to argue that all strikes should be made illegal? Why do even communist countries, in 
which no freedom to strike in fact exists, find it necessary to pay at least lip service to 
it?'1 9 
These two passages indicate the 'true' embrace within which the law now holds the 
strike -- the strike (the right or the freedom to resort to it) is 'indispensable', it is 'fun-
damental', and, as such, occupies a position alongside other fundamental rights. Not 
only has the law recognised (seen) the strike, and not only is the strike permitted 
(tolerated), but the strike attains a position of security; it joins a panoply of legal idols 
(fundamental rights of association, freedom of expression).20 
The strike, as an indispensable element, normatively determines the order within which 
it is placed -- without the strike, the order would not be 'democratic' (the implicit 
assumption here, of course, relies on a normative programme in terms of which democ-
racy = good, a programme so obvious and self-authenticating that it requires neither 
reiteration nor explanation). To such an extent succeeds the telling of the tales of the 
strike: the presence/absence of a right/freedom to strike normatively determines the 
law, that very seat of power which had to be deceived into the embrace through the 
telling of tall tales. The reaction of the law to the strike (whether or not it embraces it 
or not) becomes a moment in the meta-legal normatizing of the law (as 'good' legal 
system which embraces the strike; 'bad' system which refuses the gesture of the story-
telling). 
Through a sudden reversal, the very embrace of the strike, which takes place only after 
the strike has succeeded in convincing the law of its own normative superiority (the 
19 Kahn-Freund op cit note 2 at 4. Emphasis added. 
20 
'To recognise the freedom to strike is one thing, to translate it into terms of positive law is another. 
The techniques employed in crystallising it into concrete rules of law vary from country to country . . . 
'. Kahn-Freund op cit note 2 at 9, emphasis added. This brief passage gives some indication of the 
processes involved in the act of embracing: the strike is recognised, but this recognition has to be 'trans-
lated' (processed, rephrased in a different language), after which it has 'crystallised'. Once crystallised, 
the positive right/freedom to strike attains the status of positive law that can be applied and enforced 
using the remedies dismissed as too slow and cumbersome during the formulation of the autonomous 
argument. The dynamics of the embrace of the strike can therefore be summarised as: recognition - trans-
lation - crystal form (solid state). 
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stories say why the strike is 'good' in the sense of being 'necessary') becomes the 
normative determining moment for the law itself. Law, initially demanding a normative 
justification of the strike, eventually finds itself normatively justified through its 
embrace of the strike. 
It is through its embrace of the strike that the law is able to reflect its own meta-legal 
normativity: it is, in the light of the embrace or the failure to embrace the strike, that 
the law can be seen as being either good or bad. The embrace of the strike is, for the 
law, the mirror in the funhouse mirror-room: it is while (not) locked in the embrace of 
that which it was initially against that the law sees itself in all the meta-legal 
normativity of good and bad, going on forever .... 
But what economy enables this ideal and unobstructed view of the self? What insists on 
being suppressed in order for the view of the 'itself' of the law to be possible? 
Is it not notable that, in the passage quoted above, those who would have the audacity 
to suggest that all strikes should be illegal amount to 'a very insignificant lunatic 
fringe'? Those who suggest that the law should not embrace the strike are negligible, 
they are 'insignificant' - unimportant, and may be disregarded as being of no account. 
The economy of this 'insignificance' lies first in the fact of the alleged insanity of those 
who would argue that the law should make all strikes illegal, the fact that those who so 
argue are a lunatic fringe, and second in the spatial organisation in which they are 
found (placed), in their insanity, they are outside (the fringe) of the 'general consent'. 
Those who suggest that the strike should be illegal are mad people ranting outside the 
gate of the consensual legal discourse, and, mad people ranting outside the gate are (ex 
natura?) insignificant. 
It is this very act of silencing, an act thoroughly normative in operation (in terms of an 
economy of negatives such as 'insanity' {lunatic} and 'being outside' {fringe}), that 
makes possible the embrace of the strike through which the law sees itself going on 
forever in the funhouse mirror-room. By silencing those who would re-utter the rela-
tionship between the law and the strike as a relationship of versus where the law would 
prohibit the strike, Night #1 of the tale of the the strike-Sheherezade and the king-law 
is in effect unwritten; the entire intial stage (before the telling of the tales) during 
which the strike was at peril of prohibition and had to present justifications and 
rationales for the embrace is un-named as the strike, locked in the self-serving embrace 
of the law (through which the law can see itself as good or bad), with a forceful and 
self-obscuring self-evidence, comes to occupy a place amongst the idols of the law. The 
mad people outside the gates incessantly chant that which is (conveniently) best forgot-
ten, namely that the law would declare all strikes illegal were it not for the tales told by 
the strike; their very act of transgression (of saying that which is outside the general 
consent) signifies the troubled start of the relationship between the law and the strike. 
That which is said by those who fall outside the general consent, these mad ravings out-
side the gate, are policed in terms of ,a process of silencing: these utterances are 
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silenced as a result of their act of transgressing the general consent. Even though they 
say that which is, in effect, where the relationship between the law and the strike began 
on Night #1. But Night #1 is ancient history (it is a fairy tale) and the law, enjoying the 
unobstructed view of its own normative justification brought about (made possible) by 
its ~mbrace of the strike, ruthlessly suppresses the insane uprising at the gate. 
Steps have been taken. 
The police have come and gone; there'll be a story in the papers. 
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[ . . . it will be the task of those chapters that follow this breaking point to examine 
that story in those papers . . . . 
Why does that piece of text, which finally utterly surrenders to its own exaggerated 
poetic, constitute the breach, the crack, but also the hinge, the joint? 
What is it that sets that piece of text apart from that which came before, and that which 
is to follow? 
For a brisure is not only a break, it is also the hinge between two pieces. Chapter 10 is 
itself an embrace: it embraces that which came before it in that it is a discourse of 
order (it pertains to the Series 1 Ordering Discourses) and, as such, it (re)presents a 
certain context for that which is to follow. But that piece of text equally vigorously 
embraces that which is to follow, for it narrows the focus in preparation for what is to 
follow, it lays the foundation upon which the perilous structures of the rest of this text 
are to be built. If chapter 10 told the story of the telling of a story, subsequent chapters 
are to have as their concern the ceaseless telling, un-telling, silencing, embroidering, 
ignoring, abridgement, and improvisations of these stories and other stories told in 
terms of these stories. 
That collection of sentences (demarked by certain conventions: chapter headings, blank 
spaces) stands alone. This fact may appear at first to be sloppy organisation: either it 
should be part of the context (Context/Contratext), or it should belong to the final 
chapters. But, just as every text has a context, does not every text have a turning point, 
a break or a crack which is at the same time that which joins the sides of the break? 
This is not to say that the text is not whole (in the sense of being coherent) but it is 
simply a foregrounding of a critical point reached in the development of the discourse 
(this text, that text, the one pointed to).] 
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ARCHAEOLOGY OF SILENCE I 
(OBLITERATION, CONSTRUCTION, TRANSGRESSION) 
THE TRANSGRESSION OF NORMATIVE CLOSURE IN THE 
INDUSTRIAL ACTION JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GERMAN FED-
ERAL LABOUR COURT 
' "Begin at the beginning," the King said gravely, "and go on till you come to the end: 
then stop. " ' 
-- Lewis Carroll Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (1865) 143 (Everyman's Library 
Edition 1992) 
'Der Grofie Senat ist nach § 45 Abs. 1 Satz 2 ArbGG nicht verpflichtet, die 
vorgelegene Fragen nur entweder mit "Ja" oder mit "Nein" zu beantworten.' [The 
Large Senate is not compelled, in terms of§ 45(1) of the Labour Courts Act, to answer 
the submitted questions with a mere "yes" or "no".] 
-- Large Senate of the Federal Labour Court, 28 January 1955 
[PROLOGUE: AN ACT OF READING (Discourse of Order Series 2 Part 5) 
Beyond the hinge, beyond the breach ... 
A (potentially) infinite discourse, stretching into a future infinity from an infinity (from 
that which came, if only in a temporal sense, before it) ... A sequential text, to be 
ranged over, potentially infinitely, indefinitely. A ranging over that could arbitrarily 
fasten upon any random moment of the discursive landscape --- any momentous dis-
cursive outcrop being a potential 'beginning'. 
What is an act of reading (this act, any other act) to fasten upon in its comfortless 
(obessive?) ranging over a series of texts that together bear the appellation 'the indus-
trial action jurisprudence of the German Labour Court?' Is the question itself aporetic, 
perhaps even totally superfluous? For is that series of texts found as pre-classified, as 
grouped, presented (sequentially) in a single volume?• Is the act of classification of the 
texts any concern of an act of reading, implying a blind (or, at best, semi-sighted) 
acceptance of the archival structures that made that categorization possible in the first 
place? Is an act of reading (this act, any other act) itself a categorization in terms of 
1 Hueck, Nipperdey ,Dietz (founding eds) Nachschlagewerk des Bundesarbeitsgerichts - Arbeitsrechtliche 
Praxis (looseleaf: Volume first published in 1955),~ 
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other categorizations, again referring (endlessly, for there is nothing outside the text) to 
other categorizations? 
This is the nighmare of the archive (and that through which the archive is readable, that 
which the archive makes possible: an endless labyrinth of text, countertext, text and 
that which makes the text text). Reading in the funhouse of a serial discourse. The act 
of reading is an archaeology (excavation) of the archival labyrinth within the text . 
whence it cannot escape . . . ] 
11.1 OBLITERATION AND ESTABLISHMENT (1955) 
It may appear, at first glance, as if the beginning need not be problematised for it is 
ready-made, ready for use. This discourse has a purported 'beginning' (even though it 
may transgress its own founding nature in the course of the very act of foundation) ---
there is a decision Number 1, a point which purports to be the point from which all 
else comes (the point before all others). There is a point that purports to be, for want of 
a better word, the Beginning of the Discourse. 
This categorization (Decision #1) implies that the founding decision of the Large Senate 
of the German Federal Labour Court in 19552 must be approached with considerable 
care, for it is the one and only opportunity an act of reading could hope to have of 
observing the full unfolding of a founding or establishment of a serial discourse: once 
established, that which follows upon that founding act may take place in terms of the 
archival rules established within that process of founding. The founding (canonical) dis-
course determines (lays down) the (transgressable) boundaries of the subsequent (or 
within which the subsequent takes place). The establishment of the principles or rules 
of the archive will also make possible the transgression (or contamination) of those 
principles or rules. 
There is a following-upon, in a temporal sense (a seriality or sequentiality), but also in 
the sense of legitimation (subsequent decisions depend, for their legitimacy, upon the 
legitimacy conferred upon the discourse by the founding act of that discourse). The 
legitimacy of the subsequent depends on the legitimacy the founding discourse is able 
to find for itself. 
The act of founding is no mere fiat --- no mere calling into being. It is not the creation 
of something from nothingness. For a traditional analysis the identification of the fiat 
itself (and the apparent policy considerations motivating that act of judicial creativity) 
would be sufficient. 
But for the purposes of this (instant) analysis, it is important to bear in mind, firstly, 
that the foundation of a discourse (law-as-discourse) takes place within a context (a 
2 BAG AP Nr 1 on Art 9 Basic Law (Industrial Action). Decision of the Large Senate of the Federal 
Labour Court: 28 January 1955. 
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context that itself structures the founding and a context that is simultaneously trans-
gressed by that founding). An act of establishment is, secondly, determined by an econ-
omy of supply and demand: that which must be sacrificed for the establishment, that 
which the discourse is to demand be sacrificed (forfeited, given up) for its own sake. 
The operation of this discursive economy can be clearly observed in the following pas-
sage: 
'Die LOsung kan vielmehr aus dem Wesen des gewerkschaftl. Streiks als kollektiver 
KampfmaBnahme gefunden werden. ' [The solution may, on the contrary, be found in 
the nature of the strike (called by the trade union) as a measure of collective action.]3 
Contained within the grammar of this innocuous-looking sentence lies acts of both 
obliteration and establishment. 
11.1.1 Act of obliteration 
The first noun in the passage quoted above is 'solution' (Losung): there is, by implica-
tion, a problem to be solved or a question to be answered. This to-be-answered ques-
tion is about the strike and its effect upon the employment relationship: whether partici-
pation in a strike called by a trade union terminates the employment relationship, even 
though the employees failed to give notice of termination of their employment con-
tracts. 4 
According to the construction of the sentence, the 'solution' to the 'problem' lies 'viel-
mehr' in the nature (Wesen) of the strike.5 'Vielmehr' indicates the operation of a 
process of privileging: the standard translation of 'vielmehr' is 'rather' or 'on the con-
trary'. The solution to the problem can be found, then, in one thing (the nature of the 
3 BAG AP Nr 1 on Art 9 GG (Industrial Action) at 4R (the 'R' indicates the 'Reverse' or 'Riickseite' of 
page 4 --- this looseleaf publication employs an unorthodox numbering system, where each decision is 
given a number of appearance, and only the recto pages are numbered. Verso pages are labelled 'R'). 
4 The complainant had been employed by a fishery for a period of 22 years, becoming a member of the 
works council. On 9 September 1953, he participated in a strike called by the trade union of which he 
was a member. All members of the works council participated in the strike. The employees served no 
notice of termination of employment on the employer. The purpose of the strike was to force the 
employer to conclude a collective agreement in terms of which the netmakers would be entitled to wages 
equal to those of other employees. Five days after the strike had begun, all employees were summarily 
dismissed. On 28 November 1953, the strike collapsed, but the collective agreement did not contain a 
Wiedereinstellungsklausel (a clause reinstating all dismissed employees). Except for the complainant and 
6 other employees, all employees who had participated in the strike were reinstated. The complainant 
approached the court requesting a declaratory order that the dismissal of 14 September 1953 was invalid 
and that he be reinstated. 
5 The reference is throughout to the 'gewerkschaftlichen Streik', or a strike called by a trade union. 
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strike), rather than somewhere else. The solution is to be found in that which is 
privileged, rather than in that which is not. That which is not privileged is obliterated 
(it is not where the solution to the problem lies -- it is not of interest, suffering the fate 
of exnomination, of being unnamed). 
But the process of privileging in the text under consideration amounts to an obliteration 
of a number of legal arguments: 
• According to the majority of opinion, participation in a strike amounts to a 
breach of the employee's duty to work. This intentional and illegal breach is not 
protected by either Article 9 of the Basic Law, or by the provisions of the con-
stitutions of the states (Lander) that together make up the Federal Republic, or 
by decisions of the trade unions, or by the precedence enjoyed by a collective 
law. Participation in industrial action must take place within the limits of the 
legal order, limits imposed not only by legislation, but also by contractual 
agreements. Particpation in a strike therefore amounts to a persistent refusal to 
work, thereby entitling the employer to summarily dismiss the employees. The 
employer is also entitled to claim delictual damages from the employees. 6 
• A counter-argument holds that the participation in a strike does not amount to a 
refusal to work, and therefore does not entitle the employer to summarily dis-
miss the employees. The basis of this argument is a recognition of a special con-
stitutional right to strike (velfassungsrechtlicher Streikrecht) which supersedes 
the breach of contract. Others refer to the strike as a principle of the constitu-
tional order and linked to the law of collective agreements, the right to social 
self-regulation, and the precedence enjoyed by the collective labour law. 7 
Having outlined these arguments, and referred to the relevant sources, the text then 
proceeds to find that the mere affirmation of a constitutional right to strike does not 
amount to a solution of the problem -- the majority opinion being that the provisions of 
Article 9 protects only the freedom to associate, and not the methods employed by the 
trade union. However, the denial of a constitutional right to strike does not entail that 
participation in a strike should be construed as a breach of the employment contract. s 
This is what is being obliterated by the use of 'vielmehr': instead of these legal argu-
ments, rather than these points raised in the literature and case law, contrary to the 
views of the doctrine, the answer is to be found elsewhere -- these arguments do not 
6 See BAG op cit note 3 at 2 and 2R. 
7 BAG op cit note 3 at 3 and 3R. 
8 See BAG op cit note 3 at 3R-4R. 
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represent the truth of the matter, they must be discarded, silenced, obliterated, before 
the actual state of affairs can be found (the answer to the question can 'be found' ---
' kann gefanden werden'). The answer, the solution, is there, covered, hidden: all that 
needs to be done, is for the answer to be found (rediscovered?). Es laj3t sich finden --
the answer allows itself to be found (the process of finding implies a certain passivity: 
the answer is not made or constructed; instead it is found, ready-made, and ready to 
use. There is therefore no need to construct or make an answer). Once discovered, 
uncovered, the 'true' answer to the problem lets itself be read (Es laj3t sich lesen). 
11.1.2 Act of establishment 
The obliteration taking place is the economy of (the price to be paid for) the estab-
lishment or the construction of the discourse. It is only within the silence which follows 
upon the act of silencing that the discourse can be established anew. 9 This establishment 
of discourse is, dialectically, contained in the same act of obliteration: the solution is 
not to be found in the cited legal arguments -- on the contrary, the solution passively 
allows itself to be found in the nature of industrial action. The reference to a privileged 
'Wesen des gewerkschaftlichen Streiks als kollektiver Kampfmaj3nahme' amounts to an 
establishment of a discourse, the end of which is not yet in sight (es laj3t sich nicht 
sehen). 
This act of establishment, structured by its supplement of obliteration, must be 
approached with care, for once completed, the act of establishment will disappear 
behind that which was founded, and the discourse will proceed to ex-nominate and 
cover up its constructed nature, then to present itself with the self-assured self-evidence 
of fiat. Once established, the newly founded discourse becomes Law-as-discourse. 
This dynamic (of discourse becoming Law-as-discourse) is made possible by a number 
of factors. There is the iterability of discourse: the archival principles of the founding 
discourse being, in theory, endlessly iterable, they can be 'extrapolated' from the text 
in which they are formulated (the text of the judgment, of the decision, their context) 
and can be 'applied' subsequently, to other factual situations, in other contexts and in 
the process of application found the transgression of the discourse. 
9 Traditional historical-legal analysis could, at this point, attempt to locate the precursors of the dis-
course, to find that the discourse is based upon another Urdiscourse that came before it. So Seegert sees a 
legal opinion prepared by the then President of the Federal Labour Court at the time, Nipperdey, on a 
strike in the newspaper industry, as the basis for the decision of the Large Senate. C Seegert Die 
Formierung des Streikrechts: Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit und Koalitionsrecht im Prozefl gesellschaftlicher 
Restauration 1946 bis 1955 (1985) at 194-201. As convincing as Seegert's analysis may be, the concerns 
of the present study are discursive: the archival structures which inform (and which are to be iterated) in 
the law-as-discourse (here and now represented by the text of the Large Senate under discussion). The 
text makes no reference to the Nipperdey opinion -- it is therefore outside the text, it is not of the text, it 
is con(tra)text. 
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Another factor is the institutional position of the agent --- it is a decision handed down 
by the Large Senate, specifically empowered by the legislation to 'create' law 
(Fortbildung des Rechts) .10 Because of the institutional position occupied by the agent 
handing down the decision, the discourse attains the status of Law-as-discourse (it 
would not have had the same canonical effect if it had been a local Amtsgericht). 11 
The nature of the discourse established (the iterability of an archival discourse --- the 
archival nature and iterability determined by the agent of the handing-down, the Large 
Senate) is serial in its legitimation --- that which follows (other decisions) will 
legitimise itself by reference to the iterability and legitimation of that which preceded it 
(the decision of the Large Senate) --- in most cases, however, the iterablity and legiti-
mation will simply be assumed (and thereby fail to deserve mention). 
The establishment of the discourse (which is destined to become Law-as-discourse by 
virtue of its iterability --- in tum made possible and legitimated by the 'author' or agent 
of the discourse) occurs by referring to the 'nature' of the strike as a kollektiver 
Kampfmaj3nahme, a measure of collective action (the wide concept 'Kampf' 
encompasses 'fight', 'combat', 'action', 'engagement', 'battle', 'struggle'). It is the 
'nature' of the strike which not only makes possible the finding of the solution to the 
problem, but that same nature is such that it enables a process of privileging, where the 
'nature' of the strike is privileged over the legal arguments obliterated in the same act. 
The establishment of the first archival principle of the discourse takes place in general 
terms: 
'ArbKampfe (Streik und Aussperrung) sind im allgemeinen unerwunscht, da sie 
volkswirtschaftl. Schaden mit sich bringen und den im Interesse der Gesamtheit 
liegenden sozialen Frieden beeintrachtigen; aber sie sind in bestimmten Grenzen 
erlaubt, sie sind in der freiheitl., sozialen Grundordnung der Deutschen Bundesrepublik 
[sic] zugelassen .... 
Es besteht Freiheit des Arbeitskampfes, Streikfreiheit und Aussperrungsfreiheit. ... ' 
10 See above, 7. 3. 3. The matter was referred to the Large Senate by the First Senate of the Federal 
Labour Court in terms of § 45 ArbGG. 
11 This is an aspect of power, and it is the prevalence of this subliminal aspect of power that made neces-
sary the introduction of chapters 7,8, and 9, chapters relating, if stripped of all their other functions, of 
introducing the discursive power-structures in terms of which the agents of the decisions function (and 
attain their institutional power). The canonical force of the decisions of the Large Senate could not be 
understood unless seen within the context of the power-discourse (a power largely conferred by legisla-
tion) in terms of which that agent operates. The power-discourses are, by nature, all interlinked (for there 
is nothing outside the text): so the archival/canonical force of the decisions of the Large Senate is a func-
tion not only of the privileged position in terms of the directly enabling legislation (the Labour Courts 
Act), but also of the provisions of the Basic Law. Once the discourse currently being operated upon is 
recognised as being also a discourse of power, its relation to discourses (sometimes uncritically) pre-
sented or summarised in previous chapters should become clearer. 
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[Industrial action (strikes and lock-outs) are generally undesirable, as they cause eco-
nomic damage and adversely affect the social peace which is in the interests of all. But 
they [strikes and lock-outs] are allowed within certain boundaries, they are permitted in 
the free social basic order of the German Federal Republic .... Freedom of industrial 
action, freedom to strike, and freedom to lock out, exists.] 12 
The effect of this establishment can be summarized as being that the German legal 
order recognises a freedom to resort to industrial action (both the strike and the lock-
out), in spite of the damage wrought by industrial action (economic damage, prejudice 
to social peace). The phenomenon of industrial action has to be accommodated within 
the legal system. 
This first archival principle (the principle of accommodation) of the first industrial 
action decision of the Large Senate of the Federal Labour Court is also the first princi-
ple within this particular discursive archive. 
But no first principle can be established without the paying of a fee, and the Large 
Senate then proceeds to pay the price for the founding of the first archival principle of 
the discourse. This economy of the first principle contains a number of closely related 
acts: the provision of reasons (a process of legitimation itself), the establishment and 
linking of supplementary legitimation-discourses, and the placing of limitations upon 
the first principle. A strange transgressive act (contamination) also lies within the magi-
cal circle of these various legitimizing acts.13 
Yet all of these acts must be seen within the context of the establishment of the dis-
course through the formulation of the first archival principle of that discourse --
together these acts amount to the price that has to be paid for the formulation of the 
first principle. 
11.1.3 The justification of the first principle 
The first archival principle of the discourse (strikes and lock-outs are allowed, are to be 
accommodated in the legal system) has to be justified -- reasons have to be given for 
the first principle. 
The first archival principle of the discourse must be shown to have a logical structure 
-- that it is not arbitrary (willkurlich), that it is itself determined by a certain cause-
effect structure that explains the first principle. It needs to be shown (proven) that the 
first principle is the result of a considered reasoning, that it is not the mere exercise of 
an untrammeled and unlimited power (it must be shown not to be a fiat), but that it is 
the result of a logical process, in which advantages and disadvantages have been con-
12 BAG op cit note 3 at 4R. 
13 See 11.1.5 below. 
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sidered. The first principle is legitimised through the very stories told to the law, the 
tall tales of an utterly logical and thoroughly reasoned process, of which the first prin-
ciple is the inescapable result.14 
Two of the justifications or reasons offered are policy related: 
'Unterbrechungen der betriebl. ArbTatigkeit durch einen solchen ArbKampf sind 
sozialadaquat, da die beteiligten ArbN und ArbGeb. mit solchen kampfweisen 
Storungen auf Veranlassung und unter Leitung der Sozialpartner von jeher rechnen 
miissen und die deutsche freiheitl. Rechtsordnung derartige ArbKampfe als ultima ratio 
anerkennt.' [Interruptions of production through industrial action are socially adequate, 
because employees and employers must count on these disturbances resorted to by and 
led by the social partners and the German legal system, based on freedom, recognises 
such industrial action as ultima ratio.]15 
The two reasons offered in this passage are: 
1. Because industrial action is a part of working life, industrial action (amounting 
to a cessation of work), is socially adequate, because the employees and 
employers involved must count on (reckon with) these occurrences. 
2. The German legal system, based on freedom (' deutsche freiheitliche 
Rechtsordnung') recognises industrial action as ultima ratio. 
If regard is had to the second policy consideration, and echoing what was said before, 16 
industrial action perforce has to be justified before the eyes of the Law. Here again 
reappears the simultaneous and dialectic link between legal acceptance (and consequent 
legal protection) of industrial action, and the auto-reflective-normative process of the 
law (law as free and democratic system because of its acceptance/protection of indus-
trial action). Again the law can describe itself as being 'free' ( 'jreiheitliche 
Rechtsordnung ') only by (at the same time) accepting industrial action as falling within 
the range of actions that deserve its protection. 
The considerations surrounding 'social adequacy' are by their very nature policy and 
moral considerations, and are intricately related to the principle of accommodation. 
The principle of social adequacy has its origins in the criminal law. It means that a 
human act can only be understood by reference to the function of the act within the 
14 This is why the first principle of the discourse is not a fiat -- unlike a fiat, reasons have to be given; a 
certain process of logical legitimation has to take place. However, once this process of legitimation is 
completed, the entire process itself become obliterated through the force exercised by the first archival 
principle itself: the force of the first principle is of such a nature that its logical legitimation is obscured. 
15 BAG loc cit note 14. Emphasis added in translation. 
16 See chapter 10 above. 
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social context. An action such as a persistent refusal to work or a persistent refusal to 
perform duties in terms of a contract of employment can be socially adequate, in spite 
of the legislative provisions outlawing them --- the actual meaning of the action can 
only be determined by reference to the function of the action within the social whole. 
The relevance of social adequacy for the purposes of the decision of the Large Senate 
lies in the fact that it is through the application of this principle that the accommodation 
of the phenomenon of industrial action within the strictures of the law of contract is 
possible: even though there is a breach of the employment contract, through the refusal 
of the employee to perform his or her contractual duties, this breach (in the form of a 
strike called by a trade union for the purpose of concluding a collective agreement) is 
socially adequate and therefore not an unlawful breach of the employment contract. 17 
Further justifications of the first principle of the archive are derived from interpreta-
tions of statutory provisions and case law: 
'Es besteht Freiheit des Arbeitskampfes .... Das ergibt sich nicht nur aus der gesam-
ten historischen Entwicklung seit 1869, namentl. aus der wichtigen Regel des § 152 
Abs. 1 GewO und der allgemeinen rechtl. Uberzeugung (vgl. schon RGZ 54,258; 
56,275; 58,30; 64,56; 65,212,213; 119,294 und die st. Rechtspr.), sondem neuerdings 
namentl. auch aus § 49 Abs 2 Satz 3 BetrVG. Dort ist im AnschluB an das Verbot der 
ArbKampfe zwischen ArbG. und Betriebsrat ausdriicklich bestimmt, daJ3 ArbKiimpfe 
tariffiihiger Parteien durch das Verbot nicht beriihrt werden.' [Freedom to resort to 
industrial action exists. . . . That appears from the total historical development since 
1869, namely from the important rule contained in § 152(2) of the Commercial Code, 
and the general legal convictions [case references cited --- Imperial Court Civil Matters] 
but also recently from § 49(2) of the Works Constitutional Act [1952]. There, in con-
junction with the prohibition of industrial action between the works council and the 
employer, the Act expressly provides that industrial action between parties who have 
the competence to conclude collective agreements is not affected [by the prohibition 
contained in the Act]. 18 
The justification for the first principle ('the freedom to resort to industrial action 
exists') is linked to a historical development, legal convictions as expressed in previous 
court decisions, and legislation passed in 1952 (three years before the founding of the 
first principle). 
The founding of the first principle is, in other words, placed within a certain legal-
historical development -- the implication being that the founding of the first principle is 
17 See BAG op cit note 3 at 7R-8R. Through the use of this doctrine, the Large Senate is in effect 
accommodating industrial action within the principles of the legal system by re-writing (or, better, un-
writing) several legislative provisions, including § 626 of the Civil Code, a provision that entitles either 
party to the employment contract to summarily terminate the contract if a fundamental breach has 
occurred. 
18 BAG op cit note 3 at 4R - 5. 
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not a breach with the legal-historical tradition, but that it forms part of a historical 
tradition of the law and that the first principle is in fact merely an expression of 
the first principle of that tradition. 
The first principle 'ergibt sich' (yields itself> from viewing the historical tradition; the 
tradition simply needs to be read, viewed, and the first principle of the discourse yields 
itself --- it lets itself be read.19 
11.1.4 The legitimation of the first principle 
The importance of re-situating the first principle within a legal-historical tradition lies 
in the fact that it is also an exercise in legitimation: the first principle is shown to be no 
radical breach with what has come before it (and is therefore clothed with the legiti-
mation of that which came before it --- there is a temporal transfer of legitimation). 
Instead, the first principle is linked in legitimation to a mass of expressions of archival 
principles that came before (in a temporal sense) the formulation of the first principle: 
the formulation of the first archival principle by the Large Senate in 1955 was, by 
implication, no break with the tradition, but it is of that tradition. 
The process of legitimation continues, but now with different foci: 
'Auch die LAG haben das Prinzip der sozialen Adaquanz fiir das Recht der ArbKampfe 
als maBgebend anerkannt . . . . 
In diesem Sinne hat Bundesprasident Prof Theodor HeuB in seiner Ansprache am 
4 .10 .1954 vor dem 3. Ordentlichen KongreB des DGB das "Streikrecht" rnit Recht "als 
eine vollig legitime Sache" bezeichnet . . . . ' [The Labour Courts of Second Instance 
have also recognized the principle of social adequacy as being the relevant principle for 
the law of industrial action .... In this sense, Federal President Prof Theodor HeuB, 
in his address to the 3rd Congress of the German Trade Union Confederation {DGB or 
Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund} on 4 October 1954, correctly described the "law to 
strike" as a "completely legitimate matter" .]20 
19 This historical situation of the first principle must be seen as a transgression of the founding nature of 
the discouse: the effect of stating that the first principle is an expression not of an act of founding, but in 
fact an act contained in the operation of a tradition amounts to admitting that the first principle is pre-
established, and pre-legitimated. The act of founding becomes, then, a act of simply re-discovering that 
which has already been said. Instead of establishing a discourse, the act contained in the first decision 
of the Large Senate could then be seen as merely an act of reading: regard is had to the tradition, and the 
first principle of the tradition is simply taken over. In this manner, the act of founding (the Decision #1), 
is being contaminated by that which came before, it is being colonised by the operation of a tradition 
powerful enough to refuse to have itself (the tradition) excluded from the act of founding. The act of 
founding, having been contaminated by the operation of this powerful tradition, can now be seen as an 
allegory for an act of reading: where the text (the tradition, the previous court decisions, the previous 
legislation, the legal convictions) simply has to be read correctly, and the result of that act of reading 
then becomes the cornerstone of a new discourse. 
20 BAG op cit note 3 at 5. 
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The nature of the legitimation process that occurrs here differs in nature from the legiti-
mation process of providing the first principle with a logical substructure. Here the 
concern is to indicate a social legitimacy: it is shown (by adducing evidence to that 
effect) that the first principle is generally acceptable because other bearers of power 
have legitimised the first principle.21 It is therefore sufficient, for the purpose of 
socially legitimating the first archival principle of the discourse, to take over the avail-
able (ready-made) legitimation provided by the other courts and the Federal President. 
Once this final process has run its course, the first principle is fully legitimised: it has 
been shown to have a logical structure (reasons can be advanced for it, arguments can 
be brought in support of it), it amounts to a continuation (affirmation) of the tradition 
which temporally precedes it, and social legitimation (social acceptance) can be 
demonstrated. 
11.1.5 Obliteration, establishment and contamination 
From the intricate processes of legitimation of the first principle, the founding dis-
course falls prey to a certain contamination. There is a sudden shift into what can best 
be called a 'sociological perception' : 
'Dabei ist der gewerkschaftl. StreikbeschluB mit seiner Aufforderung zur ArbNieder-
legung die entscheidende selbstandge Kampfhandlung, die als solche rechtl. zu 
bewerten ist, wenn sie tatsachlich durch ArbNiederlegung durchgeftihrt wird. Diese 
Rechtsauffassung allein wird den soziologischen Massenerscheinungen der modernen 
sozialen und winschaftl. Kiimpfe gerecht. Sie legt es nahe, den Streik hinsichtl. seiner 
RechtmaBigkeit oder UnrechtmaBigkeit nur als kollektive Aktion und ohne Riicksicht 
darauf zu beurteilen, ob die einzelnen, den Streik vollziehenden Handlungen, also die 
ArbNiederlegungen nach erfolgter Kiindigung oder ohne eine solche erfolgen. 
Die bisher iiberwiegende Meinung ist in dieser Kemfrage unkonsequent und verschiebt 
zu Unrecht das soziologische und rechtl. Schwergewicht.' [The decision of the trade 
union to go on strike, coupled with the call to down tools, is the decisive action that 
should be legally evaluated, if that action is followed by actual cessation of work. It is 
only this legal point of view that accords with the sociological mass phenomena of 
modern social and economic action [Kampfl. This entails that the strike, with reference 
to its legality or illegality, can only be judged as a collective action and without taking 
into consideration whether the individual actions that constitute the strike (in other 
words, the downing of tools) follows the giving of the required [contractual] notice or 
21 It is vital that the legitimation process which ocurrs here be understood as a power process, where the 
exercise of power is justified by referring to other, homologous exercises of power by bearers of power 
of a not entirely dissimilar nature and extent (courts of a similar institutional position, high government 
officials). The exercise of power by one bearer of power (the Large Senate of the Federal Labour Court) 
is being situated in the context of the exercise of power by other bearers of power, thereby, by analogy, 
legitimizing the exercise of power. 
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not. The current majority opinion on this pivotal question is inconsistent and displaces 
the sociological and legal emphasis wrongly. ]22 
This crucial passage contains both a contamination and the unfolding of the second 
archival principle of the discourse, namely the strike as collective action. 
The contamination lies in the fact that recourse must be had to a sociological percep-
tion. It can hardly be termed a sociological opinion, for no evidence is cited, and no 
expert evidence had been heard. In other words, it is the sociological perception of the 
agent of the decision that is being presented here. But the sociological perception that is 
offered is one of such a self-evident and axiomatic nature, that there is no difficulty in 
recognising it as 'truth', and thereby as acceptable. 
This subtle contamination23 is of the legal discourse by an unproved (yet utterly self-
evident) sociological perception --- it amounts to the introduction of a normative 
paradigm other than a legal paradigm (one of the key moments of juridification). In 
spite of this being a contamination of the legal discourse by sociological perceptions, 
the axiomatic force of the contamination (and the force of the contents of the paradigm 
with which the contamination is achieved) is such that it can structure the unfolding of 
another (second) archival/canonical discursive principle: the collective nature of the 
strike (or the strike as collective action). 24 
Considerable care needs to be taken to re-link the obliteration/construction process 
taking place in this text to some of the general themes of juridification outlined ear-
lier. 25 
22 BAG op cit note 3 at 5. Emphasis added. 
23 The dynamic of the contamination can be unravelled from the quoted passage. There are certain mass 
phenomena, it is said, and there is a legal opinion that has to accord with the sociological view of the 
mass phenomena (of inter alia industrial action). The legal perspective must accord with the sociological 
view of industrial action --- the legal perspective is therefore determined by the sociological perspective, 
and not the other way around. The sociological perspective (or perception) functions as the normative 
paradigm for the legal perspective --- the legal perspective must be changed until it is in accordance with 
the sociological perception of mass phenomena. The meta-juridical standard functions as a corrective to 
the legal perception, and the legal perception is shifted until it is in accordance with a standard that is not 
of a legal nature. 
24 The fact that the establishment of a first and second archival principle can be traced from the text does 
not imply that these two principles are not, in their logic, closely related. The act of obliteration and of 
establishment which makes possible the unfolding of the canonical principles is itself an indirect 
reference to the 'sociological contamination' which follows: 1he solution or the answer to the question 
can be found in the nature of the strike as a measure of collective action. In this manner the first principle 
can unfold itself only within the context of the second principle, while the second principle depends for 
its iterability on the existence of the first principle (there would, after all, be little point in formulating 
the collective nature of industrial action -- principle 2 -- if industrial action had not been allowed --- prin-
ciple 1). 
25 See above, 1.1.4. 
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The processes occurring in the 1955 decision of the Large Senate of the German Fed-
eral Labour Court can be linked to normative closure and cognitive openness. If the 
law is a normatively closed system, it is the argument of this text that the oblitera-
tion/ establishment of the two archival principles in the decision under discussion 
amounts to juridification in that the normative closure is expressly breached. The text 
relies for its operations not on mere information (cognitive openness), but relies on a 
number of meta-juridical considerations (history, the sociology of collective action). 
The decision does not, in line with the legal system's cognitive openness, depend on 
these meta-juridical considerations merely as supportive arguments. On the contrary, 
the text depends, for its own normative operations on these meta-juridical principles 
(which are, of course, archival in themselves). The fact that a disregard of the norma-
tive closure takes place (through the obliteration of the legal arguments) makes possible 
a transgression of the normative closure (the legal rules) towards a shift into normative 
openness, where meta-juridical considerations not only inform (cognitively) the text's 
normative operations, but serve as the very foundation of those normative operations. 
The rules (archival principles) of the law are obliterated, to be replaced by a 
normativity structured upon meta-juridical considerations. The process of juridification 
in this instance, then, relates to a shift from normative closure to normative openness, 
from the strict application of legal principles (which were obliterated) to the importing 
of other non-legal considerations. 
In this instance, the juridification process relies on a construct, namely the doctrine of 
social adequacy. This imported doctrine serves the very important function of allowing 
(covering up) the shift from normative closure to normative openness. 26 It is through a 
26 Meyer poses the question whether the importation of the concept of social adequacy through the 
courts brought about a social change (sozialen Wandel). It is clear from his work that the concept of 
social adequacy is an opening or a node between law and the social consequences of law. After consider-
ing in detail the origin and development of the construct of social adequacy, Meyer makes the following 
statement: 'Die "soziale Adaquanz" ist in der Form und mit dem Inhalt, den ihr die Rechtsprechung 
gegeben hat, Rechtsnorm. Rechtsteoretisch ist diese Rechtsnorm als Generalklausel zu qualifizieren. 
Hierunter sind Normen zu verstehen, die den Richter fiir den zu entscheidenden Einzelfall ausdriicklich 
auf au6ergesetzliche "MaBtabe von wechselnder empirischer Basis und Dichte: Verkehrssitten, gute Sit-
ten, Standesethos, Treu und Glauben, ehewidrig ... " verweisen. Das Merkmal zur Unterscheidung 
zwischen Generalklauseln und anderen Rechtsnormen ist nicht, da6 der Rechtsanwender bei der 
Generalklausel "au6ergesetzliche MaBtabe" anwendet, sondern daB die Generalklausel ihn ausdrilcklich 
auf eine Ausfiillung mit Hilfe solche Ma6tabe verweist. Die Rechtsnorm mit festen, d.h. genau 
umschriebenen Tatbestandsmerkmalen unterscheidet sich also nicht grundsiitzlich von Generalklauseln, 
sondern lediglich graduell, denn auch bei der Definition angeblich fester juristicher Begriffe und bei 
ihrer "Anwendung auf den Einzelfall" spielen nicht dem Gesetz zu entnehmende, sondern dem richter-
lichen Vorverstandnis entwachsene Gesichtspunke die entscheidende Rolle.' ['"Social adequacy, in the 
form and with the content given to it by the courts, is a legal norm. From a legal-theoretical point of 
view, this norm should be qualified as being a general norm (or general clause). This includes norms that 
expressly refer the judge to extra-legislative "standards of flexible (non-stable) empirical basis and con-
sistency: practices and customs, moral standards, ethics, good faith, contrary to the institution of mar-
raige . . . ". The feature that distinguishes general clauses from other legal norms is not the fact that the 
applier of the law applies standards outside the legislation, but that the general clause expressly directs 
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vague and general concept that the normatively closed structure of the law can be 
breached to allow for the importation of that-which-is-not-law (history, sociology, 
etc).27 Once imported into the text through this opening, the meta-juridical becomes 
anchored to the Law-as-text by virtue of the legal reasoning which justifies that 
importation. 
The juridification process occurring in this text (called the first decision of the Large 
Senate) can be summarised as follows: 
1. Normative closure (which would entail the application of legal principles) is 
obliterated. 
2. This obliteration is dialectically linked to the establishment of two archival prin-
ciples (industrial action is allowed, industrial action is collective action). 
3. These two principles have their origin not within the normative confines of the 
law, but in meta-juridical considerations such as democracy, freedom, historical 
development and a particular sociological view. 
4. The normative application of the meta-juridical considerations takes place 
through the use of the concept of social adequacy. Through the concept of social 
adequacy the meta-juridical is imported and turned-into-law (the meta-juridical 
thereby obtains normative status). 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
him to filling the norms with such standards. The legal norm with fixed (i e well-defined) elements do 
not differ in nature from general clauses, but only as a matter of degree, because also in the case of the 
application of ostensibly fixed legal concepts and their application in an individual case the legislation 
does not play the decisive role, but this role is instead played by the judge's points of view.'] Jurgen A E 
Meyer 'Der Rechtsbegriff der "sozialen Adequanz -- ein Vehikel des sozialen Wandels?' in Rehbinder & 
Schelsky (eds) Zur Effektivitiit des Rechts (1972) 139 at 160-1. The argument can be taken much further, 
namely that the concept of 'social adequacy' is, as a general clause, wide enough to enable or make pos-
sible a breach of the normative closure (which according to Luhman characterises the legal system) by 
virtue of its being a legal norm on the one hand (and therefore not foreign to the legal discourse) but on 
the other hand also wide enough in scope to enable the passing of extra-legal standards into the legal 
system. See, in this regard, Jurgen A E Meyer 'Von der "sozialen Adequanz" zur "VerhfiltnismaBigkeit 
der Kampfnahmen" '(1974) 7 Zeitschriftfti,r Rechtspolitik 253 at 253 and 255. 
27 For the purposes of this work, these types of concepts (such as social adequacy, proportionality, the 
core-zone doctrine and others) will be referred to as being both indeterminate (because the meaning of 
the term is unstable and shifts) and polyvalent. The polyvalency of the Offnungskauseln relates to the 
fact that the term in question is, simultaneously, a legal norm (which means that it can be used with 
unproblematically in law-as-discourse) but that it also either contains actual links or enables the structur-
ing of links to the meta-juridical. In the case of social adequacy, for example, the polyvalency of the con-
cept 'social adequacy' is shown by its being a legal norm (established in the discourse of law in a 
temporally anterior sense) and that it makes possible the reference to the sociology of industrial action (as 
being a collective action). 
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5 The importation and reliance on the meta-juridical (as norms) is justified and 
juridified through a legal and policy logic and legitimation. 
11.1.6 The archival implications of the principles 
The largest part of the decision of the Large Senate is devoted to the application of the 
second archival principle and the processing of the consequences of that application: 
• If a strike and the participation in a strike is of a collective nature, the participa-
tion in a strike cannot be seen as a breach of the individual employment contract 
and therefore as illegal if the strike as collective action is legal. 28 The implica-
tion of this is that the participation in a strike does not entitle the employer to 
summarily terminate the employment contract. 29 
• The aim of the strike is to interrupt (and thereby to suspend) the employment 
relationship in order to place pressure on the other party to achieve a favourable 
collective regulation of the terms and conditions of employment. 30 
• For tactical reasons a strike cannot be called by giving the required notice (not 
only in terms of the employment contracts, but also in terms of the relevant col-
lective agreements).31 
28 
'Sind Streik und Streikbeteiligung . . . ausschlieJ3l. kollektivrechtl. Gr6J3en, so scheidet die Charak-
terisierung der Streikbeteiligung als Verletzung des EinzelarbVertrages und damit als vertragswidrig und 
rechtswidrig dann aus, wenn der Streik als Kollektivakt rechtmii.Big ist.' [If a strike and participation and 
a strike are collective concepts the participation in a strike cannot be regarded as a breach of the individ-
ual employment contract and therefore unlawful if the strike as a collective action is lawful.' BAG op cit 
note 3 at 6R. The Large Senate also discusses the breach of the employment contract from the point of 
view of Sozialadii.quanz (or social adequacy), coming to the conclusion that the breach of the duty to 
work may be socially adequate (and therefore justified). See BAG op cit note 3 at 7R. 
29 
'Der von einer Gewerkschaft beschlossene, von den ArbN ohne fristgemaJ3e Kiind. durchgefiihrte 
legitime Streik um die ArbBedingungen berechtigt somit den bestreikten ArbGeb. nicht zur fristlosen 
Einzelentlassung des einzelnen ArbN oder meherer ArbN wegen Vertragsverletzung. '[A legitimate strike 
relating to terms and conditions of employment decided on by a trade union and which is put into prac-
tice by the employees without their giving the required notice does not entitle the employer to summarily 
dismiss individual employees or more than one employee on the basis of breach of contract.] BAG op cit 
note 3 at 8-8R. Emphasis added. The court proceeds to hold that various laws governing civil matters do 
not apply to the case of a strike or the participation in a strike (including § 626 of the Civil Code, 
regulating the refusal to work). 
30 BAG op cit note 3 at 7. 
31 BAG loc cit note 30. 
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• The lock-out is also a collective act, and in terms of the principle of equality 
contained in the Basic Law (Article 3), the state is not permitted to treat the col-
lective actions of the employer differently from the actions of the trade unions. 32 
'Dem Streik der Gewerkschaften entspricht die Aussperrung . . . . ' [The strike 
of the trade unions is equal to [balanced by] the lock-out . . . ] . 33 In spite of this 
this equalisation, the consequences are different: whereas a strike (its motivation 
being to change the terms and conditions of employment) merely suspend the 
employment relationship, the lock-out terminates the employment relationship. 
There is no general duty on the employer to re-employ workers whose services 
had come to the end as a result of a lock-out. 34 The lock-out, being a sui generis 
form of termination of the employment relationship, is not subject to the rules 
relating to dismissal. 
The importance of these principles formulated in the 1955 decision lies in the fact that 
they constitute a normative paradigm constructed by the court: in its decision, and by 
extracting the consequences of the archival principles contained in that decision, the 
court formulates new archival rules. 
32 This decision is justly for its reliance on the principle of equality of weapons (Waffengleichheit, 
Kampfparitiit), which the Large Senate links to social adequacy, and also specifically to the basic social 
principles contained in the Basic Law, and, surprisingly, the right to freedom of development of per-
sonality, contained in Article 2 of the Basic Law. Even though the Large Senate therefore studiously 
avoided linking industrial action to the organisational rights and freedom of association contained in Arti-
cle 9 of the Constitution, it is clear, however, that the Constitution did influence this first seminal deci-
sion of the Large Senate. 
33 BAG op cit note 3 at 8R. Despite the basic structure of the lock-out principles so formulated, the 
Large Senate approves of a differential in the case of the lock-out, namely that the lock-out terminates the 
employment relationship. The reasons offered for this are that 'the lock-out in Germany has always 
entailed a termination of the employment relationship'. At 9-9R. It is made clear that the risk of losing 
employment (the result of a lock-out) is a part of the risk involved in resorting to industrial action. 
34 As to re-employment (Wiedereinstellung) see BAG op cit note 3 at 11-12R. 
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11.2 OBLITERATION AND ESTABLISHMENT (1971) 
11.2.1 Principles new and not-so-new 
The concept of social adequacy proved to be short-lived: by 1963, it had disappeared 
from the discourse altogether. 35 
If the structure of the decision and the approach (and formulations) of the Large Senate 
are borne in mind, it would appear (misleadingly) that the problems experienced with 
the application of the 1955 decision related not to the application of the first archival 
principle (that industrial action is allowed) or the second principle (industrial action is 
collective action), but with the application of the normative hierarchy (itself a con-
sequence of the two archival principles).36 But the effect of the 1971 decision on the 
discourse (law-as-discourse) was decisive because it totally changed not only the 
normative paradigms of the law of industial action (i e what types of industrial action 
would be permitted and what would be the consequences of that action), but that the 
justification and the structural accommodation of the phenomenon of industrial action 
in the system of legal norms was also undergoing a change, albeit subtle. 
The 1971 decision of the Large Senate of the German Federal Labour Court was an 
extended reply to a question formulated by the first Senate of the Federal Labour Court 
in 1968: 
'Halt der GroBe Senat an seiner in BAG AP Nr 1 zu Art 9 GG Arbeitskampf 
vertretenen Auffassung fest, daB der Arbeitgeber einem von der Gewerkschaft gefiihrten 
legalen Streik mit einer die Arbeitsverhaltnisse losenden Aussperrung begegnen kann, 
order billigt der GroBe Senat die Auffassung, daB der Arbeitgeber durch Aussperrung 
35 See Meyer op cit note 26 at 64. 
36 By 1960, the rules formulated by the Large Senate in 1955 were judged strong enough to enjoy 
precedence over legislation protecting pregnant women (legislation which could be linked directly to 
Article 6 of the Basic Law) BAG AP Nr 11 on Art 9 GG (Industrial Action)(1960). The legislation in 
question was the Mutterschutzgesetz (Protection of Mothers Act). The implication was that the rules for-
mulated by the Large Senate in 1955 were of such force (no doubt in part attributable to the institutional 
position of the Large Senate itself) that the archival principles and the legal rules relating to the termina-
tion lock-out which were based on those principles were judged sufficiently strong to override protective 
legislation tracing policy (protection of the family) from the Constitution itself. By 1963, it was con-
firmed that pregnant women could be locked out (even where they were not actively involved in the 
strike). However, the first Senate of the Federal Labour Court added a proviso that pregnant women 
(those enjoying the protection of the legislation) had to be re-instated by the employer once the industrial 
action had run its course.BAG AP Nr 24 on Art 9 GG (Industrial Action) (1963). 
Also in 1963, the rules established by the Large Senate suffered the imposition of a further proviso: 
before a lock-out enjoys the protection of the law, the employer must be prepared (and there must be 
some indiciations of this willingness) to negotiate with the employees who had been locked out after the 
industrial action has come to an end.BAG AP Nr 31 on Art 9 GG (Industrial Action) (1963). 
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die Arbeitsverhaltnisse nur suspendieren kann?' [Does the Large Senate retain its view, 
as expressed in BAG Ap Nr 1 on Art 9 GG Industrial Action that the employer can 
respond to a union-supported legal strike with a lock-out that terminates the employ-
ment relationships or does the Large Senate approve of the view that the employer can, 
by locking out, merely suspend the employment relationships?]37 
The question posed in this polite form should not conceal the fact that the First Senate 
of the Federal Labour Court had in actual fact refused to follow the 1955 decision of 
the Large Senate for some time. 38 
The 1971 decision of the Large Senate39 has a structure ostensibly similar to that of the 
1955 decision. After summarising the salient point of the 1955 decision, the develop-
ment of the jurisprudence between 1955 and 1968, the Large Senate obliterates the 
normative paradigm developed in the 1955 decision in the following terms: 
'Der Gr. Sen. halt an den Grundgedanken iiber den kollektiven Charakter des Streiks 
fest. Nach Ablauf von 16 Jahren muJ3 aber die gesamte Problematik des Arbeitskamp-
frechts neu iiberdacht werden ... ' [The Large Senate affirms the basic principle relating 
to the collective nature of the strike. After 16 years have passed the entire issue of the 
law relating to industrial action has to be reconsidered { neu iiberdacht werden}. ]40 
What the Large Senate said in this passage is that the normative paradigm41 constructed 
in the 1955 decision had become problematic; with the passing of time and the develop-
ment of the jurisprudence. The entire law of industrial action had to be re-thought. 
Considering the criticism in respect of the 1955 decision as it had emerged in the litera-
ture and the jurisprudence, the Large Senate in effect silences the 1955 decision by stat-
ing that the 1955 decision failed to sufficiently accommodate all relevant legal values (' 
. . . nich alle rechtl. Wertvorstellungen geniigende Beachtung gefunden haben'). 42 
37 BAG AP Nr 39 on Art 9 GG (Industrial Action) (1968) First Senate. 
38 
'Dieser Rechtsansicht vermag sich der 1. Senat nach nochmaliger Uberpriifung nicht mehr anzu-
schlieJ3en.' [After reconsidering the matter, the First Senate does not share the view {that a lock-out 
terminates the employment relationship}]. BAG op cit note 37 at 1. 
39 BAG AP Nr 43 on Art 9 Basic Law (Industrial Action) 21 April 1971). Large Senate. The facts of the 
matter can be summarised briefly as follows: Croupiers employed in a casino were locked out by their 
employer after they had followed a call by their trade union to go on a strike. The employees (whose 
services had been terminated as a result of the lock-out) argued that the lock-out was illegal and they 
claimed arrear wages and reinstatement. 
40 BAG op cit note 39 at 3R. 
41 See 11.1.6 above and 11.2.3 below. 
42 BAG op cit note 39 At 6R. 
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Having succinctly despatched the first principle as established in the 1955 decision, the 
Large Senate in 1971 proceeds to re-establish a close relative to that principle in the 
following terms: 
'Arbeitskiimpfe miissen zwar nach unserem freiheitl. Tarifvertragssystem moglich sein, 
um Interessenkonflikten uber Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsbedingungen im iiuBersten Fall 
austragen und ausgleichen zu konnen. In unserer verflochtenen und wechselseitig 
abhiingigen Gesellschaft beruhren aber Streik wie Aussperrung nicht nur die am 
Arbeidskampf unmittelbar Beteiligten, sondern auch Nichtstreikende und sonstige 
Dritte sowie die Allgemeinheit vielfach nachhfiltig. Arbeitskiimpfe milssen deshalb unter 
dem obersten Gebot der Verhii.ltnismiij3igkeit stehen. Dabei sind die wirtschaftl. 
Gegebenheiten zu berucksichtigen, und das Gemeinwohl darf nicht offensichl. verletzt 
werden. Diese Gesichtspunkte hat das BAG wegen der moglich tiefgreifenden 
wirtschaftl. und sozialen Folgen von Arbeitskiimpfen sowie in Hinblick auf die 
Verantwortung der Tarifvertragsparteien gegenuber der Allgemeinheit schon mehrfach 
betont . . . ' [Industrial action must be possible in our system of voluntary collective 
agreement in order to resolve, should it be necessary, disputes of interest. In our inter-
woven and inter-dependent society a strike or a lock-out, however, adversely affects not 
only those actually involved, but also those who are not striking and other third parties 
as well as society as a whole. Therefore industrial action must comply with the standard 
of proportionality. In this, the economic facts should be taken into account, and the 
common weal should not be detrimentally affected. The Federal Labour Court has 
expressed these points of view on many occasions before, because of the serious eco-
nomic and social consequences of industrial action and in view of the responsibility that 
the bargaining partners have towards the general society.)43 
It is vitally important to note a number of shifts that have taken place in the discourse. 
It is no longer stated that there is a freedom to strike or a freedom to lock-out (as the 
Large Senate did in 1955): Instead, for the first time, the rationality of industrial action 
is made contingent upon the normative rationality of the collective bargaining 
process. 44 This amounts to a significant shift from the discursive foundations of 1955, 
where the accommodation of the strike and the lock-out in the legal system relied on 
the formulation of indeterminate policy considerations (the historical development of 
the law, for example) and the expression of principles equally indeterminate (such as 
the fiat-like statement by the Large Senate in 1955 that there is a freedom to strike and 
a freedom to lock-out). 
43 BAG op cit note 39 at 6R. Emphasis added. 
44 The German term 'Tarifvertrag' is normally translated as 'collective agreement': while 'Vertrag' is a 
; 'contract' or 'agreement', the term 'Tarif' relates more to (collective) terms and conditions of employ-
ment (such as working hours and rates of increase of remuneration) than what is understood by the 
English term 'collective'. The German Tarifvertrag is usually substantive in nature, but may be a 'Rah-
mentarifvertrag' which sets out only certain minimum and maximum standards. The term 'Tarif-
vertragssystem' is translated as the 'system of collective agreements'. Another problematic term is 
'Tarifautonomie', which is traditionally translated as 'collective autonomy', but refers more to the free-
dom to bargain and conclude substantive collective agreements. 
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The normative change that has taken place here is marked by the fact that the Large 
Senate, in 1955, broke through the normative closure of the law by considering various 
other factors, such as a sociological view of the strike (and seeing the strike as a collec-
tive action). In order to accommodate this collective phenomenon in the legal system, 
the Large Senate relied on an open-ended concept of social adequacy or justification. 
In the 1971 decision, a discursive shift towards a teleology has been added: the strike 
as a part of the collective bargaining system; the function of collective industrial action 
within the system of collective bargaining. The function of industrial action, in other 
words, is dispute resolution, as unpleasant as it may be, and regardless of the con-
sequences. 45 
It is this teleological link between industrial action and its purpose (dispute resolution) 
that makes possible the accommodation of the destructive (note the emphasis the Large 
Senate places on the potential negative consequences of industrial action, compared to 
the sparse mention of the dispute-resolution function of industrial action) phenomenon 
in the legal system. In a sense, the end (the resolution of disputes about interests) justi-
fies the means (industrial action and all its adverse effects). The action is justified, or, 
phrased differently, socially adequate. 
Because of the apparent similarity in the structure of the decisions it would be tempting 
to argue that there is very little difference between the principle of accommodation 
established in the 1955 decision of the Federal Labour Court and the process used to 
45 The fact that the phenomenon of industrial action had been linked to dispute resolution in the context 
of collective bargaining made possible a re-evaluation of the role of the lock-out. In this regard the Fed-
eral Labour Court held as follows: 'Unsere Rechtsordnung geht davon aus, daB der ArbGeb. derartige 
MaBnahmen -- und zwar auch als den ersten Akt eines Arbeitskampfes -- ergreifen kann. Denn andem-
falls ware nicht gewi:i.hrleistet, daB es im Rahmen der Tarifautonomie durch Verhandlungen und notfalls 
durch Ausiibung von Druck und Gegendruck zum AbschluJ3 von TV und damit zu einer kollektiven 
Regelung von Arbeitsbedingungen kommt. Konnte die eine Seite, namlich die Arbeitnehmerschaft 
vertreten durch die Gewerkschaft, allein das Kampfgeschehen bestimmen und ware der ArbGeb. auf ein 
Dulden und Durchstehen des Arbeitskampfes beschrankt, so bestiinde die Gefahr, daB die Regelung der 
Arbeitsbedingungen nicht mehr auf einem System freier Vereinbarungen beruht, das Voraussetzung fiir 
ein Funktionieren und innerer Grund des Tarifvertragssystems is.' [Our legal system takes the view that 
employers can apply such measures {lock-outs}, even as the first move in industrial action. Were this not 
the case, there could be no guarantee that a collective regulation of terms and conditions of employment 
could take place within the framework of collective bargaining and, where necessary, through the appli-
cation of pressure and counter-pressure. Could one side, namely the employees represented by the trade 
union, determine the industrial action and were the employer-side limited to bearing and withstanding the 
action, the danger would exist that the regulation of terms and conditions of employment would no 
longer be based on a system of voluntary agreements, which is the prerequisite for the efficiency and the 
foundation of the system of collective bargaining.' BAG op cit note 39 at 7R. In terms of the principle of 
proportionality, the court continued, any measure of industrial action which opens an industrial action 
(be it a strike or a lock-out) has the effect of suspending the employment contracts. See BAG op cit note 
39 at 8R-9R. But the Large Senate did make provision for a lock-out which terminates the relationship 
between employer and employee (see at 9R-11R). 
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accommodate the phenomenon of industrial action within the normative structures of 
law in the 1971 decision. This would, however, be a mistaken view. The 1971 decision 
does not establish a normative justification of industrial action itself, but achieves that 
normative justification by linking industrial action teleologically to a dispute resolution 
function in collective bargaining. It is only as the servant of collective bargaining that 
industrial action is permitted: the freedom has disappeared behind the means to an end. 
11.2.2 Proportionality as limitation 
Because the Large Senate achieved the accommodation of industrial action in the 
normatively closed system of the law by linking it to (and placing it in the service of) 
another normative value-system (collective bargaining as a concept and collective 
bargaining as a system which not only establishes norms but which is also established 
in terms of legal norms), the concept of social adequacy could be jettisoned. It was no 
longer needed. 
It is important to note that the Federal Labour Court does not rely on the concept of 
proportionality (Verhiiltnismi:ifiigkeit) to accommodate industrial action within the legal 
system. Breaching the normative closure of the law had already taken place through 
teleologically linking industrial action and collective bargaining: Through the non-
problematic position of collective bargaining within the normative structures of the law, 
strikes and lock-outs are also stripped of their problematical nature and are seen to be 
institutions recognised by the law -- because they serve a useful function in respect of 
conflict resolution, the law recognises the 'legality' (in the sense of having a function 
sanctioned by law) of industrial action. 
This does not mean that all industrial action of whatever nature will be sanctioned. It is 
in this respect that the concept of proportionality plays an important role, as it is 
(mis)applied (Zweckentfremdet) in this context in order to place limitations on industrial 
action-as-dispute resolution. 
Originally developed as a construct of constitutional and human rights law in order to 
evaluate the legality of the infringement of rights, the concept of proportionality indi-
cated a tendency towards a cognitive indeterminacy as early as 1968 
'Mit der immer hiiufigeren Heranziehung und Zitierung droht der Grundsatz zum 
Schlagwort zu erstarren und in einem allgemeinen Appell an die Gerechtigkeit auf-
zugehen. Damit wird er entweder so unbestimmt, da6 er fiir die Entscheidung einer 
Rechtsfrage nichts mehr hergibt, oder er wird zum Einfallstor eines unkontrollierbaren 
und unkontrollierten Gerechtigkeitsgefiihls, das die objektiven Wertungen von Verfas-
sung und Gesetz <lurch die subjektiven des Richters ersetz.' [With its increasingly com-
mon citation and use, the principle {of proportionality} is threatening to petrify into a 
mere slogan and to turn into a general appeal to justice. Through this the principle 
either becomes so indeterminate that it yields nothing for the deciding of a specific case 
or it becomes a trapdoor for a uncontrollable and uncontrolled feeling of justice, which 
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replaces the objective values of the constitution and the legislation with the subjective 
values of the judge.]46 
The (mis)application of the principle of proportionality was not warmly received. 47 
11.2.3 The new normative paradigm in the wake of proportionality 
Once the Federal Labour Court had succeeded in establishing a teleological means/end 
link between collective bargaining and industrial action, and had applied the concept of 
proportionality to limit the exercise of industrial action, the foundations had been laid 
for a new normative paradigm: 
1. Industrial action could only be used for the purpose of achieving legitimate 
aims, and only to the extent required in order to achieve labour peace. All 
measures of industrial action (whether it be a strike or a lock-out) may only be 
applied after all other possiblities had been exhausted (industrial action is the 
ultima ratio). 48 
2. The principle of proportionality applies also to the conduct of industrial action 
(and both in the case of the strike and in the lock-out). The measures of indus-
trial action taken may not exceed that which is required to achieve the aims. The 
principle of proportionality does not relate only to the timing of the industrial 
action and the aim of the action, but also relates to the conduct of the action and 
the intensity of the action. This entails that industrial action is legal only when it 
is conducted in terms of fair rules: industrial action may not have as its aim the 
destruction of the other party, but must aim at the restoration of labour peace. 49 
46 M Gentz 'Zur VerhiiltnismaBigkeit von Grundrechtseingriffen' (1968) 21 Neue Juristische Wochens-
chrift 1600 at 1601. See similarly H G Joachim 'Its der Grundsatz der VerhfiltnismaBigkeit ein geeignetes 
Kriterium fiir die rechtliche Erfassung des Phiinomens "Arbeitskampf"?' in M Kittner (ed) Streik und 
Aussperrung (Protokoll der wissenschaftlichen Verantstaltung der Industriegewerkschaft Metall von 13. 
bis 15. September 1973 in Miinchen) (1974) 27 at 30ff. 
47 See above note 46 and also M Lowisch 'Das Uberma13verbot im Arbeidskampfrecht' (1971) 2 
Zeitschrift fur Arbeitsrecht 319, G Muller 'Fragen zum Arbeitskampfrecht nach dem BeschluB des 
GroBen Senates des Bundesarbeitsgerichts vom 21. April 1971' (1972) 23 Gewerkschafliche Monatshefte 
271, F J Sacker 'Zu den rechtspolitischen Grundlagen der Arbeitskampf-Entscheidungen des Bundesar-
beitsgerichts vom 21. April und 26. Oktober 1971' ( 1972) 23 Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 287. 
48 BAG op cit note 39 at 6R. 
49 BAG op cit note 39 at 6R-7. 
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3 After the industrial action had run its course, both parties had to endeavour to 
re-establish labour peace to as large an extent as possible. 5o 
11.2.4 Transgression and juridification 
If the most significant feature of the decision of the Large Senate was the means/end 
link between collective bargaining and industrial action (for it was this link which 
formed the basis for the 1980 decisions -- see below), the most significant aspect of 
juridification is again the use of a vague and indeterminate legal norm (proportionality) 
which structures a large part of the decision. 51 
The indeterminate concept of social adequacy which structured the 1955 decision is 
exnominated (unnamed), but the means/end teleological construction amounts to a justi-
fication of industrial action as being socially adequate because of its dispute resolution 
function. The fact that the structural (and polyvalent) norm of social adequacy is jet-
tisoned, means that another basis had to be found on which to structure the accom-
modation of the phenomenon within the system of legal norms. Proportionality plays 
no role in this, even though the text of the Federal Labour Court's decision often seeks 
to establish links between proportionality, collective bargaining, and industial action. 
But these endeavours go no further than the oracular: that industrial action, collective 
bargaining and proportionality appear in the same place, and as parts of the same 
sentences or paragraphs does not necessarily entail that proportionality is used for any-
thing other than a means of placing a normative limitation on industrial action. 
Even though the first archival principle is, therefore, retained in outcome, the trans-
gression takes place in the logical and normative reasoning which is pressed into serv-
ice to justify the first archival principle (accommodation of industrial action within the 
legal system). The normative shift which marks this transgression is from justification 
to a means/end construction. 52 
50 BAG op cit note 39 at 7. 
51 Most of the new normative rules relating to the lock-out are presented as being 'within the framework 
of proportionality', or that they should be seen 'as an expression of proportionality'. 
52 There is, of course, a certain economy operating in this shift as well. It is clear from the textual 
excerpts quoted above that the link between collective bargaining and industrial action (as the method of 
dispute resolution in collective bargaining) is presented as fact: according to the way in which this con-
struct is presented, there can be no doubt as to the functional link between collective bargaining and 
industrial action. If one bears in mind, however, that the social adequacy construct amounted, in essence, 
to nothing more than an argument of justification, the means/ends link between collective bargaining and 
industrial action does not differ in nature: industrial action (and the damages caused by industrial action) 
are justified not because the actions are socially adequate (justified), but because they serve as a dispute 
resolution system --- a means to the end of ensuring the efficiency and functionality of the collective 
bargaining system. 
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It is vitally important to distinguish proportionality from this structure, because it is 
only once the first archival principle (accommodation) has been re-structured that the 
adverse effects of industrial action (the damages to the economy, to those not participa-
ting in the strike) can be addressed by subjecting industrial action to the limitation prin-
ciple of proportionality. 
In its function as a limitation principle, proportionality again indicates a significant 
juridification. The structure of the process is similar to the structure of the 1955 deci-
sion: The application of a norm ('proportionality') that is sufficiently polyvalent and 
indeterminate to enable the breach of the normative closure on the one hand and allow 
the importation of values and meta-juridical standards into the balance of normativity 
on the other hand. Much as social adequacy was shown to be sufficiently devoid of 
meaning to make possible the flow of values from the meta-juridical (sociology, his-
tory, development, the 'true nature') to the legal, so proportionality is sufficiently 
polyvalent and vague to enable a similar flow, from policy considerations to law -- it is 
in this light that the development of a new normative paradigm (see 11.2.3 above) must 
be seen. Again juridification relates to the importation of meta-juridical considerations 
through the opening clause of an indeterminate and polyvalent norm. 
11.3 THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (1980) 
Another important similarity between the 1971 decision of the Large Senate of the Fed-
eral Labour Court and the 1955 decision is that, with one exception, the constitutional 
and human rights aspects of industrial action were ignored (obliterated). 
It is strange to find that, in 1971, the Large Senate of the Federal Labour Court refers 
to the provisions of Article 9(3) of the Basic Law53 only to state that an· individual 
employer enjoys the right to lock out employees but goes no further in interpreting the 
constitutional considerations of industrial action. 54 The constitutional normative frame-
work did not serve as the basis for the normative paradigm established by the Federal 
Labour Court in its 1971 decision, even though it appears that the Federal Labour 
Court was aware of that framework and the doctrines that were developing around the 
provisions of Article 9(3). 
It is only in 1980 that the legal empire struck back: in two major lock-out decisions of 
the First Senate of the Federal Labour Court the legal norms of the Constitution (the 
5J See above, Chapter 3. 
54 
'Auch der einzelne ArbGeb. hat das Aussperrungsrecht. Art 9 Abs. 3 GG besagt nichts Gegenteiliges. 
Er geht vielmehr nach seinem Wortlaut gerade von der Koalitionsfreiheit des einzelnen aus.' [The indi-
vidual employer also has the right to lock out. Article 9(3) of the Basic Law contains nothing to the con-
trary. Indeed, (Article 9(3)) instead takes as its point of departure the freedom of the individual to associ-
ate. (Koalitionsfreiheit).] BAG AP Nr 43 (1971) on Article 9 Basic Law (Industrial Action) at 7R. 
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1949 Basic Law) obliterated the uncertain bases of the industrial action jurisprudence, 
and anchored it firmly to a constitutional base. 55 
11.3.1 Affirmation of principles 
The first step taken by the First Senate in the first of the two major lock-out decisions 
handed down in 1980 was to affirm the normative principles laid down by the Large 
Senate in 1971 : 
'Der Senat hfilt an der Rechtspr. des Gr S. des BAG fest, daJ3 das Kampfmittel der Aus-
sperrung fur die ArbGeb, unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen aus Grunden der Paritiit 
und im Rahmen der Verhaltnismafiigkeit verfiigbar sein muB.' [The Senate affirms the 
decision of the Large Senate, namely that the lock-out must be at the disposal of the 
employer under certain circumstances on the grounds of parity and within the frame-
work of proportionality. ]56 
The First Senate in this paragraph affirms that industrial action must be accommodated 
(allowed) in the legal system (this first archival principle is by now regarded as suffi-
ciently well-established that to forego mention), and that this accommodation entails the 
accommodation of the lock-out.57 Proportionality is still seen to fulfill its function of 
limiting the exercise of the right to resort to industrial action. 
At first blush, it would appear as if the First Senate is merely following the normative 
paradigm as established by the Large Senate in the 1971 decision, for all the structural 
elements (proportionality, industrial action) are accounted for. 
11.3.2 In slavery to freedom (I): Die Tarifautonomie 
But the First Senate then immediately proceeds to place both collective bargaining and 
industrial action in the service of another legal norm, namely the core-zone of collec-
tive autonomy: 
55 BAG AP Nr 64 and 65 on Article 9 Basic Law (Industrial Action). Decisions of the First Senate of 10 
June 1980. Both decisions related to the legality of lock-outs, and were based on claims for arrear wages 
which employees claimed were payable during the course of the illegal lock-out. 
56 BAG Zoe cit note 55. 
57 There is a slight but pivotal difference. The First Senate in the quotation states the justification of the 
lock-out to be based on 'parity'. This is a signifier for an important shift which is to take place in the 
1980 decisions, namely the broader linking of collective bargaining to the concept of collective autonomy 
(which is itself regarded as being anti-juridificatory in structure), which is in tum linked to a constitu-
tional provision (Article 9(3) of the Basic Law). Whereas the 1971 decision of the Large Senate of the 
Federal Labour Court went only so far as to hold that industrial action is in the service of collective 
bargaining, the major shift taking place in the 1980 decision is the funher means/ends links between col-
lective bargaining, collective autonomy, industrial action and proportionality. 
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'Im lnteresse einer sinnvollen Ordnung des Arbeitslebens hat der Staat seine 
Zustandigkeit zur Rechtsetzung weit zuriickgenommen und die Bestimmung uber die 
regelungsbedurftigen Einzelheiten des Arbeitsvertrages grundsatzl. den Koalitionen 
uberlassen .... Den freigebildeten Koalitionen ist <lurch Art. 9 Abs. 3 GG die Aufgabe 
zugewiesen und in einem Kernbereich garantiert, insbes. LOhne und sonstige materielle 
Arbeitsbedingungen in eigener Verantwortung und im wesentlichen ohne staatliche Ein-
flu6nahme <lurch Gesamtvereinbarungen zu regeln.' [In the interests of a meaningful 
regulation of the working life the State has largely taken back its powers to make rules 
and has left the regulation of those details of the labour relationship 
{Arbeitsvertrag=contract of employment} that require regulation to the coalitions. The 
voluntarily established coalitions are given the task by Article 9(3) of the Basic Law, 
which also guarantees this core-zone, in particular to regulate wages and other substan-
tive terms and conditions of employment in their own responsibility and essentially 
without any influence from the state through collective agreements.] 58 
Noteworthy about this passage is its apparent and stated anti-juridificatory movement, 
as the passage relates how the state (and, by implication, the law) has given up its own 
power to regulate (Zustandigkeit zur Rechtsetzung) in favour of employers and trade 
unions (the coalitions). The law has, in other words, withdrawn in order to leave a 
zone (the zone of collective autonomy, the zone of freedom) in which the parties can 
auto-regulate those aspects of their (employment-based) relationships that require 
regulation. If the term 'juridification' were understood in its accepted sense of legal 
profusion this could be described as being anti-juridificatory: the law withdraws in 
order to leave a zone of freedom within which the parties active within that zone are 
free to structure their own relationship substantively. 
Once 'the core of collective autonomy' has attained the power of being a transcendental 
signifier in this discourse (the signifier which gives meaning to others),59 it comes as no 
surprise to find that the core of collective autonomy also structures the meaning of 
58 BAG op cit note 55 at 3R. 
59 Collective autonomy attains this position by being the source of all: it is the raison d'etre of collective 
bargaining, the collective bargaining legislation, and industrial action as a whole, as well as the constitu-
tional provisions contained in Article 9(3) of the Basic Law. It is placed in a privileged position, because 
it is regarded as being the norm from which other norms obtain their validity (the Collective Agreements 
Act is only a manifestation of the core-zone of collective autonomy, and the process of collective 
bargaining is protected by the core-zone of collective autonomy, and the core-zone is protected by Article 
9(3) ... ). The concept of collective autonomy (the core-zone of which is protected in Article 9(3) of the 
Basic Law) therefore appears, at this stage, to structure (inform) a normative (re)closure. But again, a 
certain discursive economy is operative: the core-zone of collective autonomy can only be placed in a 
privileged position if other legal norms are obliterated. This obliteration occurs when the court dismisses 
the legal discussions and literature, which bases the law of industrial action not only on the concept of 
collective autonomy, but also on other norms of the positive law, international agreements, and federal 
(German) legislation. The court dismisses these other norms as being unhelpful (see BAG op cit note 55 
at 6). 
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legislation on collective agreements, as the First Senate holds that the core of collective 
bargaining is realised (crystallised, or, in the metaphor of the court, concretised) by the 
Collective Agreements Act. The Senate found that the Collective Agreements Act, 
being the manifestation of the core of collective autonomy (freedom) ensures that coali-
tions (trade unions and employer organisations) have the right to create norms (through 
binding collective agreements).60 In order to ensure that the system of collective 
bargaining is functional (again the means/ends construction), the court continues to 
state that 'without the pressure applied through a strike, collective autonomy would not 
be functional' .61 
The structural conflict can therefore be summarised as follows: Article 9(3) of the 
Basic Law protects not a specific system of collective bargaining or a specific system of 
industrial action, but the core of collective autonomy (Tarifautonomie) instead. The 
Collective Agreements Act and the system of collective bargaining is but one 
manifestation (concretisation) of collective autonomy. Industrial action (strike and lock-
out) serves the functionality of the collective bargaining system by ensuring that parties 
to the collective bargaining process have instruments at their disposal to place pressure 
on the other party. This structure means that the only decision the First Senate had to 
take was what consequences (for industrial action) flow from collective bargaining 
(which is a manifestation of Tarifautonomie). 62 
It is important to note that the term Tarifautonomie is not defined, that it is a construct 
simply taken over from the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court, and that 
it functions in the text under consideration as an indeterminate and polyvalent term 
structuring a decision. The borders and limitations of the Tarifautonomie are not 
decided or mentioned: for the concept of the 'core-zone' (Kernbereich) of collective 
autonomy is sufficiently vague to make it polyvalent. 
60 BAG op cit note 55 at 3R. 
61 
'Ohne das Druckmittel des Streiks konnte die Tarifautonomie nicht wirksam werden' [Without the 
pressure instrument of the strike, collective autonomy would not function]. BAG op cit note 55 at 4R. 
The Federal Constitutional Court held, similarly, in 1991: 'Zu den geschUtzen Mitteln zahlen auch 
Arbeitskampfmafinahmen, die auf den Abschlufi von Tarifvertragen gerichtet sind. Sie werden jedenfalls 
insoweit von der Koalitionsfreiheit erfafit, als sie erforderlich sind, um eine funktionierende 
Tarifautonomie sicherzustellen.' [Measures of industrial action, aimed at the conclusion of collective 
agreements, are also protected. They are, at any rate, protected by the protection of freedom of associa-
tion, to the extent that they are necessary to ensure a functioning {system of} collective autonomy.] 
BVerfGE 84, 212, 225. 
62 
'Der Senat hat nur zu entscheiden, welche Folgen sich aus dem geltenden die Tarifautonomie 
konkretisierenden Tarifrecht fiir das Arbeitskampfrecht ergeben.' [The Senate only has to decide which 
consequences follow from the applicable law of collective bargaining --- itself a concretisation of 
Tarifautonomie --- for the law of industrial action.] BAG op cit note 55 at 6. 
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11.3.3 In slavery to freedom (II): Freedom of association 
In having to pronounce upon the validity of the principles laid down by the First Senate 
in the 1980 decision, the Federal Constitutional Court took the means/end construction 
one step further by firmly linking collective bargaining and industrial action to the pro-
tection of freedom of association contained in Article 9(3) --- with only one reference 
made to the vague concept of Tarifautonomie. 
The Federal Constitutional Court held that the provisions of Article 9(3) of the Basic 
Law in the first place protects the individual's freedom of association (this includes, the 
Court held, the employer's freedom of association). The organisations (or coalitions) 
that are formed as a result of the freedom of association also enjoy protection under 
Article 9(3). A significant aim of the organisations is the conclusion of collective agree-
ments, and in achieving this aim, the Basic Law leaves the instruments to be used to the 
choice of the parties. Because these instruments used to achieve the conclusion of col-
lective agreements are also protected by the constitutional provision, it follows that 
industrial action, in so far as the instruments are necessary to ensure a functional 
system of collective bargaining (and the conclusion of collective agreements) also enjoy 
constitutional protection. 63 
11.4 NORMATIVE CLOSURE AND JURIDIFICATION 
Throughout the industrial action jurisprudence of the Federal Labour Court (and the 
affirmation of that jurisprudence by the Federal Constitutional Court), a gradual 
process of juridification-as-discourse has been observable. 
All decisions of the Federal Labour Court, whether it be the decisions by the Large 
Senate of 1955 or 1971, or the pivotal decisions of the First Senate in 1980, rely, for 
their structure, on a term that is both indeterminate and polyvalent. 
In the 1955 founding decision, the norm used was social adequacy, a term that never 
made a re-appearance in the discourse after 1963. In the 1971 decision the term was 
proportionality, a term which succeeded in surviving even after the 1980 decisions. 64 
The 1980 lock-out decisions were structured on the concept of collective autonomy. 
These indeterminate and polyvalent terms serve the function of enabling the transgres-
sion of the normative closure, on the one hand, while ostensibly retaining the structural 
integrity of the system on the other hand. This is achieved by the fact that the term or 
63 See BVerfGE 84, 212 at 224-225. 
64 The 1980 lock-out decisions even went so far as to concretise the concept of proportionality numeri-
cally, holding that a lock-out in response to a limited partial strike must be proportionate to the scope of 
the strike. 
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norm is, simultaneously, a legal norm, with an established legal provenance, but at the 
same time, indeterminate enough (in the sense that the meaning of the norm is vague 
and flexible) to make possible a flow of information into the normatively closed 
system. But by being imported into the normatively closed system of the law through 
an indeterminate and polyvalent (legal) norm, the meta-juridical becomes part of the 
normative discourse of the law. The meta-juridical (and in the case of the 1955 and 
1971 decisions, this is especially clear) thereby becomes part of the law by occupying 
the vacant space of the indeterminacy in the Offnungsklauseln. So social adequacy is 
meaningless until determined by reference to the historical development of the law, or 
the sociological perspective of industrial action, so proportionality is stripped of its own 
meaning (that of a doctrine limiting the infringement of individual rights) to become, 
instead, the structure of limitation of the exercise of rights. Furthermore, in respect of 
proportionality, it is clear from the development of the jurisprudence that even this 
term is slowly stripped of its significance as the centralising concepts of the discourse 
become anchored in the other discourse (constitutional law-as-discourse), from which 
the industrial action jurisprudence gains conceptual legitimacy. The concept of 'collec-
tive autonomy' or Tarifautonomie is sufficiently indeterminate in meaning (not even the 
Federal Constitutional Court attempts a definition) to make possible the teleological 
linking between itself, industrial action, and collective bargaining in 1980, whereas the 
1971 decision merely linked collective bargaining and industrial action in a means/end 
structure. By 1991, the entire industrial action jurisprudence is stripped of its own 
normatively closed nature, as it is enclosed within the normative closure of the jurispru-
dence of the Federal Constitutional Court. The normative openings and transgressions 
which marked, significantly, the 1955 and 1971 decisions, and, to a lesser extent, the 
1980 lock-out decision, again undergoes a normative closure. 
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ARCHAEOLOGY OF SILENCE II 
(SILENCE AND POWER) 
JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO INDUSTRIAL ACTION IN THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF BRITISH COURTS 
'Yet it must be understood that judges do and will (to use a neutral word) develop the 
common law and interpret statutes along lines of their own policies to draw new con-
tours of liability out of old principles. This is an inescapable fact for labour, as for 
other, law. This process has a legitimacy of its own that is very difficult to question. 
Most judges have now jettisoned, as Lord Reid put it, the idea that "in some Aladdin's 
cave there is hidden the Common Law", which judges need only to find ("we do not 
believe in fairy tales any more"). But the new principle or the new tort they create is, 
upon its creation and its admission into the hallowed corpus of common law, invested 
with an authority equal to the rules that have been included there for centuries, as if it 
had been there all along.' 
-- Lord Wedderburn of Charlton The Worker and the Law 3 ed (1986) at 46. Emphasis 
added. 
'This is simply the common law in action.' 
-- Express Newspapers Ltd v MacShane and another [1980] 1 All ER 65 at 70 HL (per 
Lord Wilberforce) 
[PROLOGUE: READING THE HALLOWED BODY OF THE COMMON LAW 
(Discourse of Order Series 2 Part 6) 
From the old principles come the new, according to Weddeburn, new grounds of 
liability, new delicts, new applications of power against the power of the individual or 
the power of the collective entity. Again the act of establishment depends on a powerful 
ex-nomination, an axiomatic assumption and presentation of legitimacy that is, in the 
words of Wedderburn quoted above, very difficult to question. That which is new, 
through this ex-nomination process that characterises its establishment, appears to have 
been there always. All that was needed was for the principle to be 'read', for the 
archive to have been excavated in order to 'yield' the new principle. 
Ex-nomination is a sleight-of-hand, but it is more than magic. Ex-nomination is also 
the discursive cover for the exercise of power (anew).] 
A full reading of the entire archive, were that possible, or even an attempt at a full 
diachronic analysis of the development of that archive falls outside the scope of this 
study, concerned as it is with the traces of juridification in the law-as-text. 
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This study will, therefore, largely confine itself to a close analysis of some of the 
canonical texts in which the focus of this study can be addressed, following a procedure 
not dissimilar to that used in the previous chapter on the jurisprudence of the German 
courts. 
The repugnance shown to the combination of employees into unions can be traced back 
to the 14th century: 1 the legal attitudes (which in tum inform the judicial responses to 
industrial action) can therefore largely claim to be inherited, to be part of an invisible 
archive that, through various routes of communication, is passed on from one legal 
generation to the next. 
This organic transfer of a repugnance in respect of organised labour would explain, 
were it to suffice as a thesis, only a point of departure, perhaps a glimpse of a motiva-
tion -- no more. If one were to generalise and say that the judicial reaction to industrial 
action has always been one of disapproval, disaffection, repugnance even, this would 
explain the 'why', but not the 'how'. A general thesis of disapproval would do little to 
illustrate the manner in which this disapproval has been expressed, and the textual 
economy utilised in that process of expression. 
This chapter focuses on that very textual economy: how the judicial response finds its 
roots within the corpus of the common law, how any policy considerations as expressed 
by statute may be ex-nominated, and how the judicial response to industrial action 
legitimises itself, both in a logical sense (in that it can be shown to be logically con-
sistent with the archive, with the corpus) and in a legal sense (in that the expression 
finds itself legitimated through the position of the party or institution -- a court for 
example -- or its reliance upon other, higher, sources). 
The literature traditionally draws a number of distinctions in discussing the judicial 
reactions to industrial action in Great Britain, most prevalent being a distinction 
between a view of industrial action as a breach of contract and a view of industrial 
action (and some of its concomitant phenomena) as a tort. This divide is sufficiently 
established in the literature for it to be regarded as canonical. 2 
It is not, for the purposes of the present study, necessary to rely on this distinction, 
because once the structural function of these legal constructs (breach of contract, tort) 
are recognised, and analysed (as they are in this chapter), then it becomes obvious that 
regardless of its nature, the legal construct serves the same function, namely to ground 
the (legal) reasoning presented. 
1 See R Lewis 'The Historical Development of Labour Law' (1976) 14 British Journal of Industrial 
Relations 1 at 2-3. 
2 See, for example, Wedderburn The Worker and the Law 3 ed (1986) 578-680; R W Rideout Rideout's 
Principles of Labour Law 5 ed (1989) at 321-343. 
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It will be shown that the legal canon or archive responds to the phenomenon of indus-
trial action not merely with repugnance or mere disapproval, 3 but that the archive sees 
fit to apply force against that phenomenon. This in tum means that the discourses under 
consideration in this chapter relate, in a broad sense, to power and the exercise of that 
power. More specifically, they relate to the conditions of that power, such as the 
silence that makes the exercise of power possible and the ex-nomination which 
accompanies the exercise of legally-sanctioned and legitimated power. 
12.1 AT THE BEGINNING: ILLEGALITY 
This beginning is an example, it is not the true beginning. It could be said that what is 
presented here is a simulation of the beginning: it is an arbitrary point serving as a 
beginning, a point of departure. 
At this (arbitrary) beginning, stands Hornby v Close.4 
In holding that a trade union 'would certainly operate in restraint of trade, and would 
therefore, in that sense, be unlawful', s the text is instructive in that it traces the con-
struction of the concept 'trade union' within the discourse: 
'Under that term [trade union] may be included every combination by which men bind 
themselves not to work except under certain conditions, and to support one another, in 
the event of being thrown out of employment, in carrying out the views of the major-
ity. •6 
A further constitutive trace-element of the concept is the spectre of industrial action, 
the strike: 
'Some of the substantial objects of the society are those of a trades' union, and for the 
maintenance of its members when on strike, and these objects cannot be separated from 
the other objects, if any, of the society. '7 
3 In chapter 11 above, it was clear that, in spite of the repugnance and disapproval shown by the German 
courts in respect of the strike, the archival principles which governed legal thought made it imperative 
for the strike to be 'permitted' or allowed: some accommodation had to be reached between the archival 
principles of the law (the legal system) and the phenomenon of the 'destructive' and 'disruptive' strike. 
4 [1867] 2 QB 153. Cited as Homby v Close. 
5 Hornby v Close, per Cockburn CJ at 158. 
6 Hornby v Close at 158. Emphasis added. 
7 Hornby v Close at 160 (per Blackbum J). Emphasis added. 
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This may appear to be history, but it is vital to trace the development of the concept of 
a 'trade union' in the development of the archive, because, as will be shown, the 
archive will depend, structurally, on that very concept. 
The essential features of the concept 'trade union' at this point in the development of 
the discourse ( 1867) can be summarised as follows in the terms of the two extracts 
from Hornby v Close: 
• A trade union amounts to a collective entity: it is a 'combination' of persons. 
• The membership in the collective entity is voluntary: 'men' 'bind themselves'. 
• The purpose of the combination into a collective structure is 
(a) not to work except under certain conditions, 
(b) to offer mutual support in the case of termination of employment, and 
(c) to maintain the members of the collective if they are on strike. It is 
important to note, already at this point, the judicial conception of the 
trade union as encompassing, within its objects and purposes, the strike 
and the consequences of the strike. Note that the 'object' (the mainte-
nance of strikers) cannot be separated from any other objects ('if any') 
of the society. 
The judicial response to the phenomenon of a trade union was to apply the archive of 
the common law and hold that a trade union operates in restraint of trade, and, as such, 
it would be illegal. 
This illegality (itself the consequence of an application of the principles of the archive )8 
could only be obliterated by a power greater than the courts: the power of the legisla-
ture. The Trade Union Act of 1871 'gave trade unions basic protections from the 
criminal and civil consequences of the restraint of trade doctrine' .9 
8 
'Even without encouragement from Acts of Parliament the judges developed their own "common law" 
crimes, notably conspiracy and restraint of trade. Conspiracy could take the form of either a combination 
to pursue an unlawful object (the so-called "simple" conspiracy) or alternatively a combination to pursue 
a lawful object by unlawful means. Since many judges regarded trade unionism as a criminal objective 
simple conspiracy was of fundamental importance. Criminal liability for restraint of trade was equally 
basic because trade unions were obviously intended to restrict competition in the labour market.' Lewis 
op cit note 1 at 2~3. 
9 Lewis op cit note 1 at 3 . 
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12.2 THREE TEXTS (AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY) 
12.2.1 The rights of the individual 
The tum of the century was a significant period for the archive and its development, as 
three decisionsto of the House of Lords structured, and thereby determined the founda-
tion and future structure of, the archive. 
Momentous, not only in size, is the decision of Allen v Flood (1897). Flood and 
Taylor, the respondents, were employed as shipwrights on a certain project, and they 
could be dismissed at any time. Their duties related to woodwork, but Flood and 
Taylor had done some ironwork on a previous project. The boilermakers or iron-
workers (and their trade union) engaged on the same project as Flood and Taylor 
objected to the employment of Flood and Taylor and called for a union official (Allen). 
Allen was informed by the iron workers that they would cease working unless Flood 
and Taylor were dismissed: the ironworkers were trying to put a stop to the practice of 
allowing shipwrights to do ironwork. Allen informed the employer that, unless Flood 
and Taylor were dismissed, the ironworkers would cease working. The employer, in 
fear of the disruption of the work, complied and dismissed Flood and Taylor, also 
refusing to re-employ them in the future. 
The matter came before the House of Lords. Taylor and Flood claimed damages on the 
ground that Allen had maliciously and wrongfully, and with the intent to injure Flood 
and Taylor, intimidated and coerced the employers to break contracts, and not to enter 
into contracts with them. 
Allen v Flood was not a unanimous decision of the House of Lords. Three of the Law 
Lords were of the view that Allen was liable in tort (to Flood and Taylor) for mali-
ciously inducing the employer to breach the employment contracts of Flood and Taylor. 
This opinion depended on a certain view of the nature of the rights involved: 
'The first objection made to the plaintiffs' right to recover for the loss which they thus 
undoubtedly suffered is that no right of the plaintiffs was infringed . . . . I think the 
right to employ their labour as they will is a right both recognised by the law and suffi-
ciently guarded by its provisions to make any undue interference with that right an 
actionable wrong. •ll 
10 Thomas Francis Allen v William Cridge Flood & Walter Taylor [1897] AC 1 HL (cited as Allen v 
Flood), Quinn v Leathern [1901] AC 495 HL (cited as Quinn v Leathern) and The Taff Vale Railway 
Company v The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] AC 426 HL (cited as Taff Vale). 
11 Allen v Flood at 71 per Lord Halsbury LC. 
176 
The industrial action jurisprudence of British Courts 
The right at the core of this passage is a right pertaining to an individual: the right of 
the individual to employ his or her labour at will. 12 This right, according to the logic of 
the passage, is recognised by the law and thereby deserves the protection of the law. In 
his or her exercise of this right, therefore, the individual is also a constructed legal sub-
ject, deserving protection. 
Once the judicial gaze is focused upon the rights of the individual (the right to dispose 
of his or her labour), the logic of the archive demands that the power of the law 
responds to any unjustified infringement of that right. 13 
The fact that there had been interference with the individual rights of Flood and Taylor 
to dispose of their labour was beyond question --- what remained was to establish the 
motive for that interference. 
The focus being on the individual rights of the plaintiffs and the fact that these rights 
deserved protection led to a finding that Allen 'was guilty of intimidation and coercion 
through that intimidation' . 
But there is a certain economy to the focus on individual rights, namely the disregard 
of the collective nature of the matter. The focus on the individual rights-aspect is only 
possible once the collective aspects of the dispute had been silenced: 'I think the dis-
satisfaction among the boiler-makers at these two men being employed has been greatly 
exaggerated.' 14 This statement contains an obliteration of the collective discontent that 
was an essential feature of the dispute -- the dissatisfaction is dismissed as being 
'exaggerated'. This sentiment also depends on another act of silencing, for it com-
pletely obliterates the involvement and position of the employer in the collective dis-
pute.15 
At this point in the reading of Allen v Flood it can therefore be proposed that main-
taining and protecting the right of the individual (in this case, the plaintiffs Flood and 
12 
'My Lords, I regret that I am compelled to differ so widely with some of your Lordships; but my dif-
ference is founded on the belief that in denying these plaintiffs a remedy we are departing from the prin-
ciples which have hitherto guided our Courts in the preservation of individual liberty to all.' Allen v 
Flood at 90 (per Lord Halsbury LC). Emphasis added. 
13 
'It will be observed in what Bowen 1J says, [in Mogul Steamship Co v McGregor [1889] 23 QBD 598 
at 614] intimidation, obstruction or molestation, or intentional procurement of a violation of individual 
rights, contractual or other (always assuming that there is no just cause for it), are each of them, where 
damage has been caused, actionable wrongs.' Allen v Flood at 75 (per Halsbury LC). Emphasis added. 
14 Allen v Flood at 81 per Halsbury LC. 
15 This silencing operates only at the margins of the text: the evidence of Edmonds, the foreman of the 
employer was, in part, as follows: ' "They were rather busy just then with the boiler-makers; that they 
employed three times as many boiler-makers as ship wrights, and if the boiler-makers had knocked off 
work or struck, it would have stopped the business of the company altogether --- entirely --- at that time, 
and that is was a very serious matter to the firm, and that the discharge of the men was in order to prevent 
their having to stop their business." 'Allen v Flood at 80-1, per Halsbury LC. Emphasis added. 
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Taylor) depends on an obliteration of the exercise of collective power, the recognition 
of that power, and the recognition of the legitimacy of the exercise of that power. The 
power-play between the boilermakers union and the employer is disregarded, for the 
rights of the individual take precedence.16 
It is possible to read the divide between the dissenting minority (which held that Allen 
would be liable in tort for the loss suffered by Flood and Taylor) and the majority (who 
denied such liability) in terms of the majority's wider view, a view which also 
encompassed the collective aspects of the dispute. According to this view, Allen's role 
was not to 'coerce' or 'intimidate' the employer, but, in the words of Lord Shand, that 
Allen 'simply informed the employers of the true state of matters' .17 
The following passage contains a number of important traces of two aspects of the 
archive: the collective nature of the trade union's representation and the exercise of 
power: 
'I cannot doubt either that the appellant or the authorities of the union would equally 
have acted within his or their rights if he or they had "called the men out." They were 
members of the union. . . . It is not for your Lordships to express any opinion on the 
policy of trade unions, membership of which may undoubtedly influence the action of 
those who have joined them. They are now recognised by law; there are combinations 
of employers as well as of employed. The members of these unions, of whichever class 
they are composed, act in the interest of their class. If they resort to unlawful acts they 
may be indicted or sued. If they do not resort to unlawful acts they are entitled to fur-
ther their interests in the manner which seems to them best, and most likely to be effec-
tual.' 18 
This passage indicates an acceptance of the legal existence of trade unions (unions are 
'now recognised by law'), as well as the fact that the interests of the union may 
determine the actions of the members ('membership of which may undoubtedly 
16 See in this regard 0 Kahn-Freund 'The Role of the Courts in the Development of English Labour 
Law' (1961) 1 (New Series) Rivista Di Diritto lnternazionale e Comparato del Ltlvoro 172 at 173-4. 
17 Allen v Flood at 161. The 'true state of matters' referred to appear in the following context: 'I find no 
evidence of exaggeration or misrepresentation on the part of the defendant [Allen] .... It seems 
impossible from a perusal of the evidence to come to any other conclusion than this --- that the boiler-
makers had made up their minds they would not continue to work on the same vessel with the plaintiffs. 
That the boiler-makers had made up their minds as to the course they would pursue is clear from their 
meetings and demeanor before they sent for the defendant to come to the yard, and from the fact that they 
did send for him and required him to make the communication he did to the employers. I think the evi-
dence proves that in these communications he made no false representation, but simply informed the 
employers of the true state of matters.' It is clear from this extract that the operative structure here relies 
on a recognition of the dispute as a collective dispute: that the breach of Flood and Taylor's rights were 
not due to the actions of Allen alone, but was consequent upon a collective dispute between the employer 
and the boilermakers' union. 
18 Allen v Flood at 129-130 per Lord Herschell. Emphasis added. 
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influence the action of those who have joined them'). The actions of the individual 
members, therefore, may be influenced by the policy of the trade union -- the policy 
comes from the trade union, which informs or determines the actions of the members. 
The unions (and their members) may resort to any action which is not unlawful: they 
have a wide choice in this regard ('the manner which seems to them best, and most 
likely to be effectual'). Importantly, the union acts 'in the interest' of the class -- in 
other words, the union acts in the interest of the employees. 
It is clear from this passage that there is a different focus here, an emphasis on the col-
lective entity, and the rights of that collective entity to act in the interests of its mem-
bers. There is a recognition that the members act collectively: that their actions are 
informed by the policy of the collective they have joined. 
Based on this recognition of the nature of the trade union as a bearer of collective 
power, the employer is re-assigned a role in the dispute, the passive role of the object 
of the exercise of collective power: 
'If, then, the men had ceased to work for the company either of their own motion or 
because they were "called out," and the company in order to secure their return had 
thought it expedient no longer to employ the plaintiffs, they could certainly have main-
tained no action. Yet the damage to them would have been just the same. The 
employers would have been subjected to precisely the same "coercion" and 
"intimidation," save that it was by act and not by prospect of the act; they would have 
yielded in precisely the same way to the pressure put upon them, and been actuated by 
the same motive ... '19 
From this passage it is clear that there is a recognition that the actual dispute was not 
between the union official Allen and the dismissed shipwright Flood, but that the dis-
charge of Flood and Taylor was the result of collective pressure placed on the employer 
by a trade union. 
12.2.2 Conspiracy: the power of the many (part 1) 
Within the shadow of Allen v Flood stands Quinn v Leathern, a case determined on the 
basis of a conspiracy: Leathern, a butcher, employed one Dickie, and several other 
assistants who were not members of the union. In order to force Leathern not to employ 
non-unionised employees, the union persuaded other customers of Leathern to breach 
their contracts with Leathern. 
The House of Lords held that a combination of two or more persons who combine 
(conspire) to injure someone else in his or her trade by inducing breach of contracts or 
19 Allen v Flood at 130, per Lord Herschell. Emphasis added. 
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induce employees not to continue in his or her service is actionable if such acts (per-
formed in terms of a conspiracy) cause loss. 
Prefacing the judgment of the Lord Chancellor (Halsbury LC) are two statements of 
particular interest: 
' ... there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one 
is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as 
applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality 
of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the 
whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such 
expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it 
actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to 
follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a 
logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical 
at all. ·20 
What are the anti-archival implications of this marginal passage? Certainly, there must 
be more here than an attempt by the Lord Chancellor to negate the effect of Allen v 
Flood, which is patently part of his concern at this point. Most important in this quoted 
passage are the anti-logical gestures, the openings of the process of law-making and 
application. The starting point for these two observations is that the law is not a logical 
code, it is therefore not determined by logical rules. This entails that a statement or 
proposition cannot be deduced ('follow logically') from an antecedent. Nor can any 
statement be regarded as an exposition of the 'whole law' (assuming that the 'whole 
law' could exist), but that it is governed (qualified) by the facts. 
But it appears from the decisions of the various Law Lords that the law is governed by 
something else as well, something that lies beyond the scope of the law. Lord Mac-
naghten, for example, comes to the conclusion that a proposition that a conspiracy to 
injure, resulting in damage, gives rise to civil liability is 'founded in good sense' .21 
Lord Chancellor Halsbury holds that if the plaintiff were without remedy in a case such 
as this, where the conspiracy 'induced the servants of the plaintiff not to continue in the 
plaintiff's employment' then 'it could hardly be said that our jurisprudence was that of 
a civilised community . . . ' . 22 
Read together, the implications of these texts are that the law is not a strictly legal 
code, that it is governed not by its own archival logic but instead by the facts of the 
matter at hand. Yet at the same time, hovering on the margins of the law, are those 
20 Quinn v Leathern at 506, per Halsbury LC. Emphasis added. 
21 Quinn v Leathern at 510-511. Emphasis added. 
22 Quinn v Leathern at 506. Emphasis added. 
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norms and standards beyond the law, the 'good sense', the 'jurisprudence of a civilised 
community' . 
12.2.3 The unbridled power of the few 
Also in 1901, the House of Lords held that a registered trade union itself, as distinct 
from its members, could be liable damages in tort. The processes at work in the text of 
the judgment make it clear that the conception being addressed is, firstly, the concept 
'trade union' (again, as in Hornby v Close, as a subject of legal power -- as something 
that could be subjected to the power of the law) and, secondly, an object of power, in 
the context of this text the power of those few persons who control the trade union. For 
this reason, and as it appears from the extracts below, it is argued that this decision 
relates to subjecting the power of the few to the power of the law. 
The basic structure of the text is apparent from the following passage: 
'Subject to such control as an annual general meeting can exercise, the government of 
the society [the trade union] is in the hands of its executive committee, a small body 
with vast powers, including an unlimited power of disposition over the funds of the 
. •23 unzon . ... 
Not only frightening in itself, the spectre of an unbridled power in the hands of a few 
persons is compounded by considerations of the ends to which that power could be 
applied: ends of which the law would disapprove, such as 'the purposes of strikes and 
in connection therewith. •24 
The prospect is of power (in the hands of a few) wide enough to be applied to purposes 
which do not, in terms of an unstated normative paradigm, meet with the approval of 
the law. The response of the legal archive is therefore to move to suppress this 
unlimited power, to place limitations on it. 
Limiting the power of the trade union is accomplished with few words: 
'Has the Legislature authorized the creation of numerous bodies of men capable of 
owning great wealth and of acting by agents with absolutely no responsibility for the 
wrongs they may do to other persons by the use of that wealth and the employment of 
those agents? In my opinion, Parliament has done nothing of the kind. I cannot find 
anything in the Acts of 1871 and 1876, or either of them, from beginning to end, to 
warrant or suggest such a notion. •25 
23 Taff Vale at 437. Emphasis added. 
24 Taff Vale at 437. 
25 Taff Vale at 438 (per Macnaghten LC). Emphasis added. 
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The power of the union and the potential exercise of that power, therefore, is subjected 
to limitations. The power cannot be absolute, for the trade union is not, as the text pro-
ceeds to claim, 'above the law' -- the law is sufficiently powerful to place limits on the 
exercise of that power. Phrased differently, the union can be held liable as an organisa-
tion, it can be held 'responsible' or 'accountable' by the 'law' for the exercise of its 
power. The exercise of power (by the union) is countered by the exercise of power (the 
imposition of liability and 'responsibility' , in terms of a normative paradigm that is 
exnominated) on the part of the law. 
Another important aspect of the passage quoted above lies in the traces of the meth-
odology employed by the text in order to make space for its own normative pro-
nouncements: nothing 'can be found' in the Acts of Parliament, these Acts having been 
read 'from beginning to end'. Nothing in the Acts supports a certain conclusion (that 
the trade union cannot be held liable for wrongful acts). This fact may, at this point, 
appear to be relatively immaterial, yet it needs to be borne in mind in relation to the 
establishment of the structural determinants of the archival discourses. 
In holding that the 'collective' entity (the trade union), as distinct from its members or 
office bearers, can be held liable, concerns relating to power (this time the power of the 
law) again enter into consideration: 
'I should be sorry to think that the law was so powerless; and therefore it seems to me 
that there would be no difficulty in suing a trade union . . . if it be sued in a representa-
tive action by persons who fairly and properly represent it. '26 
The key to the passage lies in the maintenance of the power of the law: the law should 
not be regarded as powerless, everything should be done to preserve the power of the 
law. 
Structurally, the decision in Taff Vale and the resultant Trade Disputes Act of 1906 
were to determine the future form the archive and the archival discourses would take: 
'The Trade Disputes Act of 1906 which reversed Taff Vale was of great importance in 
the historical development of labour law as it entrenched a legal structure and tradition 
that would subsequently be described as "abstentionist". The Act gave trade unions a 
blanket immunity by prohibiting legal actions in tort against them and for persons 
acting "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute", it gave immunities from 
liability for the torts of simple conspiracy, inducing breach of employment contract and 
interference, as well as providing them with more legal protection for peaceful picket-
26 Taff Vale at 439. Emphasis added. 
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ing. Anomalous privileges and statutory immunities from judge-made liabilities thus 
became the distinguishing characteristic of the law of industrial conflict in Britain. '27 
The Taff Vale decision therefore determined not only the structure of the archive (judi-
cial extension of common law liability to be met by new legislation), but also, in its 
focus on power and limits on that power, constituted the trade union as a full legal sub-
ject, more so than after Hornby v Close. In the Taff Vale decision, what was at issue 
was the power of the few; those who could make decisions (and who had an unlimited 
power) and whose decisions could impact on trade union funds. In imposing 
responsibility on and potential liability of the trade union (as an entity apart from its 
members), the trade union became an object greater than provided for in the Trade 
Unions Act of 1871 and 1876. 
In response to the decision of the House of Lords, the legislature passed the Trade Dis-
putes Act of 1906,28 and this legislation operates within the discursive structure (the 
power of the many) established by the House of Lords in Taff Vale: 
12.3 
'An act done in pursuance of an agreement or combination by two or more persons 
shall, if done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, not be actionable 
unless the act, if done without any such agreement or combination, would be actionable 
... '(section 1). 
CONSPIRACY: THE POWER OF THE MANY (part 2) 
At the same time, another vision of power started operating, namely the vision of col-
lective power, as in Quinn v Leathern. This decision marked the beginning of the appli-
cation of the tort of conspiracy in British labour law. Temporarily eclipsed by the 
Trade Disputes Act of 1906, the tort of conspiracy re-emerged in Crofter Hand Woven 
Harris Tweed Company Limited and Others v Veitch and Another. 29 
27 Lewis op cit note 1 at 4. Wedderburn writes that ' ... from 1875 onwards Parliament provided for 
those organizing industrial action "immunities" in trade disputes against tort liabilities. The judges then 
expanded tort liabilities. Parliament then, belatedly, countered the judicial expansions of liabilities by 
adjusting the "immunities" (often with some gaps or uncertainties remaining) .... Let us in parenthesis 
note that the classical pendulum that swung to and from between 1875 and 1980 -- judge-made liability, 
parliamentary immunity, then more liability -- did not arise merely from the peculiarities of "creative" 
judges (though it is often best illustrated by them). It derived from the very nature of the common law, 
its attitude to property and to the social order, its ability to archive mutations in its doctrines, and its 
relationship to Parliament.' Wedderburn op cit note 2 at 577. 
28 6 Edw. 7 c. 47. 
29 [1942] AC 435 HL. Cited as Crofter v Veitch. 
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It was clearly a case falling outside the scope of the protection offered by the Trade 
Disputes Act of 1906:30 at issue was whether the combination of two trade union offi-
cials to block the importation (and thereby use of) all yarn from the mainland attracted 
tort liability. 
The House of Lords found the corpus of the law to contain both a crime of conspiracy 
(where the crime is complete if there is an agreement to effect any unlawful purpose) 
and a tort of conspiracy, the latter being defined in the following terms: 
'[T]he tort of conspiracy is constituted only if the agreed combination is carried into 
effect in a greater or less degree and damage to the plaintiff is thereby produced. It 
must be so, for, regarded as a civil wrong, conspiracy is one of those wrongs (like 
fraud or negligence) which sound in damage, and a mere agreement to injure, if it was 
never acted upon at all and never led to any result affecting the party complaining, 
could not produce damage to him. •31 
Clear in defining the parameters of the tort of conspiracy, the reasoning behind the tort 
is less easy to pin down. One of the motivations for the creation of the tort of con-
spiracy is the collective nature of the tort, the fact that there is a combination of per-
sons to inflict damage on another party. Much authority, including many statements of 
the House of Lords, can be cited for the proposition that an act that may be lawfully 
committed by an individual may become unlawful if committed by a number of per-
sons. Another explanation for the origin of the tort of conspiracy is offered, only to 
have the origin rendered irrelevant: 'However the origin of the rule may be explained . 
'32 
Even in 1982, the House of Lords33 cited, even though not fully approving, a dictum 
that: 
'[t]he distinction is based on sound reason, for a combination may make oppressive or 
dangerous that which if it proceeded only from a single person would be otherwise. '34 
30 
'In argument before this House it was conceded that no issue is involved which might bring into the 
case any provision of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906.' Crofter v Veitch at 438 (per Viscount Simon LC). 
3l Crofter v Veitch at 439-440, per Viscount Simon LC. 
32 Crofter v Veitch at 444. 
33 Lonrho v Shell Petroleum (No 2) [1982] AC 173 HL. 
34 Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor & Co [1889] 23 QBD 598 at 616. 
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The logic, then, relates to the collective nature: innocent when performed by one per-
son, the actions become a danger or 'oppressive' when performed by more than one 
person. 35 
But it is important to note that a definite shift has occurred in respect of sentiments 
expressed in the earlier decision of Quinn v Leathern and in Allen v Flood:36 no longer 
is the individual employer's power to trade an absolute right: 
'As the claim is for a tort, it is necessary to ascertain what constitutes the tort alleged. 
It cannot be merely that the appellants' right to freedom in conducting their trade has 
been interfered with. That right is not an absolute or unconditional right. It is only a 
particular aspect of the citizen's right to personal freedom, and like other aspects of that 
right is qualified by various legal limitations, either by statute or common law. Such 
limitations are inevitable in organized societies where the rights of individuals may 
clash. . . . Where the rights of labour are concerned, the rights of the employer are con-
ditioned by the rights of the men to give or withhold their services. The right to strike is 
an essential element in the principle of collective bargaining. '37 
Gradually, the interests of others have begun to enter the discourse, and have begun to 
structure the development of the archive. The rights of the employer (the employer's 
'trade rights' as they were called in Quinn v Le at hem) are now being counterbalanced 
by the 'labour rights' of the workers. No longer is the right of the individual absolute, 
but it may also be tempered by the rights of the collective: the 'right' to strike (or to 
cease work) has, by the time Crofter v Veitch was decided, gained some currency in the 
discourse, and it appears to be exercising some archival force. According to the passage 
from Crofter v Veitch quoted above, the right to strike is an essential element in the 
principle of collective bargaining (the origins of this principle, which gives meaning to 
the 'strike' is not explained or dealt with in any detail). 
35 As Lord Diplock pointed out in the Lonrho decision, this fails to take into account the nature of the 
individual entities who participate in the conspiracy: 'But to suggest today that an act done by one street-
comer grocer in concert with a second are more oppressive and dangerous to a competitor than the same 
acts done by a string of supermarkets under a single ownership or that a multinational conglomerate such 
as Lomho or an oil company such as Shell or B.P. does not exercise greater economic power than any 
combination of small businesses, is to shut one's eyes to what has been happening in the business and 
industrial world since the tum of the century and, in particular, since the end of World War II.' Lonrho v 
Shell Petroleum at 189A-C (note 33). Emphasis added. 
36 In Allen v Flood, Lord Watson held (at 92) that 'Any invasion of the civil rights of another person is 
in itself a legal wrong, carrying with it liability to repair its necessary or natural consequences in so far 
as these are injurious to the person whose right is infringed.' Applying this dictum to the facts of Quinn v 
Leathern, Lord Brampton stated (at 526): 'I cannot suppose any intelligent person reading the evidence 
adduced on the trial of this case failing to come to the conclusion that the acts complained of amounted to 
a serious and wrongful invasion of the plaintiff's trade rights ... ' (emphasis added). 
37 Crofter v Veitch per Lord Wright at 463. Emphasis added. 
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The recognition of the collective nature of trade unionism or the collective aspects to 
collective bargaining and the application of the strike within that context did not, 
however, prevent the House of Lords from holding that there was a conspiracy to 
injure which attracted liability. 
12.4 THREATS OF POWER AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE 
TRADE DISPUTE 
12.4.1 The mere threat of power 
The mere threat of power (and the effect of that threat) also attracted legal con-
sequences. In Rookes v Barnard,38 the employer (the British Overseas Airways Corpo-
ration) suspended and then dismissed an employee (Rookes) after the employer had 
received a threat from a trade union (which enjoyed a closed shop and to which Rookes 
had belonged) that the union would strike unless Rookes was dismissed (he had 
resigned his trade union membership). The union and the employer had concluded a 
'no-strike' and 'no-lock-out' agreement -- all disputes were to be resolved through arbi-
tration instead of industrial action. 
According to the House of Lords, what was at stake was 'whether it is a tort to con-
spire to threaten an employer that his men will break their contracts with him unless he 
dismisses the plaintiff [Rookes], with the result that he is thereby induced to dismiss the 
plaintiff and cause him loss' . 39 
There was no doubt that a tort of intimidation, if it did not exist at that point, was on 
the verge of being created. The policy considerations behind the establishment of the 
tort of intimidation were put by Lord Reid as follows: 
'Intimidation of any kind appears to me to be highly objectionable. The law was not 
slow to prevent it when violence and threats of violence were the most effective means. 
Now that subtler means are at least equally effective I see no reason why the law should 
have to tum a blind eye to them. •40 
For Lord Hodson, similar considerations applied: 
'It would be strange if threats of violence were sufficient and the more powerful 
weapon of a threat to strike were not, always provided that the threat is unlawful. The 
injury and suffering caused by strike action is very often widespread as well as devastat-
38 [1964] AC 1129 HL. Cited as Rookes v Barnard. 
39 Rookes v Barnard at 1166 per Lord Reid. 
40 Rookes v Barnard at 1169 per Lord Reid. Emphasis added. 
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ing, and a threat to strike would be expected to be certainly no less serious than a 
threat of violence. That a breach of contract is unlawful in the sense that it involves the 
violation of a legal right there can be no doubt. '41 
Lord Devlin echoed these sentiments: 
'I find nothing to differentiate a threat of a breach of contract from a threat of physical 
violence or any other illegal threat. The nature of the threat is immaterial, because ... 
its nature is irrelevant to the plaintiff's cause of action. All that matters to the plaintiff 
is that, metaphorically speaking, a club has been used. It does not matter to the 
plaintiff what the club is made of --- whether it is a physical club or an economic club, 
a tortious club or an otherwise illegal club. If an intermediate party is improperly 
coerced, it does not matter to the plaintiff how he is coerced. I think, therefore, that at 
common law there is a tort of intimidation .... '42 
A reading of these three excerpts makes it clear that the essential concerns underlying 
the creation of 'intimidation' relate to power, the exercise, or merely the threatened 
exercise of that power, as well as the response that the law should take to that 
(threatened) exercise of power. 
The processes used in these passages clearly show the force of the ex-nomination, as 
the axioms and obviousness of the processes take over to cover up the fact that the 
common law is in fact being extended in a direction where it had not been since the late 
18th century. 43 
Power also motivates the response of the law to the threat of the exercise of power (the 
threat to strike): what must be preserved, according to Lord Devlin, is the power and 
flexibility of the common law: 
'But there is one argument, or at least one consideration, that remains to be noticed. It 
is that the strike weapon is now so generally sanctioned that it cannot really be 
regarded as an unlawful weapon of intimidation; and so there must be something 
wrong with a conclusion that treats it as such . ... I see the force of this consideration. 
But your Lordships can, in my opinion, give effect to it only if you are prepared either 
to hobble the common law in all classes of disputes lest its range is too wide to suit 
industrial disputes or to give the statute [the Trade Disputes Act of 1906] a wider scope 
41 Rookes v Barnard at 1201. Emphasis added. 
42 Rookes v Barnard at 1209. Emphasis added. 
43 
'The threat had to be a threat of an unlawful act. The last clear example of such a liability had been in 
1793. An unduly enthuisiastic sea captain (A) had fired cannon near to the canoes of potential customers 
(B) in order to scare them from trading with a rival ship (C) off the Cameroon coast. There C could sue 
A. But how was that threat of violence relevant to a peaceful threat to strike? Indeed, lay observers in the 
court room were understandably puzzled by the very idea of modem industrial rights of workers being 
determined by precedents about canoes and cannons off the Cameroon coast 170 years earlier.' Wedder-
burn The Worker and the Law at 41. Emphasis in the original. 
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than it was ever intended to have. As to the former alternative, I cannot doubt that the 
threat of a breach of contract can be a most intimidating thing .... Granted that there is 
a tort of intimidation, I think it would be quite wrong to cripple the common law so 
that it cannot give relief in these circumstances. I think it would be old-fashioned and 
unrealistic for the law to refuse relief in such a case and to grant it where there is a 
shake of a fist or a threat to publish a nasty and untrue story. '44 
This passage contains the traces of a number of pivotal archival principles, and also 
traces of the most powerful process operative within the context of this archive, namely 
the force of the ex-nomination. 
Lord Devlin's analysis starts off by re-stating sentiments expressed in the House of 
Lords in 1942, namely that the strike is generally sanctioned (Lord Wright, in Crofter v 
Veitch, regarded it as an essential part of the principle of collective bargaining). But, 
according to Devlin's analysis, the economy of this sentiment is unacceptable -- the 
statement (the strike is sanctioned, approved) entails, as its economy, that the common 
law must be 'hobbled' -- in other words, that the power or force of the common law 
must be reduced. This economy is, by its very nature (and the nature of the forum in 
which it is expressed: the House of Lords) unacceptable: 'I said that I thought it would 
be wrong to cripple the common law .... '45 
The logic of this economy, as analysed by Lord Devlin, is as follows: to accept the 
strike (as 'generally sanctioned' and therefore not an instrument of 'intimidation') 
would 'hobble' or 'cripple' the common law. The strike, in other words, if accepted as 
generally sanctioned by the common law would have the result of 'crippling' (diminish-
ing the power) the common law, as the common law would be powerless to proceed 
against the strike. Once accepted as 'generally sanctioned', the strike would in effect 
move beyond the normative grasp of the archive of common law. 
This is not acceptable: limiting the power of the common law in this fashion would be 
'unrealistic' and 'old-fashioned' -- and, as such, this is an option not to be con-
templated. 
The only option which would preserve the power of the common law, then, is to per-
form an ex-nomination by virtue of which the threat of a strike can become equated 
with the 'shake of a fist' (that is the threat of physical violence). This is performed, in 
a very overt manner, by detailing the consequences that follow the exercise of power in 
the form of a strike: the 'incalculable loss' suffered by the company, and the 'grave 
inconvenience to the public it [the company] serves'. 
It is quite clear from the excerpts quoted from the texts in Rookes v Barnard that one of 
the pivotal concerns in those texts is the threat of power, and the manner in which the 
44 Rookes v Barnard at 1218-1219. Emphasis added. 
45 Rookes v Barnard at 1219 per Lord Devlin. Emphasis added. 
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the archive responds to that threat. By equating the threat of the exercise of collective 
power (the threat of a strike) with physical violence, it is clear that the law finds the 
collective action of the strike and the threat that it will be exercised, as abhorrent as the 
threat of physical violence (the raised fist). As structurally equivalent to the raised fist, 
therefore, the common law must respond and attach a devaluing (or negative) legal 
consequence to the threatened exercise of power. 
But this extension of the common law must not be seen as to occurr either organically 
(naturally) or in a vacuum (there is a 'countertext' to these texts). The logic in the texts 
of Rookes v Barnard is inexorable: there is an utter determination in those texts to 
reach a certain conclusion. 46 This is indicated by the fact that it is only after the crea-
tion of the delict of intimidation that the various texts proceed to structure their own 
position in respect of the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act. 47 Having created a 
liability the text must seek to accommodate that creation within another archive (the 
archive signified by the legislation, by the Trade Disputes Act of 1906). 
The economy of this accommodation is, on the one hand, an obliteration, a silencing or 
destruction of the (legislative) archive in order to provide the structural (logical) space 
and context (thereby causing a shift from contra-text to context) for the new construct. 
In order to obliterate the archival force of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, the text pro-
ceeds to interpret the legislative provisions in a singularly narrow manner. In doing so, 
at least one of the texts relies in part on the historical coincidence that Lord Loreburn 
was Lord Chancellor when the Trade Disputes Act was passed in 1906, and therefore 
'he must have been well acquainted with its provisions' .48 
In 1906, however, the tort of intimidation did not exist, so it proves relatively easy to 
obliterate the archival force of the legislation in the following terms: 
'In my judgment, it is clear that section 3 does not protect inducement of breach of con-
tract where that is brought about by intimidation or other illegal means and the section 
46 
'A "coercive threat" of a breach of contract gave a cause of action just like a coercive threat of 
violence. What stands out in the speeches of the Law Lords is their determination to reach this result.' 
Wedderburn op cit note 2 at 42. Emphasis added. 
47 Section 1 of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 reads as follows: '1. The following paragraph shall be 
added as a new paragraph after the first paragraph or section 3 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Prop-
erty Act, 1875: -- An act done in pursuance of an agreement or combination by two or more persons 
shall, if done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, not be actionable unless the act, if done 
without any such agreement or combination, would be actionable .... ' Section 3 of the same Act reads 
as follows: 'An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be 
actionable on the ground only that it induces some other person to break a contract of employment or 
that it is an interference with the trade, business or employment of some other person, or with the right 
of some other person to dispose of his capital or his labour as he wills.' Emphasis added. 
48 Rookes v Barnard at 1173 (Lord Reid). 
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must be given a similar construction with regard to interference with trade, business or 
employment. So, in my opinion, the section does not apply to this case. '49 
Once the immunities provided for by sections 1 and 3 of the Trade Disputes Act had 
been obliterated, liability for the new creation of intimidation could be established. 
The processes taking place within these texts (the establishment of a new liability and a 
new delict, within the ruins of the obliterated legislation) elicit some very insightful 
passages on the processes themselves. Again relating to a maintenance of the power and 
the flexibility of the common law, one text makes a comment about the implicit 
unknowability of the common law: 'one of the characteristics [of the common law] ... 
is ... that its principles are never finally determined but are and should be capable of 
expansion and development as changing circumstances require . . . . '5° As the circum-
stances change, in other words, the law changes to meet those circumstances -- the law 
reacts to changing circumstances. It should also be noted that the force and fle.xibility 
of the law (and, by implication, its unknowability) are approved: note the use of 
'should' -- the law should (normative approval) be able to change, it should be capable 
of expansion and development, and this is only possible if the principles of the law 'are 
never finally determined' . 
12.4.2 These are not trade disputes? 
The legal (legislative) archive signified by the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 consists of 
two main elements. In Rookes v Barnard, the relevant consideration was the act done in 
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. The other element of the legislative 
archive is the definition of 'trade dispute' --- another element of the legislative archive 
that was soon to be subjected to judicial scrutiny. 
The first remarkable feature of JT Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindley and Another51 is the 
immediate expression of dissatisfaction with the decision of Rookes v Barnard, and an 
attempt to deny the canonical or archival force of the Rookes v Barnard decision: 
'In my judgment . . . the acts of the trade union officer are protected by section 3 of the 
Trade Disputes Act, 1906. That section makes it clear that it is not an actionable wrong 
to induce some other person to break a contract of employment. If it is not actionable to 
induce such a breach, I cannot see that it is actionable to threaten to induce it. ... I 
must decline, therefore, to extend Rookes v Barnard beyond its own particular circum-
stances: for if we did, we should greatly diminish the right to strike in this country. 
Nearly every strike notice would be unlawful as being intimidation. It would mean that 
49 Rookes v Barnard at 1178 (per Lord Reid). 
50 Rookes v Barnard at 1185 (per Lord Evershed). Emphasis added. 
51 [1965] AC 269 HL. Cited as Stratford v Lindley. 
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an employer who, under the threat of a strike, raised the wages would be entitled to 
recover damages from the trade union officers on the ground that the increase was 
extorted by intimidation. No one has ever supposed that any such action would lie. It 
has always been thought that section 3 covered it. '52 
Another important aspect of the case relates to its finding that there was no trade dis-
pute. In essence, the dispute was about the recognition of a minority trade union -- yet 
it was held that this was not a trade dispute, as it 'was not connected with the employ-
ment or non-employment of any person' nor was it 'connected with the terms of 
employment or with the conditions of labour of any person' .53 Elsewhere the view is 
expressed that the officials of the minority union resorted to the embargo of the busi-
ness because 'they considered that the prestige of their union required this course' . 54 
This view of the matter having prevailed, the door opened to the archive proceeding to 
evaluate the industrial relations. The view was expressed, for example, that the fact that 
a majority trade union had been recognised offered sufficient protection 'from a practi-
cal point of view' to the members of the minority union. 55 What is subject to scrutiny 
at this point is the purpose of whatever action the trade union and its officials has 
resorted to, and if it is borne in mind that the protection offered by section 3 of the 
Trade Disputes Act of 1906 relied on there being a 'trade dispute', the power-
implications become obvious. 
In order for the exercise of collective power on the part of the trade union to qualify 
for the protection of the law in terms of the Trade Disputes Act, there has to be a 'trade 
dispute' and the actions of the trade union must be in 'furtherance' or 'contemplation' 
of that trade dispute. Once the actions taken by the union fall outside the scope of the 
protection offered by section 3, because of a finding that there is no 'trade dispute', all 
protection is lost. It may appear to be only a matter of statutory interpretation (is there 
a trade dispute or not), but the implications are far more significant. 
One of the reasons for the importance of this structure (the definition of the trade dis-
pute) is that it appears to be incapable of processing all the power structures involved in 
collective disputes. It even appears that once the law has taken a certain view of what a 
'trade dispute' is, the legal gaze becomes fully incapable of recognising the exercise of 
52 Stratford v Lindley at 285G-286B per Lord Denning, MR. Emphasis in the original. 
53 Stratford v Lindley at 323A-C. Per Lord Reid. 
54 Stratford v Lindley at 327B (per Viscount Radcliffe). Similarly: 'The defendants struck at the 
plaintiff's business by an embargo and brought it to a standstil. Their reason for so doing had no connec-
tion with the working conditions or pay of the plaintiff's workmen; none of them were members of the 
defendants' union. The defendants' object in damaging the plaintiffs' business was, to put pressure on 
another company for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing the prestige of the defendants' union as 
against a rival'. Stratford v Lindley at 330E-F (per Lord Pearce). 
55 See Stratford v Lindley at 334-5 (per Lord Pearce). 
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power by a collective of employers: once a vision has been recognised and accom-
modated, in other words, the gaze is blinded to the peripheries of the vision. 
In Torquay Hotel Co Ltd v Cousins and Others,56 a dispute, again about the recognition 
of a trade union, spread from one hotel to another, and from hotels to fuel suppliers. 
An initial dispute at one hotel (the Torbay Hotel -- which employed members of the 
union seeking recognition) erupted when the managing director of the plaintiff com-
pany, (reportedly) made some relatively inflammatory remarks, threatening to 'stamp 
out the intervention' of the union. A picket spread from the one hotel to the next (the 
Imperial Hotel), and the drivers of the fuel-trucks supplying the hotels would not cross 
the picket-lines, especially because the drivers were members of the union in dispute 
with the hotel company. 
The Appeal Court came to the conclusion that there was no 'trade dispute' as con-
templated by the Trade Disputes Act of 1906: 
'There was, I think, a trade dispute between the defendant union and the Torbay Hotel. 
The Torbay Hotel employed workers of the defendant union. The defendant union 
claimed that it should be recognised as having authority to negotiate on their behalf. 
The Torbay Hotel refused to recognise them. Such a recognition dispute is, I think, 
clearly a trade dispute ... 
But I do not think there was a trade dispute between the defendant union and the 
Imperial Hotel. The Imperial Hotel employed no members of the defendant union .... 
Counsel for the defendants said that the Imperial Hotel, through its managing director, 
had taken sides in the dispute at the Torbay Hotel and could thus be regarded as parties 
to that dispute .... No doubt Mr Chapman sympathised with the employers at the Tor-
bay Hotel, but sympathy with one side or the other does not make a person a party to 
the dispute. 
[Holding that the actions against the Imperial Hotel were not in furtherance of a trade 
dispute, the court continued] They [the actions] were done in furtherance of the anger 
which they felt at Mr Chapman for having, as they said, "intervened" in the dispute. •s7 
Wedderburn points out that the Torquay decision is 'one of the few cases when an 
employers' association has played a role' ,5s and certainly the role of the Torquay Hotel 
Association in the dispute (it stated itself to be the 'innocent victim' under threat by the 
union's action). 
What are the power implications involved, those structures of power that go some way 
to explaining this case? It needs to be borne in mind that, when speaking to a reporter, 
Mr Chapman, the managing director of the Torquay Hotel Company, also used terms 
of power -- terms that are repeated in the evidence before the court: He said that the 
56 [1969] All ER 522 CA. Cited as Torquay Hotel. 
57 Torquay Hotel at 528F-I, per Denning MR. Emphasis added. 
58 Wedderburn op cit note 2 at 567. 
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hoteliers 'can only take a certain amount of knocks before they will have to defend 
themselves. They feel they must make a stand'. Even though it was a misquote, the 
newspaper reported Mr Chapman to have said that the Hotels Association would 'stamp 
out' the intervention of the defendant union. 59 
In this situation, then, power responds to power: the apparently inflammatory rhetoric 
of the employers and attributed to a collective entity (the employers' association) is a 
response to the collective actions by the trade union. But one could ask, rhetorically, 
whether the law would respond to that kind of statement: would it be regarded, in the 
terms used in the Rookes v Barnard decision, as intimidation of the union? 
12.5 COLLECTIVE POWER AND THE POWER OF THE LAW 
12.5.1 The legitimacy of power is subjective (part 1) 
The provisions of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, which provided an immunity for 
acts done in furtherance or contemplation of a trade dispute were re-written in section 
13(1) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of 1974.60 But the fact that the 
words granting the immunity had come a long way (they have appeared in British legis-
lation in virtually unchanged form since 187 5) did not ensure that the meaning 
apparently lurking behind the words was any more accessible. 
In 1980 the question was raised whether compliance with the provisions of the 
immunity was based on a subjective state of mind (in other words, that the trade union 
59 Torquay Hotel at 525I-526A. 
60 The 1974 legislation (the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act -- TULRA) and amendments in 1976 
had largely removed the difficulties in determining whether or not a dispute was a 'trade dispute'. The 
legislation introduced in the 1970s contained a very wide definition of a 'trade dispute' -- according to 
the statutory definition contained in section 29 TULRA, a trade dispute ranges from disputes about terms 
and conditions of employment, engagement, non-engagement, or termination of employment of one or 
more employees, allocation of work or the duties of employees, matters of discipline, trade union mem-
bership, facilities to be provided to trade union officials, machinery for negotiation or consultation, 
recognition of trade unions and other procedures. Section 13(1) TULRA echoes the provisions of the 
1906 Trade Dispute Act as follows: 'An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade 
dispute shall not be actionable in tort on the ground only --- (a) that it induces another person to break a 
contract or interferes or induces any other person to interfere with its performance; or (b) that it consists 
in his threatening that a contract (whether one to which he is a party or not) will be broken or its per-
formance interfered with, or that he will induce another person to break a contract or to interfere with its 
performance.' 
By 1979, a Law Lord claimed that, after the 1974 legislation (amended in 1976 and 1978), 'the law now 
is back to what Parliament had intended when it enacted the 1906 Act, but stronger and clearer than it 
was then'. (NWL Ltd v Woods, NWL v Nelson and Another [1979] 3 All ER 614 HL at 630 (per Lord 
Scarman). In the same decision, the objective nature of the inquiry as to whether a 'trade dispute' existed 
or not (in effect an extended interpretation of section 29 TULRA) is discussed at some length (see at 
630g-632g). 
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officals took action with the intention of furthering a trade dispute) or whether the test 
is objective (in that the actions resorted to by the union must be reasonably capable of 
furthering the trade dispute). 
This is the question the House of Lords had to answer in Express Newspapers Ltd v 
Mac Shane and Another. 61 A trade dispute ('a normal one between employers and 
employees' 62) arose between a trade union representing journalists and a body 
representing the owners of provincial newspapers. As the dispute continued, secondary 
action was initiated at another company, the Press Association (PA), a news-copy dis-
tributor. The president of the union (MacShane) stated that the only reason for the sec-
ondary action at PA was to make the strike (as regards the provincial newspapers) more 
effective. The morale of the striking workers were also a consideration in launching 
and maintaining the secondary action. 
As the legislation introduced in 1974 had increased the scope for industrial action, the 
action could also now be aimed against customers or suppliers of the company 
involved. The question before the House of Lords in 1980 therefore, was 
'whether action against such innocent and powerless third parties or parties even more 
remote from the original trade dispute is in "furtherance" of that dispute becomes one 
that is difficult to answer. The answer must depend on some test other than the pos-
sibility of pressure being exercised on the original party .... '63 
It is the 'innocence' and powerlessness of the third parties, those who are not directly 
involved in the trade dispute, that deserve protection: If the action taken against such an 
'innocent and powerless' third party is not in 'furtherance' of a trade dispute, the action 
would fall outside the scope of the statutory immunity. So, at the very core of this con-
sideration lies a concern with power (or, rather, the lack of power): the protection of 
those who have, within the context of a collective power struggle (a 'trade dispute'), no 
power to exercise, and therefore deserve the protection of the law. 
The House of Lords held that determining whether or not action is taken in 'further-
ance' of a trade dispute relies on a subjective test of the motivations of the person or 
persons initiating the action( s): 
6I [1980] 1 All ER 65 HL. Cited as MacShane. 
62 MacShane at 67, per Lord Wilberforce. Emphasis added. 
63 MacShane at 69 per Lord Wilberforce. Emphasis added. Lord Wilberforce dissented from the view 
expressed by the majority of the House of Lords, and held that the text is an objective test: 'in my 
opinion there is an objective element in "furtherance" which the court must appraise. It should do so in 
the light of the evidence, giving due weight but not conclusive force to the genuine belief of those who 
initiate the action in question' (at 71). 
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'Given the existence of a trade dispute ... this makes the test of whether an act was 
done "in ... furtherance of" a purely subjective one. If the party who does the act 
honestly thinks at the time he does it that it may help one of the parties to the trade dis-
pute to achieve their objectives and does it for that reason, he is protected by the sec-
tion. I say "may" rather than "will" help, for it is the nature of industrial action that 
success in achieving its objectives cannot be confidently predicted. Also there is 
nothing in the section that requires that there should be any proportionality between on 
the one hand the extent to which the act is likely to, or be capable of, increasing the 
"industrial muscle" of one side to the dispute and on the other hand the damage caused 
to the victim of the act .... •64 
Again there are traces of several important considerations here: the fact that industrial 
action and the outcome of a trade dispute rely on, or are linked to 'industrial muscle' 
(in other words, an explicit recognition of the power aspect of industrial conflict), the 
fact that the exercise of power may cause damage to parties and institutions who are not 
involved in the complex web of the power relations which determine the trade dispute, 
and the recognition of the fact that, in spite of the damage done to the 'innocent and 
powerless', the exercise of power for the purpose of industrial action is legitimate and 
deserves the protection of the law. 
The law does not, in this case, counter the exercise of power (industrial action) with its 
own power: it grants the exercise of collective power in industrial action considerable 
leeway, accepts it and even legitimises it (even where it causes damage to the 'innocent 
and powerless'). It is important to note, at this point, that the legitimation of the 
exercise of power is not performed by the law itself, in terms of any normative 
paradigm: the normativity of the legitimation lies outside the law (it is 'subjective') and 
is therefore, in a sense, indeterminable by the law: there can be no normative paradigm 
of general application (applicable in an iterable manner from one case to the next) as 
regards the 'intention' or the 'state of mind' that the person taking the action must have 
in order to legitimate the use of power. In this sense, then, the law is silent as regards 
the legitimation of the use and application of power: there is nothing the law can say 
except to refer the normativity of the legitimation process to a normative paradigm that 
lies outside itself (in the motives of the person taking the action). 
The change in judicial approach must be seen to be more than a reflection of a change 
in legislative policy: appearing in the context of almost 80 years of judicial intervention 
in industrial action and the exercise of collective power, it must be seen as a strategic 
withdrawal of the Gudge-made) law. But this does not mean that the power of the law 
has been forfeited totally, because on the margins of the withdrawal flickers the dim 
outlines of the strategic position into which the force of the law had withdrawn: in rela-
64 MacShane at 72 per Lord Diplock. Emphasis added. The 'section' referred to is section 13(1) of the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations .Act of 1974 (amended in 1976), which reiterates the immunity con-
tained in the Trade Disputes Act of 1906. 
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tion to the granting of injunctions prohibiting industrial action, for example, the House 
of Lords states that there may be cases 'where the consequences to the employer or to 
third parties or the public and perhaps the nation itself, may be so disastrous that the 
injunction ought [not] to be refused .... '65 
The power of the law (the power exercised by the judge) may be in abeyance, like a 
sword sheathed -- but there may be situations where the full force of the law may be 
unleashed to place a limitation on the exercise of collective power. The power of the 
law may be silent, but it is still there ... 
12.5.2 The legitimacy of power really is subjective (part 2) 
And from this retreat the law again took up the battle against the collective power of 
industrial action: relying, in part, on the statement by the House of Lords that there are 
cases where the consequences of the industrial action will be disastrous, the Court of 
Appeal (under the guidance of Lord Denning MR) refused to follow the precedent set 
by the House of Lords in Express Newspapers Ltd v MacShane. But the House of Lords 
was not to stand idly by while the Master of the Rolls sowed confusion in the archive. 66 
The facts giving rise to the case were not entirely dissimilar. The Iron and Steel Trades 
Confederation (ISTC), a trade union, were in dispute with the British Steel Corpo-
ration, the public-sector steel producer in Great Britain. The trade union was threaten-
ing to extend the scope of the strike to several private-sector companies. Sitting alone 
in the Queen's Bench Division, Kenneth Jones J felt constrained by the decision of the 
House of Lords in Express Newspapers Ltd v MacShane and refused to grant the injunc-
tions. The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, granted the injunctions. 
Lord Denning held that there were two disputes: the first was the trade dispute between 
the employer and the union, and the second a 'public battle against the Government's 
attitude'. The 'second' dispute (against the Government) could by no stretch of the 
imagination be classified as a trade dispute, and therefore, Lord Denning held, the 
statutory immunity did not apply in respect of the 'second' dispute. The Court of 
65 NWL Ltd v Woods, NWL Ltd v Nelson and Another [1979] 3 All ER 614 HL at 626f per Lord 
Diplock. And also: 'My Lords, in a case where action alleged to be in contemplation or furtherance of a 
trade dispute endangers the nation or puts at risk such fundamental rights as the right of the public to be 
informed and the freedom of the Press, it could well be a proper exercise of the court's discretion to 
restrain the industrial action pending trial of the action. It would, of course, depend on the circumstances 
of the case; but the law does not preclude the possibility of the court exercising its discretion in that way' 
Express Newspapers v MacShane at 79 per Lord Scarman. Emphasis added in latter quote. 
66 Duport Steels Ltd and others v Sirs and Others [1980] 1 All ER 529 HL. Cited as Duport Steels. The 
report of the case as it appears as cited contain the judgments of Kenneth Jones J (sitting alone in the 
Queen's Bench Division), the judgments of the Court of Appeal, and the speeches of the Law Lords. The 
various courts are indicated in the footnotes. 
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Appeal then proceeded to ignore the principle of the subjective legitimation of the 
exercise of power and held that determining whether or not an act was 'in furtherance' 
of a trade dispute is 'a question on the facts. It does not depend on a state of mind, or 
anything of that kind' . 67 
What is interesting to note are the concerns motivating the fact that the Court of Appeal 
allowed the appeal: again the spectre of unlimited power and the harm that such power 
could do: 
'To call out these private steel workers, who have no dispute at all with their 
employers, would have such a disastrous effect on the economy and well-being of the 
country that it seems to me only right that the court should grant an injunction to stop 
these people being called out ... to stop all this picketing .... '68 
From outside the law comes a normative system: a system of values against which the 
exercise of collective power is to be exercised -- in terms of the discourse here, the 
health of the economy and the common weal. But there are other constitutive elements 
to this meta-juridical paradigm: the maintenance of the rights of the 'public' and the 
protection of 'freedom of the press' . 69 
At the very core of the House of Lords' response to the challenge of their dicta lies a 
conception which has become the common view of the issues: 
[Referring to the legislative immunities] 'That conclusion as to the meaning of words 
that have been used by successive Parliaments since the Trade Disputes Act 1906 to 
describe acts for which the doer is entitled to immunity from the law ... is (as I 
pointed out in the MacShane case) one which is intrinsically repugnant to anyone who 
has spent his life in the practice of the law or the administration of justice. Sharing 
those instincts it was a conclusion that I myself reached with considerable reluctance, 
for given the existence of a trade dispute, it involves granting to trade unions a power, 
which has no other limits than their own self-restraint, to inflict by means which are 
contrary to the general law, untold harm to industrial enterprises unconcerned with the 
particular dispute, to the employees of such enterprises, to members of the public and 
to the nation itself, so long as those in whom the control of the trade union is vested 
honestly believe that to do so may assist, albeit in a minor way, in achieving its objec-
tives in the dispute. •70 
A judicial repugnance of industrial action that is almost a cliche at this point of time, 
but, as one of the Law Lords recognised, 'below the surface of the legal argument lurk 
67 Duport Steels in the Court of Appeal -- at 536j of the report (per Lord Denning MR). 
68 Duport Steels in the Court of Appeal (per Denning MR) at 538g-h. Emphasis added. 
69 See above, note 65. 
70 Duport of Steels (House of Lords) at 54ld-f, per Lord Diplock. Emphasis added. 
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some profound questions as to the proper relationship in our society between the courts, 
the government and Parliament'. These profound questions relate not to institutions, 
but to institutions-as-functions, and ultimately, to the manner in which the institution 
exercises power. 11 
The repugnance of the law when confronted with the prospect of collective power being 
exercised is clear from the excerpt above; even more apparent is the distaste of collec-
tive power unlimited by any objective means, a system of checks-and-balances, some 
control. But the Auseinandersetzung with the phenomenon of industrial action reflects 
on the law itself: it places the law and the application of the law in considerable peril. n 
For the manner in which the power of the law responds to the challenge posed by 
another system of power (collective power) determines the normative standing of the 
law itself, it affects the 'morality' of the law in the eyes of the subjects of the law: 
'It endangers continued public confidence in the political impartiality of the judiciary, 
which is essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if judges, under the guise of 
interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of 
their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before 
whom the matter comes consider to be injurious to the public interest. '73 
This is the actual challenge that the exercise of collective power puts to the power 
system of the law: if the judiciary is seen to be amending legislation that does not 
accord with its own tastes and/or normative paradigms, the 'continued public con-
fidence' would be in peril, and, without this 'continued public confidence, the entire 
position and structure (the 'rule of law') would be endangered. For there should be no 
mistaking the fact that the law, even as pronounced by the judiciary, and as traced in 
this text, occupies a certain position of power: it is certainly no pun or mere turn of 
phrase to say the rule of law. 
The manner in which the law (here, specifically, the judiciary) responds to the 
phenomenon of industrial action (the exercise of collective power) thereby determines 
the legitimacy of the law itself: specifically, the judges should not provide 'their own 
preferred amendments' to the legislation: there are certain limits 'beyond which the 
judge may not go' . 74 
71 Duport Steels (House of Lords) at 550j-551a per Lord Scarman. 
72 This is a concern that has been alluded to earlier. See generally chapter 10 above as regards the rela-
tionship between the 'law' and the 'strike'. 
73 Duport Steels (House of Lords) at 542c-d (per Lord Diplock). Emphasis added. 
74 Duport Steels (House of Lords) at 551b per Lord Scarman. 
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12.6 POWER, LAW AND JURIDIFICATION 
Following the broad outlines of the developments of the archive has yielded a number 
of traces, of sudden ellipses, silences, such as the virtually total obliteration of the legal 
archive in Rookes v Barnard, where, from the fertile soil of the common law, and with 
the strange power of the ex-nomination, the court creates, using policy, a new liability, 
a new manner and method in terms of which the power of the law can be exercised. 
The entire archive, especially as presented here, can be represented as being an auto-
juridificatory archive, an archive that juridifies itself, as, through its reliance on prece-
dent, it is able to select the sources from which to take the elements of new judicial 
creations, as the 'hallowed corpus' is of sufficient force and sufficient scope to make 
possible a change in the archive without necessitating a breach in the archive. Whereas 
the German courts had to rely on terms indeterminate and polyvalent, the British courts 
have the holy body of the archive of the common law which provides most, if not all, 
of the structural elements required for a re-structuring of the archive. 
As stated at the outset, a detailed consideration of the legislation does not form part of 
this text. But even the few examples of legislation included in the current reading make 
it clear that legislation and the necessity for the interpretation of that legislation are 
important structural elements for the creation of law (or breaches or changes in the 
archive). It is within the zone of silence left between the words of the legislation that 
the archive of common law, using its advanced techniques of interpretation and law-
finding (the processes of finding policy-precedent within the archive itself), can unfold, 
it is within that zone of empowerment (for it is the function of the courts to interpret 
and apply the legislation) that the archive of the law-as-text can structure its own 
breaches and differences. There is a certain irony involved here: that the place-of-
power is the silence which results from the text, from the placing and arrangement of 
words by another (the legislature). For it is within the powerful zone of silence called 
forth by that legislative text that the archive, like some frail flower requiring the pro-
tection of a glass house, can unfold, and bloom: this is simply the common law in 
action. 
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ARCHAEOLOGY OF SILENCE III 
(THE DICTATES OF FAIRNESS) 
THE STRUCTURE AND SILENCE OF FAIRNESS IN THE INDUS-
TRIAL ACTION JURISPRUDENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN 
COURTS 
' . . . fairness dictates . . . ' 
-- Scott JA in National Union of Mineworkers v Black Mountain Mineral Development 
Company (Pty) Ltd 705194 (Appellate Division), unreported. 
'In finding an unfair labour practice the tribunal concerned is expressing a moral or 
value judgment as to what is fair in all the circumstances.' 
-- Nienaber JA in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd & 
Others (1996) 17 ILJ 455 (A) at 459E-F. 
[PROLOGUE: READING THE FINITE ARCHIVE WITHIN A SERVO-
MECHANICAL LOOP (Discourse of Order Series 2 Part 7) 
If the archive (the object of the act of reading) is finite, if it has the properties of a 
beginning, a middle and an end, a singular question remains: How is that archive to 
recognise its own closure --- its own beginning, or end? 
Certainly, neither of these momentous moments or points can be read from within the 
archive (or by the archive): it is the act of reading that structures the temporality of the 
archive, and thereby structures the artifactuality of the archive as the object of an act of 
reading. The archive is not able to recognise its own status as artefact: it is not capable 
of recognising itself. 
This, then, is the reading of the archive as artefact: the excavation of the archive in 
terms of its own artifactuality, by an act of reading which must, necessarily, be artifi-
cial (and this, the product of the reading, itself is artefact) and which is constrained by 
the rhetoric of the archive being excavated and/or by its own rhetoric. 
By implication the act of reading takes place within a servo-mechanical loop, where the 
artefactuality and artificiality correct through feedback the reading itself, away from the 
artefactuality. Reading, then, what is not there, but which determines that which is to 
be read and the reading of that which is to be read. 
This is a reading of silence.] 
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Except for the period 1988-1991, the unfair labour practice jurisdiction never included 
the power to determine whether or not a strike or a lock-out amounted to an unfair 
labour practice. Strikes and lock-outs were explicitly excluded from the definition of an 
unfair labour practice. 
But the exclusion of industrial action from the scope of the statutory jurisdiction did not 
preclude the courts (not only the Industrial Court, but also the Labour Appeal Court 
and the Appellate Division) from constructing a jurisprudence relating to the dismissal 
of striking employees. In this process of construction, the courts established an archival 
discourse (the object of study in this chapter) which is now historically and structurally 
finite. 1 
13.1 BEYOND LAWFULNESS: THE PRIMACY OF FAIRNESS 
13.1.1 The establishment of the archive 
It may appear, unproblematically, that the beginning of the archive can be marked from 
a specific text (1984 vintage). This text (and this beginning) bears the following con-
ventional name: Die Raad van Mynvakbonde v Die Kamer van Mynwese van Suid-
Afrika.2 
If this text is seen as the beginning of the archive, it could serve the useful purpose of 
problematising (again)3 the beginning of the archive or the power discourse in question. 
The beginning of the archive becomes a problem worth observing (an artefact worth 
excavating) because that which appears to be the 'beginning' of the archive latches, in 
terms of its own textual and logical structure, onto temporally anterior discourses for its 
legitimation (in terms not entirely dissimilar from the establishment of the discourse by 
the Large Senate of the Federal Labour Court in 1955). The beginning, in other words, 
relies for its status as 'beginning' on that which came before it (logically and 
temporally). The beginning (as breach, as new direction, as change) is dependent upon 
the anterior. 
1 The 'beginning' and 'end' properties of the discourse is determined by historical shifts in the power 
discourses: the Industrial Court only obtained the power to strike down unfair labour practices in the 
course of amendments to a legislative text in 1979 and 1980, with further amendments to the definition 
of the unfair labour practice in 1981. In this regard, see chapter 5 above. Similar historical power-text 
constraints determine the end of the discourse, as the institution of the Industrial Court has been done 
away with in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. Structurally, these historical facts also 
impact on the development of an archival discourse: the conceptual foundations of the discourse based 
upon the text of the 'unfair labour practice definition' simply did not exist before a given time. 
2 (1984) 5 ILJ 344 (IC). This was the first major dismissal-for-striking decision of the Industrial Court 
(see chapter 9 above). 
3 See above, Chapter 11. 
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The 'beginning' is the beginning because it is a breach with that which precedes it, 
because it is distinguishable (the beginning is therefore the beginning by virtue of its 
being, dialectically, not only of the archive or within the archive, but also a breach with 
the archive). It is within the confines of this present text (Die Raad van Mynvakbonde) 
that an excavation will yield the processes which structure the departure from the 
archive, or the change within an archive from one or more source(s) or bases of legiti-
mation to another, or from one logical basis to another. 
In order to function as 'beginning', an act of establishment has to take place. This is 
the distinguishing feature of the beginning-as-breach: the act of establishment, an act 
itself fraught with its own textual economy. 
The pivotal act of establishment takes place within a single paragraph: 
'Uit die voorafgaande is dit duidelik dat ons regstelsel 'n vryheid of bevoegdheid om te 
staak erken. Soms word daar ook melding gemaak van 'n reg om te staak.' [From the 
foregoing it is clear that our legal system recognises a freedom or capacity to strike. 
Mention is also sometimes made of a right to strike.]4 
The act of establishment (one economical in the extreme) here already signifies its own 
structure of legitimation: 5 it ex-nominates its own nature (that of being an act of estab-
lishment of the discourse) by linking the establishment-statement to other sources or 
arguments: simply, the form of the argument is: logical/sequential ('From the fore-
going ... ') 
The act of establishment is therefore structurally linked (the link is one of dependence: 
it follows, it can be deduced) to other discourses (and in this structural linking lies the 
process of ex-nomination of the founding act). It depends, for its signification value, on 
that which is both logically and temporally anterior to itself (the act of establishment), 
and thereby the act of establishment becomes (through ex-nomination) merely a con-
sequence of a discourse which came before, logically and temporally. 6 
Under a rubric ('The consequences of a legal strike') preceding the above-quoted act of 
establishment or founding, the text proceeds from point to point in preparing for its 
4 At 360E. Emphasis added. 
5 It is important to note that this is not an auto legitimation. The legitimation does not take the form of 
the axiomatic (it is therefore not simply presented as an unquestioned norm). The establishment does not 
justify or legitimate itself. The legitimacy depends on a process of signification external (in this case, 
logically and temporally anterior) to the establishment itself. In this sense, then, it could be said that the 
legitimation of an archival discourse (the new archive) is logically dependent upon the legitimation of the 
anterior archive. 
6 This could create the impression, at this point of the reading, that the act of establishment is in fact no 
breach or beginning, and that it is rather merely a 'continuation' of the discourse upon which it is prey-
ing or relying for its legitimation structures. 
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own (putative) act of foundation by excavating the discourse(s) which are to serve as 
the grounds of legitimation: the definition of a strike in terms of the legislation, 7 and 
the statutory limitations on strikes. s But the text also proceeds to cover ground more 
uncomfortable, namely the consequences that the civil law attaches to a strike. 9 
The discomfort that arises at this point in the text lies in the fact that the prior archival 
texts cited and imported by reference yield the principle that the participation in a strike 
and the cessation of work does not justify the breach of the employment contract, and 
that the employer would be entitled to dismiss an employee on the grounds of the 
employee's refusal to work. The archival texts quoted persist in regarding participation 
in a strike and the cessation of work as an unlawful repudiation of the contract, a fun-
damental breach of the employment contract, justifying dismissal of the employee. 
In performing an excavation of yet more archival texts, attention is turned next to the 
contents of section 79 of the Labour Relations Act of 1956 (as amended), a clause 
which exempted from liability trade unions, their office-bearers and officials, as well as 
their members from any civil action arising from any act or omission in the context of a 
strike (or lock-out) that complies with the procedural requirements of the Labour Rela-
tions Act. The text notes that there is no jurisprudence relating to the interpretation of 
section 79 of the Act. IO 
It is at this point that the text performs an ex-nominated act of establishment, relying on 
these pre-fabricated archival texts for its own legitimation. But this legitimation is not a 
comfortable one, as it is structured (causally) on premises that do not suppport the con-
clusion. There is nothing in the excavation performed by the text upon the archive that 
supports the conclusion: the fact that industrial action (strike or lock-out) is mentioned 
in legislation and that some immunities attach to actions accompanying the action if 
procedural requirements have been complied with cannot serve as the basis for coming 
to the conclusion that there is a freedom to strike or even a right to strike. 11 
7 At 358B-G. 
8 At358H-D. 
9 As regards this issue, the seminal decision of R v Smit 1955 (1) SA 239 (C) is quoted at length, as well 
as a shorter excerpt from Ngewu v Union Co-op Bark and Sugar 1982 (4) SA 390 (N). 
to At 360A-D. 
11 It is at this very point that the powerful discursive trope of the ex-nomination operates. It is clear from 
the excavations performed in Raad van Mynvakbonde that there is a powerful archive relating to the con-
sequences attaching to the strike. Yet this archive has to be negated or silenced in order for the act of 
establishment to take place. In doing this, the text resorts to ex-nomination by referring to other dis-
courses (the legislation, for example), while leaving unsaid the process whereby the one (new) discourse 
obtains the power to supersede the other discourse. The act of establishment, therefore, relies (again a 
structure of dependence) on a silence at its very core. 
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This act of establishment, by its own implicit admission, fails, for the force of the new 
archival structure established is, as the following passage shows, insufficient to serve as 
the basis for re-structuring the consequences that attach to a strike: 
'Dit is ook duidelik <lat n6g die gemene reg n6g die bepalings van die Wet op 
Arbeidsverhoudinge enige vebod plaas op die bevoegdheid van die betrokke werkgewer 
om die kontrakbreuk of repudiasie van die werknemer te aanvaar en daardeur die 
diensooreenkoms te beeindig.' [It is also clear that neither the common law nor the 
provisions of the Labour Relations Act prohibit the capacity of the employer concerned 
to accept the breach of contract or the repudiation of the employment contract and 
thereby terminate the contract of employment] .12 
At this point in the text, therefore, it is clear that the act of establishment has been a 
putative act. There has, firstly, been a founding statement: there is a freedom (or right) 
to strike, and this freedom/right to strike is recognised by the archive (the legal 
system). The founding or purportedly-archival statement obtains its legitimacy not in 
itself, but by referring to the archive within which it is operating. Secondly, however, 
the establishing statement is countered by a response delivered by the very same 
archive, where the archive denies the implications of the establishment. The archive of 
fairness (the new archive) is not (yet) powerful enough to supersede the (legal archival) 
power of the employer to terminate the services of employees who are participating in a 
strike. Still the rules of legality reign supreme. 
Recognising that the act of establishment failed, 13 the text resorts to another discursive 
structure, and in the context of this discourse the act of foundation or establishment 
succeeds. Within the radically indeterminate (vague and open-textured) archival struc-
ture of the unfair labour practice, it becomes possible to perform an act of estab-
lishment or founding in very simple terms: 
'Myns insiens is <lit heel moontlik en sou <lit 'n logiese ontwikkeling wees om in gepaste 
omstandighede die regmatige afdanking van 'n werknemer of werknemers wat aan 'n 
regmatige staking deelneem as 'n onbillike arbeidspraktyk te beskou . ... Sou 'n 
werknemer wat afgedank is terwyl hy aan 'n regmatige staking deelneem 'n saak aan-
hangig maak sal <lit nodig wees vir die hof wat daardie aansoek aanhoor om ag te slaan 
op die besondere omstandighede van die geval.' [In my view it is possible and it would 
be a logical development to regard the lawful dismissal of an employee or employees 
12 At 360G-H. 
13 This recognition is implicit in the statement that '[d]aar bly die moontlikheid van die onbillike 
arbeidspraktyk-jurisdiksie oor' [the possibility of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction still exists]. In 
terms of the logic and structure of the text, then, the unfair labour practice, not being regarded as the 
first (or primary) source of archival principles, is resorted to only as a last resort: only once reliance on 
other archival structures had failed does the text move on to seek reliance on the archival structures 
implicitly made possible by the unfair labour practice jurisdiction and definition (see chapter 5 above). 
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who participate in a lawful strike as an unfair labour practice. . . . If an employee who 
is dismissed while participating in a legal strike brings a matter to court, the court hear-
ing that application will have to consider the special circumstances of the case.]14 
The discursive economy governing this (successful) act of establishment again relates, 
first and foremost, to an express legitimatory statement (it is stated to be a 'logical 
development') which is at the same time (dialectically) an ex-nomination, for the legiti-
matory structure which is being expressed finds no treatment in the discourse that 
precedes it. The obviousness of the statement of legitimation obliterates the need for 
any express treatment of the logic of the legitimation. 
At this point it is necessary to consider the nature of the archive within which the text 
under consideration is situated and is situating itself, namely the archive of the unfair 
labour practice discourse. 
The fact that the unfair labour practice, in spite of a statutory definition, is a concept 
essentially without content, is entails that a number of the operations in terms of that 
statutory empowerment will have to rely on extensive ex-nominations or un-namings 
and coverings-up of discursive processes. In examining the passage quoted above, it 
appears that the operative process is one of viewing (seeing, regarding), for the text 
resorts to a rhetoric of vision, most graphically represented by the phrases: 'myns 
insiens' (in my view), 'te beskou' (to regard), 'ag te slaan' (to consider, to pay atten-
tion to). This rhetoric in the act of foundation, as the rhetoric reinforces the process of 
establishment that is taking place, re-directs the gaze of the archive away from the 
anterior (given) archival structures (the principles of common law or the archive of 
legality) towards a breach (a beginning) in and of the archive (that the dismissal of 
strikers may 'be seen' to amount to an unfair labour practice). In terms of the rhetoric 
of the establishment, then, one could argue that the archive of fairness is being 'read' . 
It is also important to note that the gaze is focusing on how logical the process is: this 
is without question the most important signifier of the ex-nomination taking place: the 
axiomatic force of the 'logic' renders virtually any further processes in the estab-
lishment of the archive and the legitimation of that establishment redundant. 
In re-directing the gaze from the logically and temporarlly anterior (the established 
sources of the law, the archive of legality) and into the contentlessness of the unfair 
labour practice definition (a contentlessness displaced by the 'logic' that is being 
'seen'), a full act of establishment takes place. Again, this act is made possible only by 
the full application of a fundamental structural effect of a radical indeterminacy (the 
sans-content unfair labour practice definition): the re-direction of the gaze towards the 
14 At 361A-C. Emphasis added. 
15 See chapter 5 above. 
205 
The industrial action jurisprudence of South African Courts 
beginning of the new archive is therefore dependent (in a structural sense) on the opera-
tion of a silence, a contentlessness that is sufficiently malleable (yet at the same time 
legitimated enough and sufficiently empowering -- it has its origin in an act of state: 
legislation) to allow the re-establishment of an archive (an archive of 'equity') 16 within 
the context (being here both the with-text and the contra-text) of an archive established 
before. 
13.1.2 Structuring the vision of silence 
Once a breach has taken place in the archival structure, and a new archive has been 
established, the act of establishment has to complete itself by providing a fuller account 
for and of itself. The importance of this process lies not in the fact that the archival text 
is now going to legitimise itself, for that process has already occurred with reference to 
the concept of the unfair labour practice (this being seen as a discourse of power, a dis-
course which legitimates the text or discourse being read or excavated). The archival 
text instead now turns its discursive operations upon iterability: that of itself which is 
to be repeated, which is to be disseminated into the archive which has just been estab-
lished: 
'Sonder om enigisins te probeer om 'n omvattende lys van relevante faktore op te noem 
mag die volgende faktore of van hulle, ter sake wees, naamlik: [Without at all trying to 
provide an exhaustive list of the relevant factors, the following factors or some of them 
may be applicable, namely:] 
(a) Die oorsaak, aard, omvang en doel van die betrokke staking. Stakings kan 
heelwat verskyningsvorms aanneem. [reference omitted] Dit volg egter nie dat 
elke regmatige staking beskerming behoort te geniet nie. [The cause, nature, 
scope and aim of the strike in question. Strikes can take many forms. It does 
not, however, follow that every lawfal strike should enjoy protection.] 
(b) Die omstandighede van die werknemer of werknemers. [The circumstances of 
the employee or the employees.] 
(c) Die omstandighede van die werkgewer. [The circumstances of the employer.] 
(d) Die duur van die staking. [The duration of the strike.] 
(e) Die uitwerking en uitslag van die staking. [The effect and result of the strike.] 
(f) Die doel van die Wet en in besonder die beginsel van kollektiewe bedinging. 
[The purpose of the Act and in particular the principle of collective bargain-
ing.] 
(g) Die aanwesigheid of afwesigheid van onderhandelinge ter goeder trou tussen 
die twee partye tydens die staking. [The presence or absence of negotiations in 
good faith between the two parties in the course of the strike.] 
(h) Die bepalings van die betrokke diensooreenkoms en veral enige bepaling 
daarin bevat wat met die deelname van 'n werknemer aan 'n regmatige staking 
16 The term 'equity' is used throughout this section as representing the new archive established in terms 
of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction. 
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handel. Die blote feit <lat die diensooreenkoms gelyk staan aan die gemene reg 
of selfs minder gunstig vir die werknemer is as die gemene reg, verhoed die 
hof nie om te bevind <lat die beeindiging van <liens 'n onbillike arbeidspraktyk 
daarstel nie. [The terms contained in the contract of employment and specifi-
cally any condition contained in that contract that relates to the participation of 
an employee in a lawful strike. The mere fact that the contract of employment 
is the same as the common law or is even less favourable for the employee than 
the common law does not prevent the court from finding that the termination 
of service amounts to an unfair labour practice.] 
(i) Die gedrag van die werknemers tydens die staking: byvoobeeld, het die 
werknemer 'n daad teenoor sy werkgewer gepleeg wat 'n verbreking van die 
kontrak sou wees as die diensooreenkoms sou voortbestaan? [The behaviour of 
the employees during the strike, for example, whether the employee committed 
an act against the employer that would be a breach of contract if the contract 
continued to exist?]' 11 
Due care and attention must be directed at the formulation of these archival principles 
(which are to become a normative paradigm for the archival discourse established). 
There is no indication of the sources of the normative principles set out here. As an 
obiter dictum, these normative considerations (normative in the sense that they structure 
or inform a determination whether striking employees should be dismissed or not) 
simply appear from nowhere. The list does not purport to be exhaustive: a genus and 
species analysis of the characteristics or the norms listed therefore hardly appears to be 
appropriate. Yet there can be no discounting their archival status.is 
It is also important, at this point, to note the relationship between the archive of legality 
and the archive of fairness that has been established. The fact that a phenomenon (a 
strike) complies with the normative paradigm of the archive of legality (the strike is 
therefore legal) does not necessarily entail the application of the archive of fairness. 
Not every legal strike ('regmatige staking') deserves protection: the fact that the 
archival rules of legality have been complied with does not necessarily mean that the 
archival rules (protection) of the archive of fairness will find application. From this it is 
clear that the archive of fairness occupies a superior position: the archive of fairness 
(and its normative paradigm) comes into operation regardless of the (non-) compliance 
with the archival rules of the archive of legality. 
17 Die Raad van Mynvakbonde (supra, note 1) at 361D-I. Emphasis added. 
18 See below 13.1.4. 
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13.1.3 A discourse of power and silence 
The relationship between the archive of legality and the archive of fairness is addressed 
within the text itself. Once established (and legitimated), and once the iterability of the 
text has been established, the text itself proceeds to determine, finally, its own relation-
ship with the archive it breached: 
'Uit die voorafgaande behoort die interaksie van die gemene reg (insluitende die 
regsgevolge van die beeindiging van die diensooreenkoms) en die onbillike arbeidsprak-
tyk jurisdiksie duidelik te wees. In die eerste plek geld die bepalings van die betrokke 
kontrak so ver die diensbeeindiging betref. Die werkgewer is geregtig om die 
diensooreenkoms van 'n stakende werker te beeindig al neem die werker deel aan 'n 
regmatige staking. Indien die werknemer wat ontslaan is homself nie wend tot die 
nywerheidshof of indien die nywerheidshof egter bevind dat die ontslag of weiering om 
die werknemer herindiens te neem nie 'n onbillike arbeidspraktyk daarstel nie word die 
regsposisie deur die kontrak en die gemene reg beheers. Slegs indien die nywerheidshof 
bevind dat die ontslag of weiering om die werker herindiens te neem 'n onbillike 
arbeidspraktyk konstitueer en 'n bevel uitvaardig sal die statutere remedie, na gelang 
van die terme van die vasstelling, die gemeenregtelike of kontraktuele gevolge was [sic] 
uit 'n staking voorspruit vervang. Die onbillike arbeidspraktyk jurisdiksie kan myns 
insiens nie die gemene reg wysig of verander nie.' [From the foregoing the interaction 
between the common law (including the consequences of the termination of the employ-
ment contract) and the unfair labour practice jurisdiction should be clear. In the first 
place the provisions of the contract concerned apply in respect of termination of serv-
ice. The employer is entitled to terminate the contract of employment of a striking 
worker even if the worker participates in a lawful strike. If the dismissed employee 
does not proceed to the Industrial Court or if the Industrial Court finds that the dis-
missal or the refusal to re-employ the employee does not amount to an unfair labour 
practice, the legal position will be determined by the contract and common law. Only 
where the Industrial Court finds that the dismissal or the refusal to re-employ the 
worker constitutes an unfair labour practice will the statutory remedy replace (to the 
extent provided for in the order handed down by the court) the common law or con-
tractual consequences which attach to a strike. In my view the unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction cannot replace or amend common law.] 19 
This passage relates expressly to the archive of legality (common law and the law relat-
ing to the termination of the employment contract), the new archive (unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction -- the archive of equity), and the relationship between the two 
archives (the relationship between the common law rules and the unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction). 
Generally, and in terms of the logic of the text itself as quoted above, the first 
(anterior) archive prevails: an employer is still entitled to terminate the employment of 
a worker on strike in terms of the common-law rules; the unfair labour practice juris-
diction does not change or amend the rules of the common law. The new normative 
t9 At 362E-H. Emphasis added. 
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system applies if and only if the Industrial Court determines that the dismissal or refusal 
to re-employ the worker amounts to an unfair labour practice. If, and only if it has been 
established that the dismissal or the refusal to re-employ constituted an unfair labour 
practice, will the unfair labour practice jurisdiction (the archive of equity) replace or 
obliterate the consequences that would attach to the action in terms of the normative 
structures of the archive of legality (common law). 20 
The decisive factor in determining what archival system will apply appears to be 
whether or not the action in question can be seen to be an unfair labour practice. A 
determination of unfairness therefore structures the recourse to an archival discourse: if 
an act or omission is not regarded as unfair, the archive of legality applies. Once the 
determination of unfairness has been made, however, the archive represented by 'the 
unfair labour practice jurisdiction' takes over in providing a normative structure against 
which acts or omissions can be evaluated. And, once the archive of fairness has come 
into operation, its force obliterates the archive of legality and that archive's normative 
paradigm. 
Whether or not the archive of equity should find application therefore depends on a 
finding of 'unfairness' -- the application of the archive, in other words, appears to 
result from the application of itself: the archive itself determines when it should be 
applied. If an act is 'unfair' in terms of the archive of equity, then the archive of equity 
is applied. 
No indication is given as to the manner in which the concept 'unfair labour practice' 
(the key to the application of the archive of equity) is to be understood, except as some-
thing that has to be determined with reference to the facts of the case. In making a 
normative determination (whether or not a dismissal for striking amounted to an unfair 
labour practice or not), the nine factors set out in the Raad van Mynvakbonde text func-
tion as a normative paradigm against which to evaluate the impression given by the 
facts of the case. 
13.1.4 The application of the archive of equity 
Less than one year later, the Industrial Court applied the normative paradigm as set out 
in Die Raad van Mynvakbonde v Die Kamer van Mynwese van SA. In National Union 
of Mineworkers v Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd,21 a determination whether or not 
20 The uncomfortable relationship between the two archives persists. Finding that there is a 'dichotomy' 
between the application of the archive of legality and the archive of fairness, the Labour Appeal Court 
has said the following: 'Employers and employees should not be expected to arrange their affairs in a 
schizophrenic manner where one set of rules applies when the common law holdssway, [sic] whilst 
another does when the Act applies.' WL Ochse Webb & Pretorius (Pty) Ltd v Vermeulen [1997] 2 BLLR 
124 (LAC) at 128E. 
21 (1986) 7 JU 123 (IC). 
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a strike dismissal was fair or not was again, in part, processed in terms of the available 
normative paradigm present (that is, readable or iterable) in the archival discourse. But 
in this latter text, a major extending operation is taking place as the normative 
paradigm outlined in the earlier decision is itself again undergoing a dual process of, 
firstly, gaining in content, and, secondly, becoming normatively qualified. 22 
• As to the cause of the strike, it is held that the demand in question was a 'legiti-
mate and reasonable' demand for higher wages. This entails that, in order to 
satisfy this criteria, the demand which gave rise to the strike must be 'legitimate 
and reasonable' (terms also verging on contentlessness). 23 
• The nature of the strike was found to be 'primary' (as opposed to 'secondary' or 
sympathy). 24 
• As regards the criterion of 'the extent of the strike', the following entered into 
consideration: attempts to avoid the strike, restraint by union, holding of pre-
strike ballot, and that strike rules were posted. In summarising, it appears that 
the extent of the strike relates to the 'damage done by the strike', including 
physical damage. 2s 
• The objective of the strike was to 'remedy, in part at least, the low wages, 
being consistent with its cause' . 26 From this it appears that there must be a con-
sistency between the cause of the strike and the objective of the strike. 
• The circumstances of the employees were taken into consideration, including the 
fact that they were migrant workers. 21 
22 This process of normative qualification of a pre-existing paradigm can only take place once the rela-
tionship between the main archive of legality (common law) and the part-archive (equity or fairness) had 
been established. This structure (establishing the archive of equity in preference to the archive of legality) 
is indeed a prerequisite for the operation of any normative processes consequent upon the archive of 
equity. As regards the status of the archive of equity and fairness in respect of the common law archive, 
the text (NUM v Marievale Consolidated Mines) makes it clear that what is at stake is not 'the lawfulness 
or otherwise of a dismissal, but ... in fact ... the fairness and equity of a dismissal' (at 147D, with 
authorities cited). Emphasis added. Again the application of the archive of equity depends on a normative 
paradigm that is not presented: whether or not the act in question (a dismissal) was 'fair' or not. 
23 At 136D-H. 
24 At 136H-I. 
25 At 137A-C. 
26 At 137D. 
27 At 137E-F. 
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• In applying the criterion of 'the circumstances of the company', the following 
entered into consideration: the profitability of the company (i e whether it could 
afford a wage increase) and the attitude of the company to labour relations. 28 
• The duration of the strike was considered, and the fact that the strike lasted only 
three days was seen as relevant. 29 
• As regards the consequences and result of the strike, it was argued that the harm 
the company suffered was light. 30 
• Relevant to the consideration of good faith negotiations between the parties dur-
ing the strike, a number of facts entered into consideration, such as the fact that 
the company did not allow the branch chairman of the union access to trade 
union members, and that the employer made only half-hearted attempts to 
initiate discussions. 31 
• It was argued that the company had acted contrary to the provisions of a recog-
nition agreement. 32 
• The conduct of the union was argued from the formulation of strike rules, the 
fact that other employees in the industry were not brought out on strike, and the 
suspension of the strike upon the dismissal of the striking workers. 33 
• Much attention was paid to the conduct of the company, including evictions of 
employees who were on strike. 34 
In drawing conclusions from the facts, the strange relationship between the common 
law archive and the equity system of rules again emerged: 
28 At 137G-138A. 
29 At 138B-I. 
30 At 139A. 
31 At 139B-140D. 
32 At 140E-141D. 
33 At 141H-I. 
34 See at 142Aff. 
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'The company appeared to be solely concerned with the lawfulness of its actions and 
paid little or no heed to the fairness thereof. The failure to direct its concern to the fair-
ness of its actions was consequently in the circumstances of this case not conducive to 
generating conciliatory or sound industrial relations. '35 
In this context, the archive of equity formed the basis for the determination: 
' ... the behaviour of some of the company's officials coupled with the attitude which 
they adopted and which eventually resulted in the dismissal of the employees can in the 
circumstances be characterized as an unfair labour practice ... '36 
The relevance of these excerpts lies in the fact that they trace the force of the archive of 
equity that was arising at this point. The mere compliance with the rules of legality 
within the common law archive no longer meets with approval -- on the contrary, it is 
the rules of equity in the archive of equity ('the unfair labour practice') that must now 
be complied with.37 
Another important operation taking place in these passages should not be overlooked, 
for it provides a trace of the juridification process. 
A key to 'fairness' (or 'unfairness') is provided: the two key phrases 'sound industrial 
relations' and 'attitudes' . These are the names, or metaphors, for the operation of a 
new normativity, the new archive that is in force, an archive which is determining the 
normative structure of all the discursive operations. Because the actions and attitudes of 
the company did not promote sound industrial relations the actions taken by the com-
pany amounted to an unfair labour practice. 38 The excavation of the text can proceed 
even further: it should be noted that the 'attitudes' of one of the parties played a role 
35 At 150E-F. Emphasis added. 
36 At 151D. Emphasis added. 
37 The divergence between a reliance on the rules of legaltiy (the archive of the law) and a reliance on 
the archive of equity (fairness) becomes an iterable structure of the archive itself, most clearly formulated 
as follows: ' ... the submission that an unfair labour practice cannot include or refer to a lawful exercise 
of rights by an employer is not supported by the wording of the relevant provisions, or by the authority 
to which I have referred or by the patent intention and underlying philosophy of the Act. That submis-
sion is also without merit.' Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd v The President of the Industrial Court & 
Others (1986) 7 ILJ 152 (T) at 167B. In this quote appears another enigma, namely the reliance (for 
legitimacy) on the 'philosophy' of the Labour Relations Act: a trope that is not discussed, but simply and 
axiomatically relied upon. See, similarly, Natal Die Casting Co (Pty) Ltd v President, Industrial Court & 
Others (1987) 8 ILJ 245 (D) at 250-251. As to the 'philosophy' of the legislation in question, see below, 
13.4. 
38 Through being classified as an unfair labour practice, of course, a certain set of actions are devalued 
as being in non-compliance with a certain normative paradigm. These actions fell short of the normative 
system (signified by 'sound industrial relations'), and must therefore be struck down, disqualified, 
devalued. 
212 
The industrial action jurisprudence of South African Courts 
not without significance. This would seem to mean that the focal concept of 'fairness' 
relies not only on an objective determination of the facts, but also a subjective 
determination of the attitudes of the parties. Fairness, according to the logic of the text, 
would then lie not only in the actions of the parties, but also their frame of mind at the 
time of their actions. 
Another key factor in the juridification process underway here is the explicit introduc-
tion of the meta-juridical, namely the 'sound industrial relations'. The normative 
paradigm represented by the phrase 'sound industrial relations' is in effect a structuring 
element of the key to the archive of fairness: as the actions of the party in question did 
not promote 'sound industrial relations' , their actions were regarded as being unfair. 39 
13.2 LAWS FOR FAIRNESS 
In terms of the normative paradigm established in the Raad van Mynvakbonde decision, 
the legality of the strike (in other words, whether or not there had been compliance 
with the provisions of section 65 of the Labour Relations Act of 1956) was but one of 
the factors to determine whether or not the dismissal of the striking employees 
amounted to an unfair labour practice. 40 
The force and power of the archive of equity was challenged when it was called upon 
to structure a response to an illegal strike. An illegal strike (a strike that did not comply 
with the provisions of section 65 of the Labour Relations Act) was, in terms of the 
statute, a criminal offence. Apart from the common law consequences that attach to any 
strike (the archive of legality, as discussed above), the archive of equity was now con-
fronted by patent illegality. The challenge, quite simply, was so see whether the 
archive of equity (fairness) had sufficient strength to overrule the illegality. 
An initial response creates the impression that the illegality of the industrial action 
would be sufficient to breach the integrity and the application of the archive of equity: 
'As a matter of public policy I do not believe that a court should order the reinstatement 
of an employee who admits or is found to have participated in an illegal strike .... In 
39 It is not meant to say that the 'sound industrial relations' concept is the only structuring element of the 
archival key of fairness. No doubt there are other factors which also structure the pivotal 'fairness' con-
cept. It suffices for present purposes to establish that an explicitly meta-juridical normative consideration 
(sound industrial relations) enters into consideration in structuring the normative paradigm of fairness. 
The reliance on the meta-juridical should not be regarded, in this context, as an innovation. Already in 
George Divisional Council v Minister of Labour & another 1954 (3) SA 300 (C), reliance was placed on 
'inequity' and the possibility of 'industrial strife' . 
40 See, for example, Black Allied Workers Union & Others v Asoka Hotel (1989) 10 /LJ 167 at 174B: 
'The court ... bears in mind that the strike was a legal strike. That is an important factor. ... [T]he 
legality /illegality of a strike is not the sole factor which determines the fairness or otherwise of dis-
missal.' 
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other words, [the employee] has not come to court with clean hands, as it were, and in 
my judgment I should not exercise my discretion in favour of that applicant. '41 
This passage is an expression of another (unstated) normative consideration, namely the 
meta-juridical consideration of 'public policy'. The consideration of public policy con-
strained the choice of normative paradigm, and, in a wider analysis, also determined 
the choice of the archive. It is important to note that the choice of archive is, to a much 
greater extent, foregrounded in this passage: here is it called the 'exercise of discre-
tion' . This phrase is the name for a choice that had to be made between the archive of 
equity and the archive of the law. 
But this was at an initial stage only, and an important shift soon occurred. In SACWU 
& Others v Pharma Natura (Pty) Ltd, 42 the issue of morality returned in the form of 
casting blame and searching for those with 'unclean hands': 
'I do not believe that it is correct to say that this court [Industrial Court] will never 
grant relief to employees who participate in an illegal strike .... It seems to me that if 
a proper basis is laid, almost, as it were, on the grounds of necessity, circumstances 
could well be such that the court could come to the assistance of such applicants 
[employees]. Necessity in this sense would have at least the following elements: 
• the relevant circumstances giving rise to an illegal strike must not have been 
caused by the employees; 
• the employees must have been faced with such conditions that their resultant 
strike was their only reasonable option; 
• all other reasonable avenues must have been closed to them. '43 
This passage signifies a subtle but pivotal shift within in the archive and in the relation-
ship between the archives of legality and fairness. It goes further than the mere restora-
tion of the primacy of the archive of equity, a primacy that is already apparent from the 
examinations of texts performed above. 
From this passage it is clear that the illegality of the strike will not, in itself, deprive 
employees dismissed for striking of relief. However, now more pertinently than ever 
the question is a moral (or meta-juridical) question: at whose door must the fault for 
the strike be laid? If the facts yield something 'almost of necessity', the choice of 
archive may be determined by morality (that is to say the relative cleanness of hands). 
41 Tshabalala & Others v Minister of Health & Welfare & Others (1986) 7 ILJ 168 (W). It is important 
to note that this was not a decision of the Industrial Court, but of the Witwatersrand Local Division of 
the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court (as it then was). The Industrial Court did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the matter. Emphasis added. 
42 (1986) 7 ILJ 696 (IC). 
43 At 697B-E. Emphasis added. 
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If the employer bears the blame for the strike (in essence the sum of the three con-
siderations outlined in the passage above), that very (moral) blameworthiness may 
determine the selection (exercise of discretion) of the archive. 
As indicated earlier, the application of the archive of equity becomes dependent upon a 
moral determination, a set of facts that 'almost' (but not quite?) amounts to 'necessity', 
facts which succeed in toppling the employer from its moral higher ground in the mat-
ter. Once it has been established that the actions of the employer contributed to the 
strike (and that the employer is, by implication, at fault -- in a moral sense), the 
employer loses all sympathy. 44 
13.3 
13.3.1 
FUNCTIONALITY AS TRANSCENDENT SIGNIFICATION (the 
system strikes) 
The rise of functionality as normative paradigm 
It is also in the context of the illegality of the strike (and the consequences that this fact 
would have for the choice of applicable archive) that the use of a series of names arose: 
'acceptability' , 'functionality' and 'legitimacy' : 
'In determining whether illegal strikers should be protected some decisions have util-
ized the concepts of "acceptablity", "legitimacy", or "functionality". The dismissal of 
illegally striking employees would be regarded as unfair if, notwithstanding the 
illegality of the strike, it was, in the eyes of the court, a legitimate or functional strike. 
This would, for example, be the case where the illegal strike was preceded by genuine 
bargaining (thus fulfilling one of the most important policy requirements of the Labour 
Relations Act) or where the strike was provoked by the employer or could be justified 
on the grounds of necessity. •45 
The normative paradigm shrouded by the names 'legitimacy', 'acceptablity' or 
'functionality' was soon to become the dominant discursive structure in the archive of 
equity. The mere consideration of 'fairness' took a subordinate position (as one norma-
tive paradigm moved into the background while normative considerations of 
'functionality' and its manifestations took prime position): what soon became important 
was determining what appears to be a broader morality of the strike. It is only once a 
broader (and unnameable) moral judgment of the strike has been made that it can be 
44 
' ... there are numerous decisions where illegal strikers were held to have been unfairly dismissed on 
the basis that the strike was provoked by the employer, where it could be justified on the basis of neces-
sity, or where the dismissals were held to be unfair because the employer had acted overhastily and had 
not given a proper ultimatum.' PAK le Roux & Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair 
Dismissal (1994) 303-4. 
45 Le Roux & Van Niekerk op cit note 44 at 304.,Emphasis added. 
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established whether the archive of equity finds application (and that the employees who 
had been dismissed for participating in a strike were to be granted relief in terms of the 
remedial structures of the archive). 46 
The passage quoted above contains, also, an important initial structural trace: the posi-
tion attributed to the functionality construct, ,namely a construct sufficiently powerful to 
obliterate the stigma of the illegality of the strike. The functionality construct is applied 
('utilized') when it has to be determined whether illegal strikers should be protected or 
not. 47 Once the requirements of 'functionality' (compliance with the principle of 'genu-
ine' collective bargaining) have been complied with, the moral force consequent upon 
that very compliance with the normative requirements of functionality is sufficient to 
enable (and indeed to inform) the application of the archive of equity. Fairness, in this 
context, is dependent upon functionality (only what is functional is fair). 48 
The clearest expression of the functionality construct may be found in the following 
passage: 
46 
'In deciding whether to "condone" the strike (and thus grant protection to the dismissed strikers) the 
essential question before the court is whether the strike can be regarded as "legitimate" or "acceptable" .. 
. . The most important factor to be taken into account in this regard is undoubtedly the fundamental pur-
pose of the Act which is the promotion of collective bargaining with a view of maintaining industrial 
peace. In other words, a strike becomes acceptable or legitimate by reason of the fact that it may be 
regarded as fanctional to the process of collective bargaining.' Per D A Basson AM in Koelatsoeu & 
Others v Afro-sun Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Re/eke Zezame Supermarket (1990) 11 ILJ 754 (IC) at 756B-
C. Emphasis added. 
47 
' . . . the court is of the opinion that it could protect strikers who embark upon an illegal strike pro-
vided that it could be shown that the strike, notwithstanding the failure to make use of the collective 
bargaining mechanisms of the Act, still complies with the principles of genuine collective bargaining. 
The first principle of genuine collective bargaining is certainly the fact that bona fide negotiations should 
precede the (illegal) strike.' Koelatsoeu & Others (note 46) at 756G-H. 
48 The construct of functionality presents a major structural challenge in reading the archive. The essen-
tial problem relates to whether the functionality construct breaches the archive of equity or whether it 
contributes to the coherence of the archive. This approach implies that an attempt must be made to link 
the normative structures of the 1984 Raad van Mynvakbonde decision to the functionality construct, and 
thereby indicate that the normative approach to the application of the archive has remained coherent and 
consistent. According to this approach, the reading must attempt to show that the basic building-blocks 
and foundation of the construct of functionality is already contained within the discourse of the archive at 
an earlier point, and that the expression of the functionality construct does not constitute a breach of the 
archive or the transgression of the discursive structures. Another reading is, however, possible, a reading 
which concentrates not on the purported coherence and integrity of the archive, but seeks to excavate the 
silences and unnamings taking place (and structuring) that archive. This approach would imply 
(mis)reading the archive to show that the integrity, coherence and consistency of the archive is arguable 
only if the turning points (or nodes) of discursive change are ex-nominated. Instead of seeking to prove 
or document the integrity of the archive, then, this approach seeks to trace the silent operations of the 
archive. This latter approach is, for the purposes of this instant text, preferable. 
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'The right to strike is important and necessary to a system of collective bargaining. It 
underpins the system -- it obliges the parties to engage thoughtfully and seriously with 
each other. It helps to focus their minds on the issues at stake and to weigh up carefully 
the costs of a failure to reach agreement. If an employer facing a strike could merely 
dismiss the strikers from employment by terminating their employment contracts then 
the strike would have little or no purpose. It would merely jeopardize the rights of 
employment of the strikers. The strike would cease to be functional to collective 
bargaining and instead it would be an opportunity for the employer to take punitive 
action against the employees concerned. 
The [Labour Relations] Act contemplates that the right to strike should trump concerns 
for the economic losses which the exercise of that right causes. That is because collec-
tive bargaining is necessarily a sham and a chimera if it is not bolstered and supported 
by the ultimate threat of the exercise of economic force by one or the other of the 
parties, or indeed, by both. •49 
It is more difficult than it may at first appear to isolate the principles contained in this 
passage. 
It is clear, firstly, that the exercise of power (the strike) is linked, in the vision 
expressed, to collective bargaining. Secondly, the exercise of power (in the form of the 
strike) is regarded as a foundation of collective bargaining (it 'underpins' the 'system' 
-- it serves literally as the foundation of the 'system'). 50 As a manifestation of real 
power, thirdly, it serves the collective bargaining system (which is an engagement in a 
process) by forcing the parties to test their bargaining positions. 
The implication of this textual logic is that the strike has (or should have -- a moral 
pronouncement) no meaning outside the context of collective bargaining: while it is 
49 Black Allied Workers Union & Others v Prestige Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters Hotel (1993) 14 IU 963 
(LAC) at 972B-E. Emphasis added. 
50 It is interesting to note that there is no discussion of the 'system'. There is no indication of the struc-
ture and/or the nature of the collective bargaining system. By what textual economy can it therefore be 
said that collective bargaining is a system? What are the system-mechanics that drive the heart of the col-
lective bargaining system? What are the components of the collective bargaining system? The con-
ceptualisation of collective bargaining not purely as a power-exchange or temporary bargaining 
phenomenon is important, because the use of the term 'system' implies the existence of something more 
permanent. A system is a coherent whole, and, usually,· a mechanism that processes either physical 
objects or information. If collective bargaining is to be regarded as a system of information processing, it 
becomes clear that, like any other servo-mechanical system, it is correcting itself through feedback. In 
this manner, collective bargaining would dismiss as dysfunctional any aspect that did not accord with its 
own normative paradigm. Aspects that did not comply with its own normative paradigm (such as the 
exercise of power) either has to be hamassed into the normativity of the system, or it is to be discredited 
and rejected. In this sense, then, the concept 'collective bargaining' as used here can be regarded as a 
type of normative feedback instrument, determining what structures and aspects are to be approved into 
the system and which are to be rejected. 
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'necessary' to collective bargaining, it is, by implication 'unnecessary' in any other 
context. 51 
The next part of the passage quoted above relates to the termination of employment and 
the strike. It is vitally important to note that no mention is made in the passage of fair-
ness or equity. For the purposes of this pivotal passage, then, the dismissal of the 
employees is not a matter of fairness, but it is still to be seen, exclusively, in the con-
text of collective bargaining (which was earlier described as a 'system'). The logic of 
the text is that a system of collective bargaining would not be served if the employer 
were to be allowed to dismiss employees merely for participating in a strike. The strike 
would have 'no purpose' (the purpose being related to collective bargaining) if the 
employer could simply dismiss, and because the dismissal would not be 'functional' in 
the context of collective bargaining (a privileged concept in the logical ordering being 
performed by the text) it should not be allowed. In its function of information process-
ing, therefore, the system of collective bargaining rejects dismissal due to participation 
in a strike: it does not serve the system, and the feedback rejects the construct as being 
in non-compliance with itself (or dysfunctional). 
What is clear from the passage cited is the extraordinarily privileged position of collec-
tive bargaining ('the system') and, as such, the system deserves close analysis in terms 
of the textual logic of the passage quoted above. 
• The system of collective bargaining would be a 'sham' and a 'chimera' if not 
supported by power. It would not be 'genuine' collective bagaining. By implica-
tion therefore, the system depends for its efficacy on power. 
• Normatively, the collective bargaining system as the justification for the strike 
is sufficiently privileged to 'trump' the economic damage suffered by the 
employer. 
• The 'system' of collective bargaining also offers transcendental signification (it 
provides meaning to aspects of itself and aspects outside itself). As phenomena, 
for example, strikes and economic losses have no discursive meaning; it is only 
when structurally justified by the 'collective bargaining system' that they obtain 
meaning. Meaning is obtained by and from the system. Once they appear out-
51 This is not an ontological statement, but an epistemological one. The strike does exist outside the con-
text of the collective bargaining system, but in this contra-textual wilderness, the strike is dismissed as 
being dysfunctional, and it is likely to be met with the full force of legal remedies. In order for the strike 
to have an 'approved' meaning (and the meaning is 'approved' by the 'system'), it must comply with the 
normativity of the system itself. As the 'system' has to evaluate the phenomenon of the strike before it, it 
will determine the legal acceptability of that phenomenon by having recourse to certain archival princi-
ples. 
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side the zone of structural justification (and transcendental signification) of the 
'system' of collective bargaining, therefore, they would have to be struck down 
as being unjustified. 52 
• Once the privileged concept of the collective bargaining system has been estab-
lished as the source of discursive meaning for the strike, it also, necessarily, 
becomes subject to its own built-in limitation (not only of the strike). The 
'system' is finite, it has limits. Once the strike, for example, moves beyond the 
normatively-sanctioned zone generated by the 'system' of collective bargaining, 
it would lose its meaning and protection as 'functional' . If a strike therefore 
causes or appears to be likely to cause 'irreparable economic hardship upon an 
employer', the strike would no longer be functional, and the employees who 
were dismissed for participating in the strike would not enjoy protection. 53 
13.3.2 The limits of functionality 
In the Blue Waters decision quoted above, the following passage appears: 
'The limits on the right to strike concern essential services or irreparable economic 
hardship upon an employer. The precise definition of such hardship need not be 
determined in order to decide this case. •54 
A process of limitation is taking place here, namely a process of limiting the zone 
within which the strike will be functional. If a strike falls outside the scope of the func-
tional zone (that is, the strike relates to essential serivces or it causes irreparable eco-
nomic hardship to an employer) the strike is dysfunctional. Functional strikes are those 
52 An example of the transcendental signification appears shortly before the passage quoted above: 'A 
lawful strike is by definition functional to collective bargaining.' Black Allied Workers Union & Others v 
Prestige Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters Hotel at 9711. Emphasis added. It is important to note that according 
to this process, nothing more need be said about the functionality of a legal strike, because it is 'by 
definition' functional. In other words, the functionality is the standard which determines the permis-
sibility (morality) of the strike. Because the legal strike complies with requirements of collective bargain-
ing (in other words, the normative paradigm of the system has been complied with), the legal strike, 
without any further investigation, is accorded the (approved) status of being 'functional'. 
53 
'. . . the limits on the right to strike concern essential services or irreparable economic hardship upon 
an employer. The precise definition of the extent of such hardship need not be determined in order to 
decide this case. That is because no evidence of any significance was presented by the respondent 
[employer] to establish economic hardship. The respondent appears to have suffered nothing more than 
some inconvenience on account of the strike.' Black Allied Workers Union & Others v Prestige Hotels 
CC tla Blue Waters Hotel (1993) 14 ILJ 963 (LAC) at 972I-973A. Emphasis added. 
54 At 972J-973A. Emphasis added. 
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strikes that are sanctioned by the system of collective bargaining (but only if the strike 
complies with the normative requirements of the system) and that do not transgress the 
limitations (essential services, economic harm) of the 'system' . 
This brief passage reveals the trace of dialecticity of the 'system': the system of collec-
tive bargaining not only justifies the strike (and thereby imparts a meaning, a sig-
nificance, to the strike}, but it also establishes the normative limitations on the strike 
(those areas in which a strike will fall foul of the normative sanction of the system, or 
where the strike moves beyond the legitmatory and significatory force of the 'system'). 
In other words, two motions to the process of signification take place here: the system 
(collective bargaining) provides the phenomenon (the strike) with its normative mean-
ing (why the strike is allowed, what role it plays}, and at the same time (and in the 
same motion) it determines the limits to the normative justification the system offers. 
In this dialectic process, the enigmatic system reveals ever more information about 
itself. The most important piece of information gleaned at this point is that the system 
(the transcendental signifier) has a limitation. Once beyond the limit, the system is 
incapable of providing normative protection (justification) to the phenomenon. The 
system, in other words, has a limit to its power (the sphere of normative influence of 
the system is therefore finite). 
In the brief passage setting out the limits to the normative justification for the strike, 
the nature, scope and location of the limits are left open. The text does not reveal 
where the limits lie: the limit are not defined. Yet these very limitations of the 'system' 
prove to be elusive: 
'My difficulty with "irreparable economic hardship" as a limitation on the right to 
strike is that it would in many cases be impossible to determine whether the stage of 
irreparable hardship had been reached at the time when dismissal of strikers is being 
considered. One would obviously not have to wait until irreparable economic hardship 
had already occurred before insisting upon the right to dismiss strikers if it were 
obvious that irreparable economic hardship would ensue if the strike were to continue. 
Is it fair to an employer to insist that the stage be reached where irreparable harm has or 
is about to occur before the employer is entitled to protect his interest for his own and 
his employees' benefit? I would prefer to hold that the likelihood of substantial eco-
nomic loss would entitle an employer to say: "I must protect my business by exercising 
my right to dismiss strikers". Whatever the true test may be, I am satisfied that on the 
material presented in this case the respondent [employer] had indeed reached a stage 
where it was suffering real economic hardship such as to entitle it to exercise the right 
of dismissal. •55 
This passage alludes to some important aspects and shifts taking place within the 
archive. It may be impossible to determine where the limit (called here 'irreparable 
55 National Union of Mineworkers v Black Mountain Mineral Development Co (Pty) Ltd (1994) 15 ILJ 
1005 (LAC) at 1011J-1012C. Emphasis added. 
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economic loss') lies, and once it has become impossible to determine where that limit 
lies, the limit cannot be applied. Because of its indeterminacy, the limit is fully rejected 
as irrelevant. The rejected limit is, however, replaced with a 'limit' that appears, on the 
face of the name it is given, to be less indeterminate: 'substantial economic loss'. There 
is a significant difference between 'irreparable economic harm' (the rejected limit of 
normative protection) and 'substantial economic loss' . The economic loss need not be 
'irreparable'; instead, the requirement is now simply that the economic loss must be 
'significant'. It is no longer required that there must be 'harm' to the employer, but 
only that the employer suffer 'loss'. Undoubtedly, it could be argued that any 'loss' 
also amounts to 'harm' , but an 'irreparable harm' (damage that cannot be repaired, 
permanent damage) is not the same as 'substantial economic loss'). 
This shift within the structure of the archive does not, however, render the limit less 
indeterminate, as the limit still finds no application. The limitation upon the construct 
of functionality is impliedly admitted to be indeterminate: 'whatever the true test may 
be .... ' Regardless of the 'true test', in other words, the text proceeds to excavate 
another limit on functionality, named, this time, 'real economic hardship'. Again, a 
subtle shift has taken place: the hardship suffered by the employer must be 'real'; 
presumably in the sense that it must be objectively determinable and not subjective. The 
employer, in other words, must be able to prove objective facts leading to a conclusion 
of 'economic hardship' . But here indeterminacy still reigns, for there is no indication of 
a normative paradigm which would structure a conclusion of 'economic hardship' . 
There is no indication of the 'true test' for economic hardship. The limit remains 
unfindable and unknowable. 
In view of the stated unreliance (and implicit admission of the indeterminacy) of the 
'true test', it appears that there is another normative structure which determines 
whether or not the strike is functional. In order to determine whether a strike has 
reached or transgressed the limits of functionality an unnamed or silent archive is 
operating: the 'true test' is rejected as being unfindable ('regardless of the true test') 
and therefore irrelevant, in favour of a normative structure that operates beyond the 
text. 
13.4 THE RETURN OF FAIRNESS (fairness dictates) 
It is necessary, at this point, to reconsider the position that the construct of 
functionality, itself relying on the concept of a 'system' of collective bargaining, 
occupies in the present discourse. 
Initially functionality served as a legitimation construct to enable the selection of an 
archive (namely the archive of equity -- the unfair labour practice jurisdiction) as 
against the archive of legality. This selection became problematic when there was a 
clear contravention of the archival rules of the archive of legality; in other words, when 
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the strike was illegal. Functionality proved to be sufficiently powerful, through its 
reliance on the 'system' of collective bargaining, to structure an obliteration of the 
archive of legality and thereby render the archive of legality inapplicable. Even where 
the strike was illegal, the force of the functionality construct was sufficient to 'trump' 
the application of the rules of the archive of legality. 
In structuring the construct of functionality, the 'system' of collective bargaining, as 
norm construct, played a pivotal part. It would be no exaggeration to say that, without 
its link to the 'system' of collective bargaining, functionality would not have displayed 
the same discursive force. In establishing the discursive force of the functionality con-
struct, then, it is important to bear in mind that this force depends not on the cogency 
of the concept itself, but on the force and legitimacy of the archival constructs on 
which it depends. 
There can be no doubt that the concept of a 'system' of collective bargaining, and the 
normative associations of this concept have played a fundamental role in the archive 
presently under examination. The force of the concept of a collective-bargaining system 
can be analysed in the following terms: 
• Collective bargaining is the basic normative (transcendental) signifier of the 
Labour Relations Act. This is a dominant discursive figuration: in many deci-
sions the Appellate Division (now the Supreme Court of Appeal) had held the 
entire 'philosophy' of the Act (in other words, the normative archival structures 
that underpin the entire Labour Relations Act) to be the concept of collective 
bargaining. 56 
• Collective bargaining, as such, still requires normative sanction. It is not an 
end, but a means to an end. The end, of course, is the maintenance of industrial 
peace. 57 In this manner, the collective bargaining 'system' derives its moral 
force (as well as its legitimation, and its signification) from the normatively 
charged construct of 'industrial peace' . 
• Industrial peace, axiomatically, is beneficial. The normative force of this 'good' 
is sufficient to render legitimate the 'system' and everything that the 'system' in 
56 
'The fundamental philosophy of the [Labour Relations] Act is that collective bargaining is the means 
preferred by the legislature for the maintenance of good labour relations and for the resolution of labour 
disputes.' National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd & Others (1996) 17 ILJ 455 
(A) at 475F. See also SA Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union v OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd (1995) 
16 ILJ 1031 (A). See also above, chapter 5. 
57 
'The primary object of the Act is to promote collective bargaining in order to foster industrial peace.' 
NUMSA v Vetsak (supra) at 475G. 
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turn legitimises. The concept of 'industrial peace' also acts as a transcendental 
signifier: it provides meaning (a purpose, in this case) to the 'system' of collec-
tive bargaining. 58 
As the dominant signifier in a dominant discourse, sanctioned by the highest institution 
in the system (the Appellate Division), the construct of collective bargaining, perforce, 
has to be seen as the most powerful concept in the archive. Once the strike is func-
tionally linked to so powerful an archival structure, and indeed becomes a determinant 
for that archival structure, even the concept of the strike, in spite of its negative con-
notations, becomes a concept with a powerful normative charge:59 
'The freedom to strike is integral to the system of collective bargaining -- the withhold-
ing of their labour is a legitimate weapon available to workers seeking to achieve 
rational demands through lawful means. If workers were not free to strike, their 
bargaining power would lack substance and credibility. It follows that care should be 
taken not to disparage or undermine the freedom to strike lawfully. '60 
This passage illustrates the link between the strike and the 'system' of collective 
bargaining. Firstly, the strike is 'integral' to that 'system' .61It is not clear what this 
means: does it mean that the strike is a part of the system, or does it mean that the 
strike is a determinant of the system (in other words, that the strike determines the 
efficiency of the system). In view of the fact that the 'substance and credibility' of 
'bargaining power' depends on the strike, it is clear that the strike is not to be regarded 
as a part of the system, but rather as a determinant of the efficiency of the system. 
Without the strike, the system would not work. The system's efficacy and functioning 
is determined by the strike. 
58 By implication, therefore, collective bargaining that does not serve the maintenance of 'industrial 
peace' would not be normatively sanctioned. This is why bargaining in bad faith, which is still a form of 
bargaining, but one which does not seek the maintenance of industrial peace, has received the full force 
of normative disqualification. This form of bargaining is not 'genuine' -- se above, note 47. All courts 
(the Industrial Court, the Labour Appeal Court and the Appellate Division) have expressed the normative 
disqualification of bargaining in bad faith, also through the application of and reliance on the unfair 
labour practice construct. 
59 The normative charge of the strike is indicated by, for example, the term 'legitimate weapon' - even 
though a weapon, its use is seen as 'legitimate'. The strike also deserves protection and it should not be 
undermined or disparaged. Once infused with the normative sanction of the system, in other words, the 
strike is rendered normatively unobjectionable, and, further, normatively unassailable (it should not be 
disparaged or undermined). 
60 NUMSA v Vetsak (supra) at 4750-H. Emphasis added. 
61 There is still no indication, in this passage, as to what is meant by the 'system' of collective bargain-
ing. 
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Secondly, the strike, as determinant of the system's efficiency, deserves protection: like 
the dominant concept of the collective bargaining 'system' itself, the strike deserves 
protection, and should not be undermined. The strike partakes in the protection given to 
the dominant signifier (collective bargaining). As a function of the system, the com-
ponent of the system is treated as privileged as well. 
Striking in the passage quoted above is, however, the subtle return of the archive of 
legality. The strike is a weapon for the achievement of aims 'through lawful means'. 
The freedom to strike 'lawfully' should not be undermined. Does this mean that an 
illegal strike would not be functional to collective bargaining in the same way? Is only 
the legal strike functional to the 'system' of collective bargaining, and therefore deserv-
ing of protection? If the functionality construct has its origins, as outlined above, in the 
context of the illegal strike and the protection of the illegal strike, then it appears that 
an important shift has taken place: only the lawful (legal) strike is conducive to collec-
tive bargaining. 
This re-appearance of the archive of legality is prevalent in another expression of the 
archival principles, and here again appear traces or indications of the relationship 
between the archive of equity and the archive of legality: 
'The fact that a worker is engaged upon a lawful strike does not per se render any con-
sequent dismissal unfair. Within the context of lawful strike action an infinite varity of 
situations can arise, and one must needs have regard to the relevant circumstances of 
each particular case in order ultimately to determine whether any resultant dismissal 
was fair or not. [reference omitted] 
Fairness comprehends that regard must be had not only to the position and interests of 
the worker, but also those of the employer, in order to make a balanced and equitable 
assessment. In judging fairness a court applies a moral or value judgment to estab-
lished facts and circumstances. . . . And in doing so it must have due and proper 
regard to the objectives sought to be achieved by the Act. In my view it would be 
unwise and undesirable to lay down, any universally applicable test for deciding what is 
fair. To revert to the facts. •62 
This passage is rich with a number of traces. Four nodes of textual logic must be 
excavated here with due care. 
The first node of the textual logic relates to the archive of legality. Again, the archive 
of legality plays a subordinate role, as the text makes it clear that compliance with the 
normative rules of the archive of legality does not pre-determine the outcome of an 
evaluation in terms of the archive of fairness. Legality, in other words, does not 
determine fairness: fairness must be judged in its own terms. What is striking about this 
first point is the fact that the construct of functionality seems to have disappeared 
62 Per Smallberger JA in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd & Others 
(1996) 17 ILJ 455 (A) at 476B-E. Emphasis added. 
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entirely. It should be borne in mind that a 'lawful' strike has been held 'by definition' 
to be functional to collective bargaining. 63 The implication now is that dismissals con-
sequent upon a functional strike may also be fair. The archive of fairness, it appears, is 
no longer determined by functionality: regardless of the functionality of the strike, a 
dismissal has to be evaluated in terms of the normative paradigm of the archive of 
equity. In evaluating the strike against the normative paradigm of the archive of equity, 
naturally, due regard must be had to the facts (one has to 'revert' to the facts). 
The second node of textual logic relates to the nature of fairness. In this, the text relies 
on the following statement: 'Fairness is a broad concept in any context . ... It means 
that the dismissal must be justified according to the requirements of equity when all the 
relevants features of the case -- including the action with which the employee is 
charged -- are considered. '64 It is in this sense, then, that the text (the passage from 
NUMSA v Vetsak quoted above) claims that fairness includes the consideration of the 
interests of both the employer and the employee 'in order to make a balanced and equi-
table assessment'. The implications of this second node of logic are significant: fairness 
is a broad concept, a concept virtually without meaning. The broadness (or contentless-
ness) of the concept of 'fairness' (the name of an archive) is not context-dependent: 
regardless of the context, fairness remains broad and vague. Yet the meaning ('it means 
... ') is a deductive process: once a dismissal is justified (the conclusion of the argu-
ment) according to the 'requirements of equity' (premiss of the argument). If a dis-
missal complies with the 'requirements of equity', in other words, the dismissal will be 
justified (and necessarily, according to the logic of the text, fair). The construct 
'requirements of equity' implies that the pivotal concept of 'equity' has its own norma-
tive paradigm or set of norms: before something can be regarded as being 'equitable' 
(and therefore justified and therefore fair), there are 'requirements' that have to be met. 
Yet these 'requirements' are ex-nominated: they are not (and can not) be named. The 
most that can be said about 'the requirements of equity' is that all relevant 'features' of 
the case (the facts of the case) are considered? This is the operation of a fully ex-
nominated archive: once the facts of the case are considered, these facts must be 
measured against the normative rules (the paradigm) or the 'requirements' of 'equity'. 
Apart from considering the facts of the case, then, there is no indication of the contents 
of this normative paradigm of equity: it is totally hidden behind its own rhetoric, the 
logic of which assumes that the common understanding of 'equity' (the archive) is suf-
ficiently well developed that an expression of the 'requirements' (or the normative 
paradigm) of that archive will appear to the observer upon an evaluation of the facts. 
63 
'A lawful strike is by definition functional to collective bargaining.' Per Combrinck J in Black Allied 
Workers Union & Others v Prestige Hotels CC tla Blue Waters Hotel at 9711. 
64 E Cameron, H Cheadle & C Thompson The New Labour Relations Act (1989) at 144-5. Emphasis 
added. 
225 
The industrial action jurisprudence of South African Courts 
The third node of the discursive logic apparent from the extract from NUMSA v Vetsak 
as quoted above is vital for present purposes, as it appears to render the archive of 
equity (fairness) finally beyond the grasp of any epistemology. The text states clearly 
and unequivocally that a determination of fairness rests upon a 'moral judgment'. 65 The 
most important implication of this node is an implication relevant to juridification, 
namely the introduction of a meta-juridical paradigm. The argument of the text is that a 
determination of whether or not an action amounts to an unfair labour practice is 
dependent upon a 'moral' or 'value' judgment. This is clearly the introduction of a 
meta-juridical standard, the application of which rests on a moral paradigm, a value 
judgment, the structure of which is both unknowable and unfindable. By definition, the 
'moral' or 'value' judgment is dependent and structured upon a normative paradigm 
which is either only partly based on legal considerations, or not at all. Here the concept 
of 'fairness' is denuded of its cognitive value, as it is rendered structurally dependent 
on that which lies outside the law, namely morality or values. 
This is immediately qualified by the fourth node of the textual logic contained in the 
extract from NUMSA v Vetsak, namely a structuring of the meta-juridical with the 
juridical. The text makes it clear that, in making the moral or value judgment, due and 
proper regard must be had to the objectives sought to be achieved by the Labour Rela-
tions Act. The normative paradigm is, in other words, at least partly structured by a 
legal consideration, namely the 'objectives' of the Act. It is, however, clear from the 
text that the objectives of the Act are not the only consideration relevant to making the 
'moral' judgment: these objectives need to be given due and proper regard, but there is 
no indication that they are exclusive and decisive considerations. 
It is clear from the archive itself that the standard 'interpretation' of the 'objectives' or 
'philosophy' of the Act is the promotion of collective bargaining, itself a means to the 
end of the maintenance of industrial peace. And in this manner, the construct of 
functionality comes into play, in a most contradictory manner. The contradiction can be 
highlighted in the following manner: In deciding whether or not a dismissal for striking 
is fair, the tribunal makes a moral judgment. This moral judgment is structured (at least 
in part) by the objectives of the Act. The objectives of the Act are to maintain indus-
trial peace by means of collective bargaining. Conflated, this yields the following: the 
moral judgment depends on whether there has been compliance with the normative 
paradigm entailed in the 'collective bargaining system' . This in turn yields a statement 
that comes as no suprise: a finding of an unfair dismissal depends on whether there has 
been collective bargaining -- a restatement of the construct of functionality. 
65 
'In finding an unfair labour practice the tribunal concerned is expressing a moral or value judgment as 
to what is fair in all the circumstances.' Per Nienaber JA in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Vet-
sak Co-operative Ltd & Others at 459E-F. 
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Now it has also been held that a lawful strike is 'by definition' functional to collective 
bargaining. In terms of the normative force of the 'collective bargaining system' , it 
would appear that any dismissal consequent upon a functional strike would amount to 
an unfair labour practice. Yet (and here the contradiction arises), this very passage 
from NUMSA v Vetsak begins (the first node) by denying that very conclusion: the fact 
that a strike is lawful (and by definition functional) does not itself render the dismissal 
unfair. In other words, a fair dismissal can follow even upon a functional (legal) strike. 
Does this mean that the construct of functionality has lost its force? Can it be argued at 
this point, that functionality has lost its power to provide meaning for the strike and for 
the subsequent dismissal consequent upon that strike? If a functional strike can also 
give rise to a fair dismissal, it would appear that the reliance of the archive upon the 
construct of functionality has diminished, if not disappeared altogether. 
But this shift in the normative structure of the archive has its own textual economy, 
namely a return to unknowability: the text refuses to establish its own operations as a 
normative paradigm, by stating that '. . . it would be unwise and undesirable to lay 
down any universally applicable test for deciding what is fair'. Here is a return, then, 
to the meta-juridical, as the text refuses to become determinist about its own operations 
and refuses to elevate those operations into a normative paradigm, thereby in tum strip-
ping the text of its iterability on this point. 
The upshot of the reading of this text, at this point, is that a determination of fairness 
and a resultant application of the archive of equity is dependent not upon any legal 
principle, but upon an ex-nominated meta-juridical paradigm that cannot be laid down, 
that cannot be named, that cannot be iterated and applied in subsequent texts. The logic 
of the text breaks down to an extent sufficient to argue that the application of the 
archive of fairness has, at this point in the act of reading, become a-rational (if the 
'moral' or 'value' is regarded here as being irrational as distinguished from rational 
normativity). 
The irrationality of the paradigm which structures the application of the archive of 
equity and the normative paradigm of that archive does not, however, entail non-
reliance on that paradigm. In National Union of Mineworkers v Black Mountain 
Mineral Development Company (Pty) Ltd,66 one single sentence confirms an utter 
reliance upon this irrational normative system: 'A stage is reached when fairness dic-
tates that dismissal is justifiable' . 67 The essence of the reliance is contained in the verb 
'to dictate' . If fairness can 'dictate' it would mean that 'fairness' has a set of prescrip-
tions, a normative structure that could be relied upon, structures that could be read (or 
66 Case 705/94, as yet unreported. Decision by the Appellate Division, as it then was (per Scott JA). 
Date of decision: 25 March 1997. 
67 At 30 of the typewritten judgment. Emphasis added. 
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accessed in some manner) and applied (these structures, the normative paradigm of the 
archive of equity, would be iterable). 
A final blow is dealt to the once-powerful construct of functionality: 
'The inquiry is not whether one or other course may have been more successful in 
resolving the dispute or whether the employer could have endured the strike for longer; 
the inquiry is whether in all the circumstances (including, for example, the duration of 
the strike and the extent of the measures actually taken by the parties to resolve the dis-
pute) the dismissal can be said to have been unfair. '68 
This may appear, on the face of it, to be a re-affirmation of the functionality-construct 
and its role in the determination of the fairness of the dismissal. If it is borne in mind 
that 'economic harm' or 'real economic loss' is the limitation of the functionality con-
struct, then it is clear that by rejecting the inquiry 'whether the employer could have 
endured the strike for longer', both the limit of the functionality construct and the con-
struct itself suffers rejection. 
Instead of the functionality construct, there is a return to the irrational (unreadable, 
unknowable) normative paradigm that hides behind the names 'fairness' or 'equity': the 
question is whether 'in all the circumstances' the dismissal gives the impression (for 
fairness dictates) that the dismissal was unfair. In spite of its irrationality and the fact 
that the normative paradigm which would yield a conclusion of 'fair dismissal' or 
'unfair dismissal' cannot be written or uttered, the sense of reliance upon that 
irrationality is undiminished. 
13.5 WITHIN THE SILENCE (JURIDIFICATION) 
This extended excavation of a series of texts has yielded a number of strange results: 
the continued clash between the archive of legality and the archive of equity (the most 
important consideration here being the normative paradigm or set of rules which 
determines which archive is to apply), the manner in which the archive of legality per-
sists in contaminating the archive of equity by refusing to relinquish its role in the 
determination of fairness, thereby ensuring its own (subordinate) place within the 
normative paradigm of the archive of equity. The result of the clashes of the archives 
can rightly be called an artefact, a creation marked by its artificiality. In the final anal-
ysis, the selection of the archive is determined not by recourse to any iterable norma-
tive paradigm, but that determination is, instead, dependent upon recourse to a 
paradigm that, even though irrational, ('moral' or 'value judgment') retains its role as a 
structuring normative paradigm. It is a paradigm that persists in 'dictating' decisions, 
choices and applications of principle. 
68 NUM v Black Mountain (supra) at 30-31 of the judgment. Emphasis added. 
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Should one be called upon to name the artefact, it would not be inappropriate to call it 
the 'right to strike.' From the earliest text within the archive excavated here (and 
appearing in many of the extracts contained in this act of reading), it has been a theme 
of the archive that there is a freedom/right to strike. This freedom/right was contructed 
in the absence of any statutory or constitutional basis for claiming it to be either a free-
dom or a right. But the legitimising and significatory forces of the various constructions 
in the archive, most notably the functionality construct, was of sufficient force to 
enable the expression of 'freedom' or 'right'. 
Yet a broader economy of silence remains, the silence encapsulated by the 'unfair 
labour practice' and its essential lack of content and structure. It is only within the 
space created by this silence that the meta-juridical (and, eventually, irrational) could 
be developed into a normative paradigm for determining how the archive is to respond 
to the phenomenon of the strike. From the void emerges the irrational, that unknowable 
and unfindable normative paradigm that dictates what is fair or unfair. 
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ENDGAME 
(COUNTING THE SPACES) 
MOMENTS OF SILENCE 
' "You're thinking about something, my dear, and that makes you forget to talk. I can't 
tell you just now what the moral of that is, but I shall remember it in a bit." 
"Perhaps it hasn't one," Alice ventured to remark. 
"Tut, tut, child!" said the Duchess. "Everything's got a moral, if only you can find 
it. II I 
-- Lewis Carroll Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (1865) (Everyman's Library Edition 
1992) 107-8 
[THIS IS . . . (Discourse of Order Series 2 Part 8 
The machine does not count the words . . . it counts the spaces between the words. 
With what expectation does this text approach its own end or ending? What does the 
archive of the convention within which this text is presented (if any) demand: a closure 
of the text, a final interpretation, a summary, rendering the reading (ex post facto) that 
has taken place redundant? 
For if the end of the text is to be a 'conclusion', would it not present an interpretation 
of the reading, would it not present a reading of itself, a reading that would, by its very 
position (at the end of the text) obtain the force of the closure of the meaning the text 
has disseminated throughout? Can the conclusion, the end of the text, also be the final 
closure of the text, or is it merely a mark, a point (an arbitrary point) that marks the 
end of an act of reading, and which marks, at the same time, the beginning of another, 
the reading of the reading, the interpretation of the reading (a making-sense of that 
which has been read). This cannot be the end of the text, but it is a play between the 
text that has been read, the reading of the reading (the 'interpretation' of the reading), 
the reading of the texts within which this text finds itself (the context, the contra-text) 
and the texts which begin after the last word of this text, after the completion of this act 
of reading. 
Because this text has been, throughout, a play between the readings of the 'other' text 
(the text that is not there) and the text (that IS there) this is the end-game, which is also 
the beginning of the game: the beginning of the reading -- from this point on, the read-
ing of the text (this text, that text, those texts oracularly presented in quotes, in 
parables ... ) 
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Additionally, the expectation is that there must be moral: there must be a point to these 
thousands of words. This is the expectation with which the end(game) is approached: 
deliver the moral -- provide the act of patient reading with a transcendental signifier 
which renders whole and coherent these many thousands of words.] 
This has been a study of silences; throughout this text, a writing about reading (reading 
written), the operations of silence have appeared. 
In order to make sense of the argument, it is convenient to re-visit some of the 
moments of silence that have appeared in the process of reading. 
As a metaphysics or grand narrative of the law, juridification (as presented in terms of 
its own discourse, its own series of texts and within its own context) relies on a process 
of active silencing, the silencing of the law into a document of juridification (the legal 
text as 'proof' of juridification'). In order to escape this silencing, this violence upon 
the law-as-text, it is necessary to obliterate the procedures of juridification in order to 
restore the law-as-text as a 'monument', as signification in-itself and for-itself. This 
manner of reading (itself reliant upon a silencing of the procedures contained in the 
canonical texts of juridification) or 'excavation' would resort to a non-allegorical read-
ing of the law-as-text. A diachronic analysis of the archive (a series of discourses) 
would not be an excavation, but, more ambitiously, an archaeology of the archive of 
the law-as-text. Within the canon of the texts of juridification, the key movement or 
gesture is the shift from the legal 'norm' (in terms of a conception of normative closure 
of the legal system) towards the meta-juridical, that which lies outside the law. It is 
here that the stated normative closure of the legal system experiences a crisis, and it is 
here that juridification unfolds its full force. 
As this text is characterised by a comparative approach, it was necessary to consider the 
canonical methodology of the comparative method. Yet again, the programme of the 
canonical comparative texts is silent at those essential points within its own programme, 
leaving indeterminate and indeterminable the 'context' which the programme of com-
parative methodology insists; simultaneously, the programme of comparative labour 
law dismisses its own textuality, claiming that language is a burden, an 'instrument' 
that stands between a reality and the understanding of that reality. But an analysis of 
the canonical texts indicates that, instead of accessing the 'reality' that is purportedly 
'outside' the text, the rhetoric of those canonical texts folds in upon itself to reaffirm its 
own textual nature and own textuality, from whence it cannot escape. 
An excavation of the canon of comparative labour law does not entail that the 
programme must be dismissed out of hand, but that the silences within the programme 
must be filled, and, for this purpose, the presentation of the 'context' is limited to 
identifying the dominant discourses within the archive 'labour law' in the three 
countries under consideration, as well as the institution-as-function within those 
countries. For it is only within the context (contratext) of the dominant discourses in 
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the archives, that the act of reading proceeds, it cannot (unless it were to be 
incomprehensible) be satisfied with a mere presentation of the reading without an 
indication of the context (contratext) within which that reading takes place. 
Because the ultimate aim of the text is a reading of three archival discourses (the 
' industrial action jurisprudence'), that reading must disclose the context within which it 
takes place -- this does not imply a mere blind acceptance of the context (that would be 
a silencing, a closure), but a recognition of the problematic nature of the context which 
is being presented. 
The context presented in this study, then, is limited to presenting the relevant 
institutions-as-function (the labour courts or civil courts) as well as the dominant dis-
courses within which those institutions-as-function operate. This, then, is why it is 
necessary to present some information on the German court system (the 'agent' of the 
archive) and the dominant discourse (Tarifautonomie) within which that agent operates; 
the same considerations apply to Great Britain and South Africa -- in the latter case, it 
is necessary to have some understanding of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court as 
well as the dominant discourse of fairness within which that institution exercised its 
function. This must not be seen as being unproblematical, for the archaeologies pre-
sented later problematise those very dominant discourses: while collective laizzes faire 
is the dominant discourse in British labour law, the manner in which the British courts 
have reacted to the phenomenon of the strike indicates the problematic nature of that 
dominant discourse, and the threat under which that dominant discourse finds itself. 
In returning the gaze to the institution-as-function, the concept of the 'labour judiciary' 
appears, for it is these institutions-as-function that perform the role of agents in the 
excavations which form the second part of this text. 
Yet again, silence soon proves to be pervasive as an examination of what is normally 
understood under 'the labour judiciary' indicates that, firstly, the origins of these 
institutions-as-function do not fit into any rigidly historical determinist scheme -- these 
institutions-as-function may, according to the literature, be the response to certain 
needs, but the nature of these needs remains indeterminate and indeterminable. The his-
torical factors which appear to have given rise to these institutions, at least in some 
cases, appear to be determined by chance: the Napoleonic conquest of the west bank of 
the Rhine; the munitions requirements of the First World War. ... 
It is furthermore, in this respect, to no avail to attempt a distinction between the labour 
judiciary and the 'ordinary' judiciary (the 'ordinary' civil courts), because the concept 
of 'court' (which is also the genus of the labour judiciary) soon proves to be as 
indeterminable as the origin of the labour judiciary. In having to determine whether or 
not an institution-as-function is a 'court' or not, the law turns silent, and structures its 
response to the question in terms of an 'impression', the evaluation of facts -- there 
being no general test to determine, in terms of a positive discourse, what is a 'court' 
and what is not a 'court'. In this pivotal aspect too, then, the discourse of the law is 
rendered silent by the task and the challenge with which it is confronted. 
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How is the 'law', the 'legal system', or the discourse of the law to respond to the 
phenomenon of industrial action? It is clear that, at least initially, there is a distinct 
antipathy towards the strike (a theme that appears again and again in the course of the 
readings in the second part of this text) -- that there is a relationship of versus, of the 
law 'against' the strike. It is only once the law can obliterate or silence this antipathy 
that the law can accommodate the phenomenon of industrial action and, in doing so, 
establish a normative image of itself: because the law accommodates the strike, the law 
is 'democratic' -- the accommodation of the strike is seen as the distinguishing feature 
of a 'democratic' legal system. 
In shifting the antipathy of the law towards an accommodation (which is more than a 
sympathy) industrial action has to rely on certain discursive narratives (stories) -- tales 
that must be told to the law as industrial action stands before the law, and seeks the 
accommodation (and resultant protection offered by the law). 
The second part of this study is devoted to an excavation of texts: it is, in a sense, 
therefore, a reading of the telling of tales by industrial action in order for the law to 
accommodate and accept industrial action. The second part of this test is a reading, a 
close and forensic reading of the canonical texts within a 'jurisprudence' -- the pivotal 
and archival texts within a sequential series of texts, a discourse. 
These readings yield again the operation of a number of silences: generally, it can be 
said (at the risk of closing the reading of those readings) that, at the pivotal point in the 
'jurisprudence' a silencing takes place, as the institution-as-function, in accommodating 
industrial action within its own archive, has to displace and silence various other 
archives and normative paradigms. The silence is at the heart of the breach within the 
archive: as the archive shifts and strains to accommodate a phenomenon (that appeared, 
initially, to be 'repugnant' to the law, as a British court stated as late as 1980) -- it is 
indeed the silence that makes possible the very breaches of the archive. Predicated as it 
is upon its own coherence and integrity, the archive is incapable of structuring a full 
breach with itself -- it is only possible to breach the archive, to change the rules and to 
introduce a new normative paradigm within the frame of silence which stands at the 
heart of the process: German law could respond to the phenomenon of industrial action 
only by silencing an extended archive of illegality, of breach of contract. South African 
law, relying on an indeterminate concept of 'fairness' in terms of a statutory empower-
ment (and this aspect of power should not be disregarded) was in a position to silence 
the operation of an archive of legality and structure an archive of equity with a norma-
tive paradigm sufficiently powerful to obliterate or silence the archive of legality. Time 
and again, the British courts obliterate the policy of legislation (through processes of 
reading, of interpretation) to accord with their own vision of what form the accom-
modation of industrial action in the law should take: for British law there has never 
been an archival structure sufficiently powerful enough to obliterate the power-effect of 
the common law (the strike as a breach of contract). But in the creation of various torts 
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the British courts in part obliterate not only the archive of the common law (precedent) 
but also the policy considerations which motivated legislation. Also apparent from the 
jurisprudence of the British courts is the reaction against power: power exercised by a 
limited number of people, or collective power exercised by a large number of people. 
In accommodating the exercise of power within the structures of the archive, the law 
itself expresses its own concern for its own powers -- the respect for the law, the con-
tinued public confidence in the judiciary. 
Silences also stand at the nodes of shifts taking place within the archival discourses: as 
the discourse of the law (as it responds to the strike) shifts and changes, there are again 
silences that make possible those breaches within the archive itself. Silence therefore 
enables not only the obliteration of an anti-strike archive (the archive of legality, the 
archive of the common law), but also the shifts within the discursive logic of the 
archive itself: as the legitimation of industrial action shifted from proportionality, for 
example, it became predicated upon a contentless concept of Tarifautonomie, a concept 
which the archive from which it is taken (like the other indeterminate nominations that 
appear) is not in a position to define. 
This links to another concern, namely the limit, the margin, and the silence which lies 
beyond that limit. The concept of Tarifautonomie has no apparent limits, it is flexible 
in the extreme (a consequence of the concept's indeterminacy) -- it can serve as the 
ground of legitimation for any number of various forms of strikes and lock-outs, and, 
by implication, any potential number of shifts within the archive. So, too, the concept 
of functionality, similarly a transcendental signifier, attempts to posit limits, margins, 
borders, only to have the archive respond to that attempt by retreating into an 
irrationality of morality, of value-judging .... 
(Is this the moral of the story?) 
These, then, have been the discourses of silence, the archives that, instead of relying on 
a positive rationality (that which is, axiomatically, there), has to rely upon a silence to 
breach that rationality, to make possible a displacement of that rationality, to enable a 
shift, a change . . . . This is the result of the reading, a reading not of the metaphysics 
that render the law-as-text an allegory of another, but, instead, an archaeology, a series 
of excavations of texts, focusing (not exclusively) on the judicial responses to industrial 
action. In a nutshell (is this the moral of the story?): an archaeological reading of the 
archives (judicial responses to industrial action) yields not a positive result, but can 
trace only the trace (the ptesenrte of an absence, a silence) ... the trails of the power-
ful silences that determine the archives, their shifts, changes, permutations. 
As a process, juridification depends on the silence, on the absences, on the nothingness 
within the archive: it is only once the positive rationality of the legal archive has been 
shattered that the meta-juridical can, through that silence, and through the force of the 
ex-nomination, be imported into the discourse of the law-as-text. It is only once the 
normative paradigms contained within the archive of the law-as-text has been 
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obliterated through an un-naming that the meta-juridical can inform the shift in the 
archive, the change in the archive. Juridification, then, is an importation of the meta-
juridical into the positive rationality of the law-as-text, from which point on the archive 
closes (with varying degrees of success) around the newly-imported normativity and 
makes it part of the archive: the principle becomes the law. 
For the purposes of this process, the most important aspect is the un-naming, the 
silencing of the archive or parts of the archive that would not allow that importation: 
the obliteration through un-naming of that which is there in order to make possible the 
introduction of that which is, endlessly, beyond the law-as-text, but, by being 
processed through the juridification process, becomes of the law: the meta-juridical 
structures the archive, lends the archive its force, its power, its flexibility. 
Within the rational archive of the law, juridification represents the introduction, ironi-
cally, of that which lies, forever, 'beyond' the text -- juridification, using the powerful 
instrument of ex-nomination and predicated upon the availability of a discursive space 
(a structural silence within the archive), imports into the rationality of the law the meta-
juridical ... that which makes good industrial relations sense, which is proportional, 
that which is subjective (the exercise of power), the morality, the value .... It is by 
means of the ex-nominations, the unwritings, the obliterations and the silencing of the 
discourse of the law that juridification unfolds its full force, as it breaches the rational 
normative closure of the law, to enable the importation of the irrational. 
Juridification is the confluence of these forces: the silencing, the obliterations, the un-
namings of things, the creation of the space (like the spaces between the[se] words) --
spaces into which meaning can seep and through which signification, in endless chains, 
can reach -- a silencing which makes possible the breach of normative closure of the 
law, the contamination of the discursive rationality with that which cannot be, and 
which does not let itself be 'read' (because it is forever silent, it is endlessly 'beyond'). 
But this is more than a problem of perception, more than a mere inability to read, 
because this is the silence at the heart of the discourse, that not only refuses to be 
'read', but, invariably beyond the rationality, refuses to be written (es laftt sich nict 
schreiben). 
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[Discourse of Order Series 2 Part 9 
This, then, is the 'end' of the actual text: everything that appears after this point is not 
of the text; prompted by the institutional frame within which this text is offered, it is, 
to a greater or lesser degree, posttext.] 
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